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ABSTRACT

AN UNDISTORTED PICTURE:
BROADCASTING, JOURNALISM AND THE STATE, 192 0-1941
MAY 1994
THOMAS W. ASHWELL, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
M.A.
Ph.

,

D.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Gerald

W.

McFarland

This dissertation investigates the development of

radio news broadcasting in the years between the First and

Second World Wars. Historians have long acknowledged that
radio's coverage of the outbreak of the Second World War in
Europe marked the beginning of modern broadcast journalism.
Too little attention has been paid to why the news

broadcasts Americans listened to in ever greater numbers as
war approached took the shape they did. This study attempts
to place broadcast journalism in context by examining the

evolution of radio news and information programs as one
part of the rapid development of a new industry and its

evolving regulatory framework.
Radio broadcasting emerged following the First World
War.

The potential of the new technology quickly became

the
obvious, and both producers and consumers turned to

government to bring stability and order to the new
industry.

Private broadcasters were licensed to use the

iv

people's air in exchange for their pledge to serve an ill-

defined "public interest" standard. The "American System of
Broadcasting" which developed between the wars was the
result of this bargain.

A new kind of journalism was created for the new
medium. Responding to various commercial, regulatory,

professional and bureaucratic imperatives

,

the industry

sought to protect itself by repeatedly proclaiming its

commitment to fairness

,

balance

,

accuracy and impart ial ity

Yet the immediacy and emotional intimacy of radio as

v/ell

as the many crises of the period made "obj ect ivity" an

elusive goal

.

Broadcast

j

ournal ists

,

industry execut ives

elected officials and the public constantly debated the
meaning of the word and sought to insure that the

broadcasts they produced or heard were compatible with
their diverse visions of society.
By examining the development of broadcast journalism

within the context of both the radio industry and the
times,

this dissertation studies the growth of a

profession, an industry and the conflict among competing

public and private interests for control of a new

technology and, more importantly, the flow of information
in a liberal,

capitalist society. The conflict was part of

the broader debate over the proper role of government and

corporations in modern society which took place during the
interwar years.

V
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INTRODUCTION
"THE FIRST NEW FORM OF JOURNALISM IN GENERATIONS " ^

In 1938, as the nation groped for lost prosperity and
the world stumbled toward war,

millions of Americans sought

answers to their questions on the radio. Radio in the 1930s

both reported and made the news. The still new invention

played a critical role in shaping public opinion and public
policy, bringing events and issues into American homes with

unparalleled immediacy and intimacy. Broadcasters who
reported events and presented issues were as amazed as
their audience with the magic of radio as they sought the

best way to take advantage of its powers

.

At the same

t

ime

the future of the medium was being shaped by a continuing

debate among corporations, consumers and the federal

government over the role the radio should play in American
society.
In September of 1973,
a thirty-part

the CBS Radio Network broadcast

documentary recounting memorable news

broadcasts. The occasion was the thirty-fifth anniversary
of the Munich crisis,

an event which foreshadowed the

Second World War and also marked the dawn of a new
journalistic age. CBS commentator Eric Sevareid told the
Eric Sevareid, CBS network, September 23, 1973, text
reprinted as liner notes for an album of excerpts from the
series. An Ear to the Sounds of Our History, Columbia
Special Products P12345, 1974.
1

1

audience that 1538 "was the beginning, not of news itself

by radio, but of systematic, structured journalism in
sound,

staffed by a new kind of

j

ournal ist

The chroniclers of broadcasting agree with his

assessment.^ Erik Barnouw, radio's most prominent
historian, asserted that prior to the middle of the decade,
"with rare except ions

...

there was a blackout on current

problems" on the air.^ Edward Bliss, who like Barnouw

worked for many years in network radio before becoming an
historian of the industry, acknowledged that radio began
covering news events in the 192 0s but agreed that what is
today recognized as broadcast journalism began when "the
2

Sevareid, CBS network, September 23

,

1973

The standard history of American broadcasting is
Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcast ing in the United
States, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966,
1968, 1970). Among the most insightful contemporary
accounts is Francis Chase, Jr., Sound and Fury: An Informal
History of Broadcasting (New York: Harper, 1942) The most
comprehensive chronicle of broadcast news is Edward Bl iss
Jr., Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism (New
David Holbrook
York: Columbia University Press, 1991)
Culbert, News for Everyman: Radio and Foreign Affairs in
Thirties America (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976)
Irving E. Fang, Those Radio Comm.entators ! (Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1977) and David H. Hosley, As Good as
Any: Foreign Correspondence on American Radio, 1930-1940
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1984) focus on the
period under discussion. See also Jeffrey Ian Cole, "Born
to the New Art: CBS Correspondents and the Emergence of
Broadcast News, 1930-1941" (Ph.D. diss.. University of
California, Los Angeles, 1985) and Murray Katzman, "News
Broadcasting in the United States: 1920-1941" (Ph.D. diss.,
New York University, 1968). Much of the most interest mg
work on broadcast journalism rushes past radio to
concentrate on the television era.
^

.

.

4

Barnouw, History of Broadcasting, vol.

Web (1968)

,

17.

2

2,

The Golden

networks established their news organizations in the
1930s. "5 David Culbert observed that broadcast journalism

only began to mature "after the Munich crisis in September
1938

[when]

events abroad seemed so ominous that listeners

began depending on radio as a major source of news."^
Historians seeking a first example of this new form of

journalism have even designated a date: March

13,

1938. As

German troops marched in the streets of Vienna, CBS aired
its first "World News Roundup." Featuring live short-wave

pickups from across Europe and North America, the program

redefined broadcast news and, as Columbia

'

s

news director

at the time would recall with an ironic metaphor, marked

the moment "Frankenstein created the monster.""^ The first

"World News Roundup" is replicated each day on radio and

television stations across the country and around the world
as reports from correspondents are linked by an announcer

and presented as a seamless whole. As historian Donald

Godfrey observed many years later, the broadcast "clearly
illustrates the impact CBS Radio News had in establishing a

Bliss, Now the News, ix. Bliss was a news writer and
editor for CBS. Barnouw was assistant script manager for
radio plays at NBC.
5

Culbert, News for Everyman, 14; see also Robert
Smith, "The Origins of Radio Network News Commentary,"
Journal of Broadcasting 9 (Spring 1965), 113-22.
^

R.

Paul W. White, News on the Air (New York: Harcourt,
45.
Brace, 1947)
7

,

format that is still widely used in both radio and

television news.

"®

Today's flood of electronic journalism, the lifeblood
of the information age, began on the radio, and radio news

did undergo a radical change as the Second World War
approached. Broadcasters began to think of themselves for
the first time as professional journalists, committed to

factual

,

analytical reporting of current events

.

Suddenly,

radio was understood to be much more than a medium devoted
to popular entertainment and advertising messages. As

Europe tumbled into war, radio became a respected and
influential news source as well

.

While chroniclers of

broadcasting regularly celebrate this transformation, they
fail to explain satisfactorily why it took place.

Looking back, the confluence of extraordinarily

talented individuals, world- shatter ing events, commercial
imperatives, new technology and growing audience demand for

information at a single point in time makes the development
of broadcast news in the years before the Second World War

appear either miraculously preordained or an astonishing
coincidence. Neither explanation is satisfying.
Those who were present at the creation later found it

difficult to explain what happened. The towering figure of

Columbia's Edward

R.

Murrow casts an impressive shadow, but

Donald G Godfrey, "CBS World News Roundup: Setting
American Journalisn:
the Stage for the Next Half Century,"
8

(Summer 1990)

,

164

4

^

can we believe a biographer's assertion that Murrow
"essentially fathered" broadcast journalism?^ William
Paley,

the president of CBS and Murrow'

the war as deus ex machina.

autobiography,

s

employer,

invoked

"The war," he wrote in his

"had transformed our once small and

inexperienced news department into a large and mature
organization.

"i°

Barnouw is among those who pointed to the

audience's appetite for information and radio's rush to

satisfy

it.

Motivated by its need to attract listeners who

would in turn attract advertisers, broadcasters had no
choice but to add more news programming to their schedules.
"News broadcasting grew," he concluded, because "it had
to.

Perhaps the answer is uncertain because we have been

asking the wrong questions. To say that radio's coverage of
the European crisis marks the beginning of broadcast

journalism ignores nearly two decades of history. More
importantly, by concentrating on the development of

Joseph E. Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American
Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), xii. Murrow's role
as the avatar of broadcast journalism should not be
underestimated. See also Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time:
The Life of Edward P. Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969);
A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times (New York:
Freundlich, 1986)
^

William S. Paley, Ab It Happened: A Memoir (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1979), 153.
10

The Golden Web, 22. See also William
Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America
Stott
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1986)
called the late 1930s and early 1940s "the 'golden age' of
radio reporting," 84.
11

Barnouw,

.

5

broadcast journalism without considering the industry
as a
whole and its place in time, we avoid fundamental questions
on the relationship between the medium and society.

Communications historian David Paul Nord urged
students of the media to focus on "the internal and
external social contejcts within which mass media messages

were produced in the past." Nord argued that it is vitally
important for historians to explore both the society in

which the media existed and "the structures, processes, and
conventions of mass media organizations.

"

As radio

broadcasting evolved during the interwar years, an entire
industry emerged.

"The most important internal story in the

history of American journalism and mass communication is
the story of growing commerc ial and organizat ional

complexity,

"

Nord suggested,

"This is a poorly understood

story in our field, a story still obscured by the

traditional focus on individuals rather than on structures
and processes

.

"^^

One reason the story is poorly understood is those

"structures and processes" were not fully acknowledged or

understood by the men and women who daily worked within
them. When Columbia's "World News Roundup" went on the air

for the first time,

the broadcasting industry was not yet

eighteen years old and, despite its meteoric ascent, was

David Paul Nord, "Intellectual History, Social
History, Cultural History ... and Our History," Journaliem
Quarterly 67 (Winter 1990), 647. Emphasis in the original
12

6

still something of the gawky adolescent as war approached,

lacking any established sense of place.

Sevareid, one of

those who had "brought into being the first new form of

journalism in generations," recalled that "to those very
early microphone reporters, including this one, it was
exhilarating,
frightening.

it was exhausting,

"14

it was a bit

The executives responsible for putting the

reporters on the air were equally unsure of themselves. As
radio commentator Raymond Gram Swing explained,
radio is a product of improvisation.

"

"American

There was no "blue

print drawn up by some great and inspired broadcasting

architect." Radio executives were "driven and harassed" and
made "clipped decisions at a feverish pace, with no time

whatever to philosophize."-^^
To place the development of broadcast journalism in

context, we must investigate the times as well as the

evolution of both the journalism profession and the

broadcasting industry. When the first broadcasters took to
The first radio "broadcast" is a subject of
considerable debate, but KDKA's election night program in
1920 is generally acknowledged as the beginning of the
commercial broadcasting industry. See Joseph E. Baudino and
John M. Kitross, "Broadcasting's Oldest Stations: An
Examination of Four Claimants," Journal of Broadcaeting 21
61-83
(Winter 1977)
1^

,

Sevareid, CBS, September 23, 1973. Sevareid,
however, was not present at Munich. He was hired by CBS in
14

1939.

Raymond Gram Swing, talk before the Women's
National Radio Committee, New York, May 13, 1941, 1, text
in box 1, Raymond Gram Swing Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
15

7

the air in the 19206,

they did not set their medium on a

course which would inevitably place Murrow and his

microphone on a London roof top twenty years later. The
radio industry and broadcast journalism developed during a
time when the nation itself confronted the future with a

mixture of anticipation and dread. This broader cultural
context,

too,

helped determine the shape of broadcast

journalism.
Radio, when it began, was widely perceived as

profoundly democratic and empowering. Citizens of the late
twentieth century, awash in images and information, must be
forgiven for failing to remember just how miraculous radio

appeared to Americans of an earlier time. Messages flew
through an invisible ether which respected no property
lines and penetrated locked doors and closed windows. Radio

promised to bring enl ightenment to rich and poor al ike in
every corner of the country. Thanks to the new technology,
thousands of voices could fill the air and take part in the
debate over the nation's future. Here was a medium that

could not be controlled by the powerful few at the expense
of the many.

Radio's freedom, however, presented a potentially
fatal threat to the medium's utility. As broadcasters knew

and listeners quickly discovered, the medium's messages

could be reduced to gibberish if radio waves carrying those
thousands of voices conflicted. Like so much of the modern
industrial world, both radio broadcasting and listening
8

demanded stability and order to flourish. But could
that
order be imposed without destroying the freedom and
promise
of the wondrous new medium?
If we keep this question in mind as we examine the

development of radio broadcasting, the growth of the
industry becomes a metaphor for one of the fundamental
debates of the interwar years.

"One of the most powerful

impulses" of the time, historian Alan Brinkley observed,

was "the urge to defend the autonomy of the individual and
the independence of the community against encroachment from
the modern industrial state. "^^ Would the

nev;

medium prove

to be a bastion of autonomy and independence or would it

become simply another alienating institution? Would radio

allow the people to speak, or would the people be spoken
to? The answer was far from certain in those years, and the

role the state would play was both unclear and of critical

importance

Historians exploring the growth of the broadcasting
industry have frequently described the struggle for control
of the medium as yet another victory for the nation's

corporate interests with the state serving as a feckless
and often willing accompl ice

^"^
.

"A vast industry has grown

Alan Brinkley, Voicee of Protest: Huey Long, Father
Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Alfred A.
1^

Knopf,

1982)

,

xi

See for example Susan J. Douglas, Inventing
American Broadcasting 1999-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987), Philip T. Rosen, The Modern
St en tors: Radio Broadcasters and the Federal Government
1920-1934 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1980) as well
1"^

up around the needs and wishes of sponsors," Barnouw would
write in the late 1970s,

"Its program formulas, business

practices, ratings, demographic surveys have all evolved in

ways to satisfy sponsor requirements." The commercial

imperatives of broadcasting had become so internalized by
the television age, he argued,

that "most decision-making

swirls at levels below him, requiring only his occasional

benediction at this or that selected point. He is a
potentate of our time.

"^®

The triumph of commercialism was never quite so

absolute in the age of radio. As Barnouv; himself observed

thirty years earlier, broadcasters were licensed by the
federal government because

every spot on the dial is public property. The
Federal Communications Commission, act ing for the
public, may grant this or that company a license
to broadcast at this or that frequency, and to
make a profit on it through the sale of time —
provided " the publ ic interest convenience and
necessity" are served
,

This was the bargain broadcasters had agreed to in order to
insure order in the ether. In the years before the Second

World War, a time when Americans were unsure how to balance

as Barnouw, History of Broadcast incf, especially the first
two volumes, A Tower in Babel (1966) and The Golden Web
(1968), which carry the story up to 1953.

Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern
Potentate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),

4.

Radio Drama in Action: 25 Plays
Erik Barnouw, ed.
of a Changing World (New York: Rinehart, 1945), vii.
Emphasis in the original.
1^

,

10

autonomy and order, freedom and aecurity, the
conditiono of
the compact were unclear.
"The public interest" wac a weighty and fiercely

contested phrace, and the history of broadcasting

regulation reflects that conflict.-^ At the start of the
radio age, Herbert Hoover, who as Secretary of Commerce

helped seal the bargain between broadcasters and the state,
looked back on a decade of war and revolution and ahead to
the future. He argued that what he called American

individualism - "that each individual shall be given the
chance and stimulation for development of the best with

which he is endowed in heart and mind" — would prove to be
"the sole source of progress " for the nat ion

Hoover's individualism was not the Spencer ian laissezfaire of the late nineteenth century. That kind of

"unrestrained and unintelligent self-interest," he felt,
led only to dangerous and destruct ive abuses
of the world," Hoover believed,

.

"The probl em

"is to restrain the

destruct ive inst incts while strengthening and enlarging
those of altruistic character and constructive impulse.

"^^

For an overview of the regulatory system focusing
on the television age, see Erwin G. Krasnow and Lawi-ence D.
Longley, The Politics of Broadcast Recfulation (New York:
They observe regarding the Federal
St. Martin's, 1973)
Communications Commission that "few independent regulatory
commissions have had to operate under such a broad grant of
power with so few substantive guidelines." Quotation at 16.
.

Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1922), 13.
21

22

Hoover

,

Aineri can Indi vi duali sm,

11

15-6.

Hoover

-B

prescription for the modern age was redolent of

both classical liberalism's ideal of enlightened selfinterest and the centuries -old dream of a Christian

commonwealth. It also encompassed what historian Ellis

Hawley called "the central assumptions of progressive
thought." Hoover believed "that man could rationalize and
improve human society, that he could do so within a
liberal -capital ist framework without radical social

restructuring, and that he should utilize both public and

private agencies in the task."^^
As Secretary of Commerce, Hawley suggested,
"Hoover ... saw himself as the protagonist of a new and

superior synthesis between the old industrialism and the
new,

a way whereby America could benefit from scientific

rationalization and social engineering without sacrificing
the energy and creativity inherent in individual effort,

'grassroots'

involvement, and private enterprise." This

synthesis. Hoover believed, would balance freedom and order

and "meet the need for national reform, greater stability,

and steady expansion, yet avoid the evils long associated

Ellis W. Hawley, untitled essay, in J. Joseph
Herbert Hoover and
Huthmacher and Warren I. Susman, eds
the CriBiB of American Capitaliew (Cambridge: Schenkman,
23

.

1973),

5.

12

,

with 'capital consolidations,' politicized cartels,
and
governmental bureaucracies

.

"24

This model for a new cooperative industrial society

had been tried with success during the First World War.
Government and industry, combined in such groups as the
Committee on Industrial Preparedness and the War Industries
Board, had mobilized America to win the war to end all

wars. War collectivism blurred the lines between the public

and private sectors, creating a powerful synergy. For

Hoover and many others, these wartime organizations were
models of efficiency and progress. As historian Murray

Rothbard observed, this vision remained alive throughout
the 192 0s and would "return full-blown in the New Deal and
in the World War II economy. "^^

While the state would play
the cooperative state,

a

major role in developing

it is important to keep government's

limited role in perspective. Hoover advocated what has come
to be called associat ionism

— voluntary cooperation

between the public and private sectors — and flatly
repudiated state socialism. The Russian Revolution was to
Hoover a chilling and obvious example that socialism "has
Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce
Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,
1921-1928," CTournal of American History 61 (June 1974),
2**

117

Murray N. Rothbard, "War Collectivism in World War
A New
I," in Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, eds
History of the Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the
American Corporate State (New York: E.P. Button, 1972),
25

.

110

13

,

wrecked itself finally upon the rocks of destroyed
production and moral degeneracy.

"^s

He sought to save

capitalism from its own worst instincts while retaining the
benefits of competition and reward.

Hoover hoped these ideals would help shape a radio
industry which truly served the public interest, but, as a

biographer noted, he "was more willing to risk the
development of private monopoly or oligopoly than federal
control." Corporations with a financial stake in advancing
the art "were essential to

[radio's]

rapid development. But

however logical his reasons were for relying upon this
select group of broadcasters,

monopolistic trends.

in doing so he fostered

"^7

Monopoly, as historian Gabriel Kolko noted, was a

concept which carried significant ideological weight in the

early years of this century. It was "a political slogan"

rooted in a hundred years of struggle and used to condemn
all forms of concentrated authority perceived as threats to

individual liberty.^® For reformers and radicals who still
26

Hoover, American Individual! em, 36.

Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten
Progressive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 112-3. The
failure of attempts to regulate industry for the common
good has been a frequent theme of historians. For an
examination of the communication industries, see Robert
Britt Horowitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989)
27

Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A
Reinterpretat ion of American History, 1900-1916 (Glencoe,
Illinois: Free Press, 1963; Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967), 62.
28

/
14

vividly recalled the populist rebellion and passionate

progressivism of their recent past, monopoly was
antithetical to freedom. While Hoover yearned for a benign

associationist state, others feared the overwhelming power
of capital and recalled Henry Demarest Lloyd's warning

"that a people who are slaves to market - tyrants will surely

come to be their slaves in all else... that a people half

democratic and half plutocratic cannot permanently
endure

.

Many Marxist critics would point out that the outcome
was preordained. Louis Althusser, following Antonio
Gramsci, argued that the fine division between the public

and private sectors was "a distinction internal to

bourgeois law" because the capitalist state was in its
broadest sense an amalgam of private capital and the
governmental institutions capital established to protect
itself. Radio would inevitably become what Althusser called

an "ideological state apparatus" constructed to reproduce
the social relations of production necessary to maintain

the supremacy over the working class.

The freedom radio seemed to offer, Theodor Adorno

argued in 1938, was illusory. Forced to flee Germany,
29

[1894]
173

Henry Demarest Lloyd, Wealth Againet Commonwealth
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice -Hall 1963),
,

.

Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," trans. Ben
Brewster, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other EBsaye (New
York: Monthly Review, 1971), 127-86.
30

15

Adorno was at the time affiliated with the Office of
Radio
Research, one of the earliest academic centers for the

study of the medium. He did not like what he heard. For
Adorno, a leading member of what has come to be known as
the Frankfurt School, broadcasting represented an arena for

controlled and futile opposition to the dominant culture.
The radio listener exploring the ether, he said,

participated in an artificial exercise that merely
resembled freedom. The listener, Adorno wrote,

"becomes the

discoverer of just those industrial products which are
interested in being discovered by him. He brings nothing
home which would not be delivered to his house." Radio
"freed" the individual to join "the public mechanism

without exerting even the si ightest influence on it

Such dour conclusions

,

.

"^^

as communicat ions theorist

Stuart Hall has pointed out, beg vital questions. By

assuming that ideology is necessarily imposed by a dominant
class, the possibility of resistance to the hegemonic

paradigm,

the possibility of change,

is

ignored. The

reaction of the listener, Hall argued, can not be taken for
granted. Additionally, defining boundaries between the

public and private spheres and determining the mechanisms
Theodor W. Adorno, "On the Fetish-Character in
Music and the Regression of Listening," trans. Maurice
The
Goldbloom, in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds
Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum,
1982), 293. The Office of Radio Research was funded by a
grant 'from the Rockefeller family and established at
Princeton in 1937 under the direction of Paul F.
Lazarsf eld.
^1

.

16

,

of control is far more problematic than Althusser
allowed.

How is

it,

Hall asked, that in developed liberal

democracies private institutions "without direction or

compulsion by the State

...

reproduce

...

accounts of the world

constructed within fundamentally the same ideological
categories?" The dominant ideology, Hall suggested, is

resisted and reinterpreted and can cut both ways,

ultimately limiting the ways social structures may
reproduce themselves

Communication theorists remain divided on whether the
emergence of the mass media is good or bad news, whether
the new media represent an extension of centralized control
or a profoundly democratic opportunity. Clearly,

proprietors of any mass medium worthy of the name —
newspapers, magazines, film, radio, television — must

possess deep pockets. As press critic A.J. Liebling

observed half a century ago,

"anybody in the ten-million

dollar category is free to buy or found a paper in a great
"Signification, Represent at ion,
Stuart Hall
Ideology: Althusser and the Post - Structural ist Debates," in
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (June 1985), 91114, quotation at 100-1. Any historical examination of the
media must take notice of cultural studies, especially the
work of Hall and others affiliated at one time or another
with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the
University of Birmingham. For a recent survey of the field,
see Valda Blundell, John Sheperd and Ian Taylor, eds
Relocating Cultural Studies: Developments in Theory and
Research (New York: Routledge, 1993)
^2

,
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city like New York or Chicago.

"33

Such discussions,

however, are too often, as cultural
historian Raymond
Williams suggested, ahistorical because
"there is a general
tendency to confuse the techniques themselves
with the uses
to which, in a given society, they have been
put. "34 The
mere existence of media do not predetermine the

consequences of their use.
first,

"If the government gets them

as Nazi Germany did with radio," New Age theorist

Stewart Brand pointed out,

"you get a top-down bias in the

political process." If, however, advocates of radical
change control the media, the result can be quite
different.
noted,

"Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in Iran," Brand

"spread by audiocassette tapes, copy machines, and

telephone; no one bothered to take over a broadcast

facility until the Shah left.

"35

The struggle over the future of the new medium of

radio was in large part ideological, contested across the

terrain of American culture.
33

A.J.

36

"The American System of

Liebling,

The Press, 2nd ed. (New York:
Ballentine, 1975, 15. Liebling' s essay was first published
in the Dartn)outh Alumni Magazine in 1947.

Raymond Williams, Culture & Society: 1780-1950 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 1983), 301.
34

Stewart Brand, The Media Lab: Inventing- the Future
at MIT (New York: Penguin, 1988), 213.
35

3S

Recent scholarship on popular culture has examined
how regulatory battles over censorship and licensing
frequently reflect deeper ideological disputes. See for
example American Quarterly 44, no. 4 (December 1992), a
special issue devoted to "Hollywood, censorship and
American culture."
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Broadcasting," the industry's trade organization explained
as the Second World War approached,

"is based on the same

democratic ideals which guarantee us freedom of the press,

freedom of religion, freedom of speech.

"^"^

Such words often

disguised more mundane goals, but the stirring phrases of
the nation's past were regularly invoked as they so often

are when institutions face threats to their survival. That

broadcasters who spoke of freedom of speech were equally
concerned with freedom to exploit the ether for private
profit merely reflects the nation's continuing struggle to
define itself
The internal context of broadcast journalism was

equally contested, A new profession was inventing itself,

creating its own standards and practices. One vital
standard of broadcast news which became increasingly

prominent in the late 193 0s and continues today is a loudly
and frequently proclaimed commitment to objective, value
free

j

ournal ism.

Paley,

stepping forward in the 19 3 0s as

the industry's most quoted public spokesman, pledged as war

approached that his network would "present the essence of
the news, both national and international,

in a strictly

factual and objective way, devoid of bias."^^ Murrow, not

National Association of Broadcasters, The ABC of
Radio (Washington, DC: National Association of
n.p.
Broadcasters, 1938)
^'^

,

Paley, Annual Report of the Columbia
Broadcasting- System, Inc. For the Fiscal Year Ended
December 28, 1940 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System,
[5]
1941)
^®

William

S.

,
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yet the radio's patron saint but already the model
foreign

correspondent,

insisted in 1939 that he and his colleagues

labored "so far as humanly poss ible

.

.

.

to avoid the

intrusion of personal opinion" in their broadcasts and

aimed to provide their listeners with news "that is as
objective as we can make it."^^

Even President Franklin

Roosevelt himself praised

D.

"objective reporting" as the kind of "real news [which] has

sharpened the minds and judgment of men and women
everywhere." Radio listeners, he observed on the basis of
his experience, were becoming increasingly sophisticated

and had "learned to discriminate over the air between the
honest advocate who relies on truth and logic and the more

dramatic speaker who is clever in appealing to the passions
and prejudices of his

1

isteners

.

Roosevelt spoke with

considerable authority. Not only was he an acknowledged
master of the medium, he was as chief executive radio's

ultimate regulator. Clearly, his opinion on the subject
mattered.

Edward R. Murrow, testimony, Official Report of
Proceedings Before the Federal Comwuni cations Conmieeion at
Washington, DC in the matter of Commission s Order No. 37,
Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in
the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters, FCC docket
no. 5060, vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3251-2, box 1404,
record group 173, Washington National Records Center,
National Archives and Records Administration, Suitland,
Maryland.
'

Broadcast address, quoted in "FDR Praises Radio,"
NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Reports 7
(November 3, 1939), 3809.
40
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Despite the protestations of Paley, Murrow and the

president himself, few reporters truly believed

it was

possible for a journalist to be an objective observer. By
the time of the First World War, correspondents were

increasingly expected to help explain what events meant by

providing necessary background and a measure of
interpretation with their dispatches. That required

selectivity and editorial judgment. As Murrow implied, most
journalists who aspired to objectivity saw it as a goal to
be sought rather than a standard to be assumed.

Over the past thirty years, both journalists and those

who observe them have increasingly come to agree just how
elusive objectivity

is.

Scholars who have examined the

evolving institutions of the media and persuasively argued
that journalism's commitment to objectivity is largely a

product of cultural, political, bureaucratic and

professional imperatives which came to the fore during the
last century and a half."*^ As Gaye Tuchman explained it,

objectivity was a "ritual" practiced by journalists working

within a corporate environment. Fragments of "pertinent
information gathered by professionally validated
See Herbert J. Gans, Deciding- What 'b News: A Study
of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time
(New York: Pantheon, 1979); Dan Schiller, Objectivity and
the News: The Public and the Rise of Commercial Journal i em
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981);
Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of
Gaye
American Newspapers (New York: Basic Books, 1978)
Tuchman, "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual," American
Journal of Sociology 11 (January 1972), 660-79.
*!

;
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methods

when taken together, present themselves as both

individually and collectively self -val idat ing

Together,

.

they constitute a web of facticity by establishing

themselves as cross -referents to one another.

"^^

Objective

news coverage, Michael Schudson contended, was another

example of relativist philosophy which developed in

reaction to the stresses modernity imposed on traditional
society. Objectivity, he noted, became "an articulate

professional value in journalism" during the interwar years
and,

"like related ideals in law and social science at the

same time, was founded on a confidence that the loss of

faith was irretrievable.""^^
This faith in the loss of faith survives to the

present day. Journalists now content themselves with more
obtainable goals such as balance and accuracy

.

When the

newly- appointed ombudsman of the Waehington Poet wrote her

first column in 1992, she confessed that "at some point,

I

gave up my devotion to objectivity. Journalism is not
stenography, and a newspaper is more than a chute running

from speaker to reader." While objectivity might be humanly
impossible "and insufficient anyway for finding meaning,
then newspapers still owe their readers fairness, balance.

Gaye Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the
Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press, 1978), 82,
42

86

.

Schudson, Discovering the News,
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157,

159.

authoritative information and coverage that is accurate,
reliable and complete

.

"^"^

Journalism's retreat to relativism had been under way
for years by the time modern broadcast journalism emerged
in the late 1930s. Faith in absolute objectivity had been

in full flight since the 1920s. Walter Lippmann had raised

fundamental questions about the journalist's ability to

comprehend the modern world, much less determine the truth.
Lippmann'

s

suggested solution included professional

standards which acknowledged the elusive nature of reality

while embracing scientific standards of evidence.

As the

media became increasingly industrialized, professionalized

and prosperous, newspapers and broadcasting organizations

developed their own traditions, folkways and bureaucratic
imperatives. Since truth could not be safely defined, a
more practical model evolved along the lines Lippmann

suggested which explicitly confessed human frailty while

emphasizing verifiable standards such as balance and
accuracy.

Joann Byrd, "The Ethical Journalist,
Post, June 28, 1992, C6

"

Waehington

Lippmann' s work was especially influential because
he was himself a working newspaperman, albeit one who
operated at a more Delphic level than most of his
colleagues. See especially Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion
(New York: Free Press, 1922) and The Phantom Public (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925) as well as Ronald Steel,
Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Atlantic
Little Brown, 1980)
.

for example, Warren Breed, "Social Control in
the Newsroom," Social Forces 33 (1955), 326-35; Edward Jay
Epstein, News From Nowhere: Television and the News (New
46 See,
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In the common parlance of the newsroom, however,

such

reporting was still often described as "objective".
A

standard journalism text first published in 1932 as

Reporting for Beginnere was retitled Interpretive Reporting
when it was reissued in 1938 to reflect the changing
understanding of the journalist's proper role. The author,
however, continued to maintain well into the 1960s, when
the very mention of ^the word was likely to bring a sneer to
the lips of his student -readers

"that the first step

,

upward in journalism is through mastery of the fundamentals
of thorough,

"^"^

objective reporting.

Too many academic discussions of objectivity

deteriorate into pointless arguments over how many
reporters can dance on the head of a pin. As newspaperman,

historian and critic of journalism James Boylan noted,
debunkers of obj ect ivity "were right only in the narrowest

debater

s
'

-point sense

.

Objectivity did exist and does exist — as an
ideology, as a modus operandi, as a cultural
phenomenon. Merely to point out that news stories
are not "obj ective " in its abstract sense does
.Objectivity has
not dissipate its reality.
gradually come to be understood not only as an
impersonal, "balanced" style of news writing
(which is the commonplace or newsroom, sense of
but also as representing the broader
the word)
.

.

,

,

Random House, 1973) and Tuchman,
Strategic Ritual
York:

"Objectivity as

.

Curtis D. MacDougall, "History and Purpose,"
Interpretive Reporting, fifth ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1968), viii. Emphasis added.
47
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claim of journalism for its position in society
- that of an impartial third party, the one that
speaks for the general interest.
That "broader claim" that journalism can be an important

and impartial contributor to the democratic discourse was
of course at the heart of Lippmann's call for reform.

fact,

in the eyes of its practitioners,

In

it justifies the

existence of the news media.
In any discussion of objective reporting, then,

vital to define the term not abstractly
-

did, within the context of

j

,

but,

it

is

as Boylan

ournal ism. Basic to this

working definition of objectivity which evolved on the shop
floor are accuracy, fairness and balance. Reporters were

expected to get the names and numbers right and refrain
from overtly taking sides. Even such relatively modest

aspirat ions

however

,

,

begged many important cul tural and

psychological quest ions

.

When confronted with their sins,

journalists, well aware how problematic objectivity was,

complained they were only human and muttered that those who
raised such questions did not have to face daily deadlines.
As broadcast journalism developed between the world
wars, both the leaders of the industry and the editors and

James Boylan, "Infancy of Objectivity," review of
Schiller's Objectivity and the News, Columbia Journalism
Review, September /October 1981, 61
See for example Schiller's discussion of how the
Police Gazette' ^ crime coverage on the one hand disrupted
the complacency of society while on the other privileged
authority by citing police and court records as the source
of accurate information. Schiller, Objectivity and the
News, 96- 124
49

.
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reporters who actually produced news and public
affairs

broadcasts repeatedly pledged to pursue objectivity.
The
standards of radio news are especially worthy of

consideration because, as Godfrey aptly observed, many of
the conventions of television news are rooted in radio.
Indeed, most of the familiar faces on television newscasts
in the 1950s and 1960s belonged to men

- and

a very few

women - who began their careers in radio during the Second

World War. Of the many radio traditions they brought with
them to television, the most significant was the medium's

proclaimed commitment to objective journalism.
When they were attacked for failing to achieve that
goal, broadcasters reflexively defended themselves as

impartial and fair and their reports as balanced, when the

Nixon administration assaulted a radical "media elite"
which sought to undermine the traditional values of the
"silent majority," CBS News president Richard Salant

emphatically denied that television twisted the news to fit
a predetermined agenda.

The goal as always, he said, was

accuracy, fairness and balance.

"Our reporters do not cover

stories from their point of view,

"

Salant insisted,

"They

are presenting them from nobody's point of view."^*^ His

critics howled at the transparent impossibility of Salant
claim, but members of the journalistic fraternity knew

exactly what he meant.
Quoted in Epstein, News From Nowhere, epigram.
Emphasis in the original.
50

26

'

.

An additional observation can also be made. Debates
over objectivity hinge on the broader issue of perceived
fairness. When society at large is divided,
of fairness, balance and impartiality

the definitions

— the pillars

of

objectivity — become increasingly controversial. The
assault on objectivity during the 1960s and 1970s was

played out against the background of the societal upheavals
of the day which shattered the Cold War consensus. The
193 06 saw similar sharp divisions within American society

which intensified as issues of war and peace moved to the
fore.

Consensus collapsed at decade's end, only to be

revived as the United States was drawn into the war in
1941
If,

then, objectivity can be best understood as a

professional "modus operandi" rather than as something

which can be empirically demonstrated, two goals can be
achieved. First, protracted arguments over the absolute

truth of specific assertions can be set aside. Second,

broadcast journalism as it developed can be analyzed most

fruitfully by examining how it reflects the proclaimed
standards of the industry and the profession.
While the debate over objectivity involved all the

media including radio, broadcasting was uniquely shaped by
its peculiar nature. Unlike the printed word, radio was a

creation of the modern age. The new medium represented to
many Americans a chance to rectify past mistakes, a new

opportunity to achieve through modern means traditional

democratic goals which had for so long proven elusive.
If
this opportunity were to be realized, the fundamental

question would have to be answered: Who would control the
air?

Discussions of the proper role of radio in a
democratic society took place in the context of a deeper

and more emotionally charged debate over how society should
be constructed. Did modern times make the old verities

obsolete? Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana, a leading
figure in the regulatory debate, personified the political

dislocation of the times. How could the Progressive
candidate for vice president of 1924 become the ant i -New
Deal isolationist of 1940? Wheeler maintained he was never
inconsistent.
the times,

"My own feeling," he recalled,

the issues,

"is that while

and the leaders have changed, my

basic outlook has remained the same." Wheeler confessed he

could no longer identify his allies.
'

1

iberals

'

"I

agree with the

when they are on the side of justice for the

individual and against the concentration of economic
power," he said.

"I

agree with the 'conservatives'

in their

opposition to the buildup of centralized power in the
federal government

."

While it is tempting to dismiss

Wheeler and those who clung to the civic virtues of an
earlier era as relics of a day which had passed, it is

Wheeler with Paul F. Healy, Yankee From
the West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), 428.
SI

Burton

K.
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important to recall that in the context of the timec
they

reprecented a cignificant portion of public opinion.
Radio broadcasting developed in the twilight of the

progreccive era and flourished during the New Deal. It wac
a time when government cought to reinvent itcelf and,

ac

hictorian Jameo Weinctein obcerved, corporate leaderc
"Gupported political ideologiec that appealed to large
numberc of people of different cocial claGcec in order to
gain,

and retain, popular support for their entrepreneurial

activity.

"^^

The new broadcacting induGtry followed that

course aG well. The American Syctem of Broadcasting wac the
resul t

Both radio and itc critics chared the came rhetoric of

democracy and freedom while dicagreeing on what the wordc
meant

.

Radio newc wac chaped in the midct of thic debate

By examining how the radio indue try and itc regulat ore

attempted to reconcile their inGt itut ional and prof eccional
imperat ivec with the ideology and tx'adit ional accumpt ionc
of American democracy, we can learn come thing of how thoce

traditions were understood and reinterpreted in the
interwai^ yearc

.

James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal
xiii.
State: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968)
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patent rights and establishing interlocking directorships
to create pools and trusts reminiscent of late
nineteenth-

century industrial cartels. The newly- empowered federal
government, eager to maintain a wartime monopoly over the

new technology, first sought direct control of the medium
and then attempted to maintain its influence by forging an
alliance with the private sector.
Others sought to fit radio into their diverse visions
of the future.

Entrepreneurs, seeking the main chance,

opposed the growing power of both the state and
corporations which could stand in the way of their dreams.
Reformers of many stripes rightly saw the medium as a
powerful tool that could reshape society for good or ill
and fought to control radio's content. Through it all,

broadcasters and the public discovered together the wonders
of radio.

Ultimately, of course, each of these factions sought

power in its own way. They hoped to control the new medium,
not just for their own ends, but for what they understood
to be the good of society as a whole. Each insisted its

vision represented the best use of this miraculous new
invention. Citizens of the information age of the late

twentieth century who take for granted technologies which

allow sounds, pictures and electronic data to flow around
the world at the speed of light may underestimate the sense
of wonder and amazement with which people of a different

time greeted radio broadcasting. In the 1920s, a younger,

less jaded nation listened in awe as voices from afar

entered their homes and their lives, logically flowing
through something called the ether, a mysterious aura that

passed over, around and through everything, ignoring
national borders and private property, touching both rich

and poor, radio was truly miraculous.

A common motif used to graphically illustrate the
wonders of radio featured godlike specters floating in the
heavens, hurling bolts of lightning across the

countryside

.

2

These dramatic images sent a mixed message

that tapped deeply seated hopes and fears. Radio waves were

portrayed as a natural element like water or fire. They
were powerful, and humankind could, if it proved worthy,

enjoy their benefits. The image, however, also carried

a

Promethean warning. If prideful men and women abused this
its power could be turned against them.

gift,

Clearly radio

waves in the ether, like the fire that warmed us or the

waters of the rivers and oceans, had to be wisely used.
This new medium promised to carry us into a new day, but to

what brave new world would we be delivered?"^
The visual media in the 192 0s so frequently used
this image, it became a cliche. For especially elegant
examples of this motif, see the New York Times, September
12, 1926, sec. 11, 1 or the cover art for Doubleday's Radio
Broadcasting- magazine during 1926-27. In the 1930s, when
the Radio Corporation of America's subsidiary RKO was a
leading motion picture producer, the studio's films opened
with the image of lightening bolts flashing across the
globe from a radio tower. Perhaps RCA felt by then it had
taken its rightful place in the heavens.
3

The history of technology is filled with examples of
this duality: Will the new allow us to correct the mistakes
4

32

.

Although radio broadcaeting was a product of the
192 06,

the theoretical underpinnings and earliest

technology of radio emerged from laboratories in Europe
and

America during the late nineteenth century.
the case with new technology,

^

As is often

the unfamiliar was explained

by analogy. Wireless communication, as the name implies,
was first understood and promoted as a way to extend

existing telephone and telegraph service to places beyond
the reach of poles and wires. Although the human voice may

have been first transmitted through the air as early as
1892

— there are several rival claimants for

the honor of

being first — wireless messages like telegrams were
typically transmitted in the dots and dashes of Morse code.
By the turn of the century, a new industry based on point-

to-point communication was taking shape.

Guglielmo Marconi, experimenter and entrepreneur, had
spanned the English Channel with wireless in 1899,

attracting popular acclaim and financial backing from
British investors. By 1910, the company bearing his name
of the old or simply give those in power new means to
exercise their control? Regarding communications, see for
example James Carey, Communication as Culture (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1989) and Daniel J. Czitrom, Media and the
American Mind: From Morse to McLuhan (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1982)
.

The standard histories of the development of radio
technology are Hugh G.J. Aitken, Syntony and Spark: The
Origins of Radio (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976) and
Aitken' s second study. The Continuous Wave: Technology and
American Radio, 1900-1932 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1985)
5
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launched commercial wireless service between the
United
States and Europe. American Marconi Company, the
domestic

subsidiary of British Marconi, soon operated a network of
sending and receiving stations, controlled the majority
of
the nation's radio traffic and held the rights to many

critical wireless patents. American Marconi, however, was
not alone in the field. It soon become apparent that there

was money to be made from the new technology, and several

corporate rivals took the field in hopes of carving out a

portion of the new market.
American Telephone and Telegraph realized what the
growth of radio could mean to its existing technologies and
actively pursued new breakthroughs in its laboratories.
ATScT also

purchased promising patents of independent

experimenters who lacked the capital and expertise to
exploit their inventions. General Electric developed a

powerful long-distance transmitter in hopes of profiting
from the equipment needs of the new industry. Westinghouse

and other electrical firms also plunged into the wireless

technology business. Another significant player was United
Fruit Company. Eager for a way to connect its sprawling

network of plantations and cargo ships. United Fruit

developed its own wireless system, the Tropical Radio
Telegraph Company.
The federal government also took a leading role in

stimulating the growth of wireless. Radio promised to
answer the navy's traditional search for a way to
34

,

coordinate itG Bcattered bases and ships at sea.
As the
fleet grew along with the nation's imperial
ambitions,

communications kept pace. The navy installed one of GE

s

'

powerful transmitters in New Jersey as the keystone of
its

transoceanic wireless system. The admirals much preferred
to do business with domestic manufacturers and remained

wary of foreign-owned American Marconi, questioning the
firm's loyalty in time of international conflict.^

Major corporations and the government were not the
only radio pioneers. This was the era of inventor-

entrepreneurs such as Edison, Ford and the Wright brothers,
and scores of scientists and engineers were cloistered in

laboratories across the country in search of technological

breakthroughs which would both advance the art and make
them a fortune."^ Several of these mavericks, notably Lee de
Forest, Reginald Fessenden and Charles Herrold, broadcast

words and music long before the First World War, hoping to
drum up publicity and impress potential investors.®

Fessenden broadcast a Christmas eve concert in

19 06

from

his experimental transmitter on the Massachusetts coast

and Herrold was on the air in San Jose, California in

19 09,

Susan J. Douglas, Inventing- American Broadcaetincf
1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
^

1987)

,

7

192-240.

Douglas,

Inventing American Broadcasting, 144-86.

See Joseph E. Baudino and John M. Kitross,
"Broadcasting's Oldest Stations; An Examination of Four
Claimants," Journal of Broadcasting 21 (Winter 1977), 61
®

83

.
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at one point connecting his transmitter
to the city's

street car wires to create a giant antenna.
Amateur

hobbyists learned of the new technology, and soon
thousands
were building crude transmitters and receivers,
filling the
air with crackling dots and dashes. Hams, as the
amateurs

called themselves, networked across the country and

organized the American Radio Relay League in 1915. To
demonstrate both the utility of the new medium and its farflung membership,

the League passed a wireless message from

coast to coast.
As the various factions jockeyed for advantage, the

need to regulate the new medium soon became apparent. Too

much was at stake to allow the ether to degenerate into an

unintelligible jumble of competing messages. The Wireless
Ship Act of 1910 required larger sea-going passenger

Christopher H. Sterling and John M. Kitross, Stay
Tuned: A Concise Hietory of American Broadcasting (2nd ed.
Belmont Cal if ornia Wentworth, 1978 1990)
18-47 Amateur
radio operators apparently began calling themselves "hams"
in the earliest days of the medium. The Oxford English
Dictionary credits the coinage to American slang and cites
a 1919 reference to a ham as "a student telegraph
operator." H.L. Mencken noted in The American Language:
Supplement II (194 8) that "ham" was in common usage in the
United States in the early twentieth century to denote "any
inept or amateurish workman or other person" in a variety
of fields. While the word quickly lost its negative
connotation among radio operators, it would be logical to
assume that early wireless telegraphers encountering
interference from eager amateurs dismissed the interlopers
as "inept or amateurish." While "ham" and "amateur" have an
obvious homophonic connection, the slang meaning of the
term seems to stem from what was perhaps its earliest
usage: "ham actors." Mencken traced the derivation to the
fact that amateur stage performers used ham fat to remove
their make-up while more polished professionals used cold
^

;

,

:

,

cream.
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vessels to carry wireless equipment and trained
operators.
Because the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
administered
the nation's maritime laws, he was also charged
with

enforcing the new wireless regulations. In 1912, an
international convention in London produced a treaty

dividing the electromagnetic spectrum to regularize the use
of wireless frequencies. Congress enacted the first omnibus

domestic broadcasting law, the Radio Act of 1912, to comply

with United States treaty obligations and at the same time
directed the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to license all
wireless stations and operators. In 1913, when Congress

created a separate Department of Labor, control of wireless
remained with the Secretary of Commerce,
With the First World War, private use of the ether was
temporarily suspended. On April

7,

1917,

one day after the

United States officially entered the conflict, President
Wilson invoked a section of the 1912 Radio Act which
allowed the government to commandeer wireless stations in
time of war. All stations not already operated by the

government were placed under the control of the US Navy.
Radio waves could cut through the fog of battle, and the

military had great hopes for the new technology. The navy
ordered manufacturers to pool patents and standardize parts
so a steady stream of radio sets could be sent to the

Federal Communications Commission, "Information
Bulletin: Evolution of Wire and Radio Communication,"
(Washington: Federal Communications Commission, 1988), 4
10.
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front. Hundreds of hams enlisted to operate the
machinery.

Equipment improved rapidly as government contracts

stimulated research and development
The military remained concerned that enemies could

listen in on wireless messages but trusted that new
inventions could eliminate that unfortunate aspect of the
technology. In his 1918 report to Congress, Josephus
Daniels, Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, endorsed the

performance of the mil itary- industrial cartel.

"The Navy

occupies a strong position in the commercial radio field on
account of efficient service rendered," he wrote,

"and

I

think presages the way for making this service entirely

governmental

.

"^^

At war's end, as Daniels suggested, the government

sought legislation to create a state radio monopoly. The

President would be authorized to "requisition, and take

permanent possession of
every radio station

.

.

,

for the use of the Government

.now in existence." The proposal also

effectively foreclosed future exploitation of the ether by
the private sector. New, privately-owned stations would be

allowed on the air, but only if their signals did not cross
state lines or interfere with government transmitters or
receivers. Given the technology of the times, the exception

was rightly considered an extremely small loophole. The

279

11

Douglas, Inventing- American Broadcasting-, 288.

12

Quoted in Douglas, Inventing American Broadcaeting,

.
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Secretary of the Navy would be in charge of the
new
system.

The government's bid for a monopoly was immediately

caught in a crossfire of criticism from an unlikely

alliance of anti monopolists, foes of expanding government
power,

irate amateurs and businesses with a stake in the

promising new industry. Their motives differed, but they
all mobilized the language of political freedom to defend

both individual liberty and private profit. Republican
Congressman William Greene of Massachusetts warned the
navy's plan would establish a "Government monopoly,

contrary to any control that we had hoped for years to
establish under the Sherman antitrust law." If the navy's

plan became law, Greene predicted, wireless would become
"an immense trust,

view of

it,

and it also becomes, according to my

the establishment of the Department of the Navy

in the commercial business. "^^

Amateurs protested that the ban on interstate wireless
transmissions would stifle the hams' right of free speech.

Entrepreneurs dreaming of becoming the next Edison and
corporate leaders with their eyes on the bottom line also

1^

H.R.

13159,

65th Cong., 3rd Sess., sees. 2-4 (1918)

Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, A Bill to Further Regulate Radio Communication,
hearings on H.R. 13159, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess., December 12,
1918, 11. The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
had jurisdiction over radio legislation because the federal
government had first become involved with wireless because
of maritime safety issues.
1^
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sounded a democratic theme. The general manager
of Unit^
Fruit's radio operation feared the nation had fought
"a

great war to make the world safe for democracy" only
to
make the United States "unsafe for business." The navy's

plan to create a government radio system, he said, was
truly "un-American.
It is following the principle of autocracy rather
than of democracy .... I maintain that peace should
bring certainty to every form of legitimate
enterprise as a practical application of our
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness rather than uncertainty under
Government ownership
Not surprisingly, with rhetoric emblematic of the times,

capitalism and democracy were assumed by all to be
synonymous
The legislation quickly sank, but Daniels' dream of a

unified radio industry responsive to government interests
survived. So too did the industry's desire for stability

and orderly growth

.

Overt monopoly, either publ ic or

private, appeared a political impossibility, but the

wartime alliance between the private sector and the state

provided a proven model for managed competition in the
national interest. The result was the Radio Corporation of

America
George Davis, testimony, hearings on H.R. 13159,
December 19, 1918, 314.

Quoted in Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America
(2nded.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956, 1972), 139. The
standard contemporary account of the creation of RCA is
Gleason L. Archer, History of Radio to 1926 (New York:
American Historical Society, 1938; reprint, Arno, 1971).
1^
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RCA,

the child of the government and General
Electric,

would become in 1926 the parent of the National
Broadcacting Company, the moct popular and financially
GuccesGful provider of radio programming during the

medium'G "golden age". RCA waG alGo a model example of how

corporate cooperation aided and abetted by active

governmental support could lead to domination of a new
indue try.
In 1919, Admiral W.H.G.
of communicationG,

Bullard,

the navy'G director

returned from the VerGaillec peace talkc

to meet with General Electric officials in New York.

admiral "appeal

[ed]

to

[GE]

The

on patriotic groundc not to

grant rights under itc patentG or Gell itG apparatus to the

Marconi Companies or any other foreign interests." GE

*

powerful transmitters, Bullard said, were the best in the

world and were the company to
Marconi interests,

"

sel 1 these devices to the

in this critical period of the history

the result would be to fix in British hands a

of wireless,

substantial monopoly of world communication." He urged GE
"not to sacrifice or impair the possibil ity of establ ishing

an American Radio Company powerful enough to meet the

competition of other radio interests of the world, but, on
the contrary^

company

"^"^

to form or cooperate in forming such a

'

.

General Electric Company, "History of Radio
Corporation and its Relation to the Art of Radio
Communication and to the Requirements of Public
Communication," April 25, 1921, box 64, Wallace H. White,

AT&T, Westinghouse and United Fruit eagerly
joined GE
in financing the new Radio Corporation.

The navy had

insisted that the new corporation be a domestic one,
so

American Marconi found itself on the outside looking

in.

"There exists on the part of officials of the Government,"
the Marconi board informed its shareholders,

"a very strong

and irremovable objection to [American Marconi] because of
the stock interest held therein by the British company. "18

By the end of 1919,

boycott

,

its business crippled by the government

American Marconi surrendered.

The new partners quickly entered into a series of

mutually beneficial cross - 1 icensing

,

manufacturing and

sales agreements exploiting their own patents as well as
the inventions RCA had inherited from Marconi.
all iance was an immediate success

business in 192 3

,

.

The

Surveying the radio

the Federal Trade Commission reported

that RCA was "the most important factor in that industry"

because of the cross - 1 icensing agreements and "the dominant
factor in the communication field" because the company

served as the government's surrogate in international
communications, forging alliances with foreign governments
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, 3. Emphasis in the original.
Jr.

19

Quoted in Head, Broadcasting in America,

140.

For a detailed summary of the origins of RCA, see
Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade
CommieGion on the Radio Industry in Response to House
Resolution 548, Sixty-Seventh Congress, Fourth Session
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 9-38.
15
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and their state-owned wireless monopol ies

.

20

1921,

for

instance, RCA parlayed as an equal with British Marconi

France's state -operated CGT and Telefunken of Germany and

created an international consortium controlling all
wireless communications to and from South America. 21

Continuing to conflate public interest and private profit,
General Electric later defended itself from monopoly

charges by stating that its involvement with RCA "was urged

upon

[it]

by the Navy Department

.

"22

The wireless industry in the United States, then,

entered the 192 0s with the government and the industry's
giants in agreement. The major corporate players had worked
20

Federal Trade Commission, Report for Fiscal Year
1924 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924)
20.
The report itself is cited in note 19 Gupra.
,

Owen D. Young, as told to Mary Margaret McBride,
"Freedom of the Air," Saturday Evening- Post, November 16,
21

1929,

194.

General Electric, "History of Radio Corporation,"
9. RCA's founders would later claim the blessing of
President Wilson himself for their project. RCA chairman
Owen Young contended in a 1929 "as-told-to" Saturday
Evening- Post article (November 16, 1929, 16) that Bullard
made his appeal at Wilson's behest. Admiral Cary T.
Grayson, Wilson's personal physician who accompanied the
president to the peace talks, testified before the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce (December 17, 1929) that
Wilson asked one day at breakfast to be reminded "'...to
get in touch with. .Bullard. I have an important message
that I want to send to Mr. Owen D. Young relative to the
protection of American rights and possibilities in radio
communication.'" Senator Burton Wheeler, an RCA critic,
contended the corporation's leaders were "patent
racketeers" and their assertion that Wilson's concern with
international postwar communications excused a decade of
monopolistic domestic practices was "the cheapest kind of
advertising bunk." See "Formation of R.C.A. Ascribed to
Wilson," New York Times, December 18, 1929, 14.
22

.
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together under the leadership of government during the
war

and had been able to reconstitute that wartime alliance,

again with the help of government, when peace came. This
corporate -governmental detente had stirred no divisive

public debate or significant congressional outrage because
international communications and the sale of powerful radio

transmitters hardly touched the everyday lives of
Americans. The moguls of the industry had, however, not

anticipated that their conception of radio would have to
change as the medium rapidly evolved. As Owen

D.

Young,

the

GE vice president who became board chairman of RCA, later

admitted,
1920.

.

.

"we had no broadcasting in our minds in 1919 and

.It was an amazing thing,

contemplated at all

.

which we had not

"^^

Young exaggerated only slightly. There were a few who

understood the potential of the wireless as a mass medium.
While Herrold, Fessenden, de Forest and the others were

conducting their experiments, David Sarnoff was working for

American Marconi as assistant traffic manager. Unlike the
others, he believed his future was in the corporate world,

and his rapid climb to the top of RCA soon proved him

Testimony in Congress, Senate, Committee on
Interstate Commerce, A Bill to Provide for the Regrulation
of the Transmission of Intelligence by Wire or Wireless,
hearings on S 6, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., December 9, 1929,
1115-6. If Young seems in retrospect to have overlooked the
obvious, it should be remembered that new technologies
often take unexpected courses. Many of the best and
brightest in Hollywood were equally stunned a half-century
later when they discovered that consumers preferred to rent
rather than buy video cassette recordings.
2^

.
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correct. Sarnoff had joined Marconi as an office
boy,

taught himself Morse code and subsequently won notoriety
as
the operator who received the distress calls from the

sinking Titanic in 1912. It was a story the ambitious
Sarnoff made certain became widely known.
In 1916, well aware that voices and music as well as

corporate and governmental communiques were being heard in
the ether,

Sarnoff wrote a memo outlining a possible

alternative to point-to-point communications:
have in mind a plan of development which would
make radio a "household utility" in the same
sense as the piano or phonograph. The idea is to
bring music into the house by wireless.
.The
receiver can be designed in the form of a simple
"Radio Music Box" and arranged for several
different wavelengths
I

.

.

American Marconi would of course manufacture the receivers.
The new product, he modestly suggested,

handsome profit.
Sarnoff
proposal.

's

"could yield a

"^^

American

I-Iarconi

superiors ignored his

Private point-to-point communication by wireless

fit the profitable model of existing telegraph and

telephone technology, and commercial demand for the new
service was already evident. Broadcasting was technically
feasible, of course, but they doubted there was any real

potential in the idea. The point-to-point market remained.

Quoted in Head, Broadcasting in America, 132. When
the Federal Communications Commission launched its probe of
network broadcasting monopolies in 1938, Sarnoff, by then
the chief executive of RCA, introduced the "music box memo"
into evidence, no doubt to solidify his stature as a
founding father of broadcasting.
24
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they felt, the most lucrative and safest course
for the
industry. Indeed the RCA partners were so single-minded,
they initially made no provision for dividing profits
from

broadcast ing

After the wartime freeze on private wireless was
lifted, as the government and the corporations sought to

stabilize the industry, hundreds of hams lined up for

permission to go back on the air. Many were content to
communicate by Morse key, but a growing number explored
voice transmission. These protobroadcasters transmitted
their messages to no one in particular, but spoke hopefully
into the ether for any and all to hear. Some began to

attract small but faithful audiences.
One was Frank Conrad, an engineer at the Westinghouse

factory in Pittsburgh who had been experimenting with radio
since 1912. Conrad received his amateur wireless license in
1916.

When the wartime ban ended, he obtained a new license

and resumed tinkering with his transmitter. His earliest

broadcasts were descriptions of the equipment he was using
and appeals for responses from anyone who might be
listening. Tiring of this routine, he one night placed his

microphone in front of a phonograph and played records. His
invisible audience demanded more and, by the late fall of
1919,

Conrad was broadcasting concerts every Wednesday and

Saturday evening. Fast running out of records, Conrad
struck a deal with his neighborhood music store. The

merchant would supply him with the latest recordings if
46

.

Conrad would mention they were on Bale at the store.
The
merchant soon noticed new customers were visiting his

store

and asking to buy records that Conrad had played on the
air
By September 192 0, growing interest in Conrad's

broadcasts led a Pittsburgh department store to place a

newspaper advertisement for handmade wireless receivers,
"on sale here $10.00 up," which would allow the curious to

tune in for themselves. Harry Davis, a Westinghouse vice

president who had been following Conrad's experiments, saw
a chance to cash in on what seemed to be a growing fad.

The

company had a warehouse full of war surplus receiving sets
and tubes. If more radio broadcasts were available, he
figured, more people would become interested in buying

receivers. Davis asked Conrad if he could set up a more

powerful station which would offer a nightly schedule of

broadcasts

.

^5

Conrad and D.G. Little, another veteran amateur radio
enthusiast, oversaw construction of the station's makeshift
studio, a shack really, on the roof of the Westinghouse

factory in East Pittsburgh. At the end of October, the

Department of Commerce granted the company a license,
assigning the call letters KDKA from a roster maintained to
identify ships and shore stations. On November

2,

192 0,

KDKA Radio, It Started Hear: The HiBtory of KDKA
and Radio Broadcasting (Pittsburgh: Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 1970), 2-8.
25
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the

,

night of the Harding-Cox election, six men crowded
into the
shelter beside a microphone, a 100 watt transmitter,
a

couple of telephones and a hand-cranked record player.
A
wire antenna ran from the transmitter to a steel pole and

then to one of the plant's smokestacks. Arrangements had

been made with the Pitteburgh Poet to relay election
results from the newspaper city room to the studio, and

company publicist Leo

H.

Rosenberg stood by to read the

bulletins as they were received. The phonograph was placed
near the microphone to provide musical interludes. KDKA

signed on at six o'clock to begin a broadcast which made
that election day,

social historian Frederick Lewis Allen

suggested a decade later,
someday have to learn.

"a date which school children may

"^^

The number of listeners remains unknown but likely did

not exceed 2,000. There were simply not that many radio

receivers out there. Because Davis understood the potential
of radio broadcasting,

he knew that "a broadcasting station

is a rather useless enterprise unless there is someone to

listen to it." The industry would need a boost in order to
It Started Hear, 2-10; Erik Barnouw, A
History of Broadcasting in the United States, vol. 1, A
Tower in Babel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966)
64-74; Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal
History of the IS20 's{J<Sew York: Harper & Row, 1931, 1964),
64. KDKA, in its fiftieth-anniversary station history,
identifies the original station personnel as Little,
Rosenberg, William Thomas, R.S. McClelland, John Frazier
and W.W. Rodger s Conrad was not present. He was at his
house in nearby Wilkinsburg, ready to go on the air with
his amateur transmitter in case of a malfunction back at
the plant.
26

KDKA,

.
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get started.

"We had a number of simple receiving outfits

manufactured," he recalled,

"These we distributed among

friends and to several officers of the company" who were

instructed to invite their neighbors over to listen to the
broadcast. Another, larger group assembled in the main

ballroom of the Edgewood Club in the suburbs and listened
through a pair of Navy loudspeakers Westinghouse engineers
had scrounged from the factory's supplies.

Farther afield, KDKA's broadcast was picked out of the
air by hams throughout western Pennsylvania, Ohio, West

Virginia and beyond. In Irwin, Pennsylvania, a large crowd
gathered to hear the latest returns while being entertained

by an evening of silent films. The signal was even received
by a startled Marconi operator aboard a troop ship off the

Virginia coast. The captain, fearing a hoax, refused to
announce the resul ts to the crew.
The broadcast's impact was amplified by West inghouse

'

formidable publicity and merchandising campaign and, in the
words of broadcasting historian Erik Barnouw,
national mania.

"^8

"set off a

The choice of election night for the

debut was inspired. What better way to demonstrate the

utility of radio, a medium still mysterious to most
Laurence Bergreen, Look Now, Pay Later: The Rise of
Network Broadcasting- (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1980), 25; KDKA, It Started Hear, 9-10; "Wireless Success
in Broadcasting Returns One of Election Features,"
Pittsburgh Post, November 5, 1920, 16.
27

28

Barnouw, A Tower in Babel,

49

10.

Americans, than by communicating democracy in
action? The
experiment was such a success, the Pitteburgh Poet

predicted "that four years hence the radio method of
sending news of the election at that time will be almost

universally used.

"29

While KDKA's election night broadcast has become
landmark,

a

it was neither unique nor indeed unprecedented.

Wireless pathfinders, their names and experiments lost in
the ether,

had surely radioed election results from point

to point before.

In 1916,

de Forest had broadcast election

returns over his experimental station in New York. In 1920,
some amateurs no doubt tuned in both KDKA and experimental

station 8MK which was announcing the election's outcome to
listeners in the Midwest. The station, a project of Detroit

News publisher and dedicated radio hobbyist William
Scripps, had also transmitted the results of the Michigan

primary in August.
But KDKA's broadcast was different, different

precisely because it was a broadcast, 8MK's election night
experiment was publicized in advance by the Detroit News,

and amateur wireless operators were asked to transmit

reception reports back to Detroit. As Barnouw has noted,
8MK's effort "was thus seen as a project shared by a

brotherhood of initiates." KDKA's broadcast was, on the
other hand,

"something for everyone, a social delight for

"Wireless Success in Broacasting Returns One of
Election Features," 16.
29
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"

home or country club." Rather than speaking to
"radio

operators" huddled over "receiving stations," KDKA

explicitly intended to make radio a mass medium, available
to all without "mysterious knowledge or ritual. "^o
The

radio broadcasting boom was underway.
KDKA was soon joined on the air by other broadcasting
stations, and a small but rapidly growing number of

listeners eagerly sought out their signals. At first,
listeners were not concerned with the content of the

programs they heard. The fact that they could hear voices
speaking to them from across the land was reason enough to
listen. An event that took place within months of KDKA's

debut is instructive.

Kaltenborn,

In April of 1921, Hans von

the editorial writer for the Brooklyn Eagle,

was also a director of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce.

Wouldn't it be exciting, he thought, if the Chamber could
stage a demonstration of this new invention, radio

broadcasting, as part of its annual banquet? A radio

receiver would be installed at the banquet hall, and

Kaltenborn would deliver a brief speech from the studios of
RCA's WJZ across the river in Jersey City. If the

experiment worked, Kaltenborn recalled, it would be "a
wonderful stunt

,

went over to New Jersey, delivered a brief
address, then hurried back to Brooklyn to see
whether it had actually been received. As I came
into the banquet room there was tremendous
I

^0

Barnouw, A Tower in Babel,
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70

.

applause, and I was informed that the experiment
had been a perfect success - they had heard
every word. The miracle of radio had established
Itself with the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce

Kaltenborn had discovered a means of spreading his views
that far surpassed the reach of the Eagle'

editorial page,

b

and he would soon become a familiar voice on the radio.
The
implications of Kaltenborn 's "stunt" soon became apparent
to the business people who heard him that night. The

Chamber members could certainly imagine their corporate
messages magically flowing through the ether to every home
in the borough.

By July 1922,

the government had licensed 382

broadcasting stations. By the end of the year, the total
had climbed to 56 9. The most powerful were sponsored by

corporations which, like RCA, Westinghouse and General
Electric, hoped to profit from the sale of radio receivers.

Others were backed by newspapers, department stores or
hotels seeking publicity, good will and ultimately new

business by providing entertainment, sports scores and news

bulletins to listeners. Schools, colleges, churches and
state and local governments began broadcasting their

messages, adding lectures, sermons and farm market reports
to the mix.

^2

Many early stations were operated by former

amateurs who, like Conrad, were delighted to find financial

Quoted in "The Early Days of Radio,
Heritage, August 19 55, 66-7.
31

"

American

Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, To Amend the Radio Act of 1912, hearings on HR
11964, 67th Cong, 1st Sess., January 2, 1923, 12.
32
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backing that allowed them to pursue their hobby on

a full-

time basis. Other, less fortunate hams upgraded
their

schedules independently and created dozens of underfinanced, part-time stations which helped fill the air
with

sounds
As broadcasting stations multiplied, radio receivers

were soon on the way to becoming the "household utilities"

Sarnoff had foreseen in 1916. Harry Davis was proven right.
If broadcasts were in the ether, people would purchase

radios to hear them. In 1922, Commerce Secretary Hoover

estimated that "over 600,000 persons possess wireless
telephone receiving sets, whereas there were less than

fifty thousand such sets a year ago."^^ Hundreds of radio
shops sprang up around the country. In 1923, consumers
spent $136 million on radio sets and parts; in 1924, the
total rose to $358 million.^'* Only one in twenty American

homes included a radio in 1924, but the trend was clear,
"Here,

"

as Davis would say as he recounted the story of

KDKA to a rapt audience at the Harvard Business School in
1928,

"was an idea of limitless opportunity."^^

Quoted in CM. Jansky, Jr., "The Contribution of
Herbert Hoover to Broadcasting, " iJournal of Broadcasting
(Summer 1957)

,

1

242

Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 94.

sterling and Kitross, Stay Tuned, 656. Radio
penetration in 1924 roughly equaled television penetration
in early 1950.
Quoted in Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 68.
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The booming broadcasting industry
presented a unique
challenge to the free market system. According
to accepted
doctrine, the development of a new product would
attract

entrepreneurs eager to profit from newly created consumer
demand, and the marketplace would decide which ones

survived. While this model might be valid on the
equipment
side,

the proliferation of broadcast stations could not
be

controlled by the laws of supply and demand. Technology and
international treaty agreements limited the size of that

portion of the electromagnetic spectrum which could be
devoted to broadcasting. It was fast becoming apparent that
there was not room on the air to allow all who wished to

broadcast to be clearly heard. The growing number of
stations crowding the airwaves, especially around New York
and Chicago, soon threatened to throw the broadcast band
into unintelligible chaos. The broadcasting industry could
be destroyed by its own success.

Secretary Hoover, charged with regulating radio,

determined early on that the 1912 law "was a very weak
rudder to steer so powerful a development." Studying the
situation, he was impressed, he recalled,

"with three

the immense importance of the spoken radio;

things:

first,

second,

the urgency of placing the new channels of

communication under public control; and, third, the
difficulty of devising such control in a new art." A year
after taking office,

"in our usual fashion of solving

problems wherever possible by cooperation rather than law,
54

.

Hoover moved to bring order to the ether by calling
representatives of the industry to Washington for the first
of what would become a series of four national radio

conferences

^"^
.

Held annually by the Commerce Department between 1922
and 1925, the conferences reflected Hoover's associat ionist
ideals. Taken together,

they demonstrate an attempt to

bring rationality and order to the new medium through the
combined, cooperative efforts of the best minds in public

and private agencies. The conferences faced a formidable
task, but Hoover remained confident that, given time, a

satisfactory course for the industry would emerge.

"The

situation faced is so complicated," the New York Times

cautioned as the first convened, "that it may take a week
or more to formulate recommendations to Congress.

"^^

That

prediction turned out to be far too optimistic.
Each conference managed to handle only a portion of
the problem as broadcasting became increasingly popular and

complex. Reports and studies were drafted each year and

forwarded to Hoover who relied on the recommendations as he

exercised the limited controls granted him under the law.
The conferences became larger and more inclusive each year.

Forty invited delegates attended the first. By 1925, more
Herbert Hoover, The Mewoire of Herbert Hoover: The
Cabinet and the Preeidency 1920-1933 (New York: Macmillan,
37

1952)

,

38

Times,

139 -40

"Asks Radio Experts to Chart the Ether,

February 28, 1922,

16.
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"

New York

.

.

.

than 1,000 took part. Equipment manufacturers and

government officials were well represented as were radio
researchers and members of amateur groups including the

American Radio Relay League eager to protect the hams'
concerns. Broadcasters, too, allied to present a common
front. The National Association of Broadcasters was formed

by twenty station operators in 1923 and avidly supported
Hoover's efforts to bring order to the ether.
Representatives of interest groups ranging from the
National Chamber of Commerce to the American Civil

Liberties Union were also on hand. They understood that the

new medium would be a powerful shaper of public opinion.
Consumers were represented by a growing number of local

radio listeners clubs which sprang up around the nation.
These groups frequently petitioned Congress and the

Commerce Department for action to el iminate interference
The conferences fit Hoover's prescription for finding

solutions to pressing problems through negotiations among

voluntary interest groups

See David Mackey, "The Development of the National
Association of Broadcasters," Journal of Broadcasting- 1
(1956), 305-25. The NAB was originally formed to oppose the
American Society of Composers and Publishers' demand that
broadcasters pay performance rights fees for music played
on the radio. The NAB and ASCAP would spar for years before
reaching a court - imposed armistice in 1941.
39

See Edward F. Sarno, Jr., "The National Radio
Conferences," Journal of Broadcasting 13 (Spring 1969),
189-202
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Hoover was insistent on one thing prior to the start
of the first conference:

The airwaves must belong to the

public and be policed to the extent necessary by the
government. Drawing an analogy with progressive

conservation concerns, Hoover compared the airwaves with
navigable waterways, open to all but monitored by the
state. Government officials should serve as "ether cops" to

control radio traffic, he said, so freedom of the air could
be maintained.

That freedom, he acknowledged, could not

be absolute because "even if we use all the ingenuity

possible

I

do not believe there are enough permutations to

allow unlimited numbers of sending stations."
It becomes of primary public interest to say who
is to do the broadcasting, under what
circumstances, and with what type of
material .... There is in all of this the necessity
to establish public right over the ether

roads.
.There must be no national regret that we
have parted with a great national asset.
.

.

Hoover bel ieved private ownership of radio channels would
create "a monopoly of enormous financial value" which he

compared "to private ownership of a water navigation
channel" and found equally inappropriate. Each of the

conferences in turn endorsed the concept of public

ownership and private use of the airwaves. In keeping with
the "cooperative spirit" that marked his philosophy.

"Hoover to Advise on Radio Control," New York
Times, February 10, 1922, 9.
41
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however, Hoover made no attempt to replace existing
license

holders who were serving the public interest.

^2

By the time the first conference convened, the RCA

patent allies had established themselves as broadcasters.
ATScT

proved especially protective of its patent rights,

raising fears that a monopoly might take control of the
ether.

"It would be most unfortunate for the people of this

country," Hoover told the first conference,

if

broadcasting

"should come into the hands of any single corporation,
individual, or combination.

...

whether this control arose

under a patent monopoly or under any form of
combination.

""^^

As was the case with the question of

private ownership of radio frequencies, however. Hoover

hoped a consensus could be reached. The allies, not as
patient, moved in 1922 to crack down on smaller

manufacturing and broadcasting companies who, they claimed,
were infringing on their patents. Raising high the banner
of "freedom of the air," the independents called on

Congress for protection.'^'*
They found enough support to force a House resolution

directing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the
industry.

In response to the resolution,

Hoover, MewoirG,

14 0-1.

Hoover, Memoirs,

14 3

the FTC issued a

Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of
American Television (New York: Oxford University Press,
44

1977)

,

39-40.
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detailed report in December of 1923, followed a month later
by a formal complaint charging RCA, GE, AT£cT and the other
allies "combined and conspired for the purpose
of

.restraining competition and creating a monopoly in the

manufacture, purchase, and sale... of radio devices
in.

.

.broadcasting.

...

and

"^^

A key ingredient of the cross-licensing pacts created
by the RCA allies gave AT&T the leading role in commercial

broadcasting and Western Electric, its manufacturing
subsidiary,

the right to build transmitters. The telephone

company broadly interpreted commercial broadcasting,
assuming virtually every station which took to the air

ultimately had financial gain in mind. AT&T established a
chain of stations throughout the East and claimed in its
patent infringement suits that other stations were unfairly
us ing patented technology for commercial purposes

.

If

AT&T's suits were won, the New York World warned, a
broadcast monopoly with a unified programming policy would
control the air "and the whole national audience of radio
listeners, which now numbers at least twenty million, will

hear only what this policy dictates that it shall hear.""*^
The nation's industries had become increasingly

centralized over the past half century. The result, the
"Monopoly in Radio by Eight Concerns Charged in
Action," New York Tiwee, January 28, 1924, 1.
Theodore Edwards, "The Radio Monopoly that Menaces
the Freedom of the Air," New York World, March 16, 1924,
editorial section, 1
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permitted to monopolize or control the means of public
communication." When it was suggested that "perhaps the
simple moral philosophy underlying legislation and

government had finally proved inadequate to the burdens
imposed upon it by a complex and intricate mechanical

civilization," Hoover responded,

"I

don't think so.

believe this problem, difficult as it undoubtedly

I

is,

can

be solved on the time -honored principles of common

justice.

"^^

Hoover's dogmatic faith in cooperative,

scientific American individualism remained unshaken. As he

had confidently written at the start of the decade,

"we

have erected organisms that each generation has denounced
as Frankensteins

,

yet the succeeding generation proves them

to be controllable .... Our basic social ideas march through

the new things in the end."^^

But what were those "basic social ideas" Hoover

invoked? Did the emergence of RCA represent a necessary

rationalization of competition which would lead to new
technological breakthroughs and the orderly development of
the medium? Or did it represent a pernicious monopoly which

would stunt the industry by denying freedom of the air to
Herbert Hoover, interview, New York World, March
16, 1924, editorial section, 1. While the World*
interviewer received no byline, the wording of the question
indicates it may well have been Walter Lippmann who had
become the World's editorial page editor in 1923. The
question certainly echoes a major theme in Lippmann 's
writings during the period.
Hoover, American Individualiew

61

,

46-7.

those not admitted to the corporate alliance? All agreed

radio must be operated in the public interest, but how was
that interest to be defined? The question had been framed,

but the answer was unclear.

As the nation debated how best to regulate the new
medium, radio broadcasters themselves constructed its

content. They groped their way toward a successful formula,

drawing on pre-existing media for models. Yet they soon

discovered that model ing- by -analogy had its limits. Visual
images which worked on stage and film to reinforce the

spoken word were, of course,
air. On the other hand,

impossible to duplicate on the

radio enjoyed advantages of sound

which neither print nor film could enjoy. Most importantly,
the medium's immediacy,

its ability to communicate to a

vast audience an event as it happened, was new and

completely different. Broadcasters had to learn how to
transcend the limits and take advantage of the unique
virtues of their new medium.
The content of the earliest radio broadcasts was not
the result of any master plan.

Programming was determined

largely by trial and error and frequently dictated by
expediency. Broadcasters soon discovered how difficult it
was to fill hour after hour of air time with fresh
material. Many early radio stations operated for only a few

hours a day, and the main prerequisite for going on the air
was often the willingness to perform on demand.

62

,

While programming evolved over the years, the goal
of

broadcasters, then and now, remained the same: They sought
to attract an audience. At first,

for the experimenters,

simply reaching anyone at all to prove that it could be
done was sufficient reason to take to the air. Soon,
however, broadcasters set their sights on different goals.

As broadcasters realized how much it cost to operate radio
stations, they came to understand that audiences once

assembled could be exploited.
Radio's product is its audience. Broadcasters speak of

selling time, but what they are actually selling is access
to the audience which they have attracted.

If private

enterprises were expected to operate radio stations,

private sources of funding would have to be developed.

Advertising became the industry's lifeblood but remained a
sensitive topic throughout the 1920s. Hoover told the first

radio conference "it is inconceivable that we should allow
so great a possibility for service to be drowned in

advertising chatter.

Direct advertising — unabashed

"^^

sales pitches for consumer products and services — arrived

gradually and always amid considerable hue and cry.
Indirect advertising — promotion, publicity, good will

aimed at moving goods more discreetly — was there from the

beginning

51

Hoover, Memoirs

,

14 0.

63

RCA and its allies operated their stations to promote
the new industry. The costs could be written off as

promotional and advertising expenses. As broadcast
schedules expanded and costs rose, however, station

operators began casting about for new revenue. Here, an

analogy with established media offered a solution.
Telephone and telegraph companies had long charged others
for the use of their systems. Why not extend the practice
to radio? AT&T inaugurated "toll broadcasting" in 1922,

selling fifteen minutes of air time on
station,

WEIAF,

its New York

to a real estate developer who extolled the

virtues of life in bucolic Queens. Gradually, other

advertisers followed suit

.

Advertising agencies purchased

blocks of time and created programs that both reflected
their clients' chosen images and attracted audiences.

Agencies and trade journals realized radio was a powerful

medium for communication, capable of bringing personal
messages into every consumer'

s

home but constantly warned

clients that the medium had to be carefully used. Vulgar

programming and intrusive hucksterism could offend
listeners and discourage sales.

Advertising might be vulgar, but what was the
alternative? "The largest unsolved question in this entire
problem," Hoover said in 1924,

"is the problem of

remuneration for broadcasting stations."
Roland Marchand, Advertieing the An^erican Dream
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 89-94.
52
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The man who evolves a practical and fair way of
compensating them will have cracked the hardest
nut in the bowl. The British Government meets
this by licensing receiving instruments, and
imposing a tax out of which broadcasting stations
are remunerated. We cannot do that. It would make
the Government responsible for the programs,
which would lead to an impossible situation'.

Despite the presence on the air of numerous stations

licensed to government agencies, usually state land grant
colleges, government broadcasting was widely seen as

inimical to "freedom of the air." With government funding

equated with government control, advertising gradually came
to be seen as a necessary evil. The debate concerned what

form radio advertising would take and what regulatory role
if any the government would play. As media critic Gilbert

Seldes explained,

"the plat itudinists and the propagandists

may make the air unclean; they are, however, the price

which has to be paid for freedom of the air.

"^"^

As broadcasters experimented with programming in the
192 0s,

they found that among the things their new medium

did exceedingly well was deliver the news. The immediacy of

radio and the timeliness of news seemed a perfect fit. And
as broadcasters sought to create popular programming, news

was an area they sought to exploit. As they tried to define
their new medium, they also tried to define news and figure
out how to bring news to the people without offending

government regulators who controlled access to the ether.

World interview,

53

Hoover,

54

Gilbert Seldes,

1.

"Listening In," The New Republic,

March 23, 1927, 140-41.
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Defining radio news is a more complex task than might
be assumed. Historian David Paul Nord suggested news is
"the reporting of current public occurrences." While the

definition remained constant, he cautioned, "the meaning of
each of the key terms — occurrence, public, current, and
reporting-

—

is contingent on the social contexts of the

time and place.

"^^

gy including both "reporting" and

"occurrences" in his definition, Nord reminds us that when
we discuss the news, we are discussing both events

themselves and the sharing of information about events.

Radio broadcasters from the beginning shared information
about public occurrences with their listeners. The medium,
however, did more than that. For the first time, thanks to
radio,

the audience could share in the event itself as it

occured. For our purposes, a broad definition of news

borrowed from communications historian Mitchell Stephens
perhaps the most useful:

is

"new information about a subject

of some public interest that is shared with some portion of

the publ ic

.

David Paul Nord, "Teleology and News: The Religious
Roots of American Journalism, 1630-1730," Journal of
American History 77 (June 1990), 7. Emphasis in the
original Nord argued that modern day news reports often
echo colonial era sermons and pamphlets reflecting the
predictable teleological patterns of God's revealed plan.
Both, he suggested, include news of horrors and disasters
which fit archetypal patterns. Today, however, in a
pluralistic society lacking a shared world view, "no one
knows what the stories mean."
55

.

Mitchell Stephens, A History of News: From the Drum
to the Satellite (New York: Penguin, 1988, 1989), 9.
56
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Technology, commercial imperativec and explicit and

implicit policiec of both the inductry and the government
all helped chape radio newc,

ac did the cultural and cocial

milieuG from which the firet broadcacterc emerged. Many
came to the new medium from newcpaperc and arrived with the

print medium's profeccional baggage in hand. Otherc came
from public relatione or the performing arte or simply

walked in off the street and developed their journalistic
techniques and standards as they went along. They all found
themselves in the business of transmitting information to
the public and they could accomplish that in different
ways. A practical definition of radio news gradually

emerged.

One method was familiar, rooted in the origins of
speech. An event could be observed and later described to
the audience. Newspapers had been doing this for

generations, because it aped the way all individuals

communicate with one another. Or, and this was the unique
virtue of radio, the event could be transmitted directly to
the audience as it happened, without obvious mediation.

Each method was intended to transmit news, information of
interest to the publ ic

Early broadcasters soon began including news
headlines, weather reports, commodity market prices and

baseball scores in their programs. The first scheduled

—
newscasts — scripted summaries of the day's events
probably were heard over WWJ in Detroit, the station that
67

began as 8MK, but the practice spread quickly across
the
country.

57

gy 1922, KYW, the Westinghouse station in

Chicago, was airing frequent newscasts. In January,

the

station began broadcasting news summaries from the offices
of Hearst's Chicago Eveningr American. By the end of the

year, KYW launched its ambitious "World Crier" round-the-

clock coverage. Station staffers wrote and announced news

bulletins on the hour and half -hour, twenty- four hours a
day,

based on material provided by the Chicago Evening-

Standard.

58

Listeners soon discovered they did not have to

wait for the local newspaper to be delivered to learn the
latest news.

While newscasts created interest, live broadcasts of

events as they happened created a sensation. Using

telephone lines to link microphones in the field to their
transmitters, radio stations brought all kinds of

information to their listeners. KDKA broadcast

a service

from the Calvary Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh on January
2,

1921 in what is generally believed to be the first

remote broadcast. Two Westinghouse engineers, wearing

surplices to avoid attention, set up their equipment and
Irving E. Fang, Those Radio Comment atore ! (Ames,
Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1977), 5.
57

Joseph E. Baudino, "The Story of KYW, " speech to
Delaware Valley Chapter of the Broadcast Pioneers,
Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, September, 24, 1975, KTW station
folder, Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC. KYW is
one of the most traveled of all broadcast call signs, first
assigned to Chicago and then Philadelphia before being
transferred to Cleveland and finally back to Philadelphia.
58

68

,

.

relayed the services back to the studio. The rector noted
that one engineer was Jewish and the other Roman Catholic,
a symbol,

religion,

he said,

of "the real universality of radio

"^^

In April,

KDKA broadcast a prize fight and, later that

summer, a Pittsburgh Pirates baseball game from Forbes
Field.

Warren Harding's speech dedicating a Baltimore

^0

monument to Francis Scott Key was broadcast in 1922,

Woodrow Wilson made his final appeal for the League of
Nations by radio on Armistice Day eve,

Three months

1923.

later, Wilson's funeral was carried on stations in

Washington, New York and Providence. ATkT had discovered
that its network of telephone

1

ines could transmit a

program to radio stat ions in several cities

allowing

,

scattered listeners to be united into an audience far
larger than any single station could command.

Broadcasters also invited speakers into their studios.
The medium opened its microphones to the folksy and the
the amusing and the inspirational,

erudite,

KDKA,

It Started Hear,

speakers who

12.

charnley. News by Radio, 5. Broadcasts of sporting
events, especially the World Series and Jack Dempsey's
heavyweight title fights, were seen as means to induce men
to purchase radios and were heavily promoted. The same
pattern would be followed during the television boom
following the Second World War. See Benjamin Rader, In Its
Own Image: How Television has Transformed Sports (New York:
Free Press, 1984)
^0

Edward Bliss, Jr., Now The News: The Story of
Broadcast Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
^1

1991)

,

17
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could fill the ether with practical advice or
learned
explanation. Listeners sweeping the airwaves came
across

pastors and politicos, professors and polemicists in
profusion. Often, to the delight of both the speakers and
the broadcasters,

they stopped to listen. These studio

speeches, which broadcasters simply called talks, covered

every conceivable topic and have too often been ignored

when we look back at broadcast news. They were, however, a
radio staple and a leading source of information.
The public took to news broadcasts of all sorts in

astounding numbers and with astounding speed. The
technology of radio, however, blurred the distinction among
different types of information programming

.

While

information in a newspaper or magazine clearly passed
through many hands before reaching its audience, radio gave
the public the illusion of direct communication with

reality. A newspaper, historian William Stott noted, offers
a "report of experience,

experience .... Direct
newspaper,

,

not the experience. Radio provides

on-the-spot coverage, impossible in a

is in a sense perpetual on radio. "^^ No longer

did the public have to wait to read all about

it.

A

newspaper could offer its readers a digest of an event only
after it had been filtered through the cumbersome machinery
of print. With radio, people could actually listen to the

William Stott, Documentary Experience and ThirtieG
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1986),
6-

82,

70

.

.

event as it happened and interpret every nuance, every

inflection for themselves.
Furthermore,

the role of the announcer was far

different than that of the v/riter. The printed word cool,

logical,

the announcer

linear - provided distance. The voice of

- human, emotional, seemingly spontaneous

even when carefully rehearsed - served as a direct link

between the audience and the event. Hearing an event
described was different than reading about

it.

When an

announcer described an event that was occurring before his
eyes,

the listener's experience was immediate,

intimate and

real

Heywood Broun, one of the most influential newspaper
columnists of the 1920s, described what it was like to
listen to the World Series on the radio:
[Announcer Graham] McNamee individualized and
particularized every emot ion He made me feel the
temperature and the tension. The wind hit him and
.No mere ticker report
deflected off to me
could be in any way comparable, because McNamee
allowed you to follow the ball on the wing. The
instant it left the pitcher's hand, the radio
audience knew it was speeding on its way. The
sound of the bat against the ball, the cry of the
crowd, the swift dash after the fly — all that
came to consciousness
.

.

.

.

Heywood Broun, forward to You*re On the Air by
Graham McNamee with Robert Gordon Anderson (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1926), vi Prior to radio. Western Union
provided pitch-by-pitch coverage by telegraph ticker, and
sports fans gathered in public places to follow the games.
See Eight Men Out (1988), John Sayles, dir., for an
especially evocative portrayal.
.
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Tne announcer was more than a reporter, more than
an

observer. He became the listener's surrogate, a direct
link
to the event,

indeed an inseparable part of the event

itself. Listener and announcer conspired to create a shared

version of reality.
Radio, Marshall McLuhan suggested, extends our senses

over vast distances,

"contracts the world to village size,

and creates insatiable village tastes for gossip, rumor,
and personal malice.

"^^

Yet it could also become, as

President Hoover among many others hoped,

"a new means of

widespread communication of intelligence that has the most
profound importance from the point of view of public
education and public welfare.

These two opinions are not

necessarily contradictory. Radio allowed its audience to
hear the words of pres idents

,

descr ipt ions of boxing

matches and discussions of cooking, child-rearing and new

technologies

.

Each disparate broadcast provided new

information. Through their radios,

listeners learned of and

shared a new and wider world.
Thanks in large part to the efforts of the radio

conferences and hard-pressed Commerce Department staffers,
a degree of order survived in broadcasting despite the

tumult.

Still,

the airwaves grew increasingly cluttered

Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The
Exteneions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hall, 1964, 1965), 305.
^4

Hoover, Memoirs

,

14 0

Hoover, the Commerce Department, broadcasters and
the radio conferences did undertake significant reforms
72

.

and,

for listeners,

finding a clear signal often required a

great deal of patience and some technical expertise.
As

sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd discovered when they

assessed the impact of the new medium on Muncie, Indiana
in
1924,

"far from being simply one more means of passive

enjoyment,

the radio has given rise to much ingenious

manipulative activity.

"^7

The radio boom, many observers

believed, heralded a popular awakening of interest in

science and engineering among the youth of America.

"Tuning

in on a distant station," suggested one commentator in

defense of the hobby,

"is a good deal like hunting for an

unknown scientific fact." Youngsters who devoted hours to
solving the problems of radio would find they had developed
"exactly the mental habits most in demand in the larger

field of general research."^® Listeners dubbed "DXers" or
"distance hounds" fiddled with their receivers in hopes of

between 1922 and 192 5 including periodic shifting and
prior it iz ing of usable frequencies within the broadcast
band, establ ishing geographic and frequency spacing among
exist ing stat ions and set t ing power 1 imi tat ions Technology
also helped keep the situation somewhat under control.
Improved transmitters kept stations closer to their
assigned frequencies and power while superhetrodyne tubed
receivers, far more discriminating than previously common
crystal sets, enabled listeners to better sort out
competing signals
.

Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown:
A Study in American Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
269.
World, 1929, 1956)
^'^

,

Willis R. Whitney, quoted in "Radio a TrainingSchool for Science," Literary Digest March 15, 1924, 22.
Douglas discusses the "populist technology" of early radio
at length in Inventing American Broadcasting, 187-215.
^8

Dr.

,
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pulling in signals carrying information and entertainment
from across the country. The radio audience was not
passive. Listeners were active participants in the new
medium.
The 1912 law remained,

however,

"a weak rudder"

that

continued to function only because of nearly universal
consent to Hoover's administration. During the conference
years,

several attempts were made to amend or replace the

law to strengthen government regulation. As Hoover noted,
these reforms were doomed by "the very success of the

voluntary system we had created. Members of Congressional
committees kept saying,
bother?

'"^^

however,

'It

is working well,

so why

There was a time bomb hidden in the

lav/,

and it dealt with the licensing power of the

Secretary of Commerce.
While the law required every wireless operator to

obtain a license,

it was unclear whether the Secretary of

Commerce could use his discretion in awarding permits or

whether any applicant who met the rudimentary standards of
the law, written before the broadcast era began, had to be

issued a license. If it was, as Hoover said, a "primary

public interest to say who is to do the broadcasting, under
what circumstances, and with what type of material," a

measure of discretion was mandatory. Hoover, however,

doubted he had the authority under the law to deny any
Hoover, Memoirs,

142
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legitimate application. Republican Representative
Wallace
H.

White, Jr. of Maine, a delegate to the first radio

conference, agreed and in 1923 filed legislation that would

bring the law up to date and make it clear "that it is not

mandatory on the Secretary to issue a license, but is in
his discretion to issue licenses only when the public

service will be benefited thereby.

""^^

One month after the first hearings were held on

White's bill, the courts moved to limit Hoover's authority.
The case involved a New York company which sent point-to-

point messages for commercial customers

.

Because the

messages caused interference with several New York area
broadcasters, Hoover denied a new license. The company
sued,

and the federal Court of Appeals ordered Hoover to

issue the renewal. Congress, the court ruled after

reviewing the legislative history of radio regulation,
"

intended fully to regulate the business of radio

telegraphy, without leaving it to the discretion of an

executive." Some level of interference is inevitable on the
airwaves,

the court noted,

"hence the

[1912]

act undertakes

to prescribe regulations by which interference may be

minimized rather than prevented." Therefore, interference
alone was not sufficient grounds for disapproval. Hoover,
the court said, must issue a license.

"The only

discretionary act is in selecting a wave length.

which,

House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
HR 119 6 4 hearings 20
70

,
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in

:

.

his judgment, will result in the least possible

interference,

""^i

Those involved with the new industry understood the

implications of the Intercity decision but despaired of an
immediate solution.

"Since the last Conference

I

feel more

strongly than ever that legislation is needed," White wrote
to an AT&T executive in 1924,

"and yet

I

suspect there is

less demand for it than heretofore."

There seems to be a general willingness on the
part of all interests to let things ride as they
are. It is my view that this state of mind comes
from the unusual confidence which all those
interested in the Radio industry have in Hoover.
I cannot think of anyone else who could exert
such an influence over the situation as he does.
When a change comes to the Secretaryship I look
for much less harmony in Radio ranks, and I would
not be surprised to see an awful mess follow. "^^
If faith in Hoover was one reason for a lack of

congressional action, the difficulty of drafting an

acceptable bill was also daunt ing

.

Complex technical

questions had to be answered, and most members had little
expert ise in the new medium

.

Senator Burton

K.

Wheeler of

Montana recalled an exchange after one hearing with
president Merlin Aylesworth of the National Broadcasting

Company

After he got through... he followed me out and
wanted to know what I thought of his testimony.
And I said I didn't know [if] he was telling the

Hoover
1007

,

Intercity Radio, 286

F.

(1923),

1003 at

.

White to Eugene
White Papers
72

42

v.

S.

Wilson, October 30,

76

1924,

box

.

truth or not telling the truth because I didn't
understand enough about radio and neither did
anybody else on that commi t tee
For the time being,

it seemed,

the beet and safest action

was inaction. Meanwhile, the industry and its influence

continued to grow.
The election year 1924, many observers proclaimed,
would,

thanks to radio, mark a new era in politics.

The

Nation predicted that
every important speech will go out on the air to
hundreds of thousands, sometimes to millions, who
would never dream of packing themselves into
tight stuffy halls to hear the candidates .... More
effective than pamphlets, mass meetings, or
street orations will be these speeches to the
great home audiences receiving through the single
sense of hearing. It is something new in
politics, something totally, amazingly new.
Radio, Owen D. Young asserted, represented "a great hope
for democracy.

""^^

The people could participate fully in the

"The most reactionary newspaper," Senator Robert

process.

La Follette of Wisconsin predicted,

"will fear to twist

facts which thousands of its readers receive directly by

radio

.

"

"^^

Burton K. Wheeler, interviewed by Ed Craney,
September 30, 1964, oral history file, Broadcast Pioneers
Library, Washington, DC, n. p
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5

"Politics By Radio," The Nation, January

2,

1924,

.

Quoted in Eunice Fuller Barnard,
The New Republic, March 19, 1924, 91.
75

"Radio Politics,"

Quoted in J.H. Morecroft, "The March of Radio,"
Padio Broadcast, October 1924, 476.
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Both AT^T and RCA announced they hoped to accemble
networks of ctationc to cover the party conventionG, the

campaign and the inauguration. If cuch radio coverage wac
totally new to politicians and the public,

new to the broadcacterc

.

it was

equally

The election year would test both

radio's technical limits and the talents of broadcasters.
Both major parties agreed to allow radio to broadcast
their nominating conventions, dipping into their campaign
funds to underwrite the cost. The Republicans' three -day

Cleveland coronation of Calvin Coolidge passed without
incident in June, causing only modest public response.

After hearing the Republicans on the radio, the Democrats
agreed to pay ten thousand dollars for access to ATkT'o
chain of stat ions

.

"Many shrewd observers bel ieve

Kal tenborn noted two years later,

never spent to worse purpose.

""^"^

,

"

H V.
.

"that campaign funds were

Shattered by the Ku Klux

Klan and League of Nations issues

,

hamstrung by the unit

and two- thirds vot ing rules which kept front - runners Al f red
E.

Smith and William Gibbs McAdoo from the nomination, the

Democrats wrestled through seventeen days and 103 ballots
in a classic political brawl before settling their

nomination on John

W.

Davis.

Graham McNamee, whose World Series broadcasts so
impressed Heywood Broun, was the lead announcer for WEAF
and AT5cT's network of stations, the largest yet assembled,
H.V. Kaltenborn,
October 192 6 6 74 - 5
77

"On The Air," Century Magazine,

,

78

,

reaching as far west as Kansas City.^e Major

J.

Andrew

White announced for a smaller chain of RCA stations

clustered in the Northeast. Neither broadcaster knew what
he was getting into. As McNamee later wrote,

precedents or rules to guide us.

.

"there were no

.all we really knew was

that people met and somehow got together on a candidate

""^^
.

In Cleveland, the Republican convention had gone according
to script.

The broadcasters had merely introduced the

scheduled speakers, let the band play a rousing medley and
gone home. The New York convention promised to be more

raucous and less predictable. At the outset, neither chain

committed itsel f to complete gavel - to -gavel coverage
promising only

"

full or partial reports " of the proceedings

but cautioning that regular programming was "subject to

cancel 1 at ion or postponement in favor of convention

The number of stations which actually broadcast
WEIAF s coverage remains unclear. Contemporary press reports
based on information provided by AT&T first indicated
eighteen stations — WEAF and seventeen affiliates —
planned to air the convention, but subsequent press
references mention twenty -one or twenty- three af f il iates
linked by either telephone lines or over-the-air pick-ups,
rebroadcasting another station's signal. Given the unclear
regulatory climate of 1924, it seems likely that some
smaller stations pirated portions of the broadcast making a
final count impossible. McNamee wrote that twenty- seven
stations carried at least some of the coverage. McNamee,
You're on the Air, 79.
'

79

McNamee,

You re on the Air,
^

79

70-1.

.

reports.

"80

Both the radio stations and their announcers

would learn as they went.
The men on the air could have looked to newspaper

reporters for guidance, but they knew because their medium
was different,

their job was different, too. McNamee

especially saw himself as an announcer rather than

a

journalist, an important distinction. An announcer's
skills,

he believed,

included a good voice, organizational

skills and, perhaps most importantly, what he called "the

ability to harmonize, synchronize, and be on time."^! The
announcer served as the listener's gracious host,
identifying new voices, explaining what was going on,

making the listener comfortable while all the time keeping
the broadcast on schedule. His job was not to analyze,

criticize or distract in any way from the featured

attraction
McNamee understood the virtues of preparation and much

preferred to work from a script or detailed notes. He spent
what time he could before the convention touring the Garden
"Hour by Hour in the Air Today, " New York World,
June 28, 1924, 27. The same disclaimer appeared in each
day's radio program log throughout the convention.
®^

McNamee, You're on the Air, GO. McNamee was a
concert singer before joining WEIAF. When he visited the
station's studios one day, his warm baritone voice and
pleasant manner impressed the management, and he was
offered a job, McNamee always claimed he was simply curious
to see what a radio station looked like and had no
intention of asking for work. For an appreciation of
McNamee '6 style and versatility, see Red Barber, The
Broadcasters (New York: Dial, 1970), 19-53.
81

80

with a publicist employed by the arena's operator,
legendary boxing promoter Tex Rickard, and a stenographer
in tow. McNamee was not in search of the latest
delegate

tally or details of platform debates which, he feared,
were
"of little interest to anyone not a politician." Instead,

he was collecting anecdotes about the building's past

—

"filler-in stuff," McNamee called it - to use during "dead
spots in the program." When a speaker arrived at the
podium, McNamee would be silent. The convention itself,

after all, was the real attraction. McNamee

'

s

preferences

and the party's interests coincided on this point. A party

publicist screened the announcer's notes before he went on
the air, warning,

"Remember, young man,

I

want to see every

word you send out," a reminder that radio was being allowed
to broadcast at the party's sufferance and for the party's
good.

^2

Given the ongoing debate over control of the airwaves
in the 192 0s, broadcasters had good reason to be careful

not to offend the powers that be. The party leaders at the

New York convention could when they returned to Washington
change the way radio licenses were awarded and radio

stations operated, perhaps jeopardizing the very future of
the industry. Accordingly,

the broadcasters often proved

eager to muzzle themselves and accepted explicit or

92

McNamee,

You're on the Air, 79-81.

81

implicit restrictions on coverage that newspapers
rejected
out of hand.

When WEAF and the AT&T stations broadcast an address
to Congress by President Coolidge in December,

1923,

for

example, McNamee went to Washington to announce the event.

Radio had never broadcast a presidential address to
Congress, and McNamee had no specific instructions, other

than to introduce the president and cue the studio in New
York when the event was over.
As the speech progressed, McNamee began taking notes

on the backs of envelopes.

"I

had begun just for the fun of

the thing," he later wrote, but since some listeners no

doubt had tuned in after the speech began,
a bad idea,

I

"it would not be

thought, to recapitulate it for them." When

Coolidge finished, McNamee announced that the president had
just concluded an address to a joint session of Congress

and read his hastily-composed summary.
Afterwards, McNamee was quite pleased with himself. As
he read newspaper accounts of the speech,

he noted that the

passages he had highlighted in his summary were the same
points the reporters had mentioned in their stories. Mail
from listeners was positive as well. Management back at the
station, however, did not view McNamee

'

s

initiative as

favorably.
It was decided not to repeat the practice on
other such occasions. While this time it had been
done without offense, it is obvious that there
could be complications, should the broadcaster be
indiscreet or too partial in his summarizing, and

82

stress certain points too much while ignoring
others ®^
.

The anecdote is early evidence of cautious,

deferential attitudes within the industry and raises

intriguing questions. Who, for example, might take offense
at an announcer's summary that was too partial? By all

indications, the audience had approved of the innovation.

What complications might develop? As McNamee broadcast from
the Capitol, White's radio legislation was before Congress,
its final shape still unclear. Of more immediate concern,

Federal Trade Commission investigators were probing the

radio industry and, a month later, would issue their

monopoly complaint against the patent allies.

ATScT had

ample motive to be wary of "complications."

Convention fever spread slowly at first. To publicize
both its broadcasts and the medium itself, WEAF erected
loudspeakers outside New York's City Hall to bring the

proceedings to passers-by. The experiment, a newspaper
reporter decided early in the event, was "a flat failure."
Those who paused were "bored to death by the voices which
came over the radio." One women listened for a time and

dismissed the entire affair, saying it was "just like alot
of men - to spend the whole day talking.

"^"^

As the

convention went on, however, public interest soared.
®^

McNamee,

You're on the Air, 68-9.

"City Hall Park Thinks Convention All Talk," New
York World, June 29, 1924, 8. See also photographs of the
scene in the World, June 28, 1924, 1; June 29, 1924, 3S;
July 3, 1924, 5.
84

83

.

Before it was over,

the broadcast had become a rousing

success. AT&T estimated an audience of up to twenty
million

listeners had tuned in for at least part of the
proceedings, and New York City police said they noticed a

marked slackening in midtown traffic when the convention
was on the air. Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana, the

convention's chairman, became an audience favorite.
Governor Jim Brandon's drawling declaration at the start of
each roll call — "Alabama casts twenty- four votes for

Oscar

Underwood!" — turned into a comic catch phrase.

W.

Even the clerk who called the roll of the states became a
minor celebrity. The Cleveland Plain Dealer published a

photograph of party functionary P.J. Halligan to satisfy
its curious readers

One newspaper proclaimed the convention had stimulated
"more interest.

.

.than has been evoked by any other event

since Marconi first made the ether run errands for

mankind

.

"

®^

In Boston, where radio loudspeakers were

erected outside a downtown newspaper office, large crowds

gathered to hear "the voice of democracy." Listeners
spilled off the sidewalk and into the street, the men's
summertime skimmers turning Tremont Street into "a garden

"You've Heard Him Over Radio. He Calls Democratic
Vote Roll," photograph, Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 4,
®5

1924,

2.

"Sleepy Millions Alert for Break and Last Ballot,"
New York World, July 6, 1924, 6M.

84

of straw hats. "87 A New York newspaperman
vacationing in

Maine thought he had at last escaped the convention
until
"from a large horn protruding from a store window as

passed came a terrifying sound.
der-wo-o-o-od' it said.

I

'Twenty-four votes for Un-

"88

The brightest star to emerge from the broadcasts was

McNamee. Hour after hour, day after day, he was the

listener's companion and guide. Throughout the convention,
he avoided political comments and leavened the broadcasts

with the background material he had so carefully gathered,
not always to the best effect. He opened one broadcast with

what a Boston critic summarized as "a dreary historical
sketch,

in which he described New York as it was during the

last national convention held there back in eighteen- fifty

something

.

"

8^

When he did offer observat ions on the

proceedings, careful listeners noted, he limited himself to

personal asides and attempts at humor based on the length
of the affair.

"McNamee made his usual prediction prior to

the opening of the evening session,

"

the convention reached its midpoint,

a reviewer noted as

"Mac is an optimistic

bird. He hopes and believes every session will be the

"Convention News on Herald Radio, " Boston Herald,
July 2, 1924, 24; "Convention Doings Still Draw Crowds,"
Boston Herald, July 4, 1924, 14.
87

88

July

12,

Oliver H.P. Garrett,
1924,

"Perspective," New York World,

9.

Charles Burton, "Review of Last Night's Radio,"
Boston Herald, July 2, 1924, 24.
89

85

last. "90 The next day,

announcing,

he opened his broadcast with a joke,

"This is the Democratic national convention.

We've decided to leave out that other word (nominating)
for
the present and let nature take its course. "^i

Inevitably, a few unplanned or embarrassing utterances

slipped into the ether and proved memorable. "The profane
and exasperated asides of party managers" which reached the
still -sensitive ears of the folks back home created "the

sensation of the moment in the radio world.

convention clerk Halligan misstated

when

delegation's vote

listeners could hear partisans on the floor

total,

clamoring for a correction.
that,

a

"^2

"It was little things like

the New York Timee suggested,

"

"and not the larger

happenings, that gave the listener-in the feeling of actual

presence at the convention.

"^3

The people listened, not with patriotic fervor but

with a certain morbid fascination. Captivated by the
broadcasts, they were, witnesses tell us, appalled by the

event itself. A Boston newspaper opined on the Fourth of
"There is something fascinating about this

July,

Charles Burton, ""Review of Last Night's Radio,"
Boston Herald, July 4, 1924, 14.
90

Quoted in "Listening In at the Globe," Boston
Evening Globe, July 5, 1924.
91

"Electioneering on the Air," The New Republic,
September 3, 1924, 8.
92

93

Times,

"As Present Though Miles Away," editorial.
July 2, 1924, 18.
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New York

If g

convention.
it,
P.

like a dud firecracker. There's no fun in

but it might go off.
Adamc,

"94

to newspaper columnict Franklin

the broadcast c were a welcome corrective. The

press corps had in past years, he wrote, been able to
filter out much of political "bunk" before it reached the

public and render both the rhetoric and those responsible
for it acceptable. Now,

thanks to radio,

learning that the bunk is fundamental
wonders,

.

the electorate "is

And wonder of

is learning to cast an off eye at the political

it

prophets of the daily papers and say,

'Is

THAT so!'"^^

If the convention demystified the politicians,

the

announcers, most agreed, were not to blame. The broadcasts,

by allowing the

"

1

isteners - in the actual feeling of

presence at the convention,
"Radio,

"

"

had simply exposed the truth.

a popular radio magazine proclaimed,

"demonstrated

its ability to spread information as no other medium

possibly could." McNamee was commended for his "tact, keen
observation, and a charm of manner;" White, for "his

careful observation and extraordinarily fine descriptive
powers.

"9^

Some listeners insisted, however, they could

detect spoken and unspoken biases over the air. One critic

reported that "White, than whom there is no smoother talker
9^

Boston Herald, July

95

F.P.A. [Franklin
New York World, July 10,

P.

4,

1924,

Adams],

1924,

14.

"The Conning Tower,"

13.

Morecroft, "The March of Radio," Radio
Broadcaet, September 1924, 399.
96 J.H.

87

in the radio world, gives evidence that
he is disgusted

with the convention" as the roll calls droned
on while
McNamee "strives to keep up a cheerful tone. "97
Another
suggested McNamee had been told to pull his punches

because

"he was reporting for stations and listeners
of conflicting

political opinions from Atlanta to Kansas City, St.
Louis,
Chicago and Canada. "^^

McNamee never claimed to be an analytical journalist,
and he had been warned by both his employers and party

officials not to give offense. Despite his best intentions,
however,

the intimate relationship between the listener and

the announcer created a special bond which undermined his

attempts to remain a neutral observer. McNamee would later
marvel at "the extent to which radio has become a part of
the life and habits of our people." When he traveled the

country, McNamee said listeners would regularly approach

him as if he were an old friend "merely because

I

am part

of that machine. "95 Because the announcer was their friend,

listeners naturally empathized with him. They put

themselves in his place and mingled their emotions, biases

and predispositions with his.

"McNamee and White Convention Heroes,
Sunday Herald, July 6, 1924, 8.
97

"

(Boston)

and McNamee are Heroes of
Convention," New York World, July 13, 1924, 9E.
98

"Walsh, White,

Graham McNamee, "Behind the Mike," American
Magazine, April 1928, 26.
99
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The earliest broadcasters often noted the intensely

personal bond between speaker and auditor. Kaltenborn

recalled that while readers often commented on points
raised in his newspaper editorials, when he spoke on the
radio,

"at first,

it was only the fact

that they heard you

that listeners reported.

What you said was relatively unimportant. The
phrase, "Your voice came into my living room as
clear as a bell," occurred in hundreds of
letters. That was the miracle, the marvel; that
you could actually be heard. It was only later
that listeners began to comment on what I said,
and not on the fact that they heard what I
said.

By 1924,

the personal bond between announcer and listener

continued, but the audience was also becoming increasingly

aware of what it heard on the radio. For the broadcasters,
this was a decidedly mixed blessing. The medium was being

forced to take responsibility for its content.
While McNamee described himself as an announcer,

Kaltenborn proudly claimed the mantle as radio's first news
analyst and saw himself as a trailblazer for commentators

who would follow.

"I

was the first person to interpret the
"No one else had tried

news on the air," he boasted.
it. "101

while McNamee took it in stride when he was warned

not to give offense, Kaltenborn, a self-conscious and self-

Kaltenborn, "Reminiscences," 1950, 62, in the
Radio Pioneers project of the Oral History Collection of
Columbia University, hereafter Kaltenborn, COHC. Emphasis
in original
100 H.V.

101

Kaltenborn, COHC, 66.

89

:

confident advocate of vigorous free speech throughout
his
long career, called such suggestions censorship.

Kaltenborn was never presented with a specific list of
topics or opinions which were considered out of bounds, but
he understood station management was listening to what he
said. This was especially true at WEAF.

that in case

I

"I

was later told,

got off the beam and said anything too

utterly outrageous," he recalled, "they were prepared to
cut me off and bring in the piano player. "^^2

Kaltenborn believed broadcasters served an important
public role in a democracy. He brought his newspaper
training with him to the new medium and maintained that

radio was simply a new vehicle for an old, activist
message
always believed that the press had a very high
mission in our Republic, both to inform public
opinion, to reflect public opinion, and to create
publ ic opinion All three functions are essent ial
if the press is to perform its duty. In the same
way, I felt that radio should inform, reflect,
and create public opinion.
I

.

This was an optimistic, progressive view that the press, to

paraphrase Justice Brandeis, could cleanse society with
sunshine. This activist view, what the muckraking

journalists at the turn of the century called "the
literature of exposure," was to Kaltenborn and others the
Kaltenborn, "The Early Days of Radio," 67;
Kaltenborn, COHC, 63, 113-4. Kaltenborn stated his fee was
$100 per talk.
103

Kaltenborn, COHC,

115.

90

Emphasis in the original.

.

reason a free press existed.

"There is only one way to get

a democracy on its feet," newspaper publisher
Joseph

Pulitzer had said,

"and that is by keeping the public

informed." Democracy could cure itself of any ill, he
insisted,

if the people had the facts.

"Get these things

out in the open, describe them, attack them, ridicule them
in the press," Pulitzer insisted,

"and sooner or later

public opinion will sweep them away.

"lo^ Radio,

Kaltenborn

and others believed, should follow the same path.
The leaders of the industry were not so certain.

Crusades could anger listeners, advertisers and,
importantly,

federal regulators. While Kaltenborn was never

dragged away from the microphone in mid broadcast, his
commentaries, delivered during airtime purchased by his
newspaper, were moved from station to station because

nervous broadcasters, he said,

"were unwilling to have me

provoke and antagonize sections of the audience

.

"^o^

Station managers were particularly sensitive to

provocations which antagonized those in power.
On one occasion. Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes angrily called the president of AT&T to demand that

Quoted in Alleyne Ireland, Joseph Pulitzer:
ReminiBcencee of a Secretary (New York: Mitchell Kennerly,
1914)

,

115

David G. Clark, "H.V. Kaltenborn and his
Sponsors," Journal of Broadcasting 12 (Fall 1968), 319;
Kaltenborn, COHC, 114. Kaltenborn did not leave the
Brooklyn Eagle and become a full-time radio commentator
until 1930.
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Kaltenborn be silenced. Hughes had been entertaining
guests
at his Washington home when he turned on the
radio just in
time to hear Kaltenborn attack the administration's
policy

toward the Soviet Union. The broadcast, Hughes argued,
was

both an embarrassment and an invasion of privacy.
Kaltenborn'

s

broadcasts were relayed to a Washington

station by AT&T telephone lines, and Hughes insisted that
the telephone system should not be used to air public

criticism of cabinet of f icers

.

The secretary's threat,

while never translated into direct government action,
indicates both a willingness to brandish federal power as a
threat and how an individual listener could take a radio

broadcast as a personal affront.

Kaltenborn was certain that fear of federal
intervention was the reason that many radio broadcasters
were hesitant to take part in debates over public issues.
The medium, he wrote,

"has been extremely timid about

permitting the broadcasting of anything that contravenes
the established order," because the party in power

"controlled wave-lengths, licenses, and time -allotments
the broadcasters required in order to address the public.

"Radio," he concluded,

"is making people think in unison."

It is doing more than any other agency to develop
the lock-step in public opinion. As radio is now
controlled, it objects to that which provokes and

David Holbrook Culbert, News For Everyman: Radio
and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport,
70.
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976)
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stimulates independent thinking as "too
controversial "i^"^
.

Radio had promised to increase public participation
and

usher in a new age of democracy. The New Republic observed
in 1927, but "none of these expectations has been

fulfilled.

.

.

,

[Radio's]

timidity is apparently growing worse

as the audiences get larger.

Broadcasters learned that informational programming

could both attract audiences and bolster the medium's image
of public service, but they remained wary of the

controversy which might be spawned by full-throated
expressions of opinion or controversial analysis. When RCA

announced with great fanfare in 1926 the creation of the
NBC network "to provide the best program available for

broadcasting in the United States,

"

the company's statement

promised programs "comprehensive and free from
discrimination.

"

The network did not include the word

"news" in its announcement of proposed programming, but

pledged to insure "that every event of national importance
may be broadcast widely throughout the United States." By

concentrating on special events and talks, the network

hoped to avoid the problem of opinion,

Kaltenborn,
108

26,

1927,

"On The Air," 673,

675-6.

"Can Radio Be Rescued?" The New Republic, October
251.

"Announcing the National Broadcasting Company,
Inc.," display advertisement in the New York Times,
September 14, 1926, 27.
109
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Meanwhile, the regulatory climate remained unsettled,

and in 1926, an Illinois court threatened to unleash
a
whirlwind. Zenith Radio Corporation had applied for a

license to operate a broadcasting station in suburban
Chicago. When the Commerce Department granted approval for

just two hours of broadcast time each week on a shared
frequency. Zenith ignored the limitations. The government

sought an injunction to force the station into compliance
or off the air.

After hearing arguments, the US District Court in
Chicago agreed that Zenith had violated its license but
then stated that the government had overstepped its bounds

by setting such restrictions in the first place. Building
on the J/3terci ty decision, the court reasoned Congress had

failed to establish any "test or standard ... by which the

discretion of the Secretary is to be controlled." Congress,
the court ruled, had set out limited specific guidelines

within the law regarding the assignment of wave lengths and
operating hours and "has withheld from [the Secretary of
Commerce]

the power to prescribe additional regulations."

Although the nature of radio had changed radically since
1912,

the court ruled it was not the role of the secretary

to set new regulations without explicit Congressional

authorization.

"The theory of our institutions of

government," the court concluded,

94

"does not mean to leave

room for the play and action of purely personal and

arbitrary power,
The Zenith decision was upheld by an opinion from
the

Justice Department. Responding to Hoover's request to
bring
the case to the Supreme Court,

the Justice Department

predicted further appeals would prove futile and concluded
the government had "no general authority under the

[1912]

Act to assign wave lengths to broadcasting stations." The

only solution was "new legislation, carefully adapted to
meet the needs of both the present and the future. "in With
the government's "ether cops" disarmed, broadcasters began
to shift frequencies and extend hours and power in hopes of

gaining a competitive edge or finding an interference - free
place in the spectrum. The cooperative consensus was
collapsing, and both listeners and broadcasters across the

country demanded action.

11°

United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation,
2nd Series (1926), 614 at 618.

12

F.
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35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926) in Frank J. Kahn,
Document B of American Broadcasting (New York:
ed.
Appleton-Century-Crof ts, 1973), 31-32.
,

It quickly became clear that if Congress did not
act to restore order to the air, the courts would.
Historian Louise Benjamin cites another 1926 case stemming
from the crowded airwaves of Chicago, The Tribune Company
in which the Illinois
V. Oak Leaves Broadcasting et al
state courts held that the Tribune's radio station held de
facto property rights to its frequency, a "priority of
time", because it had been on the air since 1924. See
Louise M. Benjamin, "The Precedent that Almost Was: A 1926
Court Effort to Regulate Radio, " Journalism Quarterly 67
(Autumn 1990), 578-85.
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Several radio bills were soon filed as Congress
moved
to restore order. White believed Congress should
simply

ratify the system of broadcasting which had evolved under
Hoover. The new law, he insisted, should "regulate Radio

communication and prevent interference. It should not make

new law!

"113

medium,

they feared, had fallen under the control of a

Others took a more expansive view. The new

handful of powerful corporations. The democratic promise of

radio was in jeopardy.
The debate which led to passage of the Radio Act of
1927 echoed themes which had been stated and restated since
1920.

Both advocates of limited legislation and those who

championed sweeping reform appealed to what one scholar has
called "a libertarian mythology" which relied on the

vocabulary of democracy. Free speech, free enterprise and
equal access to the air were universally praised while

censorship and public or private monopoly control of the
ether was condemned

.

Hoover himself had set the tone

during the national radio conferences by embracing public

ownership and government regulation of the ether while

condemning monopoly and restrictions on free speech. Radio

would fulfill its promise, he said, if "the time-honored
principles of common justice" were observed by both the
Side-by-side copy of Dill and White bills, S. 1754
and HR 5589, with typewritten and handwritten comments, box
61, White Papers. Emphasis in the original.
Rowland, Jr., The Politice of TV
Violence (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1983), 22.
114
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industry and the state,

"The broad and basic duty of the

Government," he explained,

"is to keep the ether free and

open to everybody.
The broadcasters quickly echoed Hoover's words and

embraced the ideology of freedom.

David Sarnoff flatly declared,

"Public interest," RCA's

"should be the sole test of

admission to this illimitable forum.

"^^^

As regulators,

broadcasters and their critics pledged their devotion to
these fundamental goals, democratic rhetoric became useless
as a means of debating actual policy.

Civil libertarian

Morris Ernst feared corporate domination of broadcasting
was already restricting free speech. He doubted, however,
the new legislation would produce a better system.

"Everyone," he sourly noted during the debate over the

Radio Act,

"is announcing that the radio is a public

utility and should be operated for the public benef it

"^^"^
.

Congress discussed a variety of solutions including

government broadcasting and mandating common carrier status
for broadcasters, but the debate focused on the question of

monopoly.

"I

want to see radio conserved for the benefit

Hoover, World interview,

1.

David Sarnoff, "Freedom of the Air: Uncensored and
Uncontrolled," The Nation, July 23, 1924, 90.
Morris L. Ernst, "Who Shall Control the Air?" The
Nation, April 21, 1926, 443.
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See Hugh Carter Donahue, The Battle To Control
Broadcast News: Who Owns the First Amendment? (Cambridge:
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of the people generally," Senator William
Borah of Idaho

proclaimed,

"and not permitted to come under the control

o]

monopoly." A pillar ot Weatern progreooi vi am for a
generation, Borah had warily watched ao control

medium concentrated in New York board roomo

.

ol

i

ho new

Economic

concentration would, he feared, lead inevitably to
reotrictiono on free opeech. He called for an independent
radio commiooion with explicit antimonopoly powero

comparable to thooe oi the Federal Trade

Comitii

oo ion

.

Only

Dtrict government regulation, he oaid, could inouie Iteedom
of the air.^^^

The concern over monopoly wao in large part a freedom
of opeech iooue.

Thooe whooe viewo did not dovetail with

what KLaltenborn called "the eotabliohed order" had already

tound that they could be denied a chance to opeak

.

Senator

Wheeler recalled that during a diopute over electric power
regulat ion in Montana

a o tat ion

,

broadcact the utility'

o

owned by the power company

viewo and refuoed to give the other

oide a chance to opeak. Wheeler aloo remembered hio firot

Senate campaign in 192 2 when one radio

o tat

ion "let the

Republicano have time but... they wouldn't even cell me
time.

"^2*^

Norman Thomac, the leader of the Socialiot Party,

wao denied the opportunity to deliver a radio addreoo on

Donald G. Godfrey and Val E. Limburg, "The Rogue
Elephant of Radio Legiolation: Senator William E. Borah,"
Journaliam Quarterly 67 (Spring 1990), 215-6.
120

wheeler, Craney interview,
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n.p.

"freedom of the air" on a New York City station because
the
station manager relied on leased telephone lines for
remote

broadcasts and he feared retaliation from AT^T.

"We thought

•Freedom of the Air' was a harmless topic; but Mr, Thomas's

speech was too radical," explained the station's spokesman,
"He wanted to slam hell out of WEAF, and we've got to

depend on

WEIAF. "^^i

The Radio Act which eventually emerged from the

process reflected the libertarian mythology. The ether

would remain a public trust, and
Commiss ion would issue radio
convenience,

1

a

new Federal Radio

icenses "as publ ic

interest, or necessity requires." The law

barred the FRC from establishing any regulations "which
shall interfere with the rights of free speech by means of

radio communication" while at the same time explicitly

banning "any obscene

,

law specified that

if any

"

indecent
1

,

or profane language

.

"

The

icensee shall permit any person

who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal

opportunities to all other such candidates." The
legislation,

in other words,

had something for everyone,

including strong antimonopoly language and, because White
and other Republicans remained convinced that licensing

authority should remain with the Secretary of Commerce, a
"Thomas Barred Again From Radio, " New York World,
May 17, 1926, 4. As the headline indicates, this was not
the first time Thomas had been excluded from the people's
air
121
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provision for the FRC to revert to advisory status when
Congress decided order had been restored to the ether.
It was the public interest clause,

122

however, which

would become, in Senator Clarence Dill's phrase, the Magna
Carta of the law. Dill, a progressive Washington Democrat,
was the author of the Senate's version of the legislation.

As they worked out the final wording of the bill, Dill

recalled that he and White agreed that radio must continue
to be developed for the good of the entire nation.

know whether he or

I

"We're talking about the

let's say the public and we put in public

interest
law,

don't

said one day what's the use of fussing

about this," Dill remembered,
public,

"I

.

"^23

phrase, borrowed from public utilities

was redolent of "the time -honored principles of common

justice" which Hoover said should form the basis of

government regulation and equally as vague.
The ambiguities of the Radio Act soon became evident.
The FRC

'

s

first order of business was to undo the damage of

the Zenith ruling and restore order to the broadcast band.

Commissioner Henry A. Bellows discussed the task facing the

new commission in a Washington speech. ^^4

broadcasting

See United States Statutes (HR 9971, The Radio Act
of 1927, February 23, 1927), vol. 44, pt 2, chap. 169,
1162-74
122

.

clarence C. Dill, interview with Donald G. Godfrey
and William Chamberlin, March 7, 1975, Broadcast Pioneers
Library, Washington, DC.
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Federal Radio Commission, Annual Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927), 6-7.
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station is in many ways akin to a newspaper," he explained,
but "there is no arbitrary limit to the number of

newspapers which may be published." Radio stations,
however, were limited by technology and the limit "has not

only been reached,

it has been far overpassed." The result?

"The demand from every section of the country is to cut

down the number of broadcasting stations in the interests
of the listening public," The FRC,

not find suitable frequencies

...

Bellows admitted,

"can

even for all the stations

already built and in operation," let alone new stations to
serve the rest of the country.
The only way to reduce interference was to eliminate

some radio stations and reduce the power and operating

hours of others. The FRC

'

s

only guideline in determining

which stations to keep and which to change was the public
interest standard.

responsibility,
the

[FRC]

.

Bellows confessed, because "it means that

must say to this person,

to that person,

for you

"

"It is a rather appalling

*

You may broadcast,' and

'You may not broadcast;

there is no room

'

The commissioners had not sought this power. Bellows
said,
do,

"it is the thing which Congress has told us we must

and it is the thing which the people of America rightly

demand shall be done." Given the "infinite" variety of
radio programs, how was the commission to judge which
stations should be allowed to broadcast? "How shall we
measure the conflicting claims of grand opera and religious
101

,

services, of market reports and direct advertising, of
jazz

orchestras and lectures on the disease of hogs?"
While the law reqxiired that the FRC make the
decisions, Bellows said it was up to the public to let its

will be known.

"The future of radio broadcasting," he said,

"is in your hands."
It is for you to say whether this potent agency
shall be used rightly or wrongly. It is for you
to say whether it shall degenerate into a mere
plaything or develop into one of the greatest
forces in the molding of our entire civilization.
It is for you to establish close relations with

the broadcasters who serve your communities and
to show them that it is to their advantage to use
their stations for the highest type of public

service
The commissioners, Bellows concluded,

"can do only what you

tell us you want done."

As broadcasting ended its first decade, the radio

industry continued its phenomenal growth. If the

marketplace was a valid judge, broadcasters were clearly
serving the public interest. More than a third of all

American households owned a radio by 1929, and the medium
was becoming an ever more important source of information

and entertainment. Radio had become a bully national pulpit
for those who could gain access to the air. Thanks to the

development of radio networks, all Americans could now
share events and experiences. When Hoover was inaugurated
as president in March of 1929,

102

an estimated sixty million

5

Americans listened
that time.

in,

the largest radio audience up to

12

Still, many wondered if the medium had betrayed its

promise. The First World War and its aftermath,

"the perils

of prosperity" described by historian William Leuchtenburg,

shaped a nation twisted by "the painful transition from

nineteenth-century to modern America.
Harding called for "normalcy,

"

"^26

when President

his plaint resonated because

many Americans shared his concern that the world was

becoming a terribly different place. The war, growing
urbanization, the legacy of decades of immigration,

technological innovations that reshaped home and workplace,
the increasing power of national corporations which seemed
to threaten cherished individual and regional values all

excited and confused Americans of the 192 0s. As historian

Warren Susman noted,

"an exceptional and ever-growing

number of Americans came to believe in a series of changes
in the structure of their world, natural,

technological,

social, personal, and moral." ^27 Many felt, as the Lynds

discovered when they questioned the people of Muncie,
Indiana, that they had "one foot on the relatively solid

125 Bliss,

Now The NewG,

24.

William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity:
1914-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),
12 6

273

.

Warren I. Susman, Culture Ae History: The
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(New York:

Pantheon,
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ground of established institutional habits and the other
fast to an escalator erratically moving in several

directions at a bewildering variety of speeds.

"^28

Radio was part of the problem and part of the solution
as well.

By bringing the nation together, radio spread

democracy and demagoguery, clarification and confusion,

consumerism and compassion. The medium helped bring the
contradictions of modernity to America. The reformist

passion of the progressive era had cooled, but a lingering
distrust of monopoly remained alive. Hoover hoped

cooperation could smooth the rough edges of capitalism, but
as historian John Hicks noted,

and the debate over radio

regulation affirmed, many Amex*icans bel ieved,

cooperation failed,

if

"a principal duty of government was to

regulate and restrain business in the interest of the

people as a whole

.

"i-^

Broadcasters and advertisers sought to provide popular

programming which would attract broad audiences while al so
attempting to offer "the highest type of public service."
Inevitably,

their decisions sometimes triggered protests

from those who felt broadcasters were abusing the public
trust.

The FRC wrestled with the public interest standard

Lynd and Lynd, Middletown, 498. See "Prelude: May,
1919," chapter 1, 1-12 in Allen, Only Yeeterday for a deft
summary of how from the perspective of 1931 "the
circumstances of American life have been transformed" since
the end of the war.
128

John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933
(New York: Harper k Row, 1960), 66.
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and maintained "the interest of the broadcast listener
is
of superior importance to that of the broadcaster"
but

could not or would not tell broadcasters what kind of

programming served the public interest,

To dictate

programming would be censorship, the FRC said, and that was
forbidden by both the law and American tradition. While
regulators proved reluctant to upset the increasingly

popular status quo, the threat of disruptive government
action remained, ready to be used.
Broadcasters supported government intervention to
limit and regularize competition. But they feared

government control of content v/hich could force them to

relinquish control over valuable air time or jeopardize
their licenses. Accordingly, to preserve their right to use
the public airwaves,

they fervently embraced the language

of the public interest and freedom of the air,

the

libertarian mythology that appealed to popular
sensibilities
As the 1920s turned into the 1930s,

increasingly

sophisticated listeners facing an increasingly complex and
confusing world sought and expected a different kind of
news from the radio. It would no longer be enough to simply

broadcast an event or a summary of headlines. Radio would
be expected by its audience to add perspective, background

and analysis to the swelling tide of information.
130 FRC,

Report (1928),

167-8.
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"What the radio needs today above all else is

editors," suggested The New Republic in 1930. Radio

broadcasters should no longer think of themselves as
McNamee had as announcers. They should develop their
reportorial powers of observation, interpretation and
skepticism,

"the attitude of

j

ournal ists "i^i This idea
.

would win favor with both audiences and working
broadcasters themselves during the 1930s. The men and women
on the air would continue to experiment with their new

medium and would continue to surprise themselves and their
audiences as they discovered the power of radio. Because
these experiments attracted audiences, they also appealed
to the station and network operators. This new kind of

broadcast news, however, also injected partisan controversy
into radio. While that attracted listeners,

it also

attracted the attention of government regulators who held
the power to control the public airwaves and, accordingly,
the right of the radio industry to profit from that

resource
For the leaders of the radio industry, the former was

much to be desired, the latter was not. They would try
their best to have it both ways by demonstrating that they
sought to serve the public interest.

131
7,

1930,

Mrphe

Radio and the Press," The New Republic, May
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CHAPTER II
"A STRONGER AND STRONGER TOOL OF DEMOCRACY "1

David Sarnoff

's

dream of radio as a household utility

was fulfilled in the 193 0s. The miraculous new medium of
the 192 0s became in the next decade an accepted and

increasingly important part of American life. More than
half the nation's homes had radios by 1930; more than two-

thirds — twenty- six million — by 1935. As Americans

debated the nation's involvement in the Second World War in
radio reached into fifty million households, 82.6

1941,

percent of the nation's homes. In the Northeast, the upper
Midwest and along the Pacific Coast, radio penetration

exceeded ninety percent

.

Radio in the 193 0s truly became a mass medium,

bringing entertainment and information to the nation. As
the industry grew,

the question of who would pay did not

prove to be, as Herbert Hoover had predicted in 1924,

"the

hardest nut in the bowl."^ Advertisers would foot the bill,

William S. Paley, CBS annual report to stockholders
broadcast over the CBS network, April 5, 1938, reprinted as
"Minimum Interference Asked by Paley, " Broadcasting, April
^

15,

1938,

15.

Federal Communications Commission, An Economic Study
of Standard Broadcasting, mimeographed report issued
October 31, 1947, 103. "Standard broadcasting" refers to AM
radio as opposed to FM radio and television.
2

Herbert Hoover, interview. New York World, March
1924, editorial section, 1.
3
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and they eagerly purchased more and more air time. In
1928,

radio had captured one percent of the nation's total

advertising budget with estimated gross billings of $14.1
million. The medium's share climbed steadily over the next
decade: four percent in 193 0, ten percent in 1934, twentyone percent in 1940 on gross billings of $208 million.

Radio's ascent was matched by a proportional and steady
decline in newspaper advertising. Newspapers still

controlled the lion's share of advertising — $629 million
in 1940

— but that was $218 million less than in

a percentage of gross advertising billing,

1929. As

the nation's

newspapers, which had received eighty- one percent of all

revenue in 1928, took just sixty- two percent in 1940.

Broadcasters aci'oss the country did not share equally
in the medium's growth. The most powerful stations, which

could assemble the largest and most desirable audiences,
were the most prosperous. Smaller stations struggled to
make ends meet.

"Probably two thirds of the existing radio

FCC, An Economic Study of Standard Broadcasting 98,
100. QrosE newspaper advertising billings did not regain
1929 's level until 1946. According to Commerce Department
and advertising industry figures cited in the FCC study,
both the nation's disposable personal income and
advertising expenditures bottomed out in 1933 and did not
regain 1929 's level until 1941. Media advertising accounted
for slightly more than half of the nation's total
^

,

promotional, marketing and advertising expenditures
throughout the 193 0s. Magazine publishers' advertising
share remained relatively constant throughout the period,
drifting from eighteen percent in 1928 to a low of fifteen
percent in 1933, 1934 and 1935 before rebounding to
seventeen percent in 194 0. The growth of radio advertising,
therefore, came almost entirely at the expense of the
newspaper industry.
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stations," Senator Clarence Dill stated in 1934,

"are not

able to do more than pay for their own maintenance now.

"5

The grinding democracy of the marketplace made the strong

stronger. It cost money to provide listeners with top shelf
talent. The most popular programs attracted the largest

audiences which,

in turn,

attracted advertisers who could

pay for still more expensive programming.
This dynamic of commerce led to the most remarkable

aspect of radio in the 193 06: the spectacular development
of the national radio networks. The first ad hoc chains had

been forged in the early 192 0s to broadcast special events
of national interest such as the World Series and political

party conventions. The National Broadcasting Company's Red
and Blue chains, the Columbia Broadcasting System and the
Mutual Broadcasting System came to dominate the air waves
in the prime listening hours by providing stations across
the country with live programming over networks of leased
t e 1 ephone

1

ine s

.

Congress, Senate, Senator Clarence C. Dill of
Washington during debate on the Wagner -Hatfield Amendment
to the Communications Act, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
CongreBBional Record (May 15, 1934), vol. 78, pt 8, 8830.
^

.

The time differences across the country presented an
obvious problem here. A program broadcast at eight o'clock
in the East would air live on the West Coast at four in the
afternoon, significantly reducing its possible audience.
The networks responded to the problem by offering repeat
performances of popular programs for the West Coast and
also created regional mini -networks which fed programming
to the western half of the country exclusively.
^
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While technology made the radio chains possible, the

imperatives of commercial broadcasting made their creation
mandatory. Advertisers sought to reach beyond the range of

even the most powerful and popular single station to
attract a national audience."^ While the benefits of
national networks to advertisers were obvious, broadcasters

argued that listeners were the ultimate beneficiaries. Our
system of privately-operated, commercially- supported radio,
they said, provided the best programming in the world. Most

Americans seemed to agree and listened in growing numbers
to Jack Benny,

Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy, Bing

Crosby, Toscanini

'

NBC Symphony, the World Series, events

s

only the networks could afford to bring to every corner of
the country because

,

as Sarnof f himself stated,

"radio

proved itself an important medium in the highly compet it ive
field of advertising.

"®

See Susan Renee Smulyan, " 'And Now a Word from our
Commercialization of American Broadcast
Sponsors.
Yale University, 1985)
Radio, 1920-1934" (Ph.D. diss.
Standard practice called for the chains and their
affiliates to share advertising revenues from sponsored
network programming. The chains also produced "sustaining"
programs which were not sponsored. NBC charged affiliates a
fee for sustainers while Columbia made them available at no
charge in exchange for an option insuring the network
access to a portion of the local station's air time,
"7

.

.
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David Sarnof f, testimony in Official Report of
Proceedings Before the Federal Comniuni cat ions CommiGeion at
Order No.
Washington, D.C. in the matter of ComndsBion
37, Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting,
Monopoly in the Broadcasting Industry and Related Mat ters
docket no. 5060, vol. 1 (November 14, 1938), 33, in box
1400, Record Group 173, National Archives National Records
Center, Suitland, Maryland; hereafter "FCC docket no.
®
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Free radio, free enterprise and free choice, the

industry argument went, had proven superior in every way to

government control. In Europe, state monopolies controlled
broadcasting, producing a product that was dull, elitist

and potentially "the most effective agency ever devised for
the enslavement of the mass mentality of a nation.

Critics carped that the growing influence of the networks
was limiting program choices and overwhelming radio with

advertising chatter. Was this, they asked, truly in the
public interest? Sarnoff argued that it was. American radio
had proven profoundly democratic.

"The richest man," he

"cannot buy for himself what the poorest man gets

said,

free by radio. "^^
The rhetoric of broadcasters remained remarkably

consistent through the years. Radio was a resource of

unlimited potential that could be best developed for the
benefit of the people by dynamic free enterprise. American

broadcasting was popular and profitable, yes, but it was
also committed to serving the public interest. When NBC was

created in 1926, the network promised it would "be an
instrument of great public service" and "provide the best

program available for broadcasting in the United States."
Management decisions would "reflect enlightened public

William Hard, "Should the U.S. Adopt the British
System of Radio Control? Arguments Opposing," Cong[ressional
Digest, August -September 19 33 217
9

,

10

Sarnoff,

testimony in FCC docket no. 5060, 33.

Ill

"

.

s

opinion" and be overseen by a prestigious Advisory Council
of distinguished private citizens which would insure

quality,

fairness and good taste.

Sarnoff reaffirmed the pledge.

radio broadcasting," he said,

A dozen years later,

"In every consideration of

"the 'public interest' we are

pledged to serve is that of the entire nation,
Radio,

"i-

driven by revenue derived from its stewardship

of the public air waves,

never tired of counting the ways

it served the public interest.

One was news and public

affairs programming. By educating the public on issues of
importance, broadcasting could become,

in the words of

Columbia's president William

"a stronger and

stronger tool of democracy

.

Paley,

S.

"^^

The networks and stations

across the country broadcast news summaries to supplement
their established schedules of talks and expanded live

"Announcing the National Broadcasting Company,
Inc.," display advertisement, New York Times, September 14,
1926, 27; LOuise M. Benjamin, "Birth of A Network's
'Conscience:' The NBC Advisory Council, 1927," JournaliBn)
Quarterly 66 (Autumn 1989), 587-590. The Council's
distinguished seventeen original members formed a
prototypical "blue ribbon" commission carefully selected to
represent and impress the public. They included 1924
Democrat ic pres ident ial nominee John W Davis president
William Green of the American Federation of Labor and Mary
Sherman of the General Federation of Women's Clubs and not
one but two former secretaries of state: Elihu Root and
Charles Evans Hughes. Benjamin accurately points out that
the Council served as an excellent public relations shield
for NBC, adding a high gloss to the project while
deflecting possible charges of censorship and monopoly
which might have threatened the network.
^1

.

12

Sarnoff,

,

testimony in FCC docket no. 5060, 34, 40.

Quoted in "Minimum Interference Asked by Paley,
Broadcasting, April 15, 1938, 15
1^
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broadcasts of an ever wider range of special events.
Popular entertainment programming was clearly the bulwark
of commercial broadcasting,

attracting the largest

audiences and providing the industry's revenue base, but

broadcast historian Erik Barnouw overstated the case when
he suggested that "with rare except ions

...

there was a

blackout on current problems" on radio until the late
193 0s. 14 In fact,

hardly a day passed without a variety of

news programs on the air. To be sure,
'n'

in 193 0, when Amos

Andy and Rudy Valee ruled the ether, listeners during

the first week of October,

for example, had only one

regularly scheduled nightly network news program to tune to

— Lowell Thomas's fifteen- minute talks on WJZ and NBC's
Blue Network — but that was hardly the only listening

option for those who preferred information to
entertainment

.

1^

Broadcasters devoted a remarkable amount

of air time to talks and special events and saw

informational programming — news — as a significant factor
in the growing appeal of radio.

Erik Barnouw, A Hietory of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 17.

Program listings for both New York stations and
major stations across the country for the coming week in
"Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week," JVeiv
York Times, October 5, 1930, sec. 10, 9. Metropolitan
newspapers of the day routinely published schedules for
out-of-town broadcasters and, as the Second World War
approached, international short wave signals, testimony to
the appeal of long-distance listening.
15

Some historians appear too reliant on Harrison B.
A Thirty-Year History of Progranw Carried on
Summers, ed.
16

,
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Columbia, with New York's WABC its flagship station,

aired the most ambitious schedule of informational

programming in October,

1930.1'^ H.V.

Kaltenborn discussed

current events Monday night at seven and was followed by

Alexander Woolcott's "Town Crier" program which featured
news of the lively arts. On Thursday at eight, Frederick

William Wile assessed "The Political Situation in
Washington Tonight" while "Kaltenborn Edits the News" aired
at 8:30. Other information programs during the week

included a talk by journalist Heywood Broun, the latest

Broadway gossip from Daily Mirror columnist Walter Winchell
and several important special events, including a speech by
President Hoover and live coverage of the World Series

between the Cardinals and the Athletics.
WEAF and NBC Red carried only a single program of news
analysis

,

Will iam Hard

*

s

"Back of the News " Wednesday at

7:45, but aired the World Series^

several special events

National Radio Networks in the United States 1926-1956
New York:
(Columbus: Ohio State University, 1958; repr
an exhaustive and extremely useful compilation
Arno, 1971)
of network program schedules, sponsors and ratings.
Summers' classification system segregates evening and
daytime programming and lists informational programs under
several different headings. More importantly, because it
limits its scope to regularly scheduled programs, it
ignores the many hours of one- time-only special events and
talks which formed a vital segment of radio's public
affairs effort
.

,

,

The Columbia Broadcasting System usually referred
to itself as "Columbia" throughout the 1930s. The familiar
"CBS" acronym begins to appear as an alternate designation
in 1932-33 but did not become the people's or the network's
choice until quite late in the decade.
17

114

and talks including speeches by Hoover and retired General

John

J.

Pershing to the American Legion's national

convention in Boston and talks by Speaker of the House
Nicholas Longworth and New York Congressman Samuel
Dickstein. NBC Blue also carried the speeches by Hoover and

Pershing as well as the World Series.

18

The chains' commitment to information broadcasting

accelerated in 1931 and 1932. Advances in shortwave
technology made broadcasts from Europe practical, and the
networks eagerly displayed radio's ability to bring the

world home. In the first week of February, 1932, listeners
heard Pope Pius XI in Vatican City celebrate the tenth

anniversary of his coronation and the eminent physicist Sir
Oliver Lodge in London discuss the impact of science on
civilization. Both Hard on NBC Red and Wile on CBS

broadcast their evening commentaries from League of Nations

While professional teams and major colleges began
cutting deals with broadcasters in the 19206, exclusive
network broadcasts of major sporting events were the
exception not the rule until the late 1930s and the policy
of selling broadcast rights to the highest bidder did not
become universal until the 194 0s. CBS news executive Paul
White later ascribed the expensive trend to competitiveness
.1
and greed by all involved — "I write as a penitent.
was one of the worst offenders" — and regretted that he
"helped to do radio a great disservice ... .A small immediate
gain brought about a wholesale loss." Paul W. White, News
on the Air (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1947), 300-1. In
1930, CBS demonstrated its competitiveness by beginning its
game coverage at two o'clock, fifteen minutes before NBC
went on the air, to get an edge on the larger chain. What
White would have thought of today's billion dollar sports
television rights fees can only be surmised.
.

115

.

.

headquarters in Geneva that week, and Wile interviewed
France's minister of war.

From this side of the ocean, Kaltenborn offered
analysis Tuesday and Thursday evening on CBS while John

B.

Kennedy talked about current events Friday night on NBC
Blue. Both NBC and CBS offered daily coverage of the winter

Olympics from Lake Placid and an array of talks and
speeches on current events by public figures including

President Hoover, New York State Appeals Court Judge

Benjamin Cardozo and Senators Robert

F.

Wagner and Arthur

Clapper
By 1933,

in addition to the variety of special events

and talks listeners had come to expect, NBC offered two

regularly scheduled news programs each weekday. In addition
to Thomas's nightly Blue broadcast, Washington

correspondent Anne Scribner Hard, William Hard's wife,

discussed current events each morning at 9:15 on the Red
chain. William Hard's "Back of the News" aired Tuesday

evening on the Red network while Kennedy was heard on
Thursday. Columbia presented news commentary by Boake

Carter each evening at 7:45. Kaltenborn spoke Tuesday and

Thursday while Edwin

C.

Hill presented stories "On the

Human Side of the News" Monday through Wednesday evenings

"Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week,"
New York Tiwee, February 7, 1932, sec. 8, 15.
15
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and hosted "The Inside Story," a news dramatization
program, on Friday.

20

CBS typically devoted more time to informational

programming than NBC. Paley saw news as a way to establish
an identity and audience for his second-place chain, and

network press releases in 1931 were emblazoned with the

slogan "Columbia — The News Network.

"^i

Broadcasters

understood that listeners wanted information, and they
sought to meet the demand by providing news programming in
a variety of formats.

20

"Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week,"
New York Tiwee, February 5, 19 33, sec. 9, 11. This genre,
most famously represented by "March of Time" which debuted
in 1931, would remain a fixture on network and local radio
for years. Some news dramatizations relied on actors to
impersonate figures in the news while others, such as
Columbia's "We The People, " "Report to the Nation" and
"Dateline" series, frequently brought the actual
participants in an event before the microphone to retell
their stories with the assistance of appropriate sound
effects and musical augmentation. Although critics
frequently called the programs sensational or maudlin, the
chains approached their preparation earnestly. CBS policy
directed script writers to use a participant's exact words
if they could be determined and allowed fictional dialogue
only if it was in character and could be supported by
evidence. Rehearsals for one episode of "March of Time"
were suspended while researchers determined the proper key
for the tolling of London's Big Ben. See White, News on the
Air, 249-98; Edward Bliss, Jr., Now the News: The Story of
Broadcast Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1991), 66-8. White provides several complete scripts of
radio news dramatizations including a two-part "Dateline"
from November, 1943 in which CBS correspondent Eric
Sevareid helped re-enact his trek to safety out of the
jungles of Burma. Bliss says Big Ben sounds in low E.

Sally Bedell Smith, In All His Glory: The Life of
William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 15921

66

.
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As the 193 0s began, professional journalists such
as
Kaltenborn, Wile and Hard, no longer mere announcers, began
to report the news on the radio. Nearly all of the

commentators, as they came to be called, came to

broadcasting with extensive newspaper or magazine
backgrounds. They combined their training and experience

with the technology of the new medium to create a different
kind of journalism. The broadcasts included summaries of
the day's events, but the commentators attracted listeners

because of their personalities, insights and opinions.
Radio had proven it could bring events into the home, but
these programs did more than that. They served as a gloss
to the events and opinions which listeners heard over the

air and helped make sense of the increasingly confusing
world.

22

The radio commentators soon began to attract both

loyal listeners and the attention of advertisers. As the

prosperity of the New Era collapsed into depression, the
nation seemed caught between conflicting eras and

contradictory ways of life.

"A vague fear" spread among

Americans, suggested historian Warren Susman,
sense that things were not quite right,
order,

in the moral order,

"an ongoing

in the natural

in the technological order, and

Robert R. Smith, "The Origins of Radio Network News
Commentary," Journal of Broadcasting 3 (Spring 1965), 117.
22
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most especially in the relationships among them.
times,

"23

such

listeners looked to those who could make sense of

the confusion and help them decide what was right, what
was

wrong, what to do. They welcomed the commentators'

opinions, accepting as valid a veteran Washington

correspondent's observation that "conjecture and

speculation have a value if they come from a good man in a
ringside seat.

"24

By 1934, about a third of all network programming was

paid for and produced by advertising agencies which sought
to provide both large audiences and appropriate backgrounds

for their clients' messages.

^5

unsponsored broadcasts did

not directly provide revenue, but sustaining programs, as

they were called, fulfilled an important role in radio.

They al lowed broadcasters to counter charges of excessive

commercialism while experimenting with new talent and

program forms and demonstrating their mandated concern with
the public interest. At the same time,

the best sustaining

programs boosted the overall image and audience of the
chain or station which ultimately translated to larger
audiences and more revenue from sponsored programs.

Warren I, Susman, Culture As History: The
Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century
23

Pantheon,

(New York:

1984),

192.

Raymond Clapper quoted in Frank Luther Mott,
American Journalism, revised edition (New York: Macmillan,
24

1950)

,

25

692

.

Barnouw,

The Golden Web,
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.

Just as the Brooklyn Eaofle believed in the 192 06
that
it

gained prestige and circulation from Kaltenborn's radio

talks on current events,

information programming proved the

perfect environment for some advertisers. Local stations
across the country made newscasts a standard part of their

broadcast days and often found advertisers ready to buy.
KMPC in Los Angeles aired three fifteen-minute news
summaries each day. KFAB in Lincoln, Nebraska hired the

city editor of the local newspaper to direct a twice -a-day
"radio newspaper." WEEI in Boston offered fifteen-minute
"news despatches" as well as a locally-produced commentary

program. KHJ in Los Angeles, WHKC in Columbus, Ohio and

stations owned and operated by newspapers such as the St.
Louis Post -Dispatch

,

Kansas City Star and Detroit Free

Press were also among the early providers of news
broadcasts
The first network sponsor to use a nightly newscast to

promote itself was the Literary Digest. Largely a summary
of newspaper and magazine items gathered from across the

country,

the Digest in 1929 saw radio news as a fine

vehicle for reaching its target audience. As its radio
voice,

the Digest chose Floyd Gibbons, a famous and

See the published radio logs in many larger daily
newspapers. The WEEI and KHJ schedules are from the New
York Times, October 7, 192 8, sec. 10, 21-2. See also
Mitchell Charnley, News By Radio (New York: Macmillan,
1948), 1-15; Bliss, Now the News, 45-8; "What Broadcasting
Does for a Newspaper," Radio Broadcast, February 1924, 34426

6.
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flamboyant foreign correspondent in the beet Richard

Harding Davie ctyle.
Gibbons had literally wandered into radio earlier that
year. While researching a short story, he visited NBC to

see how the medium worked and quickly discovered the magic
of the microphone 27 Gibbons had covered the First World
.

War for the Chicago Tribune, surviving a U-boat attack in
the Atlantic and losing an eye at Belleau Wood.

Sporting a

white eye patch, he delivered the news at a breakneck pace

with a highly personal bent. A colleague observed that
while Gibbons might "at times overdress the naked truth in

dramatic embroideries [and] make his own role in the cosmic

pageant the principal one, his winged words are never

altogether unreliable.

Audiences tuned in and the Digest

circulation

cl imbed while Gibbons held forth, but the magaz ine dropped

him in the fall of 1930.

Dozens of candidates were

auditioned before the Digest settled on Lowell Thomas, a
Bliss, Now The News, 27.

Percy Hammond of the New York Herald Tribune quoted
in Literary Digest October 15, 1932, 21.
28

,

Lowell Thomas, Good Evening, Everybody (New York:
Avon, 1976), 290-2. Gibbons, Thomas wrote in his
autobiography, was sacked because his hard-drinking
lifestyle personally offended the teetotalling chief
executive of the Digest's parent company. The final straw
was the arrival of Gibbons and his party on his boss's Long
Island door step late one night in search of a drink.
Still, the Digest tolerated him for a year because he
attracted an audience and his program produced results.
Gibbons and Thomas enjoyed a plum time slot immediately
before "Amos 'n' Andy" went on the air.
29
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globetrotting journalist, author and popular lecturer.

Although they were not quite sure how to define

it,

both

broadcasters and advertisers understood that personality
was critical to success in the medium. Graham McNamee of

WEAF devoted a chapter of his 1926 autobiography to letters
he had received from his listeners.

"The intensity of

feeling on the part of the radio fans," he marveled, was
"astonishing." The audience thought of the announcers as
intimate friends.
This kind of power delighted advertisers and radio

station owners but left many others uneasy. Social
scientists, presented with a new field to analyze, soon

added their academic imprimatur to the phenomenon. A

pioneer in the field, Hadley Cantril, suggested "the
immediacy and reality of the radio voice" had a profound
impact on the listener.

"If the voice sounds friendly and

informal, he feels almost as if he were receiving a

neighborly visit," Cantril wrote, "Rarely is he indifferent
to the radio voice." Cantril concluded that radio had a

"tenacious grip... on the mental life of men" Listening to a
familiar, persuasive radio voice, he wrote,
it,

and even obey its commands.

"we respond to

"^^

Graham McNamee with Robert Gordon Anderson, You're
on the Air (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1926), 172-89,
quotation at 174.
30

Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport, The
PBychology of Radio (New York: Harper & Brothers, 193 5;
repr., Salem, New Hampshire Ayer, 1986), 3, 9, 18, 259-60.
31

:
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The political implications were obvious.

In 1928,

the

two major parties poured an estimated $2 million into
radio
time.

The Democratic National Committee spent $650,000 to

promote the Smith-Robinson ticket and afterwards said it

received in response to radio appeals a quarter-million
letters,

ten-thousand telegrams and $600,000 in cash

contributions
As the power of radio became more evident and the

political climate grew increasingly contentious during the
1930s,

stations and, especially, the chains would become

the targets of a growing number of freedom of speech

disputes. Reliant on six-month licenses granted by the

federal government

,

the increasingly profitable industry

began to sense political perils around every corner. Still,
broadcasters ultimately sought to please their listeners
and listeners wanted to hear voices which had something to
say.

Such voices were truly pearls of great price which

could command both profit and prestige.
Thomas, who would be a familiar radio voice for more

than forty years, took full advantage of the medium's

intimacy by sharing with his listeners stories about his

adventures but studiously avoiding partisanship and
controversy. His cardinal rule, he wrote, was "not to

confuse opinions with hard news or be drawn into taking

David G, Clark, "Radio in Presidential Campaigns:
The Early Years (1924-1932)," Journal of Broadcasting 6
=^2

(Summer 1962)

,

233
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sides.

"33

General Smedley Butler, a Marine hero of the

first war, visited Thomas early in his career to
caution
"you have the ear of America as no one has had it before.
Why, with a few words,

or even an inflection of your voice,

you might start a revolution.

"34

Thomas believed

broadcasters should use their power to judiciously indicate
where America was, not to lead the nation toward a

particular course
Gibbons was far less circumspect. Fully confident that
his perception of events was the revealed truth, he did not

hesitate to air his opinions. Reviewing the ratings and

reading their mail, broadcasters knew personal opinion was
popular, but it was also,

they believed, potentially

dangerous. After the Digest pulled the plug on his daily
program, he continued to broadcast for NBC until his death
in 1939

,

reflecting the network

'

s

judgment that Gibbons

appealed to audiences. Politically, however, he could be
loose cannon.

a

In the fall of 1932, Gibbons broadcast from

the American Legion convention and his comments on the rout
of the Bonus Army in Washington caused a commotion in New

York.

John Royal, NBC's head of programming, fired a

warning telegram off to Gibbons after the broadcast, the
trade journal Variety reported, then "did another burnup"

when Gibbons criticized Attorney General Mitchell's speech
33

Thomas,

Oood Evening, Everybody,

3

34

Thomas,

Good Evening, Everybody,

2 96
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01

.

to the Legion.
"

"The network felt," Variety reported,

[Gibbons] put it in an embarrassing spot with the

Washington administration.

"^5

As radio news sought to define itself,

it was pushed

in a new direction. After years of cordial support, and

often outright boosterism, for the new medium, the
newspaper industry sought to bring radio to heel.^^ Jealous
of radio's growth as an advertising medium,

its impact on

circulation and its increasing role as a provider of
information, the publishers launched what came to be known
as the Press -Radio War.

Intending to crush their rival, the

newspapers instead accelerated the development of radio as
an independent force
Radio

'

s

spectacular coverage of two stories in 1932

forced the publishers' hand. In March, the infant son of
Charles Lindbergh was kidnapped from the family home in New
Jersey. Both NBC and CBS filled the air with bulletins

chronicling the fate of the child Lowell Thomas called "the
world's most famous baby.

"^"^

That fall,

the election

campaign dominated the air. Candidates spent an estimated
"Inside Stuff — Radio," Variety, September 20,
1932,

49.

For an analysis of how newspapers promoted the new
medium and helped shape "the social construction of radio,"
see Susan J. Douglas, Invent incf American Broadcasting- 18991922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
Note also detailed and generally friendly coverage of the
1924 convention broadcasts Gupra.
Bliss, Now the News,

31-4.
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$5 million for radio time

- the largest share

of the

Roosevelt campaign budget was set aside for buying access
to the airwaves

- and the chains brought up-to-the-minute

election night returns to the nation.
The machinations leading up to election night became a

farce which revealed the newspaper industry's confusion

when it came to dealing with its rival. CBS had intended to
purchase returns compiled by United Press. Shortly before
the election, UP executives backed out of the deal claiming

their newspaper clients were opposed to the idea.
Meanwhile,

the Associated Press, unaware that its rival had

broken its agreement, decided it did not want to give up
such a rich opportunity for radio publicity and offered its

service to both CBS and NBC. UP, now fearing it would lose

prestige if only AP returns were broadcast, quickly

reconnected its teletype at CBS and installed one at NBC.

On election night
service.

,

representatives of the third maj or wire

International News Service, arrived at the

networks' studios to install teletypes, asking only an on-

the-air credit in return.

As a result, radio brought

nev/s

of Roosevelt's election to the public hours before the

first extras hit the streets.

"Radio in Presidential Campaigns," 236-7.

^®

Clark,

^9

White, News on the Air,
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34-6.

Radio, a press critic of the time wrote,

that broke the tortoise's heart.

"40

"was the hare

it did not whet the

public appetite for information, the publishers believed,
it took the edge off the news and thus reduced circulation.

Radio's advantage of immediacy, the publishers knew, was

beyond their ability to counteract unless they could change
the rules of the game. As Roy Howard of the Scripps -Howard

newspaper chain put
I

it,

"If news is to be given out before

can deliver it,... I'm interested in protecting my

rights

.

"^i

The leaders of the broadcasting industry hoped to

avoid a confrontation, but as NBC president Merlin

H.

Aylesworth admitted, many publishers became convinced as
the depression deepened that radio was "a serious and

dangerous competitor for advertising and circulation

patronage

.

"42

the spring of 1933, a coalition of

publishers led by Roy Howard moved against radio on two
fronts. The AP cut off all news reports to the networks and

restricted service to individual stations. UP and INS,
bowing to pressure from newspaper subscribers, followed
suit,

and by late spring the flow of news copy to

broadcasters dried up. At the same time, the American
Isabelle Keating, "Pirates of the Air," Harper's
Monthly Magazine, September 1934, 463.
40

Quoted in "Publishers: Would Curb Radio in News
Field," NewB-Week, May 6, 1933, 26.
41

Quoted in Giraud Chester, "The Press -Radio War:
1933-1935," Public Opinion Quarterly 13 (Summer 1949), 254.
42
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Newspaper Publisher c AGGociation convention adopted

a

resolution calling on memberG to publiGh program Gcheduleo
and press releases only as paid advertising ^3
.

It was altogether appropriate that the 1932 election

had helped bring the conflict between newspapers and

broadcasterG to a head. Although Herbert Hoover shaped
radio regulation more decisively than any other chief
executive, Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the public's mind
the radio president. His administration spanned network

radio's golden age, and he was an acknowledged master of
the medium. With most of the nation's newspaper publishers

aligned against him, radio, a biographer noted, became
Roosevelt's "one great line of communication to the
people.'"*^ His radio talks,

meticulously scripted but

del ivered with studied inf ormal ity

,

made mill ions feel that

he was not only their president but their friend, a caring,

concerned ally who, as one New Dealer put

understood

"

and problems

it,

knew and

their little town and mill, their little
.

1

ives

'"^^

By the time he reached the White House, Roosevelt was
a proven veteran at the microphone. His "happy warrior"

Chester, "The Press-Radio War," 254-57/ White, NewB
on the Air, 30-42
4^

James MacGregor Burns, Rooeevelt The Lion and the
Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956) 455.
44

:

,

Federal Emergency Relief Administration field
investigator Martha Gellhorn quoted in Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Rooeevelt The Coming of the
New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 572.
45

:
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cpeech nominating Alfred

E.

Smith had been a highlight of

the 1924 Democratic convention broadcast. The
galleriec at

Madicon Square Garden, McNamee recalled,

"Dnapped wide

open" as Roooevelt concluded, drowning hie final centencec

with a roar.

46

when he nominated Smith for

the 1928 HouGton convention,

oecond time at

a

Roocevelt delivered an

entirely different cpeech, directed not go much to the
convention delegatec ac to the radio audience at home. It
wac an unprecedented kind of political oratory, the New

York Timea obcerved,

"limpid and unaffected.

Gingle trace of fuctian,

"

.

.without a

free of the bombact that had

alwayc marked effective ctump cpeaking

^"^
.

Roocevelt knew

the new medium required new ckillc.

Ac governor of New York, Roocevelt broadcact in 1929
hie

f

irct

f

ireGide chatc

.

Directed primarily at upctate

reader c of hoct ile Republ ican newcpaperc

,

Roocevel t ac cured

broadcacterc the talkc would be nonpartican diccuccionc of
state isGuec. Not curpr isingly

,

the chatc were interpreted

by his opponents ac attacks and helped propel him to a
lands 1 ide re-election in 193 0."^®

By 1933, Roosevelt was a radio professional, more

adept than many who made their living on the air. Recalling
the first presidential fireside chat, Robert Trout,

4^

48

McNamee,

You re on the Air,
*

82.

Burns,

The Lion and the Fox,

99.

Burns,

The Lion and the Fox,

118-9
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Columbia's announcer at the White House that night,
said
"we weren't used to performers like that,

especially not a

performer who also happened to be President of the United
States

.

"49

The President was not the only Roosevelt on the air.

Eleanor Roosevelt became one of the best known radio

personalities of the decade. In 1935, she was paid $72,000

— which she turned over to the American Friends Service
Committee — by a shoe company for a series of broadcast
talks.

^0

Elliott Roosevelt, the president's second son, ran

a chain of Texas radio stations and broadcast commentaries

aired nationally on the Mutual network. He would become

a

prominent and contentious figure within the industry by the

end of the decade, often editorializing against his
father

'

s

pol icies

Despite the publ ishers
not go away.

'

best efforts

,

radio news did

Popular with listeners and advertisers,

newscasts were cheap and easy for broadcasters to produce.
Most stations had never hired reporters or subscribed to a

wire service. Instead, they followed a simple formula:

Quoted in Bliss, Now the News,

"Get

52.

Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (New York:
418-9.
W.W. Norton, 1971)
50

,

"Regarding Code Compliance," NAB [National
Association of Broadcasters] Reports 7 (October 20, 1939),
3779; Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1985), 460-1. Harold Ickes, after listening to
one of his anti-third term editorials, confided in his
diary, "Elliott Roosevelt is being insufferable again."
Quoted in Morgan, FDR, 46 0.
51
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a raconteur with a good voice,

a lively imagination,

and a

copy of the afternoon paper, and there was your program.

"^2

With the publishers on the rampage, radio stations could no
longer take the customary shortcuts, but rather than

abandon news, broadcasters took up the publishers'
challenge
Columbia, with General Mills agreeing to pay the bill
in exchange for exclusive sponsorship,

set up its own news

service with correspondents in every major city.^^ At NBC,
Thomas and his two-man staff worked the phones. Thomas

quickly found that police chiefs and mayors around the
country,

"flattered to have attracted the attention of a

New York radio station, would provide us with fresh and
exclusive material right up to air

time.''^"^

When the information embargo failed, the publishers
invoked the publicity blackout. As the Columbia News

Service grew, newspapers dropped program logs of the
chain's affiliates because, as the Washington Star
declared,

the network had become "a direct competitor to

our paper" in the news field.

To make matters worse, many

papers continued to publish listings of Columbia's rivals,
isabelle Keating, "Radio Invades Journalism," The
Nation, June 12, 1935, 677.
^2

53

White, News on the Air,

5^

Thomas,

38-9.

Good Evening, Everybody, 298.

Quoted in "Radio News: Columbia News Service Has
Troubled Start," News-Week, October 7, 1933, 27.
55
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placing the network's stations at a major competitive
disadvantage. Columbia, the self -proclaimed news network,
trembled. NBC,

fearing the newspapers would soon attack its

stations, grew fearful. By the end of 1933, broadcasters

sued for peace.

Representatives of the publishers, wire services,
networks and the National Association of Broadcasters,

representing station owners across the country, gathered at

New York's Hotel Biltmore to negotiate an armistice which
from radio's perspective more closely resembled a
surrender. The pact called for the networks to suspend all

news gathering operations. In exchange, a new wire service,
the Press-Radio Bureau, would be established to provide the

chains and interested stations each day with two five-

minute news summaries based on AP reports. The first could
be broadcast no earlier than 9:30 in the morning; the
second,

no earlier than nine at night. Except for

developments of "transcendent importance" which would be
"written and broadcast in such a manner to stimulate public
interest in the reading of newspapers," the summaries would

contain only items already available in print. Neither
summary could be sponsored. As a final insult, the

broadcasters agreed to pay all costs associated with

preparing and distributing the summaries.

5^

Chester,

"The Press-Radio War," 256-7.
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"

The publishers'

spokesman claimed "the public interest

will be served by making available to any radio station
in
the United States for broadcasting purposes brief daily

reports of authentic news,

"57

agreed with him. The

settlement was widely seen for what it was, a surrender by
the chains which dominated the new medium to the barons of
the old with neither side worrying very much about the

public interest. The publishers, claimed The New Republic,
sought "to establish a dictatorship of the blue pencil over
the microphone

[by]

attempting to bottle the news and

administer it in five-minute doses only twice a day."^® CBS
news director Paul White later wrote the agreement brought
peace, but "the loser was the public.
was, News-Week noted,

"^^

Columbia's Paley

"the man who made most concessions,"

trading competition for the "tacit understanding that

newspapers were to adopt a more liberal policy on radio
publ icity

.

In Washington,

the settlement caught the attention of

radio's regulators. Senator Clarence Dill called the

Biltmore Agreement "suppression" of the news. If the
E.H. Harris, "Note to editors," January 31, 1934,
reprinted in 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., CongreBsional Record
(February 19, 1934), vol. 78, pt 3, 2726-7.
.

c.W. Whittemore, "Radio's Fight for News," The New
Republic, February 6, 193 5, 3 54.
58

5^

White, NewB on the Air, 42.

"Radio News: Broadcasters and Newspapers Make
Peace," News -Week, December 23, 1933, 18.
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restrictionG were not eaced, he predicted,

"there will be a

radio newc cervice ectabliched in the country that
will

give the newc collection agenciec a good deal more trouble
than they have ever had up to this time from radio

broadcactG." Americanc, Dill caid,
GtationG to give them information.

"expect the radio
"^^

The publicherc, by and large, were determined to ride
out cuch criticiGm becauce they did not believe radio could

gather newc. Dill'c prediction of "a radio newc cervice"
wac derided by the newcpaper trade journal Editor and

Publicher ac "a monumental bluff." BroadcaGterG coon proved
the doubters wrong. The Bocton-baced Yankee Network

provided daily newGcactc to eight Gtations around New
England. The chain'

g

editor-in-chief caid the Yankee

Network newc cervice — "exactly ac outl ined by Senator
Dill" — had become in lecc than a year "a recognized

nececcity, with a proven following many timec lar-ger than
that of any othex' radio program.

"^-^

The Don Lee ctationc in

California launched a cimilar Wect Coact newc chain^ and
many independent ctationG including WOR in New York and WLS
in Chicago jumped heartily into the newG buGinecG. A new

wire cervice

,

Trancradio Precc

,

wae organized to cerve the

Senator Clarence C. Dill, "Radiobroadcact ing of
Newc," 73rd Cong., 2nd cecG., Congressional Record
(February 19, 1934), vol. 78, pt 3, 2726.
^1

.

Leland Bickford, News While It Is News (Bocton:
64 -6
Manthorne, 1935)
^2

G. C.

,
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independents and within a year was sending up to fifty-

thousand words of copy a day to its clients,

Launched by the newspaper industry to protect its

vested interests, the Press-Radio War ended with a scramble
for economic gain.

In 1934, at a meeting of the executive

committee of the Press-Radio Bureau, United Press president

Hugh Baillie referred to Transradio and the regional radio
news chains as "outlaws" and insisted they "should be

squashed at the outset." His sentiments were ringingly

endorsed by his counterpart at International News
Service.

Less than a year later, both UP and INS,

acknowledging the valuable radio market and seeing a chance
to steal a march on the venerable AP,

announced they would

begin servicing broadcasters. The AP held out but finally
established its own radio service as the Second World War
approached.

Resistance to the pact, negotiated by the national
networks, was led by individual stations or small groups

seeking to continue popular programming. With an early wink
Bliss, Now the News, 43-4. Transradio 's finest
moment — and the Press -Radio Bureau's worst — came on
February 13, 1935 when Press-Radio prematurely flashed that
Bruno Richard Hauptmann had been convicted of kidnapping
the Lindbergh baby but had escaped the death penalty.
Transradio got the story right, and Press-Radio issued an
awkward correction ten minutes later. See Bliss, Now the
News, 35 or, for an especially gloating account, Bickford,
News While It Is News, 105-8.
^4

Quoted in Chester, The Press -Radio War, 259.

^5

Bliss, Now the News,

44.
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and nod from the influential Dill, they reckoned
they could
proceed without regulatory peril, a guess confirmed when
their licenses were routinely renewed. The network stations

soon followed suit. WEAF and WJZ, the NBC flagship
stations, offered six news summaries a day by early 1936.

Mutual
two.

'6

WOR aired five while Columbia's WABC broadcast

In addition, each carried its network's nightly news

and information programming.^^

Broadcasting emerged from the Press-Radio War with its

reputation as an information medium enhanced. The industry,
however,

still had to contend with the implications of

federal regulation. With Hoover, broadcasting's champion,
defeated,

the industry watched with trepidation as the New

Deal took shape. Roosevelt, however, was slow to turn his

attention to broadcasting. The consensus of the 192 0s which
allowed broadcasters to occupy the ether under the
supervision of sympathetic federal regulation survived the

election of 1932. Critics fretted over monopoly control of
radio, but the American system of broadcasting still seemed

the best course for the medium

.

The crises of the time

many broadcast to the nation by radio, dominated the
political agenda. In the maelstrom of Roosevelt's first
term,

radio simply did not command a high priority.
One issue which might have forced the New Deal to act

was laid to rest in the final days of the Hoover
"Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week,"
New York Times, February 2, 1936, sec. 9, 13.
6^
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adminiGtration. The Federal Trade CommiGsion monopoly probe
of the radio patent allies had resulted in a Justice

Department antitrust suit in 1930, A dauntingly prolix
dispute pitting the federal government against several of
the nation's largest corporations,

the suit was settled out

of court less than three weeks after the 1932 election. The

consent decree created an independent Radio Corporation of
America, no longer a subsidiary of General Electric and

West inghouse

,

and solved the most pressing radio "problem"

which might have confronted the new president

During the

.

first summer of the Roosevelt administration, the National

Recovery Administration did belatedly authorize
the broadcasting business. The code,

a code for

drafted with the help

of the National Association of Broadcasters, mandated

minimum wages, but radio stations, which neither

manufactured a tangible product nor sold their services to
the general publ ic

,

were far from center stage as the

administrat ion struggled to reverse the nat ion
collapse

.

'

s

economic

^®

The one major piece of broadcast law enacted by

Congress during the first term, the Communications Act of
The General: David Sarnoff and the
Rise of the Cowwuni cat ions Industry (New York: Harper &
Row, 1986), 111-38. As Bilby notes, Sarnoff was already
focused on the development of television by the start of
the New Deal and saw radio profits as the means of
financing the new medium. This made NBC especially
sensitive to any threat to commercial broadcasting as it
existed.
^'^

Kenneth Bilby,

6®

Barnouw,

The Golden Web,

31.

.

1934,

s

:

became the new controlling document of American

broadcaGting.^9 At the time, however,

minor piece of the New Deal

'

it wac

concidered

a

legiclative quilt, a largely

c

adminictrative reform. The Radio Act of 1927 had concerned
itself solely with wirelecB communications. Telephone and

telegraph regulation remained the province of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Poet Office

Department with the Department of State exercising a
measure of control over international service

.

As part of a

broader reform movement, Roosevelt moved to bring all
electronic communications under a single regulatory agency.
In the fall of 1933,

Commerce Daniel

the president directed Secretary of

Roper to set up an interagency study

C.

group to ratify the concept and,

in February of 19 34,

Roosevelt asked Congress to create

Communications Commission

.

a

new Federal

One day after the president

'

message was sent to the Hill, bills to do just that were

introduced in the Senate by Dill and in the House by

Democrat Sam Rayburn of Texas. Both had participated in the
work of Roper's panel and endorsed its limited goals.

Neither sought to disturb the existing structure of radio
regulation.

See especially Robert W. McChesney, "Franklin
Roosevelt, His Administration, and the Communications Act
of 1934," Awerioan Journalieni 5 (1988), 204-29; Philip T.
Rosen, The Modern Stentore: Radio Broadcaeters and the
(Westport Connecticut
Federal Government 1920 -193 4
161-79
Greenwood, 198 0)
69

,

,
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.

The Radio Act had institutionalized the conceptc
of

public ownerchip and private uce of the ether and

establiGhed the public interect standard as the measure for
deciding who would be allowed to broadcast. Congress,
however, had left important issues unresolved. The law

condemned monopoly and censorship and promised equal access
but left it to the Federal Radio Commission to work out the

prickliest details. Most significantly,

it was up to the

FRC to determine just what Congress meant by "the public
interest,

convenience and necessity." Through it all,

legislators kept a constant vigil over the Commission's
budget

personnel and decisions

,

While sniping at regulatory agencies is not unusual,
the FRC

'

s

troubles stand out

.

A

Brookings Institution

19 32

report concluded "probably no quasi

-

j

udic ial body was ever

subject to so much congressional pressure as the Federal

Radio Commiss ion

.

The FRC was created to restore order

" "^o

in broadcasting in the wake of the Zenith decision. To

accompl ish that goal

,

the commiss ioners were forced to

determine which radio stations were truly serving the

public interest. Understandably reluctant to tamper with

popular stations able to generate thousands of letters to
members of Congress

,

the commissioners most often targeted

smaller operations. Stations which failed to attract mass

Laurence F. Schmeckebier The Federal Radio
CommiBGion: Its History, Activities and Organization
54-5.
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1932)
70

,

,
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audiences were seen as electronic clutter, obstacles to
clear reception of popular programming. Dozens of

broadcasters representing educational institutions,
religious groups and non-profit agencies became, as the FRC

phrased

it,

"martyrs to the cause of better radio,

"'^i

This

was not what many advocates of freedom of the air had had
in mind, but Wallace White,

the House sponsor of the Radio

Act, had foreseen just such a result. The public interest

standard, he had assured a colleague, would in practice

benefit popular stations. Common sense, he suggested,
indicated that allowing marginal stations to clutter the
air "would tend to a confusion and chaos manifestly against

public interest and convenience

"^^

The conflation of private profit and public interest,
so often espoused in the 1920s, had in the 1930s lost much

New York City station operated by

of its appeal. WLWL,

a

the Paulist Fathers,

saw its air time and power

authorization reduced by a series of FRC decisions favoring
popular stations. Father John Harney, the order's superior,
told a Senate committee it was clear the "liking of the

commission was commercial —

'

oh,

yes

;

income

,

income

.

We

will do everything we can for you. Religion, education —

Federal Radio Commission, Second Annual Report of
the Federal Radio CommisBion (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1928), 73.

White to Rep. Allen T. Treadway, November 22, 1926,
box 51, Wallace H. White, Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
72
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well,

there ic a difficulty there.

'""^^

Harney and other

opponentc of radio-ac -ucual hoped the new Communicat ionc
Act would addrecD their concernc

Shortly before the

.

interagency panel iccued itc report, Roper acked Roocevelt
to appoint a new committee to ctudy broadcasting.

Radio,

Roper wi-ote, had received "inadequate attention" and

warranted "cpecial cone iderat ion

.

"

The president was at

first supportive, but Dill and Rayburn convinced him that a

new study would become a showcase for critics of commercial
broadcasting and make

it

impossible for any administrative

reform to clear Congress that year. Denied a forum

for*

expressing their views, the critics took their campaign to
the floor of the Senate.

Their vehicle was the Wagner -Hat f ie Id amendment
setting aside a quarter of all radio frequencies for
schools, colleges, churches and other non-profit "human
wel f are " agenc ies

.

Sponsored by Democrat Robert Wagner of

New York and Republican Henry Hatfield of West Virginia,
the plan attracted support from those concerned with the

dominat ion of the medium by commerc ial broadcasters and,
especially,

the increasingly powerful chains

.

The idea that

a portion of the broadcast band should be set aside for

non-profit broadcasters was not new. Dill had included

Testimony in Congress Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, A Bill to Provide for Regulation of
Interstate and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio,
(Washington:
hearings on S. 2910, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess
Government Printing Office, 1934), 190.
,

,

.
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.

Gimilar language in his version of the Radio Act,
but
was deleted in conference at White

'g

it

insictence. White, who

had been elected to the Senate in 1930, recalled that
the
set-aside issue was "one of the most difficult problems we

had to deal with." He had included language in a

preliminary version of the House bill directing the
Commerce Department to "establish priorities as to the

character of service, but even that was so controversial
that it was eliminated from the final draft." Rather than

risk "interminable discussion here in the legislative body"

which could have killed needed reform, White explained, he

passed the buck to the regulators "to make the best
distribution they could" under the public interest
standard

"^^
.

Broadcasters

,

fearing a frontal assault on the

American system of radio, rallied opposition. The reforms,
they argued, were unworkable

,

dangerously impract ical and

would in the long run prove both costly and destructive

Deftly mobilizing allies and placating foes, the
industry demonstrated considerable political skill. The
networks' capitulation to the publishers neutralized one

potential source of anti -broadcast ing agitation. If the

broadcasters had taken a stronger stand at the Biltmore,
the publishers and their formidable Washington lobbyists

would likely have taken a much more adversarial role during

74

Hearings on

S.

2910,

March

142

10,

1934,

190-

1.

the debate.

75

With critics in the press mollified,

broadcasters and their allies argued against change by
emphasizing perils lurking within the amendment.
To opponents of radio commercialism. Dill pointed out
that the Wagner-Hatf ield plan would allow the proposed non-

profit stations to support themselves by selling

advertising time. Clearly, he argued, that would mean more
commercials on the
stability,

air."^^ To

advocates of process and

former Federal Radio Commissioner Henry Bellows,

a Harvard classmate of President Roosevelt's hired by

Columbia in 1933 to manage its Washington station and help
handle government relations, recalled the president's
modest goal of "transferring the present authority for the
control of communications" to a new commission. To make a

major change in the regulatory landscape, to overthrow
seven years of experience. Bellows said, would "tell the

new commission that broadcasting must remain unstable,
hazardous, unable to look ahead with any assurance or

conf idence

"
.

"^"^

For those concerned with censorship and

William Paley, Ab It Happened: A Memoir (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1979), 118-29. Paley in his
autobiography defended his actions during the Press -Radio
War and cited fear of newspaper lobbying during the debate
on radio regulation as one motive for his agreement to the
settlement. The Biltmore negotiations commenced ten weeks
before Roosevelt called for a new Communications Act but
after the Roper committee convened, additional evidence
that the panel's conclusion that new legislation was needed
was preordained,
The Golden Web, 22-8,

76

Barnouw,

77

Hearings on

S.

2910, March 10,
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1934,

170,

180.

'

.

monopoly, Dill pointed out that the legislation

incorporated the same accurances which had been part of the
1927 law.

Finally, as a sop to educational broadcasters who

had been silenced by the FRC

b

tilt toward commercial

broadcasters, Dill offered an amendment directing the FCC
to conduct an investigation and hold a public conference on

radio education within a year."^®
All of this was enough to convince Congress to act

cautiously. The growing influence of radio as an

informational medium and the popularity of programs

produced by the national chains had given radio a solid
base of support among the nation

'

s

isteners

1

.

The concerns

of educat ional broadcasters had been duly addressed,

actually answered

.

In addit ion,

if not

opponents of the exist ing

system failed to mount a united front for change

.

Some

educators and church leaders had struck al 1 iances with
commerc ial broadcasters which al lowed them access to the
air without the expense of operating their own stations.

Intramural disputes over which labor union, which farm

cooperative might receive an educational station weakened
the coalition behind Wagner-Hatf ield

78

Rosen,

The Modern Stentors,

177-8.

Own Stations
See S.E. Frost, Jr. Education
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937; reprint, New
York: Arno, 1971); James A. Brown, "Struggle Against
Commercialism: The 1934 'Harney Lobby' for Nonprofit
Frequency Allocation," Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic
Media 33 (Summer 1989), 273-91.
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Most importantly, there was no vivid public outcry
for

reform as there had been prior to enactment of the 1927
law.

The FRC had many faults, but it had succeeded in

regularizing the radio dial. Listeners were not faced with
the infuriating interference and constantly shifting

frequencies which had in 1926 threatened to turn the ether
into a Babel. The broadcasters' appeal for continuity and

caution seemed the safest choice. Rather than risk

potentially disruptive change, legislators opted to stay
the course. Most accepted Dill's view that "private

initiative, private capital, and, most of all, American

business methods of popularizing and developing radio, have

placed radio in this country far ahead of that in any other
country in the world.

Convinced it had done enough, the

Senate defeated the Wagner-Hatf ield amendment, 42-23. Less
than a week later, a version of Dill's bill including the

major provisions of the Radio Act passed both houses and
was signed by the president on June 19,

19 34.

The transition from the old FRC to the new FCC was

seamless. Broadcasters were reassured when two allies from
the FRC, chairman Eugene Sykes and Thad Brown, were

appointed to the new agency. Radio's triumph was not,
however, total. As Erik Barnouw observed,

"in winning their

victory, networks and stations had made promises that were

clarence C. Dill in Martin Codel, ed. Padio and
reprinted
Its Future (New York: Harper and Brothers, 193 0)
as "Guarding the Ether — The American Way, " Congreeeional
Digeet August -September 1933, 196.
80

,

,

,
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hoctagec."8i The moot important wac their renewed
pledge of

allegiance to the bargain of public Dervice in exchange
fox
acceoD to the air. By again acknowledging that baoic
premice,

the radio induotry gave itc critico acceoc to a

weapon of great weight: the regulatory power of the otate.
Some Dcholarc, blecced with the percpective of time,
have Duggeoted the regulatory debate effectively ended in
1934.

To Philip Rocen,

the Communicat ionc Act reaffirmed

"the legal and regulatory foundationo of the American

cyctem initially implemented by Herbert Hoover and the

Republican adminictrat ionc during the 192 Oc.

"Q-

By

licencing individual stationc rather than the powerful
chainc,

the FCC,

Barnouw

wi^ote,

caw every day "evidence of

the irrelevance of itc work."®^ Robert McChecney cuggeoted
the Roooevelt adminictrat ion "wao willing to cacrifice the

lact and only opportunity the publ ic would have to debate
the meritc of itc broadcaoting cervice" for fear of

offending broadcacterc

.

Sucan Douglac argued that both

the 1927 and 1934 lawc endorced a conctruct favoring

corporate control of "both broadcacting technology and
acceco to the opectrum" which had been created during the

®i

Barnouw,

®2

Rocen,

®^

Barnouw,

The Oolden Web,

27.

The Modern Stentorc,
The Oolden Web,

182.

34.

McChecney, "Franklin Roocevelt, Hie Adminictrat ion
and the Communicat ionc Act of 1934," 229.
64
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first two decades of the century.

85

while such arguments

are far more apt than earlier analyses which saw the
1927

and 1934 laws as clear victories for the public interest,

broadcasters in the 193 0s were not nearly so confident that
their vision of American broadcasting had once and for all

prevailed.

Roosevelt's election had eliminated from the

regulatory structure one of the best friends the American
system of broadcasting had ever known. Hoover's views on
radio were writ large, the product of his years as

Secretary of Commerce and in the White House. He was an
opponent of government monopoly, an advocate of cooperative
self -regulation and a generally supportive critic of

commercial radio. The status quo was in large part Hoover's
creation. Given what New Dealer Raymond Moley later called

"Roosevelt's lack of firm convictions" on economic matters

and his willingness to try several different plans,
sometimes in unison, the radio industry had good reason to
be concerned

^"^
.

As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson

administration, Roosevelt had been a supporting player in
the creation of RCA. More ominously, he had also backed
85

Douglas,

Inventing AniericAn Broadcasting, 322.

See for example Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), a standard
college broadcasting text now in its seventh edition.
86

Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 228.
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.

plans to maintain the government's wireless monopoly.

Roosevelt's wartime chief, Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels, had been the most outspoken advocate of a

government radio monopoly and had taken part in the initial
1919 meeting which resulted in the formation of RCA as an

American-owned wireless company. Roosevelt himself had
participated in subsequent negot iat ions

.

®8

In 1929, Daniels

wrote Roosevelt asking for his former aide's recollections.

Roosevelt responded with a letter summarizing his meetings

with GE's Owen Young and added,

"I

was in hearty accord

with the proposal for permanent government control until
such time as it was clearly impossible to get it from
Congress.

While Roosevelt was in part simply reaffirming

his loyalty to Daniels, Roosevelt's participation in the

navy's bid to control radio was personally recalled by
several NBC execut ives

Describing the "conflicting policies and gyrations" of
the New Deal,

historian Ellis Hawley noted the Roosevelt

administration "began with government sponsorship of
cartels and business planning; it ended with the antitrust
The Cabinet Diaries of
Daniel Cronon, ed.
tJosephuG Daniels 1913-1921 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1963), 416. In light of the future debate over the
radio trust, it may be noted that Daniels, in his diary
entry for May 23, 1919, said the meeting between navy and
General Electric officials in New York was "about their
organizing a wireless company — a monopoly in patents,"
®Q

E.

,

Roosevelt and Daniels
Carrol Kilpatrick, ed.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952),
100-3
®^

,

.
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campaign and the attack on rigid prices; and along the way,
it engaged in minor excursions into socialism,

public

utility regulation, and the establishment of 'government
yardsticks.

'

"90

There were,

in other words,

enough

potential dangers within the broad outlines of the New Deal
to horrify the radio industry. After benefiting from

Hoover's benign associat ionist policies, what lay in store

with a president who pledged in his inaugural address that
"we must act,

and act quickly" to right the economic boat?

What dangerous changes could radio anticipate from what

Roosevelt's biographer Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called "a

government determined to sfovern,

"

determined to prove to

the people of the nation that the federal government could

make a difference in the ir

1

ives?^^

Broadcasters delightedly discovered Roosevelt appeared
content to let the radio industry cont inue about its

business largely as before. Criticism of specific radio
programs and industry practices continued to be heard but

rarely from the White House
dangerous critics,

The most vocal and potentially

.

it seemed,

were in Congress. Old line

populists and progressives such as Burton Wheeler who

distrusted most things corporate and hard-shell Republicans
such as Hamilton Fish who berated broadcasters for failing
Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of
Monopoly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
90

Press,

1966,

1969)

,

15.

Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal
Emphasis in the original.
^1
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,

1,

22.

.•

,

,

to recognize the evils of the New Deal regularly
sniped at

the medium. Within the FCC itself, commissioner George

Henry Payne soon proved a constant irritant. A Bull Moose
Republican reformer from New York City, Payne was a
frequent critic of shoddy programs and excessive

advertising who hectored his fellow commissioners on the
need for a vigilant FCC.^^ Broadcasting should elevate and

enlighten society, but because it was dominated by selfish
commercial interests, Payne argued in one speech, it

instead posed "a fundamental danger" to democracy.

"The

through their Government," Payne cautioned, must

people,

continue to "exercise.

.

.their sovereignty" over the

ether

When Roosevelt named Democratic New York Congressman

Anning Prall to replace Judge Sykes as FCC chairman, the
industry worried the appointment signaled an important
Payne took great pride in his progressive
antecedents During his conf irmat ion hearings in 1935
Wheeler vigilant against the encroachments of Wal 1 Street
queried, "You were appointed as a Republican, were you?"
"As a Progressive Republican," Payne corrected him.
Unsure that such a breed existed in such close
proximity to the House of Morgan, Wheeler inquired, "Well,
what is the distinction in New York?"
"I would say solitude," Payne replied.
Senator Robert Wagner, the liberal New York Democrat,
quickly interrupted to vouch for Payne's bona fides.
Congress, Senate, Interstate Commerce Committee,
Confirmation of Members of the Federal Communications
Commission, 74th Cong., 1st sess., January 25, 1935, 119.
.

,

George Henry Payne, "Safeguarding the Public
Interest in Radio," speech delivered at Cornell University,
August 21, 1935, reprinted in 74th Cong., 1st sess.,
Congressional Record (August 22, 1935), vol. 79, pt 13,
14123
.
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policy change. Scion of the Dutch colonial family which had
settled Staten Island in the 1670s, Prall had no radio
experience, but his background indicated he might lend a

sympathetic ear to critics such as Payne since he had
served as president of the New York City Board of Education

before being elected to Congress in 1923.^4 Rumors flew
that the administration was ready to launch its long-feared

assault on the broadcasters. Variety reported that
"Congressional enemies of chain broadcasters and critics of

Government policies" were pushing the White House to oust

both Sykes and Thad Brown from the FCC because their
"presence

...

regulation.

seriously damages hopes of

a

'

new deal in radio

"^^

While the industry worried, Prall maintained his

agenda was limited —

"I

wouldn't say we're going to do

anything especially sensational,

"

he assured the industry

upon taking office — and while his regime represented no
real change in course, events in 1935 demonstrated both how
the FCC worked and how sensitive broadcasters were to the

threat of government intervention. The FCC held under law
the power to revoke any broadcaster's license,

it was

reluctant to invoke that draconian solution. For the vast
"Anning S. Prall, 66, Head of FCC, Dead," New York
Times, July 24, 1937, 15. Prall did not assume his place on
the Commission until March, 1935, because members of
Congress are forbidden by law from accepting appointments
to executive agencies created by a Congress in which they
served.
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"Ganging Up on Commish,
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Variety, May

1,

1935,

25.

majority of stations, the renewal process involved
no more
than filling out a few forms and waiting for the
new
license to arrive in the mail.^e The FCC's weapon of
choice
in defending the public interest was publicity,

in the rare

instances when a public scolding proved ineffective, the

commission reserved the right to designate a license for
hearing. That, broadcasters knew, would mean more negative

publicity - possibly enough to frighten away skittish
advertisers — and mounting legal expenses which could
threaten the financial stability of the two-thirds of all
stations which were already only marginally profitable.
This one -two punch came to be known as "the raised eyebrow"

technique

^"^
.

In a talk broadcast on NBC Red, Prall promised to

"maintain a general surveillance over radio stations" and

reminded his listeners that the FCC could deny new licenses
to stations which ignored the public interest.

people," he cautioned,

"Radio

"would do well to eliminate programs

that arouse the imaginations of children to the point where

they cannot eat or sleep." Programs "that can be compared
to the dime novels of the 'Dead-eye Dick' or 'Boy Smuggler'

In its first three years, the FCC denied only eight
renewal applications, and two applicants failed to contest
their hearings, effectively surrendering their licenses
without a fight. Maurice M. Jansky, "An Analysis of the
Standard of Public Interest, Convenience and Necessity as
Defined by the Federal Communications Commission, " The
George Washincfton Law Review 6 (November 1937), 24.

Barnouw,

The Golden Web, 28-36.
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variety" would not, he said, be tolerated. He also
noted
the public's revulsion with explicit advertisements
for

patent medicines and personal care products.

^8

Prall failed to single out any specific children's

program. Nor did he identify specific products when he

criticized advertisers for discussing inappropriate
subjects on the air. He did not have to. By raising the
issues, he opened the door, and opponents of business-as-

usual on the air quickly entered. A hastily organized

letter-writing campaign, a public statement from an
impressively- titled interest group or a pointed inquiry

from a member of congress was usually enough to elicit a

response from the FCC. Broadcasters who refused to adjust

sufficiently by dropping the most controversial programs or
advertisements and continued to inspire public protests

risked being summoned for hearings. This was Prall

's

vision

of how the marketplace should work. The interaction of the

broadcasters and the public would best produce positive
change
The broadcasters

'

response to Prall

'

s

scolding is

instructive. The chairman's talk coincided with rumors of

an FCC shake-up, but the radio industry was also watching
two other potentially dangerous problems in Washington,
First,

the FCC's conference on education and radio, part of

the Communications Act compromise of the previous year, was

Chairman Prall Gives Radio Broadcasters a
Radio Spanking," Newe-Week, April 6, 1935, 34.
98

"FCC:
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scheduled for the following month. Second, and more
importantly, Congrees was debating a comprehensive reform
of federal food and drug regulations which would if
passed

impact important broadcast advertisers.

Talk of updating the legislation which created the

Food and Drug Administration in 1906 had first surfaced in
the spring of 1933. The driving force behind the proposed

changes was Rexford Tugwell, by title the Assistant

Secretary of Agriculture but by inclination a freelance
brains truster eager to bring rationalization, reform and

centralized planning to government. The bill, if approved,
would require significant changes in the patent medicine
and cosmetics industry, and the industry and its allies in
the advertising agencies and the media mounted the

barricades to stop it.^^

When Prall assumed his chairmanship, food and drug
reform was again making its way through Congress. The
patent medicine industry had managed to derail the

legislation during the previous session, but it had been a
difficult fight. The idea of pure food and drugs was hard
to oppose,

especially when Tugwell and his allies bolstered

their argument with demonstrations of corrosive and

poisonous preparations which the FDA was unable to regulate
under the existing law. In the spring of 1935, the industry
and its advertising agencies summoned top radio executives
99

Schlesinger,

The Coming of the New Deal
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,

354 -61.

"

to a meeting at the New York headquarters of
Bristol-Myers,

one of the largest patent medicine advertisers. The goal

was to bring radio into line against the bill. William

Paley of CBS and several high-ranking NBC officials were

sympathetic but declined to take an active role in
opposition. The broadcasters believed there was no

percentage,

Variety subsequently reported, in confronting

the Roosevelt administration on an issue with "strong

common support.

"lOO

Radio executives understood the value of favorable
publicity. After Prall criticized pharmaceutical

advertising, an NBC executive promptly proclaimed "radio is

hardly a suitable medium to advertise remedies for bodily
ills" and promised the network would take action to

eliminate the abuses.

NBC's announcement was quickly

trumped by CBS which revealed with great fanfare a new
network policy to limit advertising excesses and clean up
children's programming as well. Columbia pledged to refuse

advertisements which were offensive in content or which
featured sleazy, fast -talking announcers. The chain's
eight -point agenda for better children's programs was also

aimed to please. Among other things, CBS promised an end to
You With Us?' Drug Boys Ask Broadcasters at
Lunch; Polite Silence is Answer," Variety, April 24, 1935,
100

35

H

ij^^e

.

NBC sales promotion manager E.P.H. James quoted in
"Chairman Prall Gives Radio Broadcasters a Radio Spanking,
101

34

.
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chowG Which might
child,

"

"

arouse harmful nervouc react ionc in the

exactly the kind of "blood and thunder" dramac

Prall had criticized.

Columbia's policy statement was greeted with near
universal praise. Prall, lowering his raised eyebrow,

called it "an example of wise leadership." Owen Young saw
it as proof that the system worked.

"This step,

more than

anything that has recently been done," said the father of
RCA,

"justifies,

I

think,

our American system of

broadcasting control." Several leading independent stations
quickly embraced the CBS position.

103

^he New York Timec

added its editorial endorsement describing Columbia's
statement as "a policy demanding courage and vision which
we are happy to acclaim. "^^^ One of the few negative

responses came from NBC, whose publicists grumbled that the

older network had had a similar policy in place for more
than a year but had chosen not to discuss it outside the

industry
The broadcasters' deft response to Prall

's

criticism

reflected the industry's political acumen. The networks saw
no benefit in adopting an anti-reform posture. Instead,
102

"Radio Ads Curbed by Columbia Chain,

TimeB, May 14,
103

1935,

New York

10.

"Air Reform Praised by U.S.

Times, May 16,

37

1935,

"

Radio Head," New York

5.

104

Editorial, New York Timee, May

105

"NBC Slant on CBS Policy," Variety, May 22,
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1935,
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1935,

they worked behind the scenes with less
confrontational

elements of the advertising and pharmaceutical
industries
to water down provisions which could hobble radio

advertising. When a significantly weakened food and drug
bill finally passed in 1938, broadcasters enjoyed the

benefits of being perceived as leaders in the reform
movement and the income from more deftly edited and less

obtrusive patent medicine ads.io^ Similarly, broadcasters

continued to air adventure programs for children but fine
tuned the scripts and sound effects to silence their most
vocal critics while keeping the stories spicy enough to
appeal to their young listeners.

As Columbia announced its new programming policies in

May of 1935, educational broadcasters and their allies were
gathering in Washington for their promised FCC forum.
Commercial broadcasters were hoping to derail any talk of

frequency set -asides by pledging full cooperation with the
non-profits. The coincidence in timing between the CBS

announcement and the radio educators' meeting was not

missed by the New York Times which reported that "the
timeliness of the campaign to clean up the air was linked
in radio circles yesterday with the public hearing of non-

profit stations that the Federal Communications Commission
Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal 358-9.
Watered-down regulations giving the Federal Trade
Commission rather than the FDA some authority over patent
medicine advertising and labeling were approved as part of
the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938.
,
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will open in Washington today. "107 ^he FCC hoped
the forum

would "eliminate controversy and misunderstanding between
groups of educators and between the industry and educators"
while actively promoting "actual cooperative arrangements"
for more educational and uplifting programming. It would be
a far more efficient use of

both the non-profits' resources

and the public's radio spectrum, the commissioners said, to
use existing broadcast facilities rather than construct new

stations
The industry agreed that cooperation was the path of

least resistance. The alternative was likely some variant
of the Wagner-Hatf ield amendment to reserve a portion of

the broadcast spectrum for non-profit stations. To

commercial broadcasters, of course, this was unacceptable,

and it had little appeal to the regulators. Even if such a
controversial measure should succeed in Congress, the
thought of having to choose which commercial broadcasters

would be thrown off the air and which non-profit groups

would be chosen to take over their frequencies was more
than the FCC could bear with an election just a year away.

Commercial broadcasters. Variety noted as the forum began,
107

MCT_ij^i3

Times, May 15,

on Radio Ads Pleases Stations,
1935,

"

New York

24.

Federal Communications Commission, Third Annual
Report of the Federal Communi cations CommiBsion for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 193 7 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1937), 45-50; Hugh Carter Donahue, The
Battle to Control Broadcast News: Who Owns the First
Amendment? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 19-31.
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knowing they would have the upper hand in any
cooperative

projects becauee they controlled the facilities,
are leaping aboard the CommiDh bandwagon,

"generally

figuring that a

little co-operation now may head off more dractic

government action in the future.

"109

The broadcasting industry was learning that self-

regulation was the secret to avoiding government
regulation.

It was a gradual process.

When the issue at

hand was medical quackery or programs which terrified
children, practices which were either illegal on their face
or unlikely to inspire outpourings of public support,

the

system worked, but such clear-cut situations, one critic
observed,

formed only a small part of the debate over the

proper role of radio.

"As to what the Commission would do

with programs of doubtful public policy," he cautioned,
"there can be only conj ec ture

.

This was the dilemma which confx'onted both radio and
its regulators.

By soliciting and reacting to public

protests while at the same time adopting a cautious

approach to regulation, the FCC had raised expectations for
change while ratifying the status quo. In a series of test
cases dating back to the birth of the old Radio Commission,

both the commissions and the federal courts had held that
109

May

8,

"Air-Pedagogs Rally May 15 Looks Big," Variety,

193 5,

51.

110 Jansky,

Interest,

"

"An Analysis of the Standard of Public

40

159

.
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regulators must of necessity "consider the character
and
the quality of the service" when determining
whether or not

to grant a license in the public interest, when a
station

was applying for a renewal, past performance would be
"an

important consideration. "in Although Section 326 of the

Communications Act explicitly denied the FCC censorship
powers,

the commission's duty to examine programming during

licensing proceedings gave the regulators what many

broadcasters believed was a potentially devastating power.
To make matters worse for the industry, the commission's

history demonstrated that the panel launched inquiries into

programming when complaints were received from the public,
and the volume of complaints

,

not their substance

,

was

often the decisive factor in deciding which licenses to
designate for hearings

m Associate

Justice Charles H. Robb, United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, KFKB
Broa dca sti ncf Abb oci at ion, Inc. v. Fe dera 1 Radio Comm isBion,
47 F. 2d 670-2 (DC Cir. 1931), quotation at 672.
Jansky, "An Analysis of the Standard of Public
Interest," 38-9. Section 326 of the Communications Act of
1934, Public Law 73-416, states:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or
construed to give the Commiss ion the power of
censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication. No person within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall utter any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication.
The obvious contradiction between the first sentence and
the second, while in keeping with established legal
precedents, would in practice trigger its share of
controversies over the years
160

.

The failings of the regulatory tradition in place

since the early 1920s were exposed in the 1930g as

political discourse grew increasingly contentious. News-

hungry listeners demanded information and radio gave it to
them by broadcasting talks and special events and offering

newscasts and commentaries, but by serving as a vehicle for
debate, radio inevitably became a participant. The

broadcasters' most basic programming decisions — who would
speak about what and at what time, who would be allowed to

buy time and for how much — became themselves topics of
intense publ ic controversy.
Gradually,

the industry developed formal policies to

regularize programming decisions

.

These pol icies evolved

both from the body of precedent which had developed over
the previous decade and from the rhetorical and

philosophical frameworks which had defined the debate over
control of radio. Industry leaders earnestly hoped

responsible self -regulation would forestall new assaults on
the American system of broadcasting. They warily tried to

frame policies which would be seen as neither censorship

nor an effort to monopolize the air waves on behalf of

privileged interests
When CBS announced its proposals for children's

programming reform, Paley underscored the industry's
conflicting tasks of insuring free expression and at the
same time exercising responsible stewardship of the

public's air waves.

"We have no thought of setting

161

ourselves up as arbiters of what is proper for children
to
hear," he said, "but we have an editorial responsibility

to

the community,

in the interpretation of public wish and

sentiment, which cannot be waived.

"^^^

Broadcasters

constantly sought the golden mean, a balance between
freedom and control. Try as it might to blunt charges of
censorship,

the industry's own defensive practices left it

vulnerable to new attacks,
CBS,

during the programming debates over educational

radio in 1935, reaffirmed what network officials said had
always been the chain's policy. Network time would not be
sold for the spread of propaganda, only for the sale of

goods and services. Columbia explained it would continue to

broadcast discussions of controversial public issues but
only on sustaining programs produced to insure fairness and
balance. As models,

the network pointed to its own

"American School of the Air,

"

which included current events

segments, and NBC's public affairs forums,

"America's Tov/n

Meeting" and "The University of Chicago Round Table.

"^^^

Only one exception was allowed. During political campaigns,
candidates would be allowed to buy air time. The theory,
Paley later explained,

"was that broadcasters

government regulators

should exercise editorial judgment

not

Quoted in "Radio Ads Curbed by Columbia Chain,"
10

.

As It Happened, 116; Summers, A Thirty Year
History of Programs Carried on National Radio Networks in
the United States 1926-1956, 54.
114 Paley,

162

.

and take editorial responsibility for what went out over
the networks. "^^^

The Columbia policy and similar standards adopted by
the other chains and the National Association of

Broadcasters in part reflected the need shared by any
maturing industry to regularize its practices. For most
businesses, however,

internal production codes were of

relatively little interest to consumers. Radio, balancing
the often conflicting interests of its advertisers,

listeners and regulators, was under closer scrutiny. This
was especially true when broadcasters made decisions on
those staples of information programming, talks and special
events. Whenever one event was covered while another was
not, when some guests were invited to appear on radio round

tables and others were not

,

broadcasters risked attack

The Ford Motor Company's Sunday evening concert series

offered an example of how a seemingly routine programming
decision could lead to controversy. In 1934, the car maker

purchased an hour on Columbia each Sunday night to showcase
the Detroit Symphony. During the orchestra's intermission,

rather than espousing the virtues of Ford automobiles,

company spokesman William Cameron, the ex-editor of Henry
Ford's radically right wing and often anti-Semitic Dearborn
Independent, discussed current events "to assist, if

Paley, As It Happened,

116-7.

.

possible,

those who desire to make up their minds.

Invariably, he assaulted invasive government in general
and
the New Deal in particular. Ford's refusal to
subscribe to

the National Recovery Administration code for auto
makers
was, he argued,

a crusade for freedom,

a struggle against

"autocratic authority. "H^ ^^3^ the Supreme Court struck

down the NRA, he proclaimed that "every attempt to
subjugate our citizens as vassals of the state has
failed, "^s

Stung by criticism that the Ford program was corporate
propaganda,

the network struggled mightily to show that it

neither exercised censorship nor allowed their microphones
to be used irresponsibly.

"We are careful whom we invite to

broadcast, and once invited we would not expect to censor,"

said NBC program director John Royal,

"We do not expect men

and women in public life to say anything we would be

ashamed of."^^ Cameron's talks were controversial, but he
116

Thomas S. Green, Jr., "Mr. Cameron and the Ford
Hour," Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939), 670.
Barnouw, The Golden Web, 34; Green,
and the Ford Hour," 6 75.

"Mr.

Cameron

118

"Ford Sunday Evening Hour," CBS, June 23, 1935,
quoted in Bliss, Now the Newe 64. While the Ford program
was the most notorious example of corporate propaganda, it
was not unique. Fred G. Clark's "Voice of the Crusader" on
Columbia and later Mutual also provided a staunchly probusiness viewpoint financed by an alliance of manufacturers
and advertising agencies. See Barnouw, The Golden Web, 14,

5

Quoted in "Censors: Aclu Declares Radio Gags
Speakers With Red Tape," Newe-Week, September 14, 1935, 25.
119
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reprecented Ford, a pillar of American inductry and

a

valued advertiser. Advocatec of ideac out of the mainotream
of public opinion who represented organizations
unlikely to

purchase significant amounts of air time often found the
studio closed to them.

Radio's index of proscribed topics shifted over time.
As Kaltenborn had discovered while broadcasting on WEAF,

there was no actual list of subjects beyond the pale.

Broadcasters exercised editorial judgment, critics felt, by

wh i m

.

In 19 3 3,

criticism of the

i

ncom i ng Roose ve 1

administration was apparently discouraged

if not

banned

outright. The American Civil Liberties Union charged that

Columbia's Henry Bellows "frankly stated that no broadcast

would be permitted over CBS which was in any way critical
of any policy of the Administration." NBC had the same

policy,

the ACLU charged,

telling the Massachusetts

American Legion to make sure its radio speakers did not
"disturb public confidence in the President

"^^*-"^
.

The

embargo on cx^iticism of the New Deal had clearly been

relaxed for paying customers by the fall of 1934 — after
the Communications Act had been signed — when Cameron went

on the air, but other restrictions continued and even

astute students of radio found it difficult to determine
what was allowed and what was not.

"The would-be speaker

"Censors: Aclu Declares Radio Gags Speakers With
Red Tape," 25. The report outlined one hundred instances of
"private radio censox^ship. "
120
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must run the gauntlet of a regular army of amateur
Catos,"

reported a 1936 ACLU study, resulting in a "rather
catholic" list of banned subjects and speakers ranging
from

radicals to Republ icans

.

121

topic which was perfectly

acceptable to one station might be forbidden by another.

Even at the same station, a program welcomed one month
might be too hot to handle the next.

Partisan politics were a particularly treacherous mine
field for radio broadcasters, and the networks' evolving

policies were severely tested in the first month of 1936.
President Roosevelt,

in an unprecedented move,

announced he

would deliver his State of the Union message to Congress at
night.

Radio had routinely broadcast the annual message

since 1923 when McNamee experimented with his on- the -air

summary during the Cool idge administration. Previously,
however,

it had always been delivered at midday.

By

speaking at nine o'clock on a Friday night, Roosevelt knew
he would command the largest audience such an address had

ever enj oyed.
The White House, of course, claimed the president's

speech would be nonpartisan and therefore nonpol it ical

When the chains announced they would as usual carry the
address, Republican National Committee chairman Henry

P.

Fletcher, claiming Roosevelt planned to use the speech to
"Radio Censorship Charged In Survey," New York
Times, December 20, 1936, 10. The ACLU reported "seventy
'authenticated' instances of censorship by radio stations
since 193 0 "
121

.
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launch his reelection campaign, demanded air
time to
respond.

122

while Fletcher's position was predictable,

debate over Roosevelt's strategy and the chains'

cooperation spread beyond partisan boundaries. Columnist
Walter Lippmann shared Fletcher's concern that Roosevelt's
speech required some kind of a response "for never before
has radio been used in America with such calculated purpose
to establish any one man's domination of public

opinion. "123 ^BC seemed to agree. The network dispatched a

telegram inviting the Republicans to speak, citing NBC's
"established policy... of making its facilities available to

responsible speakers for discussion of both sides of public
questions affecting the national welfare.

"124

Revealing the lack of consensus within the industry,
Columbia disagreed. Paley wired Fletcher that Roosevelt

would be speaking as president carrying out the duties of
his office, not as a candidate for reelection. Therefore,

Columbia would not offer free time. Neither would the
network allow the Republicans to purchase time to respond

because it was CBS policy not to sell political time prior
to the national conventions.

In an exchange of telegrams

Turner Catledge, "Roosevelt Speech Politics, Says
Q.O.P.; Radio Reply Asked," New York Times, January 2,
122

1936,

1.

Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow,
Globe, January 4, 1936, 12.
123

"

Boston

Quoted in "NBC Allows Reply to Roosevelt Talk,"
New York Times, January 3, 1936, 3.
124
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and letters later reprinted in pamphlet form by
CBS,
Fletcher and Paley sparred over the issue. Fletcher,

appealing to the public's interest in balanced debate,

charged censorship. Paley insisted that broadcasters
must
be allowed to exercise editorial judgment and promised
to

allow the Republicans fair access to the network during the
campaign.

12

Roosevelt's speech was only one point of dispute

between the radio industry and the Republicans. Less than
two weeks after the president's message,

the Republicans

approached the networks with a request to buy time for a
series of "political skits" dramatizing the issues of the
day.

This time, both CBS and NBC refused to sell the party

air time, citing network policies against dramatization of

political issues. Given the popularity of "March of Time"
and similar fact -based programs, the explanation rang
false.

"The two great broadcasting companies are attempting

to prevent the Republican party the freedom of the air," a

party official proclaimed,

"They have abandoned their

function as servants of the people, surrendered their
independence and joined the 'dictators of the New
Deal. '"126 The Republicans turned to WGN, owned by the

Summarized in Alistair Cooke, "US Radio Fights
Political Control," World Film News, July 1936, 28-9,
reprinted in Daniel J. Leab, "Document: US Radio Fights
Political Control: 1936," HiBtorical Journal of Film, Radio
and Television 9 (1989), 189-96.
125

Harrison E. Spangler, western division director of
the Republican National Committee, quoted in "Radio Chains
126
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ant i -New Deal Chicacfo Tribune, which smugly agreed
to air
the series as a contribution to free public debate. 127

In October, the Republicans purchased time on CBS for
a talk by Senator Arthur Vandenberg 12 8
.

A veteran behind

the microphone blessed with what one leading columnist

described as "a radio voice that requires all listeners to
sit well back from their receivers," Vandenberg on this

occasion had more than the usual pre-election talk in
mind. 129 He arrived at Columbia's studio with a recording
of a Roosevelt speech and a script portraying a "debate"

with the

pire s

ident

.

CBS st8.ffeirs at first irefused. to all ow

Vandenberg on the air, then relented only to cut the

program off in midstream. When the Republicans, who had
after all paid for the air time, demanded that the program
be rescheduled and broadcast in its entirety, Columbia

refused, citing both its stand against dramatizations and a

rule against airing recorded material which stemmed from an

on-going dispute between the radio industry and the
musicians

'

union.

Bar Republican Skit But Party Gets Chicago Outlet," New
York Times, January 14, 19 36, 1.
127
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In All His Glory, 162. Columbia was
particularly adamant in its refusal to air transcriptions.
The network radio system was based on simultaneous
transmission of live programming to stations across the
country. Paley feared that recordings would allow

Smith,

169
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Paley's biographer charges that Columbia's actions

throughout the election year, while they "stopped
short of
blatant partisanship," reflected the network's strong
bias

toward Roosevelt

.

i^i

It would be more accurate to portray

the industry's behavior as additional evidence of radio's

deference toward its regulators regardless of party.

Roosevelt's acknowledged radio expertise had led the
Republicans to search for a successful means of countering
the president's advantage. As the Republicans and their

supporters in the advertising community devised strategies,

both CBS and NBC made and revised policy on the fly. Paley
and NBC's new president Lenox Lohr explained their
decisions in the familiar rhetoric of public interest and
fairness
In a letter rejecting the Republican's "political
skit" proposal,

Paley argued that dramatizations might

cause voters to decide among candidates on emotional rather
than intellectual grounds. The election, he suggested,
might be decided by which side employed the better
dramatists. Lohr repeated that same theme. NBC desired to

bring listeners "the various sides of political
issues

...

fairly and adequately," he wrote. The network

sought "to reflect the thought of the religious, political,
social and cultural life of our country" by presenting

individual stations such flexibility in programming that
the network system itself would be jeopardized.
131 Smith,

In All Hie Glory,
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"responsible spokesmen on the public questions" of the day.
"To accept such dramatic programs as you have offered,"

Lohr concluded,

"would place the discussion of vital

political and national issues on the basis of dramatic
license, rather than upon a basis of responsibly stated

fact or opinion. "^^^
The radio industry, despite its inbred conservatism,
has often shown an odd tenacity. Broadcasters seek to

please their constituents: listeners, advertisers and
regulators. They are averse to straying from courses which
have proven successful. Originality is most often met with
scorn. At times,

however, a new concept manages to enter

the medium and be universally embraced.
in the 1920s were one such example.

pickups were another
the better

,

.

Remote broadcasts

In the 1930s,

overseas

Broadcasts from far away, the farther

once perfected, became memorable radio moments

A few, the "woman

I

love" abdication speech of Edward VIII

for one, were truly historic. Others,

the sound of an

English nightingale trilling in the Surrey woods which CBS
declared a major step forward in Anglo-American relations,
simply displayed the virtuosity of the medium.

The

development of radio commentary was such an innovation.
Lohr to Fletcher, January 8, 1936, published in
"Party Head Reveals Ban," New York Times, January 14, 1936,
17

.

David Holbrook Culbert, News For Everyman: Radio
and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport,
15.
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976)
,
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Outspoken discussion of controversial issues would
seem to
have little appeal to broadcasters who believed that
controversy would by definition alienate or anger at
least
a portion of its public.

Yet controversy excited and

attracted audiences.
Network news in the mid- 1930s increasingly came to be
identified with the commentators. The chains had seen this
trend in 1934, because they argued for and won one
important concession in the Biltmore Agreement. Sponsored

broadcasts by commentators could continue on the air as
long as they were devoted to "a generalization and

background of general news situations" rather than "a
recital of spot news."!^^ It was a fine difference at best

—

hoW;

exactly, could you discuss the "background" of an

event without revealing what event you were talking about?

— which proved impossible

Columbia's White

to interpret.

dismissed the distinction as a "specious idea" and wondered
why the newspapers had gone along with

it.

"Maybe

publishers and press association executives, who might have
objected," he reflected,
'commentators.

'

"just liked to listen to those

"1^5

Like the newspaper columnists from whose ranks most
emerged, the commentators were identified as responsible

Harris,

"Note to editors," 2727.

White, NewB on the Air, 43.

172

.

journalictG with cpecial expert ice

explain the newc

.

1=^^

They cought to

a cervice in increacing demand during the

,

1930G. Ac Stanley Walker,

the ecteemed city editor of the

New York Herald Tribune, Guggected, the perconal, intimate
medium of radio ceemed ecpecially suited to cerve the
publ ic
ac a forum for comment and analyciG — a roctrum
from which the Walter Lippmannc of the ether may
ceek to explain to the befuddled citizenry juct
what everything ic about. Since the depreccion,
thic yearning of the public for an explanation of
what iG happening — if there ic an explanation —
has resulted in Gcorec of prophetc who are only
too glad, for a modect fee, to leap to the
microphone and do their level beet to clarify

matters

^'^^
.

Commentatorc who Gought more than "a modect fee" needed

a

sponsor. That implied the ability to attract an audience.

As one analyst of radio news noted,

"this places him more

in the position of a performer than a clarifier,

and may

dictate irrespons ibility in the treatment of certain
events "1^8

'

.

The nat ion

'

s

most opinionated, most diccusced and

perhaps most popular radio commentator in the mid-1930s was
Boake Carter. Born in Baku, Azerbaijan, the son of a

British oil man who doubled ac His Majesty's consular
Smith, "The Origins of Radio Network News
Commentary, " 114-5.
1^"^

Ribbon,

Stanley Walker, City Editor (New York: Blue
1934)

,

243

Sherman
Greenberg, 1942)

H.
,

Dryer, Radio In Wartime (New York:
157.
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.

.

.

agent. Carter was a $50-a-week rewrite man for the

Philadelphia Daily News when he broke into radio in 1930.
His first broadcast assignment was a rugby game because, so
the story goes, no one else understood the rules, and the

station manager thought his British accent would add a

certain tone of authenticity
Carter described himself as "a nightly radio

editorialist on the news of each day's events" with "no axe
to grind... no political adherences

— Democratic,

Republican, Labor, Socialist, Communist, or what have you

— no economic crucifix to bear, whether
little business

,

of big business,

planned economy, or laissez

pol icies "1^^ In practice, he
.

v/ac

-

f aire

an isolationist, a foe of

organized labor, the military establishment, the New Deal
and virtually everything the Roosevelt administration
supported.

Carter elbowed his way into the national spotlight in
1932 with his broadcasts following the Lindbergh

kidnapping

.

The owner of his Philadelphia station, who was

both Carter's personal manager and William Paley's brotherin-law, refused to allow CBS use of the station's mobile

broadcasting unit unless Carter was allowed to take part in
the coverage. He salted his reports on the investigation

A.J. Liebling,
Magazine August, 1938
,

140

"Boake Carter," Scribner
,

's

8

Boake Carter, ''Johnny
ix, xi
York: Dodge, 1936)

Q.

,
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Public'' Speaks!

(New

,

with tirades against the supposed corruption and
links with
organized crime of the governor of New Jersey. The programs
brought Carter national attention as well as a libel suit

which was settled with

a

subsequent on-air apology. I4i

Neither caused Carter to trim his sails.

"A news

commentator like myself," he told his audience in 1936,
"should be free to comment editorially on the day's news,
free to express my opinions,

in adherence to the best poker

language,

see them,

'Calling them as

I

letting the chips

fall where they may and playing no favorites

.' "1^2

Carter's program at its peak reached a weekly audience

estimated at five to ten million. Radio Digest^

g

annual

poll named him the most popular commentator of 1938.143 His
audience, researchers discovered, was fiercely supportive,

considered his broadcasts accurate and reliable, said he
helped them determine which current events were significant
and which were not, and generally agreed with his opinions

on the news
strata,

i^'*
.

While Carter's audience included all social

his program was especially popular with upper-

Liebling,
33

"Boake Carter," 10; Bliss, Now the News,

.

Boake Carter, "Broadcasting and the American
Public," broadcast on the CBS network, February 15, 1936,
reprinted in 74th Cong., 2nd sess., CongresGional Record
(February 20, 1936), vol. 80, pt 3, 2454.
142

.

143

Everyman

Liebling,
,

"Boake Carter," 8-10; Culbert, News for

4 7.

Hadley Cantril, "The Role of the Radio
Commentator, " Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939)
654-62
144

.
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income lietenerc moct decired by adverticerc. A ctudy
of

upper -income familiec in the Bocton area revealed that
Carter wac their radio favorite, ranking well ahead
of such
network iconc ac Major Bowec and Rudy Vallee.145

During the Little Steel strike of 1937, Carter locked
hornG with John

Organizations

.

L.

Lewie and the Congrecc of Industrial

Carter stridently attacked the CIO which

responded with picket lines outside Carter's studio and

a

boycott of Philco products. Philco sales slumped, as did
the economy generally,

and the radio manufacturer allowed

its contract with Carter to lapse.
in,

General Foods stepped

and Carter continued to broadcast on Columbia.

Targeting a broader spectrum of consumers less likely to be
influenced by a union boycott. General Foods was eager to

pay for access to Carter's audience. Certainly Carter's new
boss.

General Foods chairman Colby

M.

Chester, president of

the National Association of Manufacturers and an American

Liberty League activist, had no philosophical problem with
the commentator's opposition to trade unionism and the New

Deal 146
.

Columbia, assured of revenue from a national sponsor,
kept Carter on the air. The commentator was a lightning rod

"Listening Habits and Purchasing of Wealthy
Analyzed," Broadcact ing January 1, 1937, 34. "Wealthy" was
defined in the Boston University study as an annual family
income of $10,000. CBS later distributed the results to
advertisers in a booklet titled The Very Rich.
145

,

14 6

Culbert, Newc for Everyman, 47-8.
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for controversy, but, as one historian observed,
Carter was
"a sinner,

but a profitably sponsored sinner.

"147

q^q

^lad

room for him in the congregation until August of 1938
when
his nightly broadcasts were abruptly canceled.

Carter's sudden downfall was widely discussed within
the industry and had several causes. As his leading

chronicler, historian David Holbrook Culbert, has noted

Carter's unyielding isolationism slipped farther and
farther away from both governmental policy and the

mainstream of public opinion. Still, he maintained his

popularity with listeners until he left CBS. Carter was
"forced off the air for his isolationist views," Culbert
concluded, only after the Roosevelt administration launched
a concerted attack on the commentator,

extension,

the network.

his sponsor and, by

I'^s

Carter was clearly the target of administration
harassment. Scattered documentary evidence reveals a

campaign against General Foods, CBS and Carter himself

coordinated by the White House press secretary Stephen
Early. He was investigated by the Department of State and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, both of which

found his citizenship papers in order. The American

ambassador to Moscow, Joseph
147

Original
148

58

E.

Davies, played a key role.

Persico, Edward R Murrow: An American
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 128.

Joseph

E.

.

Culbert, News for Everyman, 34-59, quotation at

.
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His wife,

the former Marjorie Merriwether Poet, was the

major stockholder in General Foods

.

149

when Carter signed

his sponsorship contract with General Foods, Round
Table

magazine reported the Davies connection with the firm and
added,

"it is understood Mr.

Davies may 'speak to' Mr.

Carter, and it remains to be seen whether the tone of his

comments will change or not."i50 once Carter was off the
air,

Variety,

skeptically noting that "the official reason"

was because General Foods could not obtain a suitable

network time slot, suggested the commentator's battle with

organized labor did him

in.

Carter,

Variety reported, would

keep busy with a coast-to-coast lecture tour during which
he would discuss "Free Speech in the News," a topic the

show business trade journal said which was "particularly
applicable. "isi
See Culbert, News for Everyman 47-53, and David
Culbert, "US Censorship of Radio News in the 1930s: the
case of Boake Carter, " Hi etorical Journal of Film, Radio
and Television 2 (1982), 173-6.
1"*^

,

150

and Woof of American Policy," Round Table 38
(1937-8), 297-304, reprinted in 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
10,
CongrreBBional Record (August 22, 1940), vol. 86, pt
"vjarp

.
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"Boake Carter Will Air 'Free Speech' on Lecture
Tour," Variety, September 21, 1938, 27. Carter claimed
Roosevelt administration insiders such as "Early, Tommy
Corcoran, Harold L. Ickes, Harry L. Hopkins and that group"
had forced him off the air and the network would continue
to deny air time to critics of Roosevelt "until the
Administration lets up." "Censorship Seen By Boake Carter,"
Broadcasting, January 1, 1939, 18. The radically
isolationist Committee for the Defense of American
Constitutional Rights seemed unsure who exactly was to
blame, issuing a press release charging Carter had been
denied "the right of free speech. -by a small coterie of
un-American-minded propagandists." "Dies Charges Networks
151

.
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"

Ultimately,

"

the reason for Carter's disappearance from

Columbia's nightly schedule is unimportant. What is both
important and abundantly clear is that Boake Carter was

seen by his colleagues in radio as a victim of government
persecution. As Culbert has noted,

"industry insiders all

knew that Carter had been forced off the air for being so
vituperative.

whether this knowledge was based on an

accurate interpretation of events is of little consequence.
The result was the same.

Two years after Carter left CBS, Quincy Howe noted
that the national networks "have accepted Roosevelt's

foreign policy" and identified Carter as the last "strong
dissenter" who had "spoken regularly on a national

network

.

While ignoring the details of the case

"

continued,

,

Howe

"Only if Carter comes back, stays back, and hits

back can the New Deal deny that it has deliberately
squelched one of its most ef f ect ive critics on the air

.

Howe at the time was a member of the still small fraternity
are Influenced Refuted as Congressman Gets Hookup,
Broadcastinof, December 15, 1938, 15. Journalist Stanley
High, a frequent critic of what he perceived as radio
censorship, speculated in the Saturday Evening Post that
Carter was silenced by a Roosevelt administration campaign
aimed at both General Foods and Columbia and added "there
can be scarcely any doubt that all the parties concerned,
except Mr. Carter, were glad to see him go." Stanley High,
"Not-So-Free Air," Saturday Evening Poet, February 11,
1938,

77.

Culbert,

"US Censorship of Radio News,"

174.

Quincy Howe, The News and How To Understand It
Schuster, 1940; repr., Westport,
(New York: Simon
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Connecticut: Greenwood, 1968)
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of broadcast journal istc,

a commentator on

New York's WQXR

who would soon join the CBS staff. He echoed the
conventional wisdom within the broadcasting business
that
the administration could and would use its powers
to bring

radio to heel.

Throughout the 1930s, then, the broadcasting industry
had taken upon itself the role of defender of freedom of
the air. To serve the public interest, broadcasters would

provide news and public affairs programs. To avoid stricter

government regulations, they would make time available to
those wishing to discuss topics of public concern. Time

would be sold for partisan purposes during campaigns — an
increasingly profitable business for the broadcasters —
but not at other times

.

Execut ing that relatively

straightforward policy proved much more difficult than the
industry might have

1

iked,

but broadcasters consistently

argued that they, not the government
job. Not all critics agreed^

,

could best do the

including a growing number of

influential members of Congress who would continue to prod
the administration to take a much more active role in

defending freedom of the air.
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CHAPTER III
"THE ANNOUNCER HAS BECOME A GREAT DRA14ATIC SYMBOL"!

Since the beginning, radio had been in the information
business. The medium changed the way Americans learned of
the events that shaped their lives. Listeners were there

when Clarence Darrow confronted William Jennings Bryan at
the Scopes trial, when Jack Dempsey stood over Gene Tunney
as the "long count" tolled, when President Roosevelt told

them they only thing they had to fear was fear itself. Shop
clerks and school children heard the great debates of the

day played out in their living rooms. By the beginning of
the Roosevelt administration, radio was both a source of

information and a forum for debate on public affairs. Yet
in years to come,

many in the industry would look back at

the 1920s and early 1930s as a time when radio largely

ignored the news.
In the second half of the 1930s,

the industry's own

definition of broadcast news changed and narrowed.
Broadcasts of events as they occurred and talks by public
figures became,

in retrospect,

something less than real

Increasingly, broadcast news came to mean programs

news.

prepared by station or network employees who reported and
then summarized the latest current events in a factual

Archibald MacLeish quoted in Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr.,
"Exploring in Drama," New York Times, October 30, 1938,
1

sec.

9,

12,
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manner. Prior to the Press-Radio War, a CBS executive

recalled, the network had no news department.
"special events" — speeches,
dedications, parades. We did only snippets of'
news, which came in on the old-fashioned tickers
that gave you the stock market quotations. The
news was on this paper ribbon, the kind used in
ticker tape parades, and you'd paste it up on a
sheet of paper for the announcer to read.^
It was almost all

Such broadcasts hardly qualified as news, he seemed to say.
Not until broadcasters began to produce and control the

content of informational programming themselves could radio

claim to be a medium for journalism.
By equating news programming with the conscious

exercise of editorial control

,

broadcasters were

acknowledging that as stewards of the public

'

s

air they

were responsible for the content of informational

programming

.

As the decade went on, the broadcasting

industry with the national networks in the vanguard would

defend itself against attacks on its stewardship by
claiming that this kind of news was truly a better way to
serve the public interest.
The industry's embrace of this new definition of

broadcast journalism was a gradual one. True to the terms
of the Biltmore agreement,

the national networks suspended

their independent news gathering efforts, leaving daily
spot news reporting to the wire services and local

John G. "Jap" Gude quoted in Edward Bliss, Jr., Now
the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991), 27.
2
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Gtations. The networkc added the occacional ctudio
newccact

but concentrated on providing commentary, talkc and
live

coverage of special eventc from acroes the country and,
increasingly,

from around the world.

It was with an eye toward expanded special events

coverage from overseas, not daily coverage of breaking
news,

that the networks in the 193 06 began to assemble

their first foreign bureaus. The first of the network

representatives, and Columbia's lone full-time employee in
Europe until the summer of 1937, was Cesar Saerchinger. A

freelance journal ist who special ized in news of the
cultural scene, Saerchinger had lived in Europe for more

than a decade and was working for the Philadelphia Public
Ledger'

London bureau when CBS hired him in 193 0. NBC,

B

larger and more prosperous but more cautious, followed

Columbia

'

s

lead two years later, stat ioning Fred Bate in

London in 19 32 and later adding a second full-timer in
Berlin, Max Jordan, and part-timers in Geneva,

Paris and

Shanghai. Bate had lived in Europe since 1912, while Jordan

had been born in Italy, had emigrated to the United States

and had become a naturalized citizen before returning the
Europe as a newspaper correspondent in 1910

.

^

Their primary

task was to serve as producers, promoters and all-purpose

trouble-shooters protecting their employers' interests
abroad. They were paid not to report the news but to

Mitchell Charnley, News By Radio (New York:
Macmillan, 1948), 26-7; Bliss, Now the News, 70-3.
^
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arrange talks and performances by politicians, authors,
musicians, eminent and exotic personalities who would
catch
the ears of listeners back home

.

At the network headquarters in New York, the years

between the end of the Press -Radio War in 1934 and the
European crises of 1938 marked what Paul White, Columbia's
news director during those years, would recall as "a

peculiar period in news broadcast ing ." ^ with the wire
services and local stations handling the day-to-day news
beat,

the chains concentrated on living up to NBC's 1926

pledge "that every event of national importance may be

broadcast widely throughout the United States.

Network

microphones were present at virtually every occasion of
and White and his counterpart at NBC, Abe Schecter,

note,

sought a competitive edge by devising and promoting ever

William Paley, Ab It Happened: A Memoir (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1979) 121; Bliss, Now the News,
4

73

.

^

Brace

,

Paul W. White, News on the Air (New York: Harcourt,
44
1947)
,

.

Display advertisement, "Announcing the National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.," New York Times, September
^

1926,

27.
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more exotic "nemos" - remote broadcasts - from locations

across the country and throughout Europe

.

In journalistic terms. White and Schecter saw

themselves during these years as editors concerned with the
overall content of their product. Not yet certain what

radio news should sound like, they looked to the print

medium for models.

"We try to function very much like a

newspaper or magazine would,

"

Schecter explained,

can't interest all the people in pol it ics

.

.

various things that will attract attention.

.

"

"You

so we try to do

The networks

continued to broadcast conventions and political speeches
but worked just as hard to scoop the opposition on more

ethereal events: sporting spectacles, talks by celebrities,

public ceremonies and screwball features such as a trilling

English lark or a chorus of singing mice. This was radio's
enduring advantage over the printed page, the medium's
unique strength. The broadcasters' purposes were to bring
the audience "a lot of news to which people want to listen"

but also, as Schecter frankly admitted,

"to pep up

listeners to the station and the network and... to create

publicity and promotion for the company."®
Phillips Carlin, who joined WEAF as a staff
announcer in 1923 and later became a senior NBC executive,
explained in a 1939 speech that a "nemo" was "anything
outside of the studio. That is just a word somebody cooked
up. .and it stuck and has come down in the industry ever
since." "The Sustaining Program Division," typescript of a
talk given to an NBC employees' discussion group, October
25, 1939, Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC, 16.
7

.

Schecter, "The News and Special Events
Division," typescript of a talk given to an NBC employees'
8

A. A.
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During these years prior to the Second World War, the

broadcasters learned valuable skills. Schecter, White and
the network representatives overseas made contacts and

mastered techniques which would prove vital as the European
situation deteriorated. The networks learned how to
transmit voices by transoceanic short-wave relays, portable

transmitters and telephone lines to their affiliates across
the country. Saerchinger, Bate and Jordan dealt regularly

with government broadcasters who controlled the radio
studios and powerful short-wave stations of Europe and the
state telephone monopoly officials whose cooperation was

needed to link Windsor Castle, the Reichstag and dozens of
other locations to the transmitters. At home, network

executives

,

announcers and technical personnel gradually

worked out techniques, procedures and standards for
broadcasting breaking news and special events. They learned

when to interrupt scheduled programming for live coverage,
how to move smoothly from entertainment to news and back
again without confusing the audience, how to deal with
sponsors and advertising agencies whose commercial

discussion group, November 8, 1939, Broadcast Pioneers
Library, Washington, DC, 4. Regarding the singing mice,
Schecter said, "Now that sounds very silly, and it really
is very silly. On the other hand, I remember picking up one
midwestern newspaper — it was a Sunday radio section — and
it had an eight column streamer across the radio page
saying — ''Singing- Mice on Air Today. " And then a little
two column head with, "Lilly Pons Makes Debut'' - so you
see who s more important
.

'
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broadcaBts might be disrupted. The payoff would come in
1938

.

Radio's coverage of Germany's annexation of Austria in

March and the Munich crisis in September raised broadcast
news to a new level. The medium's critical advantages of

immediacy and intimacy allowed broadcasters and their
listeners to keep constant track of shifting events.

Through their radios, Americans could hear the news as it

happened and, thanks to the voices on the scene, they felt
they were participants in events. As Europe stumbled into
war, broadcasters, building on nearly two decades of

practical experience, brought the crisis home to a nation

divided over the threat of a coming war.

Historian David Culbert has argued that radio played
an important, perhaps decisive, role in building a domestic

consensus on foreign policy prior to 1941,

"first, by

making foreign policy of concern to a majority of
Americans; second, by urging a consensus as to what sort of

foreign policy this country should have."^ By bringing the

European crisis home, by making the outbreak of war
intimately real to millions of Americans, radio clearly

fulfilled Culbert

's

first assertion. An examination of the

broadcasts of the time gives considerable support to the
second. This question, however, remains: Why did radio's

David Holbrook Culbert, News for Everyman: Radio and
Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood, 1976), 3-11, quotation at 11.
9
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coverage take the form it did? Did
broadcasters

intentionally hew to the internationalist,
interventionist
line? If so, what was their motivation?
Throughout the late
193 06, broadcasters argued repeatedly that they
sought only

to serve the public interest by presenting
accurate,

unbiased information. The networks, especially
Columbia,
were vocal on this point, but as commentator Quincy

Howe

suggested after the war,
different story.

"the public record tells a

"1°

As the Second World War approached in Europe and Asia,
the war for control of the people's airwaves continued at

home. While the nation was listening to events unfold

overseas, broadcasters feared an increasingly truculent

Roosevelt administration, a newly activist Federal

Communications Commission and important critics in Congress

threatened to upset the American system of broadcasting.
Events in Washington shaped what Americans heard on their
radios as the broadcasting industry sought to defend itself
against its own enemies.

While broadcasters continued to experiment with their
medium,

the regulators of the ether attempted to keep pace

with the rapidly growing industry. Broadcasters, aware that
the law gave their federal regulators

1

if e -and-death power,

repeatedly reacted to the implicit threat of federal
intervention, even though the FCC rarely moved beyond the

Quincy Howe, "The Rise and Fall of the Radio
Commentator," The Saturday Review, October 26, 1957,

188

38.

.

raised eyebrow. Chairman Anning Prall's
comment that he
planned no sensational changes in the
regulatory climate
had proven entirely too true for many critics
who yearned
for a more activist FCC to counterbalance
what they saw as
the immense power of the corporations.
Increasingly,

as the

power of radio seemed to grow unchecked, broadcasting's
regulators were called to account for failing to bring
the
industry to heel

An odd alliance of New Deal critics gradually turned
against the FCC. Conservative Republicans such as Hamilton

Fish formed one flank of the attack. They saw the heavy

hand of government regulation suppressing both free
enterprise and the expression of opinion not consistent

with administration policies. On the other were
anticorporate and increasingly ant i -New Deal Westerners
such as Burton Wheeler who saw big government and major

corporations arrayed against local autonomy. Additional
snipers were recruited from the ranks of the administration
itself, advocates of activist government hoping to prod the

New Deal into more direct intervention in radio. The most
vocal and, from the broadcasters

'

point of view, most

threatening attacks came from Congress. Lawmakers hoped to
use threats of investigations and new regulatory

legislation to bring the industry into line.
Wheeler became the most outspoken congressional critic
of the broadcasting establishment. Born in Hudson,

Massachusetts and educated at the University of Michigan,
189

,

Wheeler had settled in the rough - and

-

mining country

tuird^le

of Montana before the Firot World War.

Elected to the

Senate in 1922, he had run for vice precident
on La

Follette'c 1924 Progreccive elate and never loot
hio
ambition for higher office. When the Seventy- Fourth
Congreco convened in 1935, Wheeler oucceeded Clarence
Dill,
who had retired to return to hie law practice, ac chair
of

the Senate's Interstate Commerce Committee,
in charge of radio legiclat ion

.

^

the committee

From that perch, he would

crucade against what he understood to be an increasingly
monopolistic, centralized radio industry beholden to

corporate interests that was being given

free pass by

a

reluctant regulators who were in the pocket of the
bx'oadcasters

.

In January,

1935,

when President Roosevelt's nominees

to the new FCC appeared before Wheeler's committee,

the new

chairman announced "everybody who knows anything about
radio appreciates that there has grown up in the United
States a practical monopoly with reference to radio

broadcasting in this country.

"^^

To Wheeler,

the growth of

Congress Senate Biographical Directory of the
Uhi ted Stateo CongrecD 1 774 -19 89 (Washington Government
Printing Office, 1989), 2033.
,

,

:

Congress Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
Confirmat i on of Member d of the Federal Communi cati one
Conwiiooion 74th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 1935, 40.
The hearings wex"e dominated by Mississippi s newly elected
Senator Theodore Bilbo who attempted to derail Eugene O.
Sykes' nomination on grounds that Sykes, a former Bilbo
ally turned New Dealer, and two FRC staffers from
Mississippi had conspired with Roosevelt to defeat him the
previous fall. "In the loom of Mississippi politics," Bilbo
^-^

,

,

,

'
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the broadcasting chains represented
centralization and

standardization of both entertainment and
public affairs.
The networks, headquartered in New York,
influential
in

Washington, bankrolled by the nation's leading
industries,
were enemies to those who like Wheeler had
for decades

defended local autonomy and individualism from the
corrupting power of "the interests." when Congress
in 1928
approved an amendment to the Radio Act requiring the
equitable geographic distribution of broadcast licenses,
southerners and westerners including Wheeler had led the
fight,

fearing the FRC if left to its own devices would

award prime frequencies to big city applicants. As General
Electric, Westinghouse and the other radio allies continued
to secure powerful stations across the country,

they blamed

this on regulators beholden to the industry.

The industry and its regulators were in fact closely
linked. President Hoover,

in keeping with his

associationist ideals, had argued that the best candidates
for the Federal Radio Commission would be found within the

ranks of the industry itself. They, he said, would be the

most knowledgeable on both the latest developments within

radio and the problems facing the industry. The FRC had

proven itself a faithful ally of commercial broadcasters
proclaimed in magnificent metaphor, "they plied like a
shuttle back and forth between Washington and Mississippi
bearing messages from the Capitol City to the unsuspecting
and confiding voters, that authorities who occupied the
exalted places in Washington did not want Theodore G. Bilbo
to be elected United States Senator." Hearings, 4.
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and membership was a useful addition to
the resume of
career-minded broadcast executives. Columbia
was especially
hospitable to former commissioners, hiring Sam
Pickard as
vice president for station relations in 1929
and Henry
Bellows as Washington manager in 1933. Fortune

congratulated CBS president William Paley for these
hirings
and credited Paley' s political acumen as a major reason

for

network's rapid rise.i^ Former and current FRC staffers
were often reunited at commission hearings. Wheeler

reminded former FRC chairman Eugene Sykes during hearings
on his nomination to the FCC.

"Now,

it is extremely bad practice,

to say the least," Wheeler

scolded,

it does seem to me that

"for a man to step out of the Federal Radio

Commission and then go up there before it and appear for
private clients." Sykes, who himself would join

a

prominent

broadcast law firm upon leaving the commission, was forced
to agree.

Despite his belief that a radio monopoly existed.

Wheeler was reluctant to replace a private monopoly with
what he feared would become a monopoly of the air

controlled by the New Deal.

"I

have never favored

Government ownership of the broadcasting in this country,
he confessed, but he added a warning to the industry.

^3

1935,

"And All Because They're Smart," Fortune, June

80.

Confirmation of Members of the Federal
Comm un i cations Commi eeion, 3 9.
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If

broadcasters failed to clean their own house,
he cautioned,
"they are going to find a demand for
Government ownership."

And the FCC, he said, would have to begin looking
seriously
at the growing influence of the chains if
it wanted to
prove it was a serious regulatory agency.

is

The attacks on radio took several forms, but
pointed

questions about freedom of speech and equal access to the
air were usually part of the inquiry. Wheeler's House

colleague from Montana, Democrat Joseph

P.

Monaghan,

introduced legislation in 1935 to limit commercial
broadcasting, establish not-for-profit stations and end

trafficking in broadcast licenses. Why, he argued, should

private businesses profit from the purchase and sale of
permits to use the people's air? The FCC

'

s

complicity in

the current system was responsible, he claimed,

for a

growing threat to democracy. As the radio trust tightened
its control of the air,

it stifled free debate.

"Big

business seeks to control and mold public opinion,"

Monaghan said in a populist outburst, "in order that they
may add to the millions they now possess and that the cost
of government may be imposed upon the little fellow rather

than upon those who are well able to pay.

"^^

IS

Confirmation of Members of the Federal
Communi cations Commission, 49-50.
Congress, House, Representative Joseph P. Monaghan
discussing H.R. 8475, 74th Cong., 1st sess.. Congressional
Record (August 23, 1935), vol. 79, pt 13, 14311.
1^

.
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Democrat Byron

N.

Scott of California called for

legislation requiring every station "to
give over desirable
periods on a regular basis and without
revenue to

unrestricted discussion of public issues"
as a condition of
its license. Radio stations, in return,
would be shielded
from any liability for slander. Scott's
proposal echoed
progressive calls that radio broadcasting should
be a

regulated common carrier which were heard prior to
adoption
of the 1927 Radio Act. Acknowledging that
broadcasters

labored under "a very real danger" that they would be
held

responsible for "defamatory or improper remarks," Scott

argued that "censorship has flourished under fear of these
dangers" and the free exchange of information basic to the

functioning of a democracy was the victim.
Such attacks from junior members of Congress

demonstrated an awareness that radio's growing influence ac
a news and information medium and its perceived

vulnerability to corporate control were of increasing
concern to the public. That no single bid to reform the

medium gathered sufficient support for passage reflected
the lack of agreement on how to create a better system.

Both the White House and a majority in Congress seemed to
agree that the newly reconstituted FCC should be given an

Congress, House, Representative Byron N. Scott,
"Proposed Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.
Resolution for the Establishment of a Broadcasting Research
Commission," 74th Cong., 1st sess., Concfreeeional Record
(August 23, 1935), vol. 79, pt
13, 14400.
.
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opportunity to function. Following the
election year
battleG over accecs to the air in 1936,
however,

there were

renewed calls for sweeping structural change.
While several
resolutions calling for investigations into
broadcasting
remained stalled in the House and Wheeler threatened
to

launch a similar probe in the Senate,

it was the entrance

of a leading Republican into the debate which
finally

forced the Roosevelt administration to act to head
off a

Congressional attack

On Saint Patrick's Day,
White,

Jr.

of Maine,

1937,

Senator Wallace

H,

the co-author of the 1927 Radio Act,

rose on the Senate floor to join those calling for a

thorough investigation of both the broadcasting industry
and the FCC. White had been easily re-elected in 1936 as
Maine voters ignored the Roosevelt landslide. Respected on

both sides of the aisle as a meticulous legislative
craftsman and behind-the-scenes negotiator, he was by

common consent the Senate's expert on communications
questions

.

^®

In a lengthy,

tightly-reasoned speech. White recounted

the legislative history of radio regulation which he had

"Ex-Senator White of Maine, Was 74," New York
Tiniee, April 1, 1952, 29; Biog^raphical Directory of the
Uni ted States Cong'resG 204 1 White was Republ ican to the
bone He first came to Washington in 1899 as the secretary
for his grandfather Senator Wil 1 iam Pierce Frye who had
been appointed in 1881 to take the seat of James G. Blaine,
the legendary Plumed Knight. White would become Senate
minority leader in 1944 and majority leader in 1947. When
he declined to seek re-election in 1948, he was succeeded
by another Republican icon, Margaret Chase Smith.
18

,

.

.

,

,
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played such an important role in writing.

One by one, he

covered the critical issues: public ownership
of the ether,
monopoly, trafficking in licenses, freedom
of
the air,

the

problems of regulation. Ultimately, White stated,
the
thrust of the law was clear. It was up to
Congress

"to make

certain that the public interest ... is not subordinated
to
private advantage," and circumstances now demanded
that

Congress act to reassert its authority.

20

The FCC, White said, had lost the confidence of the

public. Its decisions were seen as tainted by political

influence and economic power.

"There is a greater volume

and persistence of criticism of this Commission than of any

other bureau or commission of the Government," he said,

"Is

there warrant for this?... Only a searching inquiry will

give the answer to these quest ions

.

"2i

Echoing the

progressive doctrine of exposure. White said,

"I

know of no

more certain means of reestablishing the Commission in

public respect than to turn on the light of publicity and
thereby stop these attempts to improperly influence a
quasi -judicial and regulatory body of the Government

." 22

White stopped short of endorsing any one of the several
Congress, Senate, Senator Wallace H. White,
"Regulation of Radio Communication," 75th Cong., 1st sess.,
Congrreesional Record (March 17, 1937), vol. 81, pt 2,
2332 -7
1^

.

20

White,

"Regulation of Radio Communication," 2332.

21

White,

"Regulation of Radio Communication," 2337.

22

white,

"Regulation of Radio Communication," 2336-7.

196

.

resolutions before Congress, promising to
outline his own
proposal later in the session.

When the Senate reconvened after the Fourth
of July
recess, white introduced a detailed
resolution directing
the Interstate Commerce Committee to
investigate
broadcasting. He proposed an sweeping agenda of
thirty
items covering all aspects of the radio business,

including

monopoly and censorship, the use of stations by political
candidates and "the development and present facts

concerning broadcasting networks or chains, including the
effects of chain association upon the licensee's control
over his station.

"23

white's resolution was referred to

Wheeler's Interstate Commerce Committee for hearings during
the fall session.

There was good reason for the leadership to delay

acting on White's challenge. The spring and summer of 1937
had seen one of the most remarkable political turnarounds
in American history. While White was drafting his proposed

resolution for a radio investigation, two issues arose to

weaken Roosevelt's control of events. In April, he proposed
the "court packing" judicial reform plan and was rebuffed.

Secondly, the economy took a turn for the worse in the late
summer, triggering a recession which threatened to wipe out
the gradual economic gains of the first term. The

Congress, Senate, Investigation of Radio
Broadcast incf, 75th Cong., 1st sess., S. Res. 149,
Congreeeional Record (July 6, 1937), vol. 81, pt
23

.

7
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president's opponents celebrated. Less than
a year after
his overwhelming re-election victory,
Roosevelt seemed
vulnerable

.

24

Given that political background, the idea of
a fullfledged congressional investigation of the
broadcasting
industry promised to become an unwelcome partisan
side
show. The FCC to be sure had few defenders on
either side

of the aisle. As Raymond Moley would recall,

"everyone"

knew the commission was bogged down in industry politics
and had "made pretty much of a mess of things.

"25

prall

appeared unable to right the ship and, to make matters
worse, was in declining health. In the summer of 1937, the

chairman retreated to his summer home in Maine to
convalesce. On July 23, he died of a heart attack.

26

Perhaps, administration officials believed, a stronger

chairman could solve the problem. As his successor,
Roosevelt appointed Federal Power Commission chairman Frank
R.

McNinch.

McNinch had been the Democratic mayor of Charlotte,
North Carolina and had attracted some national notice in
1918 by deputizing and arming private citizens to keep the

peace during a streetcar strike. He deserted the party in
24

See for example James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt:
The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 19 56)
291-336
.

25

1939,

Raymond Moley,

"Perspective," Newsweek, February

48.
26

"Anning

S.

Prall,

66,

Head of FCC, Dead,"
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6,

1928 to endorse Hoover and was rewarded
with an appointment
to the Federal Power Commission
where, much to the

administration's surprise, he revealed an
appetite for
populist trust busting. McNinch proved
himself a

strong

Roosevelt ally during the battle leading to
passage of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935.
Roosevelt's

appointment of a man Time colorfully described as
the

president's "acute and large-eared little trouble
shooter"
to head the FCC sent clear signals both to
broadcasters and
their critics in Congress. 27

McNinch 's antimonopoly reputation was clearly meant to
soothe those on the hill who feared the domination of
broadcasting by corporate America. Wheeler had co- sponsored
the public utility legislation and knew McNinch as an ally

on that issue. For those primarily concerned that political
influence distorted the commission's decisions, McNinch
took quick action to reorganize the FCC. He abolished the
critics' favorite target, the Examining Division, which

screened all station applications and sent most on to the
full Commission for routine approval.

chairman decreed,

In the future,

the

"each hearing is to be conducted by the

Commission, by a commissioner, or by one or more suitably

qualified employees, chiefly lawyers," and referred to the
full Commission for further hearing if necessary. The

reform, McNinch said,
27

"QRX,

"

"provides for 'fair play' by

Time, May 16,

1938,

25.

"QRX"

is a standard

Morse code signal meaning "stand by for more."
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apprising the parties of the proposed
decisions before they
are made final." The result, he continued,
would mean
"first, greater efficiency, and second,

the utmost

protection attainable against possible improper
influence
by those having business with the Commission. "28
McNinch's
words seemed to be carefully chosen to mollify White,

whose

proposed Senate investigation would attempt among other
things to determine "whether the acts and decisions of
the

Commission in broadcasting cases have been influenced by
matters not apparent in the public records.

"2S

The Maine

Republican must also have noticed that among the political
appointees who were purged in the reorganization were

relatives of Democratic stalwarts Sam Rayburn of Texas and

Hugo Black of Alabama.
McNinch's appointment was clearly designed to buy the

administration time. With a vigorous new chairman on board,
a Congressional

investigation of the industry could be

opposed on grounds that the FCC should be given a chance to
put its own house in order. Despite McNinch's reputation as
a foe of the trusts and his initial administrative reforms,

critics on the hill remained restive. When Commissioner

Irvin Stewart's term on the FCC expired in July, Roosevelt
Federal Communications Commission, Fourth Annual
Report, Federal Communications Commieeion, Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1938 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1939), vi-vii.
28

29

S.

^0
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Res.
"
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6786.
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nominated the Commission's chief engineer,
retired naval
officer T.A.M. Craven, to take his place.
An Annapolis
graduate who had headed the Navy's transoceanic
radio
operations during the First World War, Craven
was an

acknowledged expert on the science of radio.
His
appointment, it was hoped, would comfort those

critics who

believed that the commissioners lacked the technical
expertise needed to properly regulate the medium.
The FCC's enemies saw the appointment another way.
Not

only was Craven part of the naval establishment that
had

worked closely with GE, Westinghouse and ultimately the new
RCA when the military controlled all broadcasting during
the war,

after retiring from the service in 1930, he had

spent five years as a consulting engineer to the industry.

That he had moved so smoothly from the public to the

private sector and now stood ready become one of the
industry's regulators seemed another example of the

revolving door policy that had plagued broadcast regulation
for so long.

During floor debate on Craven's nomination, FCC
critics seized the opportunity to voice their concerns over
the radio situation. Wheeler reminded his colleagues that
the Commission "has been used as a political football" and

"political influence," not the public interest, had too

often dictated decisions.

Massachusetts Democrat Daniel

Congress, Senate, Burton K. Wheeler debating the
nomination of T.A.M. Craven to the FCC, 75th Cong., 1st
31
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I.

Walsh agreed and warned,

"I

can conceive of nothing more

harmful and injurious to the public
interest than to have
the communications Commission
politically controlled by any
sinister influences, or by any group except
those activated
by the highest motives of serving the whole
public. "32
The

Senate leadership had the votes to approve the
nomination,
but Wheeler's warning left both Craven and the

administration duly chastened.
The attacks on radio and its regulators were by
1937

sounding familiar. The same concerns over monopoly,
commercialism, corporate control of the air and the

medium's failure to live up to expectations that it would
be a democratizing force which had dominated debate in the
192 0s persisted.

The times, however, had changed. The

networks had matured and prospered, changing radio into an
important part of most Americans daily lives. The political

climate at home was far more contentious than it had been a
decade before. The social uncertainty triggered by the

depression had been augmented by growing concern over
worldwide unrest and instability emanating from Asia and

especially from Europe where the dogs of war were baying
again.

sess., ConcfreBBional Record (August 21,
8, 9604.

1937), vol.

81,

pt

Congress, Senate, Daniel I. Walsh debating the
nomination of T.A.M. Craven to the FCC, 75th Cong., 1st
sess., CongrsBBional Record (August 21, 1937), vol. 81, pt
32

8,

9604.
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Radio's informational programming brought
the event g
home and amplified the debate over their
impact on the
nation. Columbia, the self -proclaimed news
network, would
establish itself in 1938 as the leading source
of war news
from Europe. The network's story is representative
both of
the evolution of broadcast news and of the
grittier

political issues facing the industry. Columbia, the
network

personified by Edward
for broadcast

j

R.

ournal ism.

Murrow, became the standard bearer
^3

while Murrow himself eventually

attained god-like status in television and radio newsrooms
around the world, the environment in which he worked in the
1930s was largely shaped by two network executives. These

two men, CBS vice-president Edward Klauber and news and

public affairs director Paul White, played perhaps the most
critical roles in the development of both the network's and
the industry's concept of broadcast journalism in the

critical years before the Second World War.

Klauber was forty- three when he joined CBS in

19 3

0

as

an assistant to twenty-nine year old network president

William Paley. A native of Louisville, Kentucky, Klauber
had briefly studied medicine but soon turned to newspaper
work,

first at the New York World, then at the New York

Times where his uncle had once been a theater critic. At
an example of the abiding power of the CBS News
tradition within the broadcasting industry, see for example
Gary Paul Gates, Air Time: The Inside Story of CBS News
(New York: Harper, 1978) and more recently Ken Auletta,
Three Blind Mice: How the TV Networks Lost Their Way (New
York: Random House, 1991)
33

Y'or
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the TinwB, he rose from reporter to
night city editor

during the tenure of managing editor
Carr Van Anda and
brought the Times tradition of news-as-fact
with him to the
network. A short, heavy- set man described
by Paley as
"taciturn" and by subordinates as autocratic,
tyrannical
and cruel, Klauber was morbidly shy and
certainly demanding
and terse. He brought with him a reputation as
a can-do

administrator who demanded results. 34 He also
appreciated
that the new medium, generally held in disdain
as a mere

vehicle for entertainment and advertising by serious
print
journalists, could become a valuable - if different source of information for the public. As David Halberstam,
a Pulitzer Prize -winning Timee correspondent in the
196 0s,

observed,

"Klauber transferred his own knowledge of

journalism,

learned at an elite newspaper with an elite

audience, to a new medium with a mass audience.

"35

Columbia's public affairs programming was only one of

Klauber

's

many domains. His first responsibility was to

impose order and discipline within the rapidly growing

network organization and upon the mercurial Paley

Joseph E. Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American
Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 98-9/ Robert Metz,
CBS: Reflections in a Bloodshot Eye (Chicago: Playboy,
19 75), 39-4 8; Paley, As It Happened, 6 3-4.
34

35

David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 34-5.
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36

To run the network's fledgling news
and public

affairs department, he hired White away
from the United
Press. A consummate newspaperman known
in the trade for

going to any length to beat the competition.
White

cultivated a gruff, street-smart image that belied
both his
Kansas roots and his graduate degree in journalism
from
Columbia University.

"Paul came from the school of

journalism where you worm your way into the house of the

bereaved widow and while you're there, you steal a picture
of the deceased for the paper," a CBS veteran remembered.

Another colleague perceptively suggested White carefully
cultivated his chosen newsroom persona, saying "he had seen
The Front Page too many times.

"^7

Like Klauber, White understood both radio's potential
as a news medium and how the medium's new technologies

would change journalism.

"Paul was,

I

managing editor the business ever had,

think,
"

the first real

CBS newsman Eric

Sevareid recalled,
He loved the thing, you know — the switching
around the world. That was his news, what he
called "the fine careless rapture" of the
business.
.But he was concerned with substance.
Oh yes, Paul was all wrapped up in techniques,
and who had a beautiful voice and all that; he
was a real newsman. And so was Klauber. ^8
.

.

36

Sally Bedell Smith, In All Hie Glory: The Life of
William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 118
9

.

John Daley and Helen Sioussat quoted in Persico,
Edward R. Marrow, 106.
"^"^

Eric Sevareid interviewed in "CBS: The First 6 0
Years," Broadcaeting September 14, 1987, 86. Sevareid
38
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Together, Klauber and White would create
network radio's
dominant news organization, while both
came to radio from
the newspaper industry and were committed
to the factual
paradigm, their past was liberating rather
than limiting.
Each saw radio as a different medium which
could borrow

certain techniques and ethics from print but which
would
ultimately be judged by different standards. Both
Klauber
and especially White, as Sevareid pointed out,
understood
that the dynamics of broadcasting would make for a
new and

different kind of journalism.
In 1935, Klauber hired Murrow as the chain's director
of talks. Murrow at the time was the assistant director of

the Institute of International Education and part of his

job involved negotiating radio appearances for scholars

from around the world as part of the "actual cooperative

arrangements between educators and broadcasters" endorsed

by the FCC. The CBS job, Klauber frankly told him, was
purely administrative. Murrow would use his contacts to
arrange the chain's talks schedule. He would not speak on
the air himself. That restriction had in fact allowed

Murrow to get the job. Klauber 's first choice, newspaperman
expressed a similar opinion in a letter to the author,
August 22, 1991. White's often-cited comment on the
"rapture" of the medium is from Robert Browning's HomeThoughtB, from the Sea which establishes an interesting
metaphor: "That's the wise thrush: he sings each song twice
over, / Lest you should think he never could recapture /
The first fine careless rapture!" White understood that the
transparent magical moments of broadcasting were the result
of careful preparation, not improvisation.
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Raymond Gram Swing, had already gotten
a taste of life
behind the microphone as an occasional
commentator on
foreign affairs during Columbia's
"American

School of the

Air" broadcasts and did not want to
sacrifice what he hoped
was a budding radio career. 39 Two years
after joining the
network, Murrow was sent to London to succeed
Saerchinger
as Columbia's European director.

Murrow was not a trained journalist nor was he
expected to be one by his superiors in New York. His
like Saerchinger

's,

job,

was to schedule talks by European

statesmen and celebrities as well as concerts, sporting
events and local celebrations which would make interesting

programs for the listeners back home. When a newsworthy
event occurred in Europe, Murrow'

s

job was to line up

official spokesmen or distinguished journalists to discuss

what was happening. He was not to report the events
39
i?.

Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time, The Life of Edward

Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 130-1. Murrow,

a

college debater at Washington State University, had
previously spoken on the radio on behalf of the HE and
earlier as an officer of the National Student Federation.
Murrow' 6 on- the -air debut as a CBS employee occurred on
Christmas Eve, 1936 when, after a company party, he
snatched the script for a late-night news summary away from
Robert Trout, marched into the studio and read it himself,
claiming Trout was in no shape to face the microphone.
Kendrick, a long-time CBS correspondent himself, notes that
Murrow, not the temperate Trout, was the one who had
overindulged and wrote, "Murrow never faltered. He marched
through the news clearly and precisely, as if it had been
made for him, and he for it. This was exactly the case."
The anecdote, repeated by all Murrow biographers, reveals
Murrow' 6 natural talent on the air but, more importantly,
the haphazard nature of network news at the time. Kendrick,
Prime Time, 13 7.
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himself. That was the job of the news
staff back in the
States where wire service dispatches
were turned into news
Bummaries and where Boake Carter, H.V.
Kaltenborn and the
other commentators would add their analysis.
From time to
time, if events warranted, commentators
such as William

Hard or Frederick William Wile or special events
announcers
such as Robert Trout would travel to Europe but
such

decisions seemed to be made more for their potential

publicity value than on the grounds of news judgment,
when,
for example, George IV was crowned in 1937, Trout
arrived
in London to describe the pageantry and introduce British

notables who added their insights. Murrow's voice was never
heard.

Instead,

like any other tourist, he watched the

festivities from the reviewing stands at Hyde Park.^o
This was Columbia's established practice prior to the
war.

The chain wanted the prestige of bringing events from

Europe to its listeners but also sought to maintain a

certain protective distance from the content of its
programs.

It was embarrassing when a guest of the network

referred to listeners in America as "you dear old boobs" as
George Bernard Shaw had done in 1935.

A similar statement

by a network representative might trigger such a howl of
protest the FCC would be moved to act. When Murrow was
allowed to hire an assistant — doubling the network's
Kendrick, Prime Time,

14 3-4

Kendrick, Prime Time,

144.
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European staff - in August, 1937, he
chose William
Shirer, an experienced newspaperman
and foreign

L.

correspondent. New York wanted to hear what
Shirer sounded
like on the radio because he would be
called upon to voice
introductions from time to time, but as Shirer
noted in his
diary,

"Murrow and

I

are not supposed to do any talking on

the radio ourselves. New York wants us to
hire newspaper

correspondents for that. We just arrange broadcasts

.

"42

This policy was satisfactory while radio devoted
itself to
coverage of scheduled events and timeless features. As

Europe approached war and newsworthy events erupted across
the continent without advance notice,

the chains would of

necessity require their own men and women to assume more of
the reporter ial burden. Murrow - intelligent, aware and

ambitious — seemed to foresee the future. He wanted
trained reporters on board when the time came.
The time came in March,

1938 as Hitler moved into

Austria. Neither Murrow nor Shirer was in Vienna as the

AnchluBB approached. In keeping with their primary duties,

Murrow was in Warsaw and Shirer was in Yugoslavia. Both
were making arrangements for an upcoming "American School
of the Air" broadcast which would feature musical youth

^^

William

Shirer, Berlin Dairy (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1943), 64-7, 70. The network disliked Shirer's
soft and rather high-pitched voice. The fact that White did
not block Shirer's hiring perhaps indicates that in
addition to appreciating his skills as a journalist, he did
not expect Shirer to become a regular on- the -air
L.

personality.
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groups at home and abroad.

43

shirer wac the firct to reach

Vienna, arriving in the city March ll as
an Austrian puppet
government was taking power and German troops
were marching
on the capital. He got word to Murrow in
Warsaw
and,

as the

only American radio representative on the scene,
tried to
get through to New York via short-wave from
Ravag,
the

Austrian state radio system, only to be shown the door
by
armed Nazi guards. Shirer caught the first available

plane

to London,

hoping to get on the air there as Murrow headed

for Vienna. Shirer reached London late that night and

broadcast an eyewitness account
Vienna, he also found Ravag

s

•

.

44

when Murrow reached

studio door closed to him.

NBC's Jordan, on the other hand, was allowed to broadcast

heavily censored reports thanks to a pre-existing agreement

between NBC and the Austrian radio system. Enraged by his
competitor's advantage, Paley telephoned the manager of
Ravag,

a personal friend,

executive that
now,

"I

only to be told by the sobbing

am no longer in charge here." Desperate

Paley then called NBC president Lenox Lohr who agreed

— for one week only — to waive his network's exclusive
contract and allow Columbia to use the Vienna studio. The
call for help to Lohr must have been especially galling to

Paley, Ab It Happened,
44

Shirer, Berlin Diary,

131.

77-83.
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.

the competitive Paley.^s cbs
needed to come up with some
way of getting even.

Columbia's answer was an international
multiple pickup
news broadcast that would air live
reports on the crisis
from five European capitals, New York and
Washington.
The

plan while not unprecedented had been tried
only rarely in
the past, Shirer recalled, "and it took us
months of
fussing before technical arrangements could be
completed.

And then, in the end, they usually broke down.
time,

to close the competitive gap,

"46

^his

there would be only a

few hours to prepare for the broadcast. And, to make

matters worse,

it was a Sunday.

Somehow, all the details came together in time. By

calling in numerous favors and taking advantage of years of

accumulated experience, CBS was ready to go on the air at
eight o'clock in the evening. New York time, March
1938.

The broadcast was,

phrase,

13,

in historian Donald Godfrey's

"more than just another report from Europe.

It was

a precedent - sett ing radio program. "^7

Paley, Ab It Happened, 13 0-3; Robert Landry,
"Edward R. Murrow, " Scribner'e, December 1938, 11. Landry,
the radio editor of Variety, recounted the call to Lohr
Paley explained Columbia's sudden acquisition of studio
privileges in Vienna by writing that Murrow "persuaded
German authorities to open a line for him."
45

William L. Shirer, "Berlin Speaking," Jitlantic
Monthly, September 194 0, 310.
46

Donald G. Godfrey, "CBS World News Roundup: Setting
the Stage for the Next Half Century, " American Journalieiv 7
47

(Summer 1990),

171.

211

In form,

the roundup was indeed a model for
the future

of broadcast journalism.

The structure of the program,

reports from correspondents around the
world introduced by
a single announcer at network
headquarters and distributed
to affiliates across the country, became
the now-familiar
model for subsequent radio and television
network
newscasts. In content, however, the roundup was
very much
in the accepted pattern of the times, while
Columbia's

Trout anchored the broadcast in New York, newspaper
and

wire service reporters and government officials rather
than

network employees supplied most of the inf ormat ion

.

48

Pierre Huss of the International News Service read a
cautious, censored report from Berlin. From Paris, Edgar

Ansel Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News, recently expelled
from Berlin, spoke of Germany's use of "brutal, naked
force." Ellen Wilkinson, a Labor Member of Parliament,
spoke from London while Senator Lewis Schwel lenbach of

Washington state offered an American perspective from
Washington. Shirer spoke briefly to introduce Wilkinson and

Trout's skills as an extemporaneous broadcaster are
legendary within the industry and no doubt explain why he
was chosen to announce what figured to be an important but
extremely dicey program. "He belonged, " Paley noted, "to
that small group who could talk in front of a microphone
without notes for twenty, thirty, sixty minutes, two hours,
without stopping." Paley, Ab It Happened, 133. Three
decades later, news executives at a leading New York radio
station would invoke Trout's reputation to caution new
staffers on the perils of ad-libbing. "Over the years, we
have had many reporters who insisted they could ad-lib like
Bob Trout. Most have ad-libbed their way right out of
work." Jerry Graham and Jack Pluntze, WNEW Style Book (New
York: Metromedia, [1968]), 13.
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later in the program read a diopatch
Gervaoi,

wi-itteii

by Frank

the ins correcpondent in Rome becauee
Italian

otate radio could not arrange a broadcact
circuit on ouch
ohort not ice. 49

Murrow wac the only CBS ctaffer to play a
major role
in the broadcaot. Speaking from the Ravag
ctudioc in
Vienna, Murrow informed hie liotenerc that "Herr
Hitler hac
not yet arrived
but moot people expect him comet
ime

after 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning." He then offered
a
deocription of the Auctrian capital, demonc trat ing the

eye

for telling detail which would mark hie later broadcaotc.

"They lift the right arm a little higher here than in

Berlin," he caid of the Auctrian Nazic and told of "young

Gtorm trooperc" cruioing the ctreeto in military vehiclec
"Dinging and toccing orangec out to the crowd." It wac well

after two o'clock in the morning when Murrow went on the
air.

He counded tired ac he read hie ccript, paucing

occaoionally to collect himcelf or fit hie wordc to the

predetermined time allotted for hie report. In contract to
what would become hie later practice, he identified himcelf

on the air ac "Edward Murrow" with no middle initial.
was Murrow'

D

It

first real newo broadcaot, and he did not

oound out of place among the profeccional journal io to and
Shirer, "Berlin Speaking," 310-1; Paley,
It
Happened, 133; Godfrey, "CBS World Newo Roundup," 169-70.

Edward R. Mtirrow, "CBS European Roundup," CBS
network, March 13, 1938. A portion of the text ic reprinted
in Paley, Aa It Happened, 133-4.
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politicians. Shirer noted in his diary,

especially good.... New York said.

..

"Edgar and Ed were

it was a success. "5i it

was such a success that Columbia repeated
the feat with
varying personnel each of the next two
nights. 52
The broadcast and its aftermath also
reflected how

Columbia used its news coverage as a promotional
tool.
While the CBS roundup was a remarkable technical
accomplishment, NBC had, thanks to Max Jordan and
the

network's exclusive contract with Ravag, scooped its

competition on the Nazi takeover. Not only had Jordan
been
first on the air from Vienna, he had scored a major beat

on

Saturday,

the day before the Columbia roundup, when he

intercepted Hitler's motorcade at Linz and managed to
transmit a portion of Hitler's speech to the townspeople

back to New York. In all, NBC, also largely relying on the
contributions of newspaper correspondents, aired nine
separate broadcasts from Europe over the weekend compared
to a dozen for CBS

.

^3

NBC's success did not stop CBS from claiming victory.
Just as the network had scored a public relations coup

three years earlier with its programming reform plans,

Columbia understood its performance during the Anchluee
51

Shirer, Berlin Diary,

52

Shirer,

107.

"Berlin Speaking," 311.

"Quick Conquest of Austria By Hitler Given
Extensive Coverage by Networks, " Broadcast incf April
53

,

1938,

71.
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1,

.

offered an opportunity to demonstrate
how the chain served
the public interest. Columbia's
publicity chief Paul Kesten
and his crack promotion staff quickly
compiled, printed and
distributed to opinion makers throughout
government and the
trade - at a reported cost of $7,000 - a
handsome brochure
memorializing the network's coverage of the annexation
of

Austria. The publication, Variety's radio editor
noted,
told "a fascinating story which,

incidental to its

fascination, conveyed the impression without saying so
that

Columbia had been omnipresent and omnipotent throughout."
Soon thereafter, the Headliners Club of Atlantic City

announced it would present a medal to Murrow for his work,
an honor CBS made sure was widely heralded. NBC publicists
were aghast, pointing out that White was a board member of
the Headliners Club and scoffing that the award marked the

first time a reporter had been honored for not getting the
story. CBS, with a final twist of the knife, countered by

explaining that White had actually nominated Jordan for the
medal, but the club had refused to go along because of

Jordan's rumored pro-Nazi sympathies
For Murrow and Shirer, the triumphs of March augured a

minor but nonetheless significant change in network policy.
Their primary duties remained the same, but New York now

wanted them to make a few talks on the European situation

Landry,

"Edward

R.

Murrow," 11.
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themselves.

55

Columbia and the other networks would
still

rely on distinguished foreigners and
American print
correspondents to provide the bulk of their
overseas
broadcasts, but from now on the chain's own
representatives
would also be heard on the air. Edward Bliss, for
many
years a CBS producer and news writer, suggested
the

decision was largely motivated by practical concerns.
Events were moving so quickly,

it was no longer always

possible to make advance arrangements for outside speakers
and still meet radio's deadlines.

56

As Murrow, Jordan and

the others more frequently reported the news themselves,

they evolved in their own minds as well as the minds of

network executives and listeners into credible journalists
whose observations and descriptions were worthy of respect.
As the situation in Austria stabilized, and the

public's hunger for the latest European news diminished,

Columbia suspended its nightly roundups from abroad. As one
CBS news editor recalled years later, everyone in the

network hierarchy saw the costly and technically demanding
roundups as a temporary response to a competitive
emergency; everyone, that is, except Paul White.

tasted blood," the editor remembered.

57

"Paul had

to White, dedicated

to both the wire service tradition of getting the news

A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times (New York
Freundlich, 1986), 122.
55

56

Bliss, Now the News,

57

William

J.

86.

Dunn quoted in Bliss, Now the News,
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87.

first and to maximizing the innate
advantages of radio, the
experimental roundups of March represented
the future of
the medium.

When Germany turned its attention toward
Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938, radio seized
the story.
Columbia, NBC and understaffed Mutual canceled
their

regular schedules to fill the air with the latest
from
Europe. For three weeks in September, as the great
powers
of Europe debated the fate of the Czechs, radio,

proclaimed,

Variety

"stepped in with consummate skill and utmost

efficiency and proficiency to bring to America up-to-theminute dispatches from Prague, Berlin, London and Paris

with intermittent stops at other key cities in Europe.

"^8

By broadcasting virtually every major public speech as it

happened and marshaling their own representatives as well
as scores of American newspaper journalists to add color

and analysis,

"the networks," Time reported,

"did a bang-up

job of bringing the throbbing reality of it to

listeners.

"59

Columbia logged 471 news broadcasts during

the crisis, nearly forty-eight hours worth of air time

valued at then-current network rates at $300,000. NBC's
coverage was even more exhaustive: nearly fifty-nine hours
including 117 live pickups from Europe. Once again, Jordan

scooped the opposition, using his diplomatic contacts to
58

1938,

"War and the Show Biz," Variety,

September 21,

1.
59

"Crisis Credit," Time, October
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3,

1938,

32.

obtain the full text of the Munich
agreement seventeen
minutes before it was officially released
to the press and
broadcasting its contents to the nation
forty-six minutes
before Columbia. NBC refunded $26,000
to advertisers whose
scheduled broadcasts were pre-empted,
discovering to
the

sales department's surprise "that the
majority of sponsors

welcomed the practice as it kept listeners tuned
to their
programs without fearing that they would miss the
latest

news of the crisis.

"^o

Radio had provided more than simply news, Columbia

trumpeted in a full -page advertisement in the radio trade
journal Broadcast ingr. The network had allowed its listeners
to hear "the very Sound of History." Once again,

Columbia

declared, broadcasters had proven themselves worthy

stewards "alert... to that side of public interest which is

served by knowing the truth." The chain's broadcasts

provided "the best possible demonstration of its own
awareness to the power of the truth and its own ingenuity
in obtaining it."^i

^°

"Vast Sums Spent for Nets' Coverage of Events in
European War Threat," Broadcast ingr, October 15, 1938, 15.

display advertisement, Broadcasting November
1, 1938, 8. As it had earlier in the year, Paul Kesten and
Columbia's ever-alert public relations department rushed
another souvenir book into print to capitalize on its
efforts, a 175 -page "permanent record of what radio is
doing today to keep a democratic people accurately and
fully informed on matters of vital concern to them. " "CBS
Publishes Report on European Programs," Broadcasting,
December 15, 1938, 28.
CBS,

,
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"

Audience surveys and a blizzard of
congratulatory
telegrams, letters and telephone calls
demonstrated the
public's approval. Even the White House
cooperated in

validating radio's authority and influence by
releasing a
photograph of President Roosevelt, Secretary of
State

Cordell Hull and six other cabinet officers gathered
around
a radio to keep abreast of the latest events.

62

Both the

industry and the nation learned, Shirer would later write,
"men three thousand miles away on the scene of action
could

penetrate into American homes and relate, simply and
sincerely,

the first -hand story of Europe plunging

inexorably towards war."^^
While Columbia congratulated itself on its "sensitive

alertness to news values and sources

impartiality and temperateness,

"

...

and keen exercise of

the public,

expected more than the facts from radio.

it seemed,

-phe

story

broadcasters told was far from simple. For most Americans,
it was almost impossible to comprehend what was going on.

Events tumbled out of the radio too quickly to be fully
understood, Orrin Dunlop, the perceptive radio editor of
the New York TimeB, wrote that summer and left the nation

"perplexed and puzzled.
"The New Diplomacy,
October 15, 1938, 15.

Shirer,
6^
1,

1938,

CBS,

"

photograph. Broadcast inar,

"Berlin Speaking," 311.

display advertisement, Broadcaeting

8.
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,

November

"

.

Throughout the months the "ether" has
been
saturated with discussions on wages and
crop control budgets, Federal regulationshours
of the
markets, the RFC and its loans to
business,
railway aid, the TVA, the SEC, social
home building, the small business man, secukty
tax law
relief, public works, flood control,
naval
expansion, labor relations, ant i - lynching
phosphates and un-American activities Woids
words, words, as Hamlet would say, have
been'
electrified by the mute "mike" which passes the
product of the tongue into the emptiness of
space
in hopes that somewhere somebody will be
listening
At Columbia, Klauber and White understood that
the audience

needed context if they were to put the welter of facts
in
order. During the Munich crisis. White wrote,
of Americans,

the majority

"long apathetic to events abroad,

finally

became aware that Germany alone of the big powers was

playing for keeps," and the man most responsible for
shaping that opinion was "the redoubtable Kaltenborn.

"^6

After more than a decade as a radio commentator, H.V.
Kaltenborn emerged from the Munich crisis as a nationallyknown personality. In 102 separate broadcasts over nearly
three weeks, he anchored Columbia's coverage, analyzing the

implications of the correspondents' reports and translating

speeches as they were shortwaved across the ocean.

^"^

"He

offered better comment on the crisis than any one else,
Time enthused,

"His comments throughout were calm,

Orrin E. Dunlop Jr.,
Times, July 3, 19 38, sec. 9,

"6 Months'
10.

hopeful,

Roundup," New York

White, NewB on the Air, 46.

David G. Clark, "H.V. Kaltenborn and his Sponsors:
Controversial Broadcasting and the Sponsor's Role," Journal
of BroadcaGtinof 12 (Fall 1968), 310.
^"^
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,

accurate.

"68

Lietenere responded to hie broadcasts
as they
would to especially perceptive comments
by a friend, with
dozens of telephone calls each time he
left the
studio.

"Most of them were friendly, congratulating
me for

fairness," Kaltenborn recalled,

"Some of them were angry,

telling me, always in equal number, that
or the other side of the question.

I

leaned to this

"^9

Kaltenborn analyzed the crisis to

a f are - thee -well

interviewing correspondents abroad and experts at home
as
well as offering comment on the latest communiques
from

foreign capitals. One afternoon, after a Columbia pickup
of
a church service in England,

he dissected a prayer by the

Archbishop of Canterbury in search of possible policy
implications

"7°
.

His always extemporaneous comments while

representing admirable erudition and endurance were

frequently rambling and sometimes contradictory. On
September 17, for example, he stated that the Roosevelt

administration was "sympathetic with the efforts of Britain
and France to restrain Herr Hitler" and hoped "to use our
influence on the side of peace" but was "apprehensive lest

any incautious word or action should so arouse isolationist
sentiment" that a "benevolent neutrality to the French and
68

42-3

"Combination for Comment," Time, October

10,

1938,

.

H.V. Kaltenborn, I Broadcast the CrieiG (New York:
Random House, 1938), 9-10.
69

White, Newc on the Air, 46.
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British would be jeopardized." The next
day, Kaltenborn
chided the administration for its
"discreet attitude" and
reminded his listeners that "the question
of peace and war
concerns not only Europe but the United
States and all
the

world." Just twenty-four hours later, he
veered toward a
more isolationist position and said "the
United States must
stand aloof from a continent that for the moment
is devoted
to the glorification of force. "7i

As the telephone calls Kaltenborn received indicated

and telegrams and letters confirmed, Columbia's listeners

embraced Kaltenborn'
might,

s

efforts to explain the crisis. They

as Kaltenborn observed, want to argue with his

conclusions, but they wanted to hear them. Amid confusion,

they wanted someone to set unruly facts in order. Perhaps,
as Tiwe concluded,

"in times of stress,

listeners prefer

conclusions and even bias to straight factual report ing ." 72
Certainly,

listeners across the country, struggling to make

sense of what was happening across the ocean, came to

appreciate Kaltenborn'

s

clipped,

fast-paced delivery and

admitted him, like Shakespeare's Chorus, to this history to
add narrative structure to threatening, uncertain reality.
White later recounted an anecdote about a Rhode Island

family fleeing the destruction of the 1938 New England
hurricane which struck at the height of the Munich crisis.
Kaltenborn,

J Broadcast the Crieie,

"Combination for Comment," 43.
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49,

73,

88

When they reached safety and found
their hosts listening to
a radio report of destruction
caused by
the storm,

refugees suggested,

the

"Let's dial around and find out what

Kaltenborn has to say about Europe.

"73

guch was the power

of the medium that when the voices asked,
to this great account,

"let us,

ciphers

on your imaginary forces work," the

radio audience eagerly agreed.

^4

By 1938, both broadcasters and their critics

understood the ability of the medium to shape public
opinion. For years, Kaltenborn had insisted broadcasters

must use their authority to direct public opinion. The
networks, however, were wary that if they used their power

they would be accused of misusing it. At Columbia, this

concern was played out in

a series of

backstage disputes

between the chain's executives and news personnel. Boake
Carter,

the network's first star commentator, had been

dismissed by CBS in August, the month before the Sudeten
crisis, because,

it was widely believed,

his opinions had

antagonized the Roosevelt administration. In the aftermath
of the crisis,

Kaltenborn became involved in a protracted

debate over network policy which would lead to his

departure in 194 0.
Kaltenborn'

s

position on a broadcaster's right, indeed

a broadcaster's responsibility,

to express opinions was

73

white, NewB on the Air, 47.

74

Henry the Fifth, act

1,
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scene

1,

lines 17-8

.

well known. He had long called on
"radio to tread more
freely and firmly on the battlefields
of modern thought" by
encouraging a vigorous exchange of views
on controversial
public affairs. 75 His career had been marked
with periodic
controversies over his outspoken views, and
he had paid a
professional price for his stand. Yet soon after
Munich, in
the book published to capitalize on his
notoriety, he wrote
that the radio commentator's job was "not so
much
to

express what he thinks as to try to help other
reasonable

people to keep the facts straight in their

o%vn

minds. "76

m

subscribing to that modest goal, Kaltenborn was reluctantly

conforming to Columbia's newly proclaimed network policy of
militant nonpart isanship
In the spring of 1938, as Congressional attacks on

chain broadcasters and the FCC escalated, William Paley,
because "nearly everyone in America is interested in
broadcasting," went on the air to deliver his "annual
report as president of the Columbia Broadcasting System to
the listening public as well as to our stockholders

.

"77

Paley 's remarks - carried on 114 CBS affiliates across the

country — combined a ringing defense of "our American
H.V. Kaltenborn,
October 1926, 676.
75

76

Kaltenborn,

"On the Air," Century Macfazine,

I Broadcast the Crieie, 255.

William S. Paley, CBS network, April 5, 1938. The
complete text of his talk was reprinted as "Minimum
Interference Asked by Paley," Broadcast ing, April 15, 1938,
77

15,

62-3.
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Gystem of broadcasting" with a warning
that government
regulation beyond "the bare necessities"
could "cripple our
operations in one way and another."

Recalling that radio regulation "arose out
of a single
physical fact," that there was not room on the
spectrum for
all who wanted to broadcast to be clearly
heard, Paley
urged the FCC to restrict itself to monitoring
technical

matters. Of course, he admitted, broadcasters
should be

subject to general legislation "against indecency,

fraudulent advertising and the like," but federal

regulation "should never go beyond that." Two factors would
insure broadcasting's continued development. The first was
self -regulation. Broadcasters themselves,

Paley said,

"should unite on a definite program of service, of progress

and of protection" through their trade association, the
National Association of Broadcasters. The second and

ultimately "the most swift and potent means of regulating
broadcasting" was the will of the listening public.

"So

long as each individual listener has strength enough to

snap a switch or twist a dial," Paley proclaimed,

competitive, privately-owned, advertiser-financed radio

stations would continue to respond to the public will.
Paley 's defense of the broadcasting industry deftly

recapitulated the same arguments which had prevailed for
the past fifteen years. He also defended network

broadcasting as "the miracle of radio,

"

capable of bringing

the entire nation together for "the best entertainment,

the

,

..

.

moGt authoritative discourse and
discussion, the swiftest
first-hand participation in the drama of
the world." Paley
dismissed charges of monopoly, "i can assure
you I can
imagine no more intense competitive spirit
than that which
today drives the three sets of owners and
management groups
who operate the four existing nationwide networks."
Any new
federal regulations which threatened the viability
of the

networks, he implied, threatened the framework of
American

radio
In one area of broadcasting, however,

new federal regulation:

Paley called for

"public information and

discussion." Recognizing broadcasting's impact on public
opinion,

Paley announced that "the Columbia Network has

pledged itself not only to freedom of the air but to
nonpartisanship and fairness of the air."
By freedom of the air we mean the right of
any speaker to express his views, subject only to
general laws and the laws of libel and slander,
the rule that he may not provoke racial or
religious hatred and the ordinary limitations of
good taste and the decorum appropriate to the
home s of t he na t i o n
By nonpartisanship we mean that broadcasting
as an instrument of American democracy must
forever be wholly, honestly and militantly
nonpar t isan This is true not only in pol it ics
but in the whole realm of arguable social ideas.
To put it another way, we must never have an
editorial page, we must never seek to maintain
views of our own, on any public question except
broadcasting itself
.

Paley had expressed a similar position in much the same

words during a December, 1937 talk on the CBS network.
Then,

however, he framed his proposal as the outline of a
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radio code of ethics to be voluntarily
adopted by the
industry. 78 Now, he added a new wrinkle.
If broadcasters
failed to voluntarily endorse these
standards, Paley said,
"I do not believe it would be
amiss" for Congress and the
FCC "to make adherence to these principles
a prerequisite
of having and holding a broadcast license."
Paley 's statement won widespread approval.
The
Waehingfton Post,

reflecting a consensus of press comments,

said broadcasters had demonstrated their eagerness
to avoid
bias in the past and self -regulation remained the
best
solution.

73

Broadcaetincr called it "direct and forthright"

and commended it "to Congress, the FCC and the host of

crusaders and fault-finders who constantly belabor
radio. "80 While his appeal for limited federal regulation,

defense of the network system and call for extending

licensing periods for stations all restated the industry's
corporate line which had largely been in place since the
1920s,

Paley'

s

call for absolute non-partisanship in public

affairs as a requirement for holding a license was

something new. Broadcasters in the past had advocated

balance and fairness in theory as the best way to serve the
78

William

[December 1937]
Literary Digest

"Radio Ethics," CBS network,
reprinted in "Reading Around the World,
January 1, 1938, 23-4.

S.
,

,

Paley,

"Paley '6 Speech on Federal Regulation Draws
Favorable Comment from Press, " Broadcasting, April
73

1938,

63.

Editorial, "The Paley Report: Radio's Own
Statesmanship," Broadcasting, April 15, 1938, 14.
80
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15,

public interest and in practice as the
best defense against
Congressional intervention. The industry
had always gone to
great lengths to dissuade its regulators
from taking any
role in dictating "freedom of the air."
why was he now
seeming to invite regulation?
One reason was what Paley and many others
in the

broadcasting industry perceived a serious assault
on the
radio networks from Congress, the Roosevelt
administration
and the FCC. "During the eight months of the last
Congress," Broadcast ingr editorialized in November,
1937,
"there was more oratory on the subject of radio than
in any

past Congress. The loudest note was for an investigation
of
all things radio." Despite the industry's many triumphs,
the editorial noted,

defense

.

"There was not a single speech in its

®^

The industry had so far been successful in heading off

congressional calls for investigations into network radio
but now with Senator White joining those in favor of a

thorough look inside the industry, some form of probe
seemed likely. As Congress became more restive, the

administration also became more assertive. McNinch's
appointment and his initial restructuring of the agency
were seen as signals that the regulatory climate was
shifting. Action by the FCC seemed the only way to block a

Broadcast ing November 15, 19 37, quoted in Bryan
Putney, "Regulation of Radio Broadcasting," Editorial
Research Report, February 19, 1938, 106.
,

228

.

.

congressional probe which could easily
veer out of control.
Senate Audit Committee chairman James
Byrnes of South
Carolina, a Roosevelt ally, pledged to
"resist any effort
to take up the White resolution"
for a radio investigation
"until Chairman McNinch has had time to
reorganize the

Commission and put in the reforms the President
has
requested. "82 Broadcasters justifiably feared
their

industry was under attack and sought a way to
defend their
institutions
Of the major complaints heard against the
networks,

charges of bias in public affairs programs were the
least

threatening to the basic structure of the system. To the
listening public, radio was the programs that filled the
air each day. If the industry's critics confined their fire
to the content of programming and ignored the corporate

structure of commercial broadcasting, the industry would

gladly make that trade.
When the National Association of Broadcasters gathered
in Washington in February,

1938,

Senator Burton Wheeler

delivered a strong warning to the industry that he smelled
monopoly in the air and Congress was preparing to take an
active role in regulating radio.

Quoted in Putney,
Broadcasting," 109.
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wheeler reminded the

"Regulation of Radio

Burton K. Wheeler, address to the National
Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C., February 14,
1938, reprinted in 75th Cong., 3rd sess., CongreBsional
Record (February 14, 1938), appendix, vol. 83, pt 9, 58083

Sen.

.

1
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broadcasters that they were merely "temporary"
users of
public property which "has been and should
forever be
inalienably reserved to the people." Broadcasters,

he said,

were "trustees" of the ether, and "to
overlook or disregard
this trust relationship is a breach that calls
for a

forfeit of your franchise." He reassured the
broadcasters
that he had no interest in government ownership,
saying any

form of state ownership smacked of dictatorship.
But,

Wheeler cautioned, government ownership was not the only
form of centralized control which threatened democracy.

Should "entities in the industry" become too powerful, they
could destroy the American system of radio.
"There are several species of monopoly that might get
a stranglehold on radio,

"

Wheeler mused, then recited the

litany of ant i -network charges current among critics:

centralized ownership, trafficking in licenses, national
programs which eroded local standards, high-power and
clear -channel broadcasting which threatened to overwhelm
small stations, excess advertising,

tasteless programming

and especially the overwhelming impact of the national
networks. Where, Wheeler asked, was the FCC while these

trends were developing? Too often, the regulators seemed to
be in the chain broadcasters' pockets.

"It seems to me that

if regulation of radio has lagged in any particular,

said,

"

he

"it has been in relation to those national entities."

Wheeler made a special point of raising the specter of
corporate control of public opinion.
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"We have developed a

.

technique through radio," he said,

"that ic at once a

unifying force and an instrument of
power so tremendous
that its ultimate significance cannot
yet be appraised."
The potentialities of the improper
radio are so fraught with such perilutilization of
as
require the elected representatives of to
the people
to guard zealously against the
possibilities of
such abuse. This raises the question of
and also the problem of the relation of monopoly
regulatory power of government and the use of
radio for political and commercial purposes.
"We of Congress and you of radio - both
dedicated

to the

public service - have," Wheeler concluded,

"a definite

mutuality of interest."
The next day, chairman McNinch spoke to the

broadcasters and also sounded a warning against the
temptations of monopoly.

84

Recalling his tenure at the

Federal Power Commission, McNinch advised the radio

industry that both recent events and American tradition

spelled out the fate of illegal combinations and asked,
"Why follow the tragic path that others have trod to their

downfall and ruin when all we need to do is look about and

read the handwriting on the wall, which is that America is

monopoly conscious, that America hates autocratic power,
that America will not tolerate the dominance of greed over

public utilities that touch either the economic necessities
or the social requirements of its people."

FCC chairman Frank R. McNinch, address to the
National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C.,
February 15, 1938, reprinted in 75th Cong., 3rd sess.,
Congreesional Record (May 10, 1938), appendix, vol. 83, pt
10, 1904-7.
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"Do not deceive yourselves,
gentlemen," warned

McNinch, the radio industry could
easily fall prey to an
"unwieldy concentration of control"
similar to the recently
toppled power trust. Congress and the
FCC would remain on
guard as the people's representatives.
"The American public
tumbled the pyramids of Insull and devastated
the financial
empire he built," he warned, "and you may
be sure that it
will not tolerate an Insull in this industry,
which touches
so intimately the homes and our social
life at so many
angles." Wheeler was right, he told the
broadcasters, when
he warned you of the dangers of monopoly,
"it is the duty
of the Communications Commission," McNinch concluded,

"to

prevent the development of a monopoly or to set about to

destroy it if one exists." He would, he pledged, eliminate

monopoly root and branch should a monopoly exist, certain
that "in so doing...

I

am serving the best interests of the

industry as well as of the public."
The chairman then tipped his hand, confirming a rumor
that had been circulating in trade circles for some time.
"I

have in mind suggesting to the Commission that it

proceed soon to investigate whether a monopoly exists,
McNinch said,

"This should include an investigation of the

chain broadcasting systems and of the chain contracts with
affiliates, of the management contracts and of the actual

practices of the chains in dealing with affiliated
stations." The Communications Act, he reminded the

broadcasters, allowed the FCC to regulate the networks "and
232

believe it ought to do this promptly
if it has the
necesGary information upon which to base
regulations."
The industry B leaders were stunned
and clearly on the
defensive as they left Washington. Wheeler
and McNinch,
I

Broadcasting editorialized as the NAB convention
adjourned,
"were extreme in their views; perhaps their
talks

presage a

new era, tighter regulation of radio." What
especially
annoyed the industry was the tone of the speeches.

"The

broadcasting industry does not want to see continued the
one-way practice of harassing it at every turn, threatening
it

with dire things, and calling it every conceivable

name." Radio, Broadcast incf

3iX<3ned,

deserved respect.

"For

every monopoly and blatant ad charge, broadcasting can
point to a dozen humanitarian achievements in time of flood

and storm and stress .... but we didn't notice them in the
headlines." It had been a difficult meeting for the

chastened leaders of the radio industry, its trade journal
and cheerleader admitted, and "the broadcasting

industry ... wholly cognizant of its shortcomings

... is

ready

and willing to cooperate with the national authorities."®^
One month later, as McNinch had predicted, the FCC

announced it would launch "an immediate investigation to
determine what special regulations applicable to radio
stations engaged in chain or other broadcasting are
Editorial. "The New NAB: Facing a New Era of
Regulation," Broadcasting, February 15, 1938, 12. The
magazine also reprinted the texts of Wheeler's and
McNinch 's speeches.
8^
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required in the public interest,
convenience, or
necessity." The investigation, the
Commission's order
explained, would cover every aspect of
network operations:

concentration of ownership, station operations,
affiliation
contracts and programming policies
"particularly
insofar as

the same tends toward or results in
restraint of trade or
monopoly. "86 Hearings, the FCC staff announced,
would begin
in July. While the order took no notice
of White's pending

legislation,

it listed the most important elements
of the

senator's bill of particulars.

While the FCC

'

s

announcement did not cause outright

panic in the corridors of Columbia and NBC,

it did send

detectable tremors throughout the industry. Third-place
Mutual and a few regional networks and independent stations

welcomed the pending investigation on the grounds that any
threat to the oligarchy of NBC Red, NBC Blue and Columbia

could only benefit them. The NAB, representing stations
large and small, affiliated and independent, which had

voted to reorganize and professionalize at its February
convention, seized the opportunity to hire its first fulltime executive director and launch a public relations

campaign aimed at "spreading good will and minimizing
dangers of attacks on radio.

85

March

"8"^

Broadcasters had

Federal Communications Commission, Order no. 37,

18,

1938.

Bob Landry, "N.A.B.'s Future Charted," Variety,
November 16, 1938, 25.
^"^
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euccessfully protected their interests
in the past and
hoped they could do so again.
McNinch, despite his trust -bust ing rhetoric,
had

continued to rely on the raised eyebrow technique
when
radio strayed from the straight -and-narrow.
Historian Erik
Barnouw later dismissed McNinch as "an elderly
gentlemen
who,

over-reacting to complaints

proj ected an image of

the FCC as a watch -and- ward society. "88 Certainly,

several

of McNinch 's crusades for wholesome radio reflected
his

Bible -belt background. Perhaps the most notorious involved
a December,

1937 appearance by Mae West on NBC's highly-

rated "Chase & Sanborn Hour." Portraying Eve opposite
Charlie McCarthy's Adam in a Garden of Eden sketch, West

attempted to lure Charlie, Edgar Bergen's sophisticated

wooden dummy, out of the garden by promising "I'll let you
play in my woodpile." Although the network's censors tried
to explain that the line had not seemed that suggestive

when they reviewed the script. West's provocative delivery
turned the broadcast into a scandal

poured

in,

.

As the complaints

McNinch called the program "profane, obscene,

indecent, vulgar,

sexy,

dirty, and insulting to the

American public," and, until sponsors, writers, actors and
station executives promised never to do anything like that

Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 169.
88
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again,

threatened to designate scores of stations'
renewal
applications for hearings. 89
While McNinch can be dismissed as a prude,
the
broadcasting industry's reaction indicated
radio's fear of
federal intervention. The networks could,
and often did,
muzzle entertainers whose material was deemed
too racy for

conservative listeners who might complain to Congress
or
the FCC. Columbia's rush to eliminate
objectionable

children's programs and offensive patent medicine

advertisements in response to Anning Prall's complaints was
but one example. Humorist Fred Allen joked that even his
personal letters were subject to careful review, protesting
that "all of the buts were stricken from the missives since
the word 'but' has a derriere connotation throughout the
south.

The broadcasters were equally cautious when it

came to news and public affairs programs. Advocates of

views considered too controversial or likely to trigger

complaints were sometimes denied the opportunity to speak.

Faced with any threat to their franchise, broadcasters
opted for caution and embraced self -censorship as an

McClellan Patten, "Radio Gets the Jitters,"
American Magazine March 1939, 42. The fact that a program
featuring a ventriloquist's dummy was one of decade's
biggest hits testifies to the public's willingness to
suspend disbelief when listening to the radio.
85

,

5°

Allen to Don Quinn, April 12, 1940, in Joe
McCarthy, ed.
Fred Allen's Letters (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1965; New York: Pocket Books, 1966), 211. Quinn
was the creator of the popular radio serial "Fibber Magee
and Molly.
,
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alternative to government intervention,
in 1938, as
McNinch, Wheeler and other critics
raised the flag of

trust-busting and the regulatory climate
in Washington
warmed to a new round of antimonopoly
activity,
the

networks hoped self -regulation would
again be enough to
protect the American system of broadcasting.

With the economy again in recession, ant
imonopol ists

within the Roosevelt administration argued it
was their
turn to attempt to right the economy. Cooperation
and
centralized planning had failed, they reasoned. The

best

hope for recovery now was to crack the cartels which

distorted the market and artificially maintained inflated
prices. By April,
along,

the president had been persuaded to go

and he called for a new antitrust initiative to be

headed by a Temporary National Economic Committee. While
the TNEC proposal worked its way through Congress, Thurman

Arnold was placed in charge of the Antitrust Division at
the Department of Justice. Business groups saw Arnold's

appointment as another signal that the administration was

veering toward trust -bust ing

.

Arnold, author of two

influential books on the folkways of government, was

convinced the market worked and equally convinced that
illegal combinations were preventing it from functioning

properly. 51 The market, he told a banking group, was like a
Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of
Monopoly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1966, 1969), 404-38; Alan Brinkley, "The
Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal State: The Case of
51
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boxing ring, but -the referee has been
absent in most
sections of American industry ....
such

m

who puts on brass knuckles will win.

a contest,

"92

the man

Arnold promised he

would turn economic competition into a
fair fight.
In the months following the FCC

•

s

announcement of its

monopoly hearing, congressional criticism of
the
commission's slow pace escalated. The first hearings,

scheduled originally for July, would, the FCC
announced, be
pushed back to the fall. In June, plans for an
independent
congressional inquiry into monopoly in radio reached the
floor of the House only to be defeated 236-100.93 The

resolution was brought up just hours before the House was
scheduled to debate Roosevelt's TNEC proposal, which

mandated a general inquiry into monopolies, and

administration allies led by New York Democrat Emmanuel
Celler insisted that the TNEC and FCC should be allowed to
conduct their investigations first.

"I

see no present need

for passage of this resolution," Celler argued,
it,

"If we pass

we will have three radio investigations going on at the

same time."^^ Another Democrat, Lindsay

Thurman Arnold,
557-79
1993)

"

C.

Warren of North

Journal of American Hietory

80

(September

,

92

"Arnold Likens 'Trust Buster' to the Referee," New
York Herald Tribune, September 4, 1938, 2.
93

Congress, House, debate on H.R. 92, 75th Cong., 3rd
Bess., Congreseional Record (June 14, 1938), vol. 83, pt
8, 9313-25.
94

H.R.

92,

Congress, House, Rep. Emmanuel Celler, debate on
9318.
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Carolina, while reminding the House
that he had not

entirely forgiven McNinch for bolting
the party to support
Hoover in 1928, charged the resolution's
supporters were
simply seeking to create another forum
for attacks
on the

Roosevelt administration and were carrying
water for
maverick FCC commissioner George Henry Payne,
who Warren
dismissed as "a disgruntled Republican smart aleck. "95
The network broadcasters clearly viewed the
potential

House monopoly investigation as a serious threat
and

mounted a major lobbying campaign to block the resolution.

Congressman Lawrence

J.

Connery,

the ant i -New Deal

Massachusetts Democrat who sponsored the resolution,

protested that Congress had to act because any FCC
investigation of radio "will only result in whitewash.

Republican Richard

B.

"^^

Wigglesworth of Massachusetts said it

was up to Congress to break up the radio trust,

"a

monopoly

which may fairly be said to have been created and fostered
by the Federal Government itself
enemy,

.

"^7

xhe interests were the

Connery charged, adding that the radio industry's

public relations "gang is at work; the bunch is down here
from New York going right to town." NBC, he warned, had
Congress, House, Rep. Lindsay
H.R.

92,

C.

Warren, debate on

9316.

9^

Congress, House, Rep. L.J. Connery, debate on H.R.
92, 9316. The resolution was actually introduced by
Connery '6 brother. Rep. William Connery, who had died
earlier in the year.
Congress, House, Rep. Richard
debate on H.R. 92, 9314.
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B.

Wigglesworth,

gone BO far as to retain Edward Bernays,
the nation's
leading image -maker, to twist lawmakers'
98
arms.

congressman John

J.

O'Connor of New York, the chairman of

the House Rules Committee and an
implacable Roosevelt

opponent, agreed,

"i

have never in my life seen such

lobbying against a resolution,

"

he exclaimed,

"You can walk

out in that lobby tonight and you will find
difficulty in

getting through the lobby because of the crowd of
radio
lobbyists from New York and all over the country,

and from

every department of the Government

.

"^^

Despite the administration's apparent support for the
FCC'B monopoly probe, the decision to back McNinch was

dictated more by a lack of any acceptable alternative.
Roosevelt's patience with the commission was wearing thin.
Government regulation of broadcasting was becoming a
needless irritant, an easy target for administration
critics. Committee hearings on the Connery resolution had

turned into an ant i -New Deal circus. Commissioner Payne was

becoming increasingly vocal in his criticism of both the
industry and the commission's own procedures. Testifying

before O'Connor's Rules Committee, Payne had scoffed at the
idea of an FCC investigation of broadcasting, charging that
98

92,

Congress, House, Rep. L.J. Connery, debate on H.R.

9316.
99

Congress, House, Rep. John J. O'Connor, debate on
H.R. 92, 9314. O'Connor would become a victim of
Roosevelt's 1938 purge of party conservatives, losing
narrowly in the September primary to pro-New Deal candidate
James H. Fay. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 364.
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the FCC was under the thumb of
industry lawyers and
lobbyists. In one case, he said, a lav/yer
"actually

doctored the records of the Commission
in a case in which
he was interested" and received only
"a
"lOO
soft reprimand.

By early fall, as the Munich crisis
reached its climax, the
word was passed from the White House to McNinch
to clean
house and get the situation under control.

On Columbus Day, the chairman abruptly fired
chief
legal counsel Hampson Gary, a courtly Texan and
former FRC

commissioner who was once an aide to President Wilson,
and
replaced him with William Dempsey, a thirty-two year old
protege of New Dealer Thomas

G.

Corcoran. Three other

veteran staffers, all career civil servants, were also
banished.

Rather than solve the problems at the FCC,

McNinch 's preemptory strike made things even worse. The
seven-member commission was now "split... to the bottom,"
the New York Herald Tribune reported, with Payne and T.A.M.

Craven solidly opposed to McNinch. Citing an unidentified
source — almost certainly the prototypical silk-stocking

New York Republican and Herald Tribune reader Payne —
inside the FCC,

the paper's Albert Warner, who within a

Commissioner George Henry Payne, statement to the
House Rules Committee on H.R. 92, 75th Cong., 3rd sess.,
June 2, 1938, CongreBBional Record (June 3, 1938),
appendix, vol. 83, pt 11, 2 3 57.
.

James D. Secrest, "Causes of Friction in the
Communications Commission, " CongreBsional Digest 17
(December 1938), 289. The article originally appeared in
the Washington Poet, November 20, 1938.
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year would join Columbia as a broadcast
commentator, wrote
that McNinch was plotting to turn
the commission into a
political arm of the Roosevelt administration.
The
chairman, Warner's source charged, was
"looking to

commission control of speakers on radio station
programs."
McNinch' B main targets would be "Boake Carter,
often
an

ant i -Administration commentator, and William

J.

Cameron,

of

the Ford Company. "I02

Syndicated Washington columnist Ray Tucker also saw
the political hand of the White House behind the

machinations. The purge, he wrote, exposed "the

administration's growing resentment against the Texas

dynasty on Capital Hill whose anti-New Deal spirit has
frequently pained the White House." Gary, Tucker noted, was
a well-known "friend of Texas politicos," and those in the

know saw his dismissal as more evidence of the widening
divide between Roosevelt and conservative southerners such
as Vice President John Nance Garner and Mississippi Senator

Pat Harrison.

"What most people miss — though regular

Democrats don't - is that Mr. Gary was fired by a North
Carolina Hoovercrat — Mr. McNinch — and two Republicans,
Messrs. Case and Brown," Tucker wrote.

"They and an anti-

Albert L. Warner, "McNinch Move to Oust Counsel
Stirs FCC Row," New York Herald Tribune, October 13, 1938,
2

.

242

Harrison Democrat - Eugene Sykes provided the majority
for the massacre "103
.

In the increasingly partisan atmosphere
of late 1938,

with critical congressional elections
approaching and
Europe in crisis, any public action could be
seen as

"politically inspired." Broadcasters feared their
editorial
decisions, their news and special events programming

policies which had attracted such criticism during the

presidential election two years before, would be monitored
even more carefully by both parties.
Paley's declaration of absolute impartiality on the
air must be placed against this background. Its rhetoric

was in the tradition of the broadcasting industry's past

pledges to serve the public interest, but the policy in

practice proved difficult to define and enforce. Kaltenborn

recalled that by the end of 1938,

a

few months after Carter

was dismissed, he too was being pressed to limit his

opinions despite his success on the air during the Munich
crisis when he "had shown the value of extemporized
editorial that was completely free and untrammeled.

"1°^ The

network "had been closing in on my editorial freedom,
said in an interview a dozen years later,

"

he

"for the

Ray Tucker, "Capital 'Mutiny' Concerns F.D.R.'s
Nicknaming Pals," Springfield (Massachusetts) DailyRepublican, October 21, 1938, 26.
Kaltenborn, "Reminiscences," 1950, 206, in
the Radio Pioneers project of the Oral History Collection
of Columbia University, hereafter Kaltenborn, COHC.
H.V.
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preceding two or three years," apparently
since about the
time of the network's 1936 troubles
with the Republicans
over Roosevelt's use of the air.i05
It was Klauber,

Kaltenborn said,

"who developed and

explained the policy to the people who were
working for the
news department" and who offered Kaltenborn
some practical
advice
Klauber. .would say, "Now you can do the
same thing without seeming to editorialize.
All
you've got to do is say, 'a prominent authority
declared,' or 'it is said in informed circles,'
or 'there is good reason to believe that.'" He
said, "You can always use a qualifying phrase.
Why do you have to say 'I think' and 'I
bel ieve?
"Well," I replied, "Don't you think it is
more honest in dealing with the radio audience
for me to say that this is my opinion instead of
attributing it to some anonymous official?"
He countered, "You know it doesn't set very
well to have a representative of the Columbia
Broadcasting System intruding his own opinion on
the radio audience."
"But," I told him, "the radio audience has
shown that it likes it and wants it. Even if it
doesn't agree with me it is perfectly willing to
listen to me. After all, there are some other
commentators who have other opinions. Why
shouldn't there be an editorial opinion voiced
from a radio station just as there is such an
opinion in a newspaper in signed columns on the
editorial page."
"Well," he said, "we don't believe in that
and our policy is against it."i°^
.

'

Kaltenborn, recalling the conversation more than a

decade after the fact, likely enhanced his role as an

advocate of free speech. Still, the dialogue rings true,

Kaltenborn, COHC, 206.
Kaltenborn, COHC,

2

06-7
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and,

despite his protestations, Kaltenborn
seems to have
taken Klauber's advice to heart.
In 1940, Kaltenborn-

s

nightly program moved from CBS

to NBC when Pure Oil signed him to
what his biographer

called "the most favorable contract any
radio man had ever
received. "107 while both the sponsor and the
network had
agreed, Kaltenborn said,

to a contract insuring "complete

freedom of opinion," the commentator's style
changed and
reflected Klauber's dicta
speech communications scholar
Giraud Chester who compiled a detailed analysis of
the

commentator's broadcasts noted that in the 194 0s, rather
than voice "straightforward personal opinions" as he had
in
the 1930s,

Kaltenborn increasingly adopted "techniques

which enable him to editorialize without seeming to."
Chester demonstrated how one 194 0 Kaltenborn broadcast

commenting on a speech by Wendell Willkie evolved through
three successive drafts:

listened to Wendell Willkie 's speech
last night. It was wholly admirable."
(2) "I hope you listened to Wendell
Willkie '6 speech last night. It was wholly
admirable
(3) "Millions of Americans of both parties
listened to Wendell Willkie 's speech last night.
Most of them agreed that it was a wholly
admirable speech. "109
(1)

"I

.

1°"^

Giraud Chester, "Kaltenborn Edits the News,"
American Mercury, October 194 7, 39 3.
108

Kaltenborn, COHC, 208.

109

Quoted in Chester, "Kaltenborn Edits the News,"
400. For a thorough analysis of Kaltenborn' s techniques,
see Giraud Chester, "The Radio Commentaries of H.V.
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The message remained intact. Only
the source was changed.
Klauber would have been pleased. Kaltenborn
had clearly not
Gaid that he was impressed by Willkie's
speech. That would
have been personal opinion. Instead, the
commentator cited
as his source "millions of Americans."
How could he be

expected to disagree with the voice of the people?
Whether
or not Kaltenborn had actually spoken to any
of
those

millions was a question left unasked. The form the
statement took was much more important than the validity
of
the assertion.

Such verbal gymnastics were not unusual as
journalists, radio executives and their critics debated the

proper role of broadcasting as an information source in the
late 193 0s. There was little new about the debate, of

course. Reporters and editors had always discussed how best
to communicate information to the public. As the definition
of news evolved over time,

so too did the conventional

wisdom of how best to reach those elusive goals of
conveying "facts" and "the truth." What was new, however,
was the nature of radio itself. The medium created a new

kind of reality. That much was clear.
Toward the end of Columbia's coverage of the Munich
crisis, Murrow, broadcasting from London, ruminated on what
he believed he and his radio colleagues were trying to do:

Kaltenborn: A Case Study in Persuasion"
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1947)
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(Ph.D.

diss.,

would like to cay juct one final word
broadcacting by virtue of itc cpeed and that
intimacy
IB playing a tremendous role in
the formation of
public opinion over here. If you could
hear ac
we do
London, nation hurling invective at
nation through the air, you would
understand what
I mean^ l just want to tell
you that those of us
here who talk to you from over here are
fully
conscious of our responsibility and propose
to
give you an undistorted picture of the
history
being made in Europe during these long days
and
nights. We are trying to find you material
on
which your opinion can be based. We aren't
trying
to tell you what that opinion should be no
I

m

.

It was,

Variety noted, a "statement which made

a

marked

impression on the trade, "in Murrow was in essence

acknowledging the unique power of radio and at the same
time restating the gist of Paley's policy of fairness.
As a

declaration of journalistic intent,
Timec tradition of objective,

it

echoed the New York

factual reporting which

Klauber had brought with him to CBS.
The truth of Murrow'

s

observation that radio played "a

tremendous role" in shaping public opinion during

a time of

crisis was demonstrated anew at home later that fall. On

Halloween Eve, Orson Welles'

"Mercury Theatre of the Air"

aired a dramatization of H.G. Wells' The War of the Worldo.
The broadcast, as Time reported the following week,

no Edward

"caused

Murrow, CBS network, September 25, 1938,
quoted in "Fast and Vivid War Service Given Nation by
Broadcasts," Broadcasting, October 1, 1938, 63.
R.

ni "Overseas Radio Slants,"
1938,

26.
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Variety, September 28,

something pretty close to national
hysteria. "II2 The
reworking of the 1898 science fiction
classic transposed
the setting from turn-of - the -century
England to southern

New Jersey in 1939. The day after the
broadcast, at a press
conference arranged by Columbia officials
panicked not
by

the broadcast but by the reaction to it,
Welles claimed he
was "bewildered by the misunderstanding"
caused by the

broadcast.

"At the very outset of the broadcast and
twice

during its enactment listeners were told that this
was a
play," he patiently explained, "Furthermore, at the

conclusion a detailed statement to this effect was made."
How,

he innocently asked,

could he have been expected to

know that such an obvious "fantasy... a familiarly accepted
fairy-tale," would cause such a stir?ii3

Welles of

course knew, what led thousands of Americans to take the

broadcast seriously was its use of the same techniques so

recently and grippingly demonstrated by the network's news
broadcasters during the Munich crisis.
The program had gone on the air at eight o'clock as it

had for the previous seventeen weeks. Welles welcomed the
audience and then described the evening's broadcast as a

play set one year in the future,

"in the thirty-ninth year

112

"'Boo!'," Time, November 7, 1938, 40. See also
Hadley Cantril with Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog, The
InvaBion from Mare: A Study in the Psychology of Panic
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940).

Quoted in "FCC to Scan Script of 'War' Broadcast,"
New York TimeB, November 1, 1938, 26.
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of the twentieth century,

near the end of October.

"114

Unfortunately, many listeners were
tuned to Edgar Bergen
and Charlie McCarthy on NBC Red while
Welles spoke. Those
who had tuned to Columbia when a guest
vocalist on NBC
began singing or who had not been paying
attention then
heard what seemed to be a routine remote
broadcast of an
orchestra playing dance music. Abruptly, an
announcer's

voice broke into the music:

"Ladies and gentlemen, we

interrupt our program of dance music to bring you
a special
bulletin from the Intercontinental Radio News
.

.

.

There was no such press agency. CBS officials had

ordered Welles, producer John Houseman and writer Howard
Koch to make thirty-eight specific changes in their
original script in order to make the broadcast more clearly
fictional. Most listeners failed to notice. While the words

were unfamiliar, the sound clearly mimicked the crisis

broadcasts which had held the nation transfixed the month
before
Welles was not alone in realizing the dramatic impact
of the conventions of radio news.

In an interview published

the morning of the Welles broadcast, poet and playwright

Archibald MacLeish discussed how his radio dramas had been

114

"Mercury Theatre of the Air, " CBS network, October
30, 1938. The FCC the day after the broadcast ordered CBS
to submit transcripts and recordings of the program for
examination and the network released transcripts of the
program to the press. See "Excerpts From the 'War'
Broadcast," New York Times, November 1, 1938, 26.
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overtaken by events, us One of his verse
dramas, "The Air
Raid," had been broadcast by Columbia
earlier in June and
in September, the New York Tiniee^
Orrin Dunlap
wrote,

MacLeish "had the novel experience of hearing
parts of
enacted in real life, almost as he envisaged

it

it."

He tuned in on the September broadcasts
from
Czechoslovakia in which announcers described the
black-out, the fear of bombers and the
preparations for the air attack. He heard London
commentators describing feverish activity in
digging bomb-proof shelters, the piling up of
sandbags, planes loaded with tons of death and
of
long-nozzled anti-aircraft guns pointed skyward
from their turntables.
In both "The Air Raid" and his ant i -Fascist parable
"The

Fall of the City," also broadcast on Columbia, MacLeish
had

used the techniques of radio news to bring his story to
life. As a dramatist,

he had immediately recognized the

power of the distant voice.
"For the radio play," MacLeish explained,

announcer has become a great dramatic symbol

"the

.... a

dramatic

device far beyond expectations as revealed by the European
crisis, and chiefly by those announcers who went on the air
at Prague." For the dramatist, MacLeish said,

"the

announcer as a narrator becomes a most colorful and useful
tool." As "The War of the Worlds" made clear, as events in
the real world became as dramatic as any fictional

creation, many listeners were finding it difficult to

separate the stories they heard on their radios.

Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr., "Exploring in Drama," New
York Timee, October 30, 1938, sec. 9, 12.
115
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The remarkably similar public
reaction to the Munich
crisis and Orson Welles' invasion from
Mars provided more
evidence of the power broadcasters
held and, to many
critics, the dangers which would flow
from control of the
air by their opponents. "The widespread
public reaction to
this broadcast," observed McNinch the day
after "The War of
the Worlds" aired, "is another demonstration
of the power

and force of radio and points out again the
serious public
responsibility of those who are licensed to operate
stations. "116 Fascists, communists, corporate
monopolists,

New Dealers, any group which took control of the
microphone,

it seemed,

could convince the public that it

was to be trusted and its enemies were to be resisted.

Welles and his Mercury players, columnist Dorothy

Thompson wrote,

"have proved how easy it is to start a mass

delusion." Perhaps recalling Murrow's description of
"nation hurling invective at nation through the air,"

Thompson continued:
The greatest organizers of mass hysteria and mass
delusions today are states using the radio to
excite terrors, incite hatreds, inflame masses,
win mass support for policies, create idolatries,
cibolish reason and maintain themselves in power.
The immediate moral is apparent if the whole
incident is viewed in reason; no political body
must ever, under any circumstances, obtain a
monopoly of radio, n"^
116

Quoted in "FCC is Perplexed on Steps to Take,
York Times, November 1, 193 8, 26.

"

New-

Dorothy Thompson, "On the Record: Mr. Welles and
Mass Delusion," St. Louis Post -Dispatch November 3, 1938,
11"^

,

3C.
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Ad 1938 ended, radio wac at once
eotabliched ac
vital and profitable communicat iono
industry and

a

a

potentially dangerouc monopoly. Broadcaotxng
wao, depending
on one'c perouacion, a baction of
democracy or
a oource of

dangerouc demagoguery. Radio 'o coverage
of the newc from
Europe had raiced the inductry'o prestige
and made radio

principal cource of newc for millionc of
Americano
with the FCC invectigating chain broadcacting
and

.

a

Yet

Congreccional criticc prepared to join in if they
cenced a
whitewach, the financial underpinnings of commercial
radio
were under attack. Ac the wider world tilted toward
war,

American broadcactero were concerned that their own,
cmaller univerce wac every bit ac unctable.
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CHAPTER IV
"PROBLEMS WERE COMING IN ON ALL WAVE
LENGTHS"!

By the late fall of 1938, the broadcasting
industry's
euphoria over its triumphal coverage of the
Munich crisis
had faded. For the first time since the
enactment of the

Communications Act four years before, critics of
network
radio hoped and the industry feared the regulators
were

poised to take a probing look at the way the industry
worked. Ongoing arguments over censorship, access to
the

airwaves, children's programming, advertising abuses and
the like had been subsumed by a broader debate: Were the

networks,

the engines of the medium's greatest

accomplishments and mounting profitability, in fact nothing
more than monopolies which concentrated control of the

people's airwaves in the hands of a favored few? This
became the question of the day, and broadcasters feared
powerful legislators such as Senators Burton Wheeler and

Wallace White and a majority on the Federal Communications

Commission had already decided on the answer. Network
executives, by now quite familiar with the folkways of

Washington, understood how the political game was played.

When the FCC announced an "inquiry" into monopolistic chain
Edward M. Kirby, former National Association of
Broadcasters publicist, to Frank Pellegrin, November 18,
1958, in Kirby biography file, Broadcast Pioneers Library,
Washington, DC, [5]
!
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practiceB,

the CommisBion clearly had an
answer already in

mind.

The only mystery was whether the
regulators would
Bimply raise their eyebrows or this
time initiate real
changes in the way radio worked.

While the machinations of government
agencies occupied
industry insiders, Americans listening to
the radio had
other concerns. The question of whether or
not there would
be a new European war would soon be supplanted
by
the

harsher query of when the conflict would begin.
In the
spring of 1939, America listened as Adolf Hitler
promised
ethnic Germans in western Poland that they too would
soon

become citizens of a greater Reich. As the debate over

military preparedness gripped Washington, the networks
readied themselves for the coming conflict. In June, CBS
news director Paul White went to London to meet with

Columbia's two experienced European representatives, Edward
R.

Murrow and William

L.

Shirer, and the network's newly

hired man in Paris, Thomas Grandin, and "the four of us

plotted how we'd cover the war when

it came."^

At home, Americans were divided over what role the

United States should play in the coming conflict. The First
World War had clearly failed to end all wars. Did we have
to repeat our mistakes? Was the coming conflict simply
Paul W. White, NewB On The Air (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1947), 48. White recalled that he produced a
detailed memorandum on war coverage following the meeting,
but he admitted he had no idea if the network could
actually execute its plan.
2
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another dispute among European powere
which was of no real
concern to us? Or was fascism, especially
Hitler's National
Socialism, a threat to democracy
everywhere which the
United States would have to oppose?
Politically, the New Deal had stalled as
President
Roosevelt faced an increasingly recalcitrant
Congress. The
president's failed attempt to purge his party
of

conservatives in the 1938 elections proved that
the New
Deal was not in fact the invincible juggernaut
it had
appeared to be just two years before. 194 0 promised

to be a

fascinating year. Following Washington's precedent,

presidents had always stepped aside after two terms and
Roosevelt, while keeping his own counsel, gave every

indication he would honor the tradition, dropping hints
that he yearned to retire to his gentleman's farm at Hyde
Park. Network commentators,

wind,

sniffing the shifting political

told their listeners that Harry Hopkins, Herbert

Lehman, Henry Wallace,

Paul McNutt or Alben Barkley would

secure the president's blessing as his successor. Others

now outside the New Deal's charmed circle — John Nance
Garner, James Farley, Cordell Hull and Burt on Wheelei: among

them — positioned themselves to make their own runs for
the nomination when,

if,

the president announced he would

step down. The Republicans, buoyed by their belief that the
tide of public opinion was running against the New Deal and
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RooBevelt's tilt toward internationalism,
were eager to
take their chances against any of
them.^
Both these debates were played out in
large part on
the radio, white House hopefuls sought
to sound

presidential as they addressed the issues of
the day during
radio talks. Advocates of preparedness and
isolation traded
opinions in broadcast speeches and roundtable
discussions
and whispered in the ears of sympathetic commentators
in

hopes their views and political dreams would be
blessed by
the analysts. The events of 1938 proved decisively

that the

medium had taken its place as a potent, credible shaper
of
public opinion. A Roper poll showed that while Americans
Btill relied on their newspapers for most of their daily
news,

if the radio and the newspaper offered conflicting

versions of the same story, many more would believe what
they heard on the radio.

^

A medium which had long boasted

that its great virtue was "its capacity for providing the

listener an opportunity to extend his environment easily

and inexpensively, and to participate with a feeling of
personal involvement in the events of the outside world,

"

James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt The Lion and the
Fox{New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 408-15.
^

:

"The Press and the People
August 1939, 64-5, 70.
^
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— A Survey,

"

Fortune,

5

radio in general and the networks in
particular were more
powerful and profitable than ever before.
The Federal Communications Commission
finally opened
its long-anticipated chain broadcasting
inquiry in

November,

1938. Network executives,

fearing the worst,

carefully examined their programming for broadcasts
which
might weaken their political position. Controversy
and
criticism were to be avoided at all costs. The growing
corps of news executives and broadcasters was aware
of

their employers' concerns, but they also continued to

wrestle with their own professional imperatives. How could
they as journalists best tell their stories? How could they
use radio to enlighten the public?
The concerns of the board rooms and the news

departments may have been driven by differing motives, but
at this point in their histories, both sides were

particularly sensitive to criticism. The emerging cadre of
broadcast journalists was creating a new profession on the
fly and was frankly unsure how radio could be best used to

inform the public. As journalists, they understood that
their function was to advance democratic debate by

providing accurate information. As broadcasters, they

wanted to take advantage of the immediacy and intimacy of
radio. The medium's demonstrated emotional hold over its

Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport, The Peychology
of Radio (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935; reprint,
Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer, 1986), 260.
^
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listeners both exhilarated and frightened
them. Radio's
potential to enlighten, they believed, was
matched by its
ability to manipulate and misguide.

As war approached, CBS commentator Elmer
Davis
remembered, an "hysterical fear of -propaganda'"
was in the
air.

Broadcasters and their critics had heard the power
of
radio. They understood that Roosevelt had used
the medium
6

to win the confidence of the people, and they had
seen how
a radio fantasy by Orson Welles could create panic.

They

knew that in Europe Hitler had used a state broadcasting
monopoly to consolidate his power. But Davis' comment,
however accurate, revealed only a partial truth. If
societies could be manipulated for ill, did it not follow
that they could be manipulated for noble ends as well?

Edward Bernays, the nation's leading public relations
counsel, equated "freedom of propaganda" with "the other

great civil liberties — freedom of speech, religion,
press, assembly and petition." Propaganda, which he defined
as "an attempt to modify people's ideas or behavior without

coercion," was merely "a ready tool" which "can be made the

voice of the people in the democracy of today.

"^

Elmer Davis to Edward R. Murrow, June 29, 1947,
Edward R. Murrow Papers 1927-1965 (Sanford, North Carolina:
Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), folder 169,
frame 0301.
^

Edward L. Bernays, "Does Propaganda Menace
Democracy? Melting Pot of Ideas," Forum, June 1938, 341-2.
The eminent political scientist Harold Lasswell defined
propaganda "as the use of symbols to influence
controversial attitudes" and argued that propaganda was not
necessarily a pejorative. The nation, he said, owed its
258

By the late 1930s, such positive
descriptions of
propaganda became increasingly rare.
Murrow, speaking in
1938, had told his listeners how international
broadcasting
was being used as a weapon of war and
how he wished
"you

could hear, as we do in London, nation
hurling invective at
nation through the air. "8 in reality, many
of his listeners
could hear. American intervention had proved
decisive in
the first war, and the European powers sought
to
influence

public opinion across the ocean. Powerful short-wave
transmitters were targeted at the United States from
London, Berlin,

Paris and Rome and short-wave receivers

were common. Many major metropolitan newspapers recognized
their readers'

interest in overseas broadcasts by routinely

publishing schedules and frequencies for overseas
transmissions along with program logs for local stations.^
Either by monitoring these broadcasts directly or by
listening to retransmissions on the domestic networks,

very existence to skilled propagandists who convinced
colonists "to move themselves and to risk their capital in
America. This, perhaps, is America's greatest debt to
propaganda." Harold D. Lasswell, "The Propagandist Bids for
Power," Anierican Scholar 8 (Summer 1939), 353, 350.
S

Edward R. Murrow, CBS network, September 25, 1938,
reprinted in "Fast and Vivid War Service Given Nation by
Broadcasts," Broadcaeting, October 1, 1938, 63.
Radios may be manufactured to receive signals of
varying frequencies. "Shortwave" broadcasting refers to
radio waves generated at between 2,000 and 3 0,000 cycles or
"Hertz" per second. The standard broadcast band in the
United States, often referred to in Europe as "medium
wave", includes waves generated at between 53 0 and 1,700
cycles per second. Both short and medium wave broadcasts
rely on amplitude modulation transmission.
5
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millions of Americans heard the
representatives of the
European powers argue their positions.
Time dubbed the
escalating radio propaganda wars "the
Fourth Front" and
reminded its readers of Berlin radio's
"Hitler- inspired
rule:

'Make it simple,

tell them often, make it burn.

'

"lo

The manipulation of public opinion through
the use of
propaganda, many thoughtful Americans feared, was
not

limited to questions of war and peace. The domestic

dissension of the 193 0s and the growing influence of
the
mass media, especially radio, had combined, they
believed,
to devalue rational public discourse and threaten
the

foundation of liberal democracy. Commercial broadcasters
felt particularly vulnerable to this criticism because they

relied on a form of propaganda - product advertising - for
their very survival. The industry boasted that radio could

create consumer demand and convince listeners that

purchasing a particular product would make them more
successful, more popular, more content. Broadcasters talked
as always about freedom of the air, but freedom to speak on

the radio, critics charged, was hardly free "because it

costs money, which, usually, is in the hands of antisocial

groups dedicated to narrow self-interest rather than to the

common weal."^^ Well-heeled corporations had the cash to
10

"Fourth Front,"

ri;77e,

October

H

9,

1939,

64-5.

Ferdinand Lundberg, "Does Propaganda Menace
Democracy? Freedom to Distort the Truth," Forum, June 1938,
343

.
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promote their economic and philooophical
agendas through
adverticing. Only a few ant icommercial
holdoutc by the late
1930S begrudged Ford the right to sell
its automobiles on
the air, but William Cameron's reactionary
Sunday evening

talks were quite another matter. Polemicists
such as

Cameron who paid for their microphones enjoyed
all the
freedom money could buy, but were such programs
truly in
the public interest which broadcasters were
pledged to

uphold?
The industry wrestled with the dilemma throughout
the

decade. Radio was not a common carrier like the telephone
system. Licensees were held legally accountable for the

content of broadcasts heard over their stations, even when
the air time was purchased and the program prepared by an

independent agency. The networks and individual stations

believed themselves in constant jeopardy: If they allowed
unpopular voices to purchase air time to spread their
words,

they were accused of betraying the public interest

for financial gain.

If they refused to sell time,

they were

liable to be accused of censorship and restricting freedom
of the air.

The industry's dilemma can be seen in its response to

Father Charles

E.

Coughlin. A Canadian-born Roman Catholic

priest, Coughlin exploited the anger and fear of 193 0s

America to become, thanks to radio, one of the decade's
most powerful political voices.
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He was, a biographer

observed, a magnetic personality who
like Roosevelt, Hitler
and Mussolini fit both his times and
his chosen medium.
All were strong figures. They seemed
to know the
answers to the ills of their societies.
acted with decisiveness - they acted as They
if they
really knew the answers. Father Coughlin
acted
this way too. His crisp voice with its
shrill
r's his vibrant personality and his message
were
wonderfully suited to the time in which he lived
and to the new medium which was sweeping the
country. 12

Coughlin's message, contemporary observers agreed,
could
not be separated from his medium. Commentator
Raymond Gram

Swing compared the priest, not with Roosevelt or Mussolini,
but with another Detroit celebrity, Henry Ford. Swing

observed that Ford did not invent the gasoline engine and
Coughlin did not invent radio. However, just as Ford

exploited another's invention, Coughlin "developed the
possibilities of radio as

a

source of power.... If not an

inventor, he was a discoverer

.

"^^

Coughlin was first heard on the air in Detroit in the
192 06,

broadcasting services for shut-ins and Sunday

afternoon lessons for children. As prosperity collapsed
into depression, he discussed how economic stress was

tearing apart the social fabric of families in his parish

and discovered that his talks were attracting larger and

Sheldon Marcus, Father Coucfhlin The Tumultuous
Life of the Priest of the Little Flower (Boston: Little,
12

Brown,

:

1973

)

,

37

.

Raymond Gram Swing, Forerunners of American Fascism
(New York: Julian Messner, 1935), 34.
1^
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increasingly supportive audiences.

14

At first an avid

Roosevelt booster, Coughlin evolved into
a virulent antiNew Dealer.
In 193 0, Coughlin's weekly broadcasts were
heard

nationwide during purchased time on the Coluinbia
network.
As he attacked banks, financiers and government
policies
which he said had allowed them to strangle the economy,

CBS

reacted. This was not the kind of benign religious

programming the network had had in mind. The radio priest
was far too controversial for the chain. In 1931, Columbia

demanded that Coughlin tone down his social criticism and
submit his scripts in advance for clearance. Coughlin

protested on the air, and his listeners responded with over
a million angry letters to the network.

When Coughlin's

contract expired later in the year, Columbia refused to
sell him time for his program.

The network replaced Coughlin's broadcasts with a

weekly non-denominational "Church of the Air" which
provided free time to representatives of every faith.
Columbia president William Paley disingenuously claimed
that Coughlin was not being silenced by CBS. The network,
he said, was simply trying to better serve the public

See Alan Brinkley, Voicee of Protest: Huey Long,
Father Coughlin, and the Great Depreeeion (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1982), 82-106.
14

Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 44-51; Swing, Forerunners of
Ameri can Fascism, 34-61.
15

263

.

.

interect by aoouring "the radio
audience the balanced
religious broadcacting it is entitled to."i«
Coughl in wao
not off the air for long. He created
the Radio League of
the Little Flower and aeoeitibled a
network of otationo
acroDD the country to cpread hie gocpel

How could broadcacterc claim the air wac truly
free
a peroonality with Coughlin'o popularity
and following

if

were

cilenced? The induotry, and ecpecially the networks,
nought
to defend itc claim that radio wac a medium for
free cpeech
by offering air time to thoce they concidered recponcible

reprecentativec of diveroe groupc

.

To avoid charges that

they were pandering to extremictc, however,

the chains

increasingly limited their working definition of
responsibility. Columbia barred Coughl in from the air but

welcomed speakers from established religious groups who

promised to deliver less inflammatory talks.
Publicity campaigns mounted by government agencies
also caused trouble for the industry because they were

frequently attacked as partisan propaganda. Foes of the
Roosevelt administration charged that the New Deal was

brandishing the threat of its regulatory power to command

unprecedented access to the air. The networks sought to
prove their impartiality by producing program logs showing
that both New Dealers and their political opponents were

Quoted in Sally Bedell Smith, In All Hie Glory: The
Life of William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1990)

,

160
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frequent radio speakers, but critics
such as Virginia
senator Harry Flood Byrd remained
unconvinced. Byrd charged
that the industry's eagerness to
cooperate with the

government's burgeoning public relations
operations
distorted the debate. To Byrd, who launched
an
investigation into the subject, and others, the
machinery
of the state was being perverted into a
perpetual campaign
organization dedicated to praising intrusive,

redistributive government programs.

"It is clear that the

country is literally being drenched with administration
propaganda,

"

wrote veteran Washington correspondent and

columnist Frank Kent in 1937,

"the cost of which is charged

to the taxpayers." Programs prepared by the Office of

Education,

the Department of Agriculture,

the Federal

Housing Commission and other government agencies, critics
charged, did more than dispense helpful, non-partisan
advice. They served as soap boxes for the social engineers
of the Roosevelt administration. Radio, Kent charged, had

become "one of the greatest of the publicity instruments

used by the administration.

"^"^

The fear of propaganda was not limited to ant i -New

Dealers. It cut across the political spectrum. Progressive

department store magnate Edward A. Filene, fearing the

nation was being victimized by propaganda from the right,
Frank R. Kent, "Washington's Ballyhoo Brigade,
American Magazine, September 1937, 66. See also Stanley
High, "You Can't Beat the Government," Saturday Evening
Post, November 2 0, 1937, 66.
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assembled a distinguished group of
educators, psychologists
and public opinion experts for meetings
in Boston and New
York. Each had suggestions, but none
had a solution to the
growing influence of propaganda. Finally,
one participant
recalled, Filene turned to Columbia University
Teachers
College professor and journalist Clyde
"You there
year.

I

- here

R.

Miller and said,

is ten thousand dollars for the first

don't care how you spend the money.

I

suggest you

and two others appoint a committee. The American nation
must be taught to think.

Miller used Filene

"^^

's

bequest to establish the

Institute for Propaganda Analysis "for scientific research
in methods used by propagandists in influencing public

opinion.

He enlisted an impressive roster of experts to

help in the crusade. The Institute's president was

Princeton psychology professor Hadley Cantril, the pioneer
researcher on radio and its impact on the audience. The
advisory board boasted such prominent progressive academics
as historians Charles A. Beard and James

sociologist Robert

S.

T.

Shotwell,

Lynd and economist Paul Douglas,

later a Democratic senator from Illinois.

2°

1^

Edward L. Bernays, Biography of an Idea: Memoirc of
a Public Relations Counsel (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965), 443-4. Filene died prior to the Institute's launch.
"Analysis of Propaganda: Institute Teaches How to
Bare Influences on Public Opinion," Newsweek, April 3,
15

1939,

32.

"Announcement," Propaganda Analysis: A Monthly
Letter to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze
20
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:

.

Miller set the Institute's agenda in
its founding
statement
There ie today especial need for
propaganda
analyeiB. America is beset by a confusion
conflicting propagandas, a Babel of voices of
warnings, charges, counter-charges,
assertions
and contradictions assailing us continually
through press, radio, and newsreel These
propagandas are disseminated by political
parties, labor unions, business organizations
farm organizations, patriotic societies,
churches, schools, and other agencies; klso by
word of mouth by millions of individuals 21
.

.

In words foreshadowing Murrow's widely praised
broadcast

from London, the Institute pledged it would be "fair,
scientific, objective," but admitted it "lays no claim to

infallibility. We don't propose to tell our subscribers
what to think; we aim to help them and to help ourselves

learn how to think.

"^2

Political and philosophical divisions within the

organization itself and in society at large would soon
prove how difficult it was to conduct rational discourse in
the late 193 0s. Discussing propaganda in his ground-

breaking 1935 study, The Peychology of Radio, Cantril
coolly stated that the public could resist those who sought
to twist opinion with logic.

"Rational thought," he wrote,

"is the propagandist's most deadly enemy."

Propaganda 1 (October 1937),
"Analysis of Propaganda," 32.

1.

Emphasis in the original;

21

"Announcement," Propaganda Analysis,
the original

1.

Emphasis in

"Announcement," Propaganda Analysis,
the original.

4.

Emphasis in

22
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'

[The propagandict]

followG the advice of Edmund
Burke and putG hie truct not in the
riqht
argument but in the right word. The
mechanicm upon which the propagandictmental
reliec ic
not reacon but Guggection, which
bringc about the
acceptance of a propocition for belief or
action
without the normal intervention of
critical
judgment ^3
.

Radio'G cuccecG wac, of cource, teGtimony
to the medium's
power of Guggection. By bringing fleeting
Goundc and
lingering emotionG to itG lictenerc, radio had
proven
itGelf a powerful inctrument of propaganda. In
a decade

many caw aG irrational, the medium Geemed to add
to the

uncertainty which gripped Gociety.24 seeking an explanation
for the reaction to the "War of the Worldc" broadcact,
one

pGychologict GuggeGted radio 'g coverage of the decade
crieec,

g

"together with the general strain of theGe yearG of

economic strecc and feeling of incecurity, created juct the
Gtate of mind for such a panic. It couldn't have happened
in 1928

.

"-5

Ag war approached in Europe,

the idea that any

participant in public debate could remain "fair.
23

Cantril and Allport,

The Peychology of Radio,

2^

62.

For an insightful overview of the period, see
Warren I. Susman, "The Culture of the Thirtiec" and
"Culture and Commitment," chape, in Culture Ag History: The
Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Pantheon, 1984), 150-210. For a discuGGion of
the quect for a unifying national tradition between the
wars, see Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The
Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 297-527.

Wayland Vaughn of Boston University quoted in
"Radio Panic Showc Public Jittery, Prof. Vaughn Sayc,"
Boston Globe, November 1, 1938, 5.
2^
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scientific, objective" and above the
fray seemed either
disingenuous or naive. In the fall of
1938, the Institute
for Propaganda Analysis provided
materials for a nationwide
series of discussion groups on propaganda
promoted by the
non- interventionist National Committee
on the Cause and
cure of war. "While the term -propaganda'
is used without
qualification," the New York Times blandly noted,
"it is

generally understood that it is the agencies
economically
interested in promoting war which are to be under
scrutiny. "26 The IPA's distinguished board shattered
over
the issue of military preparedness. Douglas, Cantril
and

Shotwell determined that more than propaganda analysis was

needed to counteract the spread of fascism. Beard remained

resolutely isolationist, fearing Roosevelt would use

a

new

war in Europe to distract the nation from its domestic
troubles and limit democracy and dissent. Increasingly, he

found himself uncomfortably allied with reactionary

organizations sympathetic with fascist goals.
speak out for peace,
Josephson,

"But

I

"

.

wanted to

Beard ruefully told author Matthew

found that the wrong kind of people were

in that camp, while those

other side

"I

I

like all seem to be on the

"^^

Elizabeth LaHines, "Peace Group Maps Propaganda
Study," New York Times, October 10, 1938, sec. 2, 5.
26

Quoted in Matthew Josephson, Infidel in the Temple
A Memoir of the Nineteen -Thirties (New York: Alfred A.
413-4
Knopf, 1967)
2"^

,
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Among those Beard and other nonintervent ionis ts found
"on the other side" of the issue were
most of the familiar
voices of broadcast news. Murrow, Shirer,
Davis,
Kaltenborn, Swing, virtually every prominent
radio
broadcaster of the day saw Hitler's regime as
a palpable
threat to democracy in Europe and at home.
Despite their
corporate and individual proclamations of impartiality,

each of these broadcasters was philosophically and

personally committed to democratic internationalism.
As
their fellow commentator Quincy Howe observed, "all
of

them

knew Europe as well as the United States" and believed
the
interests of the democracies on either side of the Atlantic

were inseparable

.

28

When Germany invaded Poland in 1939 and

especially after the fall of France in the spring of 1940,
they used their broadcasts and their medium to advocate

greater American aid to the allies and, as historian David
Culbert has persuasively argued, helped create a climate of

opinion in favor of preparedness and, ultimately,
intervention.

^9

The broadcasters,

long aware of their ability to shape

the public's perception of events, had since the 192 0s been

Quincy Howe, "The Rise and Fall of the Radio
Commentator," The Saturday Review, October 26, 1957,
28

14.

David Holbrook Culbert, News For Everyman: Radio
and Foreign Affaire in Thirties America (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976). As examples of the minority
isolationist view, Culbert proposed the rapidly fading
Boake Carter and Fulton Lewis, Jr. Both broadcast over
Mutual, the least influential of the four networks, in the
critical years between 1939 and 1941.
29
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concerned about how they should deal
with this disquieting
power. The debate within the industry
intensified as war
approached in Europe and became increasingly
heated
in the

two years between the start of the
war and America's entry.
Yet throughout the immediate pre-war
years, the leaders of
the broadcasting industry continued to
pretend they were

playing no part in the debate and to proclaim
their
militant nonpar tisanship on all controversial
issues at
home and abroad. Columbia's Paley, who in 1938
demanded
that radio "as an instrument of American democracy
must

forever be wholly, honestly and militantly
nonpartisan.

...

in the whole realm of arguable social

ideas," continued to be one of the industry's leading

spokesman.

30

As late as the spring of 1941, he renewed his

pledge that Columbia would continue its "consistent and

determined effort to present the essence of the news, both
national and international,

in a strictly factual and

objective way, devoid of bias."^! Radio broadcasters, he
insisted, could best contribute to the commonweal and serve
the public interest by serving as moderators rather than

participants in a democratic debate.

William S. Paley, annual report of CBS, CBS
network, April 5, 1938 reprinted as "Minimum Interference
Asked by Paley," Broadcast ing April 15, 1938, 15.
2°

,

3^

William S. Paley, Annual Report of the Columbia
Broadcast inof System, Inc. For the Fiscal Year Ended
December 29, 1940 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System,
1941),

[5].
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The reality of war and the
spectacle of fascism on the
march played an important role in
shaping both newsroom

practices and network policies just as
they shaped all
aspects of public discourse. The industry's
statements were
also shaped by more parochial concerns.
Radio executives
viewed both interventionists and isolationists
as potential
enemies and feared that many others with
long-standing
criticisms of the industry in general and the
networks in
particular were poised to strike. Whether the issues
were

neutrality or the New Deal, excessive commercialism
or too
little culture, many broadcasters observed a restive
FCC

and a truculent Congress and believed, as one industry
insider later put it, that "problems
all wave lengths.

...

were coming in on

"^2

What the industry feared more than anything else, of
course, was new government regulation which might

jeopardize radio's profits. To protect their interests,

broadcasting's leaders wrapped themselves in the now
familiar rhetoric of the Radio and Communications Acts. The

newly elected president of the National Association of
Broadcasters, former Louisville, Kentucky mayor Neville
Miller,

in his first public address called on radio's

listeners to join with broadcasters in resisting any

governmental assault on "freedom of the air.
^2

Kirby to Pellegrin, November

18,

1958,

Speaking

[5].

"Public With Broadcasters in Fight for Freedom,"
NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Reports 6
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"

over a nationwide NBC Blue hook-up
from Nashville, Miller
embraced the cooperative ethos that had
thrived since the
days of Herbert Hoover and compared
those in favor of a
more activist role for the FCC with the
Nazis.
Broadcasters, he said, wanted and needed
governmental

regulation to prevent "utter confusion on the
air" and
insure that every station operated "in the
public interest,
convenience and necessity.
"Should any station, large or small, fail to so

operate," he said,

"it deserves to lose the privilege to

operate." The suddenly confrontational FCC, however,
was

going too far and threatening "to dictate what shall and
what shall not be broadcast." The Commission, Miller
warned,

"is abandoning the democratic pattern and is

assuming the technique of the totalitarian state which
determines what the people shall hear; what they shall say;
what they shall read and think." There was. Miller said, a
"basic relation of radio to our democracy,

"

and the

industry intended to work hard "to improve radio's

contribution to American life." The answer, he implied, lay
in an alliance between privately operated radio stations

and a supportive government. Miller's peroration implicitly
made a fine distinction.

"Advocates of both sides" would be

welcomed to the microphone to take part in balanced debate.
Radio as an institution did not embrace any particular view
(August 19, 1938), 2909. Miller's address was broadcast
over NBC Blue, August 19, 1938.
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and repeatedly proved it by allowing
contrary voices to
speak out. Should the government
control radio programming,
he seemed to say, the public
would lose that forum for
debate and informed democracy would
suffer. Like Paley,
Miller portrayed radio as an unbiased
conduit, a common
carrier of sorts, for the opinions of others
rather than as
an institutional shaper of opinion itself.
As the
start of

the FCC chain broadcasting inquiry neared,

the leaders of

the broadcasting industry were fast distancing
themselves

from the idea that they or their employees were
attempting
to direct public opinion.

The FCC's monopoly inquiry, broadcasters knew, would
be a lengthy one and would proceed on two tracks.
While the

commission held public hearings to take testimony, staff
members assembled financial and legal information which

would form the bulk of the final report. The FCC, with
ant imonopol ists in Congress watching over its shoulder,

promised to cast a wide net and the result, many
broadcasters feared, would be as Variety predicted "a
cellar- to-attic scrubbing as preliminary for tightening of
the Communications Act and promulgation of sterner

regulatory principles

.

"^^

When the FCC's formal proceedings began in November of
1938,

dozens of broadcast executives representing more than

a score of national networks,

regional chains and

"Cellar-To-Attic Scrubbing Forecast as FCC's
Industry Probe Widens," Variety, September 28, 1938, 42.
34
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individual stations were called to
testify before a fourmember FCC subcommittee presided over
by chairman Frank
McNinch.3S AS is the case in all
such events, the hearings
were carefully choreographed.
NBC's David Sarnoff, a
living monument to the spectacular
growth of the medium,
was the first witness. As chief executive
of RCA, he was
the most powerful figure in the industry,
and
his

corporation, the leading manufacturer of radio
equipment
and the operator of two national chains, had
long been the

principal target of ant imonopol ists

.

In his prepared

statement, he offered an Olympian defense of the
status
quo.

"In this time of world crisis," Sarnoff intoned,

is of vital

recognize,

"it

importance that every American citizen should
in the freedom of our American system of

3^

In addition to McNinch, commissioners Thad Brown,
Eugene Sykes and Paul Walker conducted the initial round' of
hearings with the assistance of FCC staffers. The
transcript of the hearings. Official Report of Proceedings
Before the Federal Communications Commission at Washington,
B.C. in the matter of Commission s Order No. 37,
Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in
the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters, docket no.
5060, is in boxes 1400-1425, Record Group 173, National
Archives Record Center, Suitland, Maryland; hereafter, "FCC
docket no. 5060."
'

From time to time, the choreography became
painfully evident. NBC vice-president George Engles,
becoming hopelessly entangled in details while under
questioning by the Commission staff, admitted he had not
actually written the testimony he had just presented but
cheerily added, "I read it, sir, three times." Engles,
testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol. 1 (November 14, 1938),
96. Such comments, no doubt, helped inspire the tradition
of "NBC vice-president" jokes which has helped sustain
network comedians from Fred Allen to David Letterman.
3^
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"

broadcasting,
wiic of
ai
^-f
Liie eRPif=.nt^j. the
3, one
essenciaiB
of w
his own personal
freedom. "^^
;

What problems existed in the industry,
Sarnoff
insisted, must be solved by the industry
itself. Reflecting
an emerging consensus within the top
echelons
of the

industry, his solution was the same as
Columbia's Paley had

proposed the year before.

"My recommendation is that the

experience of the different groups within the
industry
should now be combined and correlated, " Sarnoff

proposed.

"An industry code should emerge that advances
beyond all

previous standards. Such a code should be an act of

voluntary self -regulation.
Trust the industry, Sarnoff continued, to solicit the

views of the public and negotiate with the government to
shape and publicize the code. Self -regulation, he insisted,

was "the American answer to an American problem." The

success of self -regulation would be demonstrated in the

marketplace by America's radio listeners.

"By their control

of the nation's radio dials they give approval or

disapproval to radio programs, and decide the ultimate fate
of the broadcaster,

"

Sarnoff said.

"Legitimate censorship

by public opinion" would determine the public interest far
more efficiently than government intervention. Self-

regulation by an industry sensitive to the needs and

^"^

1

David Sarnoff, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol.

(November 14,

1938),

36.
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desires of its audience, he concluded,
was "the democratic
way in a democratic country. "38
Sarnoff

carefully crafted testimony addressed the
concerns of radio's critics and offered
a viable solution
which fit neatly into the existing regulatory
structure.
's

Both the broadcasters and the commissioners
implicitly and
often explicitly agreed to several vital
assumptions which
had informed debates over radio regulation for
nearly
two

decades. The most important was the primacy of
the

marketplace. Government must play an important regulatory
role in administering the people's airwaves, but private

broadcasters, not government, should be allowed to use the

ether for both the public good and their own profit. What

problems existed in the industry could best be cured by

reform rather than restructuring, solved by cordial

cooperation between broadcasters and the government, self-

regulation overseen by a nurturing state. The framework

constructed by Hoover survived intact.
As testimony droned on through the winter, several
important themes developed which revealed the strategies of
the major networks. While FCC staffers probed the financial

dealings of the chains in search of signs of monopoly, the
3S

David Sarnoff, testimony, FCC docket no. 506 0, vol.
1 (November 14,
1938), 40-1. According to FCC statistics,
82 percent of the nation's 32.6 million families owned
radios at the start of 1938. In the Northeast and along the
Pacific coast, radio penetration was above 9 0 percent.
Federal Communications Commission, Statietics of the
Communications Industry in the United States (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1941), 245-7.
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networks hoped to keep their critics
focused on
programming. While the major chains made
common cause on
this issue, it must be remembered
that the networks were
profoundly different corporations. CBS was
an entertainment
business, surviving on revenue from its
network
advertisers, profits from the stations it owned
or leased
in leading markets around the nation and
related ventures
such as its artist management and booking
agencies, its

prosperity relied on the continuation of the commercial
broadcasting system. NBC was simply one part, albeit
both
profitable and visible, of RCA, an increasingly diversified
electronics conglomerate. When Sarnoff described his
company, he invoked the image of "a tree with three

branches [and] a common trunk." The branches, he said,

represented "communications, manufacturing, and
broadcasting." The root,

"the part of the tree that is

ordinarily unseen, the part that gives it life and growth,"
was research.

-^^

While the corporation itself would survive if the

broadcasting branch was for some reason pruned off, the NBC
radio networks' profits helped pay for the research that
Sarnoff believed sustained RCA. According to documents

filed with the FCC, the NBC networks in 1937 generated a

David Sarnoff, testimony, FCC docket no. 506 0, vol
1

(November 14,

1938),

23.
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s

.

$3.7 million profit from revenues of
$41.6 million.

Sarnoff

40

company needed that cash flow to
prepare for the
future, and the future was television.
With test broadcasts
underway since 1930 and scheduled service
set to
-B

debut in

the summer of 1939, Sarnoff, always
the visionary,

foresaw

a new bonanza on the horizon.

As both an industry and as a cultural
influence,

television would within a decade dwarf radio.
While we
think of the medium as a phenomenon of the
1950s, practical
television technology was developed during the 1920s. ^2
By

"NBC Exhibit 191: National Broadcasting Company
Consolidated Operating Budgets," FCC docket no. 5060 box
40

14 16

'

.

41

The standard account of the development of
television technology is Albert Abramson, The HiBtory of
TeleviEion, 1880-1941 (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland, 1987)
The best single volume chronicle of the
industry as a whole is Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975; 2d ed.
1990). The
first image telecast by RCA's engineers in 1930 was the
cartoon character Felix the Cat. The camera focused on a
foot-high statuette, selected because it was recognizable,
starkly black-and-white and immobile. The statuette is now
in the collection of the Smithsonian Institution's Museum
of American History.
.

,

As soon as radio hit its stride, broadcast pioneers
turned to television. Westinghouse engineer Vladimir
Zworykin was conducting television research in 1920.
Charles Francis Jenkins of RCA and English scientist John
L. Baird each publicly demonstrated television systems in
1925. AT&T produced an experimental telecast in 1927
featuring Commerce Secretary Hoover. General Electric
Ernest Alexanderson began testing television in his
Schenectady laboratory in 1928. Philo Farnsworth, who had
designed a primitive electronic television system for a
high school science project in 1922, telecast images in
1927. In contrast to RCA's grinning cartoon cat, among
Farnsworth' 6 first images was a dollar sign. Barnouw, Tube
of Plenty, 25-96
42

'
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the end of the 1930s,

television was very much on the minds

of both broadcasters and the public,
and the dawn of the

television age was being widely heralded
in the popular
press. In Great Britain, where the BBC
had been offering
scheduled telecasts since mid-decade, television
was by
early 1939, in the Timee of London's phrase,
"an industry
in full bloom." Londoners were expected
to purchase 40,000

sets by the end of the year.

"At the average price of

$250," the New York Times breathlessly pointed out,

"there

is more than $9,000,000 worth of sets in the
London

district alone.
States,

"43

^he potential for profit in the United

the industry believed, was virtually limitless, and

RCA mobilized its public relations operation to prepare

consumers
In a seven-page photographic essay on RCA's

experiments with the wondrous new medium, Life depicted a

dazzling future. The technology was evolving so quickly.

Life promised its readers, it was a "safe guess... that in
ten years... you will be able to enjoy most forms of public

entertainment in your home. By that time the television
industry will be one of the biggest and most powerful in
the land.

""^4

The only stumbling block standing between

television and the nation, the magazine suggested, was
financial
43

1939,

"New Industry Booms," New York Times, March 19,

sec.

11,

12.

"Television," Life, February 29,
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1939,

42.

.

Estimates place the cost of a television
show at ten times that of a radio
show or about
$2,000 an hour, exclusive of talent cost.
Because
advertisers will not get their money back
until
they reach an audience of several
hundred
thousand people, the telecasting companies
are
going to have to make and pay for their
own
programs for some time to come
RCA, because of the success of its
radio networks,

had the

money to pay for the programming which would
motivate those
hundreds of thousands to buy television sets
which, of

course, RCA would manufacture.
The networks were profit centers, but their
high

public profile presented potentially troublesome public
relations problems which could jeopardize RCA's future.
in a fit of antimonopoly fervor,

If,

the FCC scuttled the radio

networks, profits RCA was counting on to subsidize the

fledgling television industry until it became a viable

advertising medium could be wiped out.
CBS, without a manufacturing arm to produce television

receivers, approached television more cautiously. Paley was

uncertain how to approach the new medium. He feared
television would prove far too expensive to turn an
immediate profit, but he also worried that Sarnoff and NBC
might steal the march on Columbia. The network briefly put

an experimental station on the air in 1931 but did not take
a leading role in developing the new technology.

however,

45

By 1937,

Paley was convinced that television was at hand

"Television,

"

48
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and built a new and larger
experimental station in New York
with studios at Grand Central
Station and a transmitter
perched atop the nearby Chrysler
building. 46 Columbia would
remain focused on radio until well
after the Second World
War because of the network's tremendous
profitability, in
1937, when NBC reported profits of $3.7
million,

$4.2 million on revenues of just $28 million.

CBS earned

47

To protect the business of radio, the
networks'

representatives clung tenaciously to the mantle
of public
service. Radio,

the argument went, was free to serve the

public interest because it responded to the demands
of the
market, because it was not controlled by the
government.

Profits realized in the market allowed radio to provide

programming in the public interest. Profits and public
service were bound together.
free radio,

"

Sarnof f said,

"The American people have a

"because they have a

broadcasting industry that pays its own way.
the air,

"48

Freedom of

therefore, must be protected by preserving the

industry's ability to profit.
Repeatedly,
service,

to prove their commitment

to"

public

the broadcasters pointed to radio's functions as a

46

Smith,

47

Smith,

48

David Sarnof f, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol.

In All Hie Glory, 185-8. Smith notes that
Paley's choice of such highly visible locations for
Columbia's television facilities was another demonstration
of his public relations acumen.

1

(November 14,

In Jill Hie Glory,

1938),

33.
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144.

news medium and a forum for democratic
debate. NBC's news
and special events division, the
network's vice-president
for programming told the FCC, had
become "one of the most
important departments in radio," ready to
bring events from
anywhere in the world to NBC's audience 49
Explaining
.

Columbia's policies, Paley insisted that "it
is a part of
the function of network broadcasting to
provide a free and
open forum for the discussion of controversial
issues,
or

an issue that might be important to the American
people.

"^o

Witness after witness repeated the refrain: The medium

magically brought the events of the world into our homes
and allowed us to hear for ourselves the clash of opinions
in the marketplace of ideas.

Among the most forceful defenders of the networks'
policies was Edward
meetings,

R.

Murrow. Home for a holiday round of

speeches and celebrations, Murrow was as the

result of his Vienna and Munich broadcasts already a

celebrity whom the network hierarchy was eager to promote
as a champion of radio journalism.

Janet Murrow understood

her husband's symbolic role. Describing one network gala in
a letter to her family,

4

John
(November

F.
17,

she wryly noted that after "a few

Royal, testimony, FCC docket no.
1938), 448.

5060, vol.

William S. Paley, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060,
vol. 28 (January 18, 1939), 3484.
5°
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.

"

.

bigwigs have had their say, Ed
depart

is to

perform and we're to

.

Despite his triumphs on the air, Murrow
had not yet
reached the elevated status he would
later achieve. He was
a celebrity, but he was still
Columbia's all-purpose man on
the scene in Europe, called on to
fill in however the

moment warranted. The network's presence
on the continent
in 1938 was far too limited to allow
for any divisions of
labor. After reporting Hitler's march
into Austria in the

spring,

for instance, Murrow was dispatched to
Scotland to

cover the Walker Cup golf matches at St. Andrew's
and then
to Wimbledon where he shared the microphone with
tennis

champion Bill Tilden during Columbia's coverage of the
Wight man Cup competition. Later in the summer, when Howard

Hughes touched down near London during his round-the-world
flight, Murrow was at the air field to interview the

dashing celebrity airman for the listeners at home

keeping with the industry's traditions, each event was

considered part of radio's function as the people's
witness

Quoted in A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Timee
(New York: Freundlich, 1986), 133.
5^

"CBS Exhibit 241: Special International and Foreign
Broadcasts," FCC docket no. 5060, box 1417. Murrow's
broadcast partner at St. Andrew's was Henry Longhurst of
the London Evening Standard. Longhurst would go on to serve
as a golf commentator for CBS radio and television for the
next five decades.
52
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Shortly before returning to Europe
in early 1939,
Murrow testified on network news
practices before the FCC
inquiry. Murrow echoed both radio's
fundamental role as
a

witness to events and Paley's pledge of
impartiality and
objectivity. "We are attempting to bring
the listeners in
this country," he said, "information
that is
timely,

is informative,

that

that is as objective as we can make it,

information covering various fields of listener
interest,
that is to say, cultural affairs, programs
of entertainment
value, in addition to news broadcasts." Each of
these

broadcasts was informative, but he acknowledged that
the
network hoped to transmit more than information. "We are
trying," Murrow said,

"to give people an opportunity to

hear the sort of thing they would hear if they were

actually with us in Prague,
the program may or iginate

in Vienna,

or in whatever point

.

Pressed to elaborate on corporate policies on
objective reporting, Murrow cited his widely-praised
September broadcast from London at the peak of the Munich
crisis and said

"I

was given only one instruction" by his

superiors in New York.
We were to be guided by the same principles in
our European operations that apply here. In other
words, that we were to have no editorial
policies, and that under no circumstances was the
news to be selected or interpreted to accord with

Edward R. Murrow, testimony, FCC docket no.
vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3251-2.
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5

060,

"

"

"

the suggestions or directions
of individuals
interested in promoting a given point
of view,
and that, so far as humanly possible,
in
reporting from Europe we were to avoid
the
intrusion of personal opinion and not
to make an
effort at evaluating happenings in
terms of
personal approval or disapproval ^4
.

Guided through his testimony by the
questions of Columbia's
legal counsel John J. Burns, Murrow, on
behalf of his
network, clearly wanted Columbia's objectivity
policy

firmly on the record.
"What is the underlying basis for that approach
on the

part of Columbia, as you understand it?" Burns
asked.
"As

understand it," Murrow replied, "it is on the

I

assumption that the American public, if given the

opportunity to hear the facts and an opportunity to hear

a

fair statement of opposing views with reference to these
facts, will form a public opinion in accordance with the

truth.

"Then it is true without qualification that in your

foreign broadcasts to this country you have attempted no
form of editorial policy?"
"That is true
"Now,

"

.

Burns continued,

"how does your staff or how do

you arrange to segregate the element of rumor and

speculation from the factual in your broadcasts to this
country?

Edward R. Murrow, testimony, FCC docket no.
vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3252.
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5

060,

s

"

"That is very difficult because so
much news,

called news,

so-

in Europe today consists of rumor
and

speculation,

"

Murrow responded,

"but when we broadcast

rumor we try to brand it as such. In
other words, we try to
identify the source of the news, whether
official or

otherwise

.

Satisfied that they had proven the network's
point.
Burns turned the questioning to a discussion of
the
logistics of CBS coverage of the Munich crisis. A
few
minutes later, however, he returned to the question
of

editorializing on the air.
"Now,

asked,

in reporting the events over the air,

"

Burns

"did any of the Columbia broadcasters seek to state

by way of appraisal what their opinion was as to events?"
"We attempted to avoid that,

"

Murrow responded,

"We

attempted to simply give the facts, to give the setting in

which the facts occurred, and on occasion comment
concerning opinion as to the significance of those
facts

.

"55

Murrow'

B

statements, carefully elicited by Columbia's

legal counsel, obviously demonstrate the network's favored

public image as a nonpartisan source of unbiased
information which would never seek to impose its own views
on the audience. The testimony also reflects Murrow'
steadfast belief in rationality and logic, as well as his

Edward R. Murrow, testimony, FCC docket no. 506 0,
vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3253-4, 3256-7.
55
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faith in the ability of both
broadcasters and their
listeners to accurately discern "the
facts." Yet even at
the start of 1939, more than a year
before his evocative
broadcasts from London during the blitz,
Murrow was aware
that radio journalism extended beyond
the linear logic of

print into a more emotional, but no less
valid, form of
communication. By insisting that the broadcaster's
duty
included both reporting the facts as accurately
as humanly
possible while at the same time allowing the listener
to

share the experience of being present, Murrow
acknowledged
that broadcast journalism operated on different
and

sometimes contradictory planes.
The FCC completed taking testimony on chain

broadcasting in May of 1939. After 73 days of hearings
featuring 94 witnesses, the commission staff set to work.
The hearing panel had accumulated 8,713 pages of testimony

accompanied by 674 supporting exhibits. It would take the
commission until the summer of 1940 to complete its

preliminary report and order.

^6

Neither the industry nor

the FCC's many critics in Congress knew what to expect, but

neither group was optimistic. Broadcasters feared any
change would work against their interests. Congressional
critics observing the hearings were certain they detected
Federal Communications Commission, Report on Chain
Broadcasting- (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1941)
1; Federal Communications Commission, Fifth Annual
Report of the Federal Communi cations CommiBeion, Fiscal
Year ended June 30, 1939, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1940)
52
,

,
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those familiar undercurrents of
stalemate and political
bickering which had foiled their previous
attempts to bring
the networks to heel, when the FCC
attempted in March of
1939 to identify certain practices which
might be
considered "contrary to the public interest,"
the

Commission's deliberations led to an embarrassing
public
squabble between McNinch and Commissioner
T.A.M.
Craven.

When McNinch suggested the government should
mandate equal
treatment for all sides in controversial issues,
Craven
asked if that meant a program condemning gambling
or

prostitution would have to be answered by a "representative
of organized vice" qualified to offer the other
side. The
FCC,

he argued,

could only respond after the fact to

"particular evils... of serious proportions" and must resist
"any attempt to force stations to broadcast programs which
the commission thinks best for the public." McNinch replied

by branding Craven an "alarmist" and calling his dissent a
"gratuitous.

.

.flag-waving.

.

.grandstand play.

"^"^

"Morale of the Federal Communications Commission is

described by Washington observers as 'at a new low' and
work at a standstill," the New York Timee reported as the

chain broadcasting hearings wound down and the
commissioners bickered. Congress had given the FCC one last
chance to put both the industry and its own house in order.
Now,

almost a year later, neither result seemed at hand.

"New Brawls in the FCC Bring Reports the President
May Step in Again," Newsweek, March 13, 1939, 40, 42.
^"^
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"Observers believe," the Tin.es
continued,

"that the only

solution to the dilemma is a thorough
airing of the whole
FCC affair before a Congressional
Committee."
Rumors that President Roosevelt will
hand in straightening out the muddle again take a
continue to
circulate around Washington, with Judge
Sykes due to step down after twelve yearsEugene O
service
next month, broadcasters are wondering
if that
may now be just the beginning of a general
exodus
from the commission. ^8
"While the FCC can keep offending broadcasters
a-tremble,"

NewBweek added,

"its own neck is be - noosed.

"

The McNinch-

Craven spat "may add fuel to the legislative flame"
and the
word was out "that the President himself might step
in
again.

"

The question of why the FCC was unable to "solve"
the

problems of radio had many answers, the most basic being
the absence of any politically viable alternative to the

existing commercial broadcasting system. The rejection of
the Wagner -Hatfield amendment in 19 34 remained a powerful

object lesson. Beyond that, the commissioners, their staff

and the broadcasting industry they were charged with

regulating shared fundamental assumptions rooted in nearly
twenty years of cooperative management of the ether which
had been institutionalized by the national radio

conferences and reaffirmed by a growing body of precedents.
Frank McNinch had earned impressive trust -busting
"New Radio Legislation Forecast Indeed Bleak,
York Times, March 19, 1939, sec. 11, 10.
^®

55

"New Brawls in the FCC," 42.

290

"

New-

.

credentials during his service on
the Federal Power
commission and had no ambitions for
a comfortable future
within the industry he regulated,
but in practice his vi ewe
on the industry proved quite
conventional. Private
ownership of radio stations had to be
maintained so
Moreover, McNinch insisted, any system
of government
censorship would be "impracticable and
definitely
.

objectionable.

..

.If any such measure should be brought

before Congress for consideration, conviction
would impel
me to do battle against it. "61 Thus, McNinch,
wryly

described by New Dealer- turned-columnist Raymond
Moley as
"a wise and munificent shepherd" of the
listening public,
seemed unable to do more than raise his eyebrow and

periodically express his outrage at some new transgression
by the radio broadcasters
While the FCC conducted its inquiry and commercial

broadcasting's opponents continued their criticism, the

broadcasting industry moved to defend itself. Recalling two
decades of success in dealing with threats from reformers

both inside and outside of government, the broadcasters
"Public Owns Air, McNinch Cautions," New York
Times, November 20, 1938, 12.
6°

Quoted in "U.S. Radio Monopolistic? Sarnoff Starts
String of Denials as FCC Inquiry Opens, " Newsweek, November
28, 1938, 19. See also Frank R. McNinch, "Freedom of the
Air," speech delivered at Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
January 26, 1939, reprinted in NAB Reports 1 (February 3,
61

1939)

,

3229-31.

Raymond Moley, "Perspective: Radio Dangers,"
Newsweek, November 14, 1938, 48.
62
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went to work to prove that the
American system of
broadcasting was capable of regulating
itself, while the
national chains and owners of stations
large and small
across the country often argued among
themselves, they were
in agreement on the need for sel f
-regulation In December
of 1938, eleven network, station
and trade association
representatives met in New York under the
banner of the
.

National Association of Broadcasters to
organize the NAB
Committee on Program Standards. The committee
set to work
drafting the kind of new industry code Sarnoff
and Paley
hoped would provide an alternative to new government

regulations." NAB publicist Edward Kirby was appointed
committee secretary and assembled a draft from policy
statements by the networks, regional chains and individual
stations across the country. The document borrowed heavily
from Columbia's frequent public statements on programming
issues
The committee's draft of the new industry guidelines

was finalized at an NAB board meeting in New York in March
of 1939 and distributed to the membership for comment.^"*

Under provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, an industry-wide code of fair business
practices had been in force from 1933 until the NIRA was
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1935. Later that year,
the NAB issued a ten-point code of ethics short on
specifics and lacking any enforcement machinery. See
Christopher H. Sterling and John M. Kitross, Stay Tuned: A
ConciBe History of American Broadcasting second ed.
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1990), 192-3.
^3

,

Neville Miller, interview by Donald H. Kirkley,
September 25, 1973, transcript, oral history collection.
Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC, 22. Miller
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Kirby, meanwhile, went to work
building public support for
the proposal. "Self -regulation
of the industry is the

keynote," reported the Ne^ York

Tin.es,

quoting Sarnoff that

the code "would produce the
maximum of free speech and the
best kind of programs. "65 At the
annual convention of the

National Council of Women in May, Kirby
explained how the
industry would insure the "proper use of
radio" by
mandating "factual reporting" and "logical
exposition"
while banning "hidden propaganda "^^ The
following month,
.

at a meeting of the Advertising Federation
of America in

New York, the portions of the draft devoted to
ending
advertising abuses were presented "for discussion"
to
agency representatives and radio sales managers.

^7

Subsequent events indicate copies of the proposed

guidelines were also distributed to important players in
Congress,

the FCC and elsewhere in the Roosevelt

administration.

When the NAB gathered for its annual convention in
Atlantic City in the summer of 1939, the Committee on
recalled that the chains, already under fire as alleged
monopolies, were eager to endorse the code but fearful that
any enforcement mechanism would present new ant i- trust
problems

Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr., "Rules for Radio," New York
Timee, May 28, 1939, sec. 10, 10.
^5

66

"Radio Code Drawn to Prevent Abuses,
Timee, May 25, 19 39, 27.

"

New York

William J. Enright, "Puts Peace Action Up to 'Have'
Powers," New York Timee, June 21, 1939, 42.
67
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Program Standards presented the
new code of ethics to the
full membership. Resolutely
ignoring such financial issues
as monopoly ownership or network
domination of their
affiliates, the Code formally presented
to the NAB
membership in Atlantic City focused
squarely on program
content and addressed the most frequent
criticisms aimed at
broadcasters. Particular attention was
paid to news and
special events broadcasts. While forcefully
proclaiming
their dedication to free speech, broadcasters
announced
they were ready to sacrifice certain rights
in the name of

responsibility. The Code echoed many of the same
phrases

industry leaders had in the earlier years of the
decade

relied on to deflect attacks on the status quo.
News broadcasts, the Code directed, would be presented
"with fairness and accuracy" and "shall not be selected for
the purpose of furthering or hindering either side of any

controversial public issue." Editorializing was strictly
forbidden. The news should never "be colored by the

opinions or desires of the station or network management,
the editor or others engaged in its preparation or the

person actually delivering

it over the air,

of sponsored news broadcasts,

or,

in the case

the advertiser "^^
.

While refraining from voicing their own opinions,

broadcasters reassured their critics that they would make
sure that radio remained an open public forum for all
68

..The

Code," NAB Reports
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7

(July 15,

1939),

3586-7.

points of view.

"As part of their public service,"
the

Code's section on "controversial
public issues" began,
"networks and stations shall provide
time for the

presentation of public questions including
those of
controversial nature." Broadcasters, the

Code promised,

would not sell time "for the presentation
of controversial
issues" to make sure such "a powerful public
forum" would
not be controlled by "those with a greater
means to buy
it." Two exceptions were clearly noted:

Political

candidates and parties would be allowed to buy time
during
election campaigns "because at certain times the
contending

parties want to use and are entitled to use more time
than

broadcasters could possibly afford to give away," and the
stations and networks themselves would continue to offer

"fair-sided discussions of public issues" during radio

round tables and forums.
In its discussion of both news broadcasts and the

coverage of controversial issues, the NAB Code almost

exactly paralleled the policies proclaimed by CBS and
endorsed by NBC over the preceding several years

.

The

similarities to Paley's public position, first espoused in
the 1938 broadcast in which he proclaimed the industry

"must forever be wholly, honestly and militantly

nonpar t isan.

... in

the whole realm of arguable social

ideas," are striking. The Code even endorsed Paley's
69

"The Code,

"

3

58 6
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statement to the FCC chain broadcasting
inquiry that too
much public debate would alienate
listeners by asserting
that air time should be devoted
to controversial
issues

"with due regard to all the other
elements of balanced

program schedules." The similarities
extended to sections
of the code concerning advertising
and broadcasts

intended

for children as well. Recalling Columbia's
successful

efforts to deflect criticism of serials for
youngsters, the
Code dictated that such programs "should
be based upon
sound social concepts" and "reflect respect for
parents,

adult authority,

law and order, clean living, high morals,

fair play and honorable behavior
The Code,

.

""^o

in both content and purpose,

summarized an

industry consensus that had formed by 1939. From the
beginning,

the radio industry and its governmental

regulators had worked together to bring stability and order
to the new medium. Whether the issue of the moment was

news,

children's programming or patent medicine

advertising, under both Prall and McNinch, the FCC had

praised the industry when it put its own house in order. As
the end of the decade approached and the political climate

became more contentious, radio's handling of controversial
public issues moved to center stage. Both McNinch and

Senator Wheeler urged self-control on the industry while

reading the riot act to radio at the NAB
70

I.

The Code,

"

3

58 6

.
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1938 Washington

convention. At the 1939 convention,
presidential press
secretary Stephen T. Early delivered
a similar speech,
praising radio while at the same time
warning the industry
to keep its own house in order.
Early, once a Washington correspondent
for the

Associated Press and the grandson of Confederate
cavalryman
General Jubal Early, had known the President
since 1913

when Early covered the Navy Department. Despite
his
protests to the contrary, the broadcasters knew

that

Early's words carried the authority of the White
House. He
was, after all,

the presence at the side of the President

during Roosevelt's Oval Office press conferences who
would
from time to time prod the President to restate or reword
his answers to make sure they would be understood as

correct expressions of administration policy,

"^i

"The big, bad government," Early continued,

had no

desire to censor radio, nor did it desire to hamstring

broadcasters with "definite, detailed and rigid standards
of public service,

implemented by specific rules and

prohibitions." Such regulations would be both unworkable
and unnecessary because "each of you broadcasters know
"'Steve' Early, Presidential Aide: Good-Will
Ambassador to the Press," United States News, December 6,
1940, 39. Early prefaced his remarks to the NAB by saying,
"None could presume to speak for the President of the
United States.
.Any views which I express to you,
therefore, reflect solely my personal beliefs, based upon
experience as a newspaperman and upon observations made
during the past six years of official life." "Early's
Speech," NAB Reports 7 (July 15, 1939), 3590.
.

.
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whether your station is doing the
right kind of job."
Still, it was part of broadcasters'
"public duty

to keep

their programs free from false news
.... and definitely the
Government is watching and will continue
to watch with
great interest" to make sure this duty
"72
is carried
out.

The proposed NAB Code, Early concluded,
was an example of
the kind of "enlightened policies" radio
should

follow. The

Code's directives for broadcasting news,
controversial
issues and political discussions, Early said,
reflected his
"old fashioned" belief that "a reporter should
stick to the

facts with appropriate elucidation to make the news

understandable and let his reader or listener reach his own
conclusions." As long as radio hewed to such a course.

Early promised,

"so long as radio serves democracy,

it will

remain free."^^
Early's pointed comments on radio's patriotic duty to

avoid "false news" in a time of increasing world tension
fueled the industry's rush to self -regulation. His remarks,
it seemed,

offered a clear White House endorsement of the

industry's efforts to govern itself. The NAB convention,

despite a few holdouts who feared they were being stampeded
into "balloting on self -censorship,

"

voted "by an

overwhelming majority" of 148 to 24 to adopt the Code and

72

"Early's Speech," 3592.

73

"Early's Speech," 3592.
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directed the association's board to
establish compliance
procedures in time for a special
convention in September.

^4

Early's remarks fit neatly into
the pattern that had
developed over the previous two decades
and had been
further institutionalized during the
FCC s first five
years. The NAB Code was an exercise
in pre-emptive selfcensorship, but the industry in 1939
believed it had no
alternative. 75 Free speech absolutists who
insisted radio
deserved the same First Amendment protections
the press
enjoyed and a handful of station operators such as
Elliot
'

Roosevelt who insisted on the right to editorialize

resisted the Code's restrictions, but the majority of
the
industry was willing to forego the responsibility of

voicing opinion and the revenue generated by selling time
to Father Coughlin and other controversial speakers.

"A

self-imposed censorship is no safer than any other kind,

under ordinary circumstances," the Richmond
editorialized,

Tiniee -Dispatch

"but these are not commonplace times." The

leaders of the radio industry, the Times -Dispatch correctly
noted,

"foresee that unless they can themselves regulate

their programs in the public interest, the Federal

"Convention Takes Copyright, Code Action, " NAB
Reports 7 (July 15, 1939), 3585; "Broadcasters' New Code
Curbs Controversial Matter, Restrains Child Programs,
Newsweek, July 24, 1939, 27.
"^"^

Neville Miller recalled that when confronted with a
possibly controversial program many station executives
"used the Code as an excuse when they didn't want to do
something." Miller, interview, 22-3.
"^^
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communications Commiseion will make
its own supervision of
broadcasting far more strict. ""^^
As the broadcasters returned home
from Atlantic City
to await the final shape of their
new industry code, they
still shared concerns over the future
of their industry.
The FCC staff was toiling on the
chain broadcasting report
and criticism of McNinch's tenure
continued to boil. Before
the summer was over, McNinch would
depart and a new
chairman, James Lawrence Fly, would take over
with a

presidential mandate to bring order to the regulatory
chaos.

In the fall, Germany would invade Poland,
and war

would envelop Europe. These events would speed
radio's rush
to self -regulation and solidify the medium's
leaders'

conviction that news broadcasts must be presented with
"fairness and accuracy" and "shall not be editorial." Such
a policy,

most in the industry agreed, would both serve the

public interest and protect the profitable American system
of broadcasting from disruptive government regulation.

Editorial, Richmond [Virginia] Timee -Dispatch
October 6, 1939, reprinted in "Editorial Comment Concerning
the NAB Code, " supplement distributed with NAB Reports 7
(October 20, 1939)
1
"^^

,
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CHAPTER V
"SELF-REGULATION... CONSISTENT WITH THE
PUBLIC INTEREST"!

In July,

1939,

three years before his term was
due to

expire, Frank McNinch resigned as
chairman of the Federal

Communications Commission. Sixty-six years
old and
suffering from chronic colitis, McNinch,

all agreed,

deserved a rest.

2

The North Carolinian had more than
done

his duty for the administration at the
Federal Power

Commission as well as the FCC, and President Roosevelt
made
certain to acknowledge his loyalty, "it was stated
on the

highest authority," the New York Tiniee reported,

"that the

considerations of health alone had dictated the decision
of
Mr. McNinch to retire from that field" and suggested
the

chairman, once he recuperated, would be in line for new

duties

.

Despite the pleasantries, McNinch 's tenure at the FCC
had been by nearly any measure a failure, and his departure

had been expected for several months. Six weeks earlier,
James Lawrence Fly, "Some Comments on Current Radio
Problems," radio address, CBS Network, October 26, 1939.
Printed text in radio file, Raymond Clapper Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
!

2

H

McNinch Quits FCC," Newsweek, August

7,

1939,

39.

"McNinch Asks To Be Relieved of FCC Post; President
Indicates New Job Awaits Him," New York Tiniee, July 26,
1939, 1. Reporters attending Roosevelt's Oval Office
briefings were usually not permitted to quote the president
directly
3

301

"

variety, citing rumors "said to
be authoritative in wellinformed quarters," predicted
McNinch would quit "just as
quickly as another post, one which
will save his face, can
be discovered. Bad heal th
wil 1 be the excuse. "4
his
formal letter of resignation, McNinch
acknowledged what the
President and many critics in Congress
had been saying: The
FCC and the law itself were not sufficient
to
.

.

m

.

govern the

radio industry,

"it is not possible," McNinch wrote,

"to

reach the maximum of efficiency in the public
interest with
the present personnel and within the
inadequate framework
of the Communications Act."^

After five years, the Communications Act in the
opinion of many had proven as weak a rudder for the
industry as the 1927 Radio Act and the administrative

procedures of Hoover's Commerce Department. Roosevelt
himself had admitted that the FCC was out of control when
in January he asked Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana,

chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, to
consider drafting new communications legislation. Despite

repeated administrative attempts to revitalize the FCC
through new appointments and internal reorganization,
Roosevelt wrote, he was "thoroughly dissatisfied with the

present legal framework and administrative machinery" and
"New Rumor of McNinch Retirement Seems Supported;
Thompson Seen As Possible Successor in Chair, " Variety,
June 14, 1939, 32.
4

Quoted in "President Accepts M'Ninch Resignation,
New York TimeB, July 29, 1939, 2.
^
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had "come to the conclusion that
new legislation is
necessary." Roosevelt made no
specific recommendations.
Indeed, he washed his hands of the
problem, urging

"clear

Congressional policies on the substantive
side - so clear
that the new administrative body
will have no difficulty in
interpreting or administering them. "«
The President's call for new legislation
met with

quick and vocal support. Wheeler, whose
committee had
jurisdiction over radio legislation, held meetings
with
McNinch and Representative Clarence Lea, the
chairman

of

the House Committee on Foreign and Interstate
Commerce, and

won a vital endorsement in principal from Senator
Wallace
White,

the Republican from Maine who had helped write
both

the Radio and Communication Acts and was widely
regarded on

both sides of the aisle as the Senate's leading expert on
the issue. White cautiously stated the FCC might be

restructured "with advantage."
The Roosevelt administration,

the Wall Street Journal

gleefully predicted, was clearly ready to dismantle the
regulatory framework governing the communications industry
and let Congress try its hand at solving "what has long

been the New Deal's greatest administrative headache."
Within a year, the Journal predicted, a new radio law would
be enacted and a new commission appointed. The FCC, Wheeler

Roosevelt to Wheeler, January 23, 1939, in Samuel I
Rosenman, ed.
The Public Papers and Addreeeee of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, 1939 volume (London: Macmillan, 1941), 96.
^

,
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agreed, had proven a failure
and Congress had to act to
restore the people's control of
their air waves.
The problems within the FCC were
confirmed by its
members' reactions to calls for new
legislation. Rather
than fighting to protect their
political turf, the

embattled regulators welcomed the idea
that Congress and
the White House might save them from
themselves. McNinch
said he was "wholly sympathetic" with
the President's
request and noted that he had "recommended
to the President
some time ago that the commission be
reorganized."

Commissioner Norman

S.

Case,

the former Republican governor

of Rhode Island, was relieved that Congress
might step in.

"Now perhaps they can hold hearings," he told the
New York
Times,

"and get things straightened out."^

Seven months later, no hearings had been held, no new
law had been passed, McNinch had resigned and a solution
to
the FCC tangle seemed no closer at hand. The momentum
for

reform,

so evident that winter,

had melted away by

summertime, more evidence, the President's critics

believed, of the imminent demise of the New Deal.
"Undoubtedly, there will be some flashes in the pan and

perhaps a phony revival," veteran Washington columnist
Frank Kent wrote,

"Nevertheless, most detached observers

Bernard Kilgore, "McNinch Says New Law, New
Personnel Required For Efficient Operation, " Wall Street
Journal, July 29, 1939, 1.
®

"Roosevelt Seeks Laws Revising FCC,

January 25,

193 9,

12.
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New York Times,

.

are fairly well convinced
that the hand is played out,
the
game is over and the Roosevelt
regime is on the way out. "3

certainly the New Deal, if not dead,
had passed into a
new and more passive phase by the
summer of 1939. Political
defeats at home and a looming crisis
in Europe meant the
nation's role in the increasingly
troubled world would now
take center stage. Roosevelt himself
had said as much in
his State of the Union address in
January, when he finally
turned to domestic affairs, he proposed
a most modest
agenda. "We have now passed the period of
internal conflict
in the launching of our program of social
reform," the

President announced. The goal now was "to preserve
our
reforms "^^
The Communications Act of 19 34 was a product of
the

heady first days of the New Deal. Facing an economic
and
political crisis and armed with an overwhelming mandate for
change, Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress,

president recalled,

"had to forge new tools for a new role

of government operating in a democracy.
said,

the

"

Inevitably, he

"some of these tools had to be roughly shaped and

still need some machining down." Now,

it was up "to the

Congress to improve the new machinery which we have

permanently installed, provided that in the process the
Frank R. Kent, "The Great Game of Politics: The Game
is Over," Wall Street Journal, August 7, 1939, 4.
5

1°

Roosevelt, address to Congress, January
Public Papers and AddreeeeG, 1939, 7.
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1939,

social usefulness of the machinery
is not destroyed or
impaired.
The Communications Act had
proven more roughly shaped
than most. Designed to coordinate
and rationalize federal
controls of all forms of interstate
and international

electronic communications, the law was
a pastiche of preexisting statutes and regulations. The
sections concerning
broadcasting were largely taken from the
Radio Act of 1927
which itself had its origins in the associat
ionist

practices of the Hoover Commerce Department.
By 1939, the
cacophony of competing stations which had forced
Congress
to act a dozen years before had been
replaced by the

orchestrated voices of the national chains sounding
in
unison from radios across the nation. The machinery

the

nation relied upon to regulate radio had been assembled

when the chains were in their infancy. Now,

it was showing

its age.

Given the political climate of the time, a wholesale

rewriting of the Communications Act and its regulation of
telephone and telegraph service as well as radio and the

emerging television industry was probably impossible.

Conservatives in Congress were in no mood to create another

New Deal agency, nor was the unlikely coalition of crusty
populists,

left-over progressives, classical conservatives

and liberal reformers which rallied to the banner of public
11

Roosevelt, address to Congress, January
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7.
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interest ready to surrender control
of the people's air to
private corporations. The consensus
reached two decades
before held firm. The radio spectrum
belonged to the
people, yes, but private businesses
could profit from its
use as long as they pledged to serve
the public interest.
No one could say with certainty how
to solve the obvious
regulatory problems. Wheeler, as quick to
attack the FCC as
any, was reluctant to force new
legislation when
no

consensus existed. The Commission had long been
"a
political football," he said, but its problems
were
fault of the law but rather one of personnel

.

"no

"I2

"Sooner or later a new basic Federal radio law
will

have to be written," Variety editorialized, but the
trade

paper agreed with Wheeler that the problem was
fundamentally political. When that "now-unforeseen
legislation" was written.

Variety hoped it would "lessen

the present overwhelming domination of political wire-

pulling as a prerequisite to getting on the air, staying on
the air,

or improving the conditions of tenure."!^

While McNinch's resignation as FCC chair would not
take effect until the end of the summer, Roosevelt

nominated his successor within forty-eight hours, another
indication that McNinch's departure had been in the works
Quoted in Kilgore,
Personnel Required, " 4
^2

1^

July 26,

"McNinch Says New Law, New

"Self -Regulation is an Art," editorial.
1939,

31.
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Variety,

s

for some time. The President's
choice was James Lawrence
Fly, the 41-year old general
solicitor of the Tennessee
valley Authority. 14 The nomination
appears to have caught
the industry's Washington watchers
very much by surprise.

When variety handicapped the field in
June as rumors of
McNinch'e departure grew louder, the
well-connected trade
paper predicted that Frederick Thompson,
named to the
Commission in April to succeed Eugene Sykes,
would be
elevated to the chair. 15 Thompson, a newspaper
publisher
who had questioned the wisdom of awarding
additional
broadcast licenses to newspapers, seemed a logical
choice
since the newspaper ownership question was soon
to

face the

Commission. T.A.M. Craven's standing with the White
House

had collapsed because of his public disagreements
with
McNinch, but the former FCC chief engineer, the panel's

acknowledged technical expert, enjoyed considerable support
in Congress. Another name making the rounds,

Variety

reported, was that of eminent New Deal insider Thomas

G.

Corcoran.
Fly,

while he appeared to possess neither Thompson's

standing. Craven's technical expertise nor Corcoran'

political connections, was, the New York Times reported,
"rated one of the most accomplished of the Administration's
14

"Fly Named to FCC as M'Ninch Quits," New York
Times, July 28, 1939, 2/ "McNinch Quits FCC," 39.
15

"New Rumor of McNinch Retirement Seems Supported;
Thompson Seen As Possible Successor in Chair," 32.
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younger men.

"i^

Born and raised in a small town
near

Dallas, Fly had displayed signs
of Texas populism si nee
joining the Justice Department's
antitrust division in
1929.17 He helped successfully
prosecute the Sugar
Institute for antitrust violations
then jumped to the TVA
in 1934. The next year, when the
Public Utilities Holding
Company Act was under attack from the
power industry. Fly
was among a cadre of top lawyers from
various government
agencies assembled by Corcoran and Benjamin V.
Cohen to

defend the law in the courts.

18

in 1937,

as the TVA's

counsel. Fly squared off in the US District
Court in

Chattanooga against Wendell Willkie of the Commonwealth
and
Southern Corporation in an epic legal battle over who
would
control hydropower distribution in the Tennessee Valley, i^
"He is the most dangerous man in the United States

-

to

have on the other side," Willkie commented as the trial

ended with a TVA victory.
16

M

20

Fly's defense of the authority

Fly Named to FCC as M'Ninch Quits,"

2.

Henry F. Pringle, "The Controversial Mr. Fly,"
Saturday Evening- Poet, July 22, 1944, 9.
17

Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers (New York:
Doubleday, 1988), 286-7. Lash notes that several of the
attorneys present, including future Supreme Court justice
Robert H. Jackson, later received major appointments and
suggests their work on the utility holding company affair
played an important role in advancing their careers.
18

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt
The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960),
367-76
15
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Pringle,

"The Controversial Mr. Fly," 40.
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also impressed Senator George
Norris, the progressive
Nebraska Republican and architect
of the TVA, and Corcoran,
who had first encountered Fly when
both were at Harvard Law
School .21
While he was not selected to chair
the FCC, Corcoran
certainly played an important role in
filling the vacancy.

A protege of Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter,
Corcoran had arrived in Washington fresh
from Harvard Law
in 1926 to clerk for Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes.
While

Frankfurter remained at Harvard, Corcoran, who
appreciated
more than most the value of the men and women
who had their
hands on the levers of bureaucratic power,
returned
to

Washington after Roosevelt's victory and helped fill
the
government with men and women who shared his vision of
activist government. Everyone in Washington knew "Tommy the
Cork" was a man who could get things done and who kept an
eye out for promising talent.

"The spectacle of a good man

jobless or a good job manless drives him to a frenzy,"

observed the authors of a leading Washington column. 22
Larry Fly certainly qualified as promising talent and, by
1939 after five years with the TVA, he was looking to move

up the governmental ladder.

Fly brought an entirely new philosophy and style of

leadership to the FCC. Harry Plotkin, a long-time FCC legal
21

Pringle,

"The Controversial Mr. Fly," 41.

Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner quoted in
Schlesinger, The Politice of Upheaval, 221.
22
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counsel who began his tenure at
the Commission during Flys
administration, argued that the history
of the FCC
as a

significant regulatory body begins with
Fly:
The New Deal came to radio because
of [him]
The
whole concept of public responsibility
of
broadcast licensees got a strong impetus
from
Fly, and everything the Commission
ultimately did
in the area stems from the fact that
he put his
shoulder behind the wheel. 23
.

Fly had "a deep sense of the public service,"
wrote Robert
Leigh,

the director of the FCC

Intelligence Service.

'

s

wartime Foreign Broadcast

"Even those who questioned his

objectives acknowledged his devotion to the public
interest
as he conceived it. "24 under Fly,

the public interest

standard, enshrined in broadcast law since 1927 and
warmly

embraced by the broadcasting industry ever since, would
become more significant than ever before.
Fly would soon prove he had no patience for the
internal bickering that had hamstrung both the FCC and the

old Radio Commission which preceded it. Upon taking office,
he went out of his way to signal that a new era of

cooperation was about to begin. Fly acknowledged the
difficult tasks ahead but promised to consult with fellow

commissioners and the FCC staff before proposing any

Harry Plotkin, interview by Sally Fly McConnell,
n.d., 24, 26, in the James Lawrence Fly project in the Oral
History Collection of Columbia University, New York
23

Robert D. Leigh, "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats,"
Harper B Magazine January 1945, 98.
24

'

,
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radical changes in the law or
the Commission's internal
structure, "i didn't run for this
job on a dogmatic

platform," Fly confessed at his
first press conference, "i
don't assume to know the answer
to basic issues." He would
thoroughly study the issues, making
sure he "heard both
sides, and there has been a
complete exchange of views,"
before moving ahead. 25
The new chairman's apparent commitment
to prudent

reform was greeted with a sigh of relief
by the embattled
radio industry. Fly's promise to go slow
echoed Anning
Prall's initial remarks and, X^ariety
reported,
was

"accepted as evidence that considerable time
will pass
before the Commish takes up several outstanding
matters
which have been on the hook for varying periods"
including
the "most significant issue on the slate," the
chain

monopoly inquiry.
The industry's dreams of a respite from federal

intervention were soon shattered. Fly was no Prall, content
to raise his eyebrow. Events would soon overtake any

leisurely transition and force both the new chairman and
the radio industry to launch a series of important

initiatives. Fly quickly began to exercise his power and

Quoted in "J.L. Fly, New FCC Topper, to Hold Up
Decisions on Major Disputes," Variety, September 13, 1939,
25

31.
26

"J.L.

Fly,

New FCC Topper, to Hold Up Decisions on

Major Disputes," 31.
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would soon become "a favorite
industry bogeyman.
years of drift, a strong hand on
the

"27

After

FCC rudder, long hoped

for in theory,

turned out in practice to be something
less

than the answer to the industry's
prayers,

-since Mr. Fly's

accession to power last September," Colliers
editorially
fumed in the spring of 1940, "the FCC has
raised itself
from a mere monumental public nuisance to
the status,

our estimation, of Public Enemy No.

in

l."28

Fly remained true in a fashion to his pledge
to
solicit "a complete exchange of views." Those who

interpreted such words as an invitation to inaction,
however, were surprised to discover that Fly actually

intended to reach decisions and take action. His was an
incisive mind, Leigh wrote.

"I

watched him at weekly

meetings of the Commission, cutting through verbiage and

vagueness to the main point or unerringly putting the
single instance in its proper place in a general regulatory
framework.

"29

other,

less admiring, colleagues interpreted

Fly's demeanor differently. Fly has "a vivid personality

and a strong will," perpetual dissenter T.A.M. Craven
conceded, but "many things do occur that the other

commissioners know nothing about. Sometimes we are faced
Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting- in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 173.
27

28

1940,

"Who is Public Enemy No.

1?"

Colliers

,

May 25,

78.
29

Leigh,

"Politicians vs. Bureaucrats," 98
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with a fai, aaron:pU.~
Commissioner Ray Wakefield
suggested
that even chairman's strongest
supporters "will tell you
that at times Fly is a little
impatient." Fly joked about
this himself, Wakefield said,
comparing himself to the
frontier judge "who never liked
to hear both sides of the

question because it confused him.

"^o

While Fly had no established record
regarding radio
issues, his connection with the
Tennessee Valley Authority,
the most aggressive of the New
Deal's social experiments,
gave many in the industry pause. He
was a known opponent of
monopoly, and the fight against Commonwealth
and Southern
over hydroelectric power distribution
indicated he might
look favorably on direct competition between
the public and
private sectors. Many in the industry remembered
that

during the discussion over educational broadcasting

mandated by the Communications Act, the TVA's
spokesman
called for the government to "own and operate a national
system of radio stations, giving full-time coverage over
the entire country." The government network would be

administered by a committee of representatives from
"nonprofit national educational and cultural

agencies

..

.designated by the President." The government

stations would not replace existing commercial operations
but would share the broadcast band. However, by taking
space within the already crowded spectrum, commercial
30

Quoted in Pringle,

"The Controversial Mr.
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Fly,"

9

broadcaeters quickly noted, the new
stations would
effectively limit the development
of new commercial
stations. 31 The TVA's plan for a
state-run radio service
had never been implemented, of course,
but five years in
such an environment hardly endorsed
Fly to the wary
industry.
The perception that Fly was a member
of Corcoran 's

bureaucratic legion also gave critics of the
FCC pause.
Corcoran and his frequent collaborator Benjamin
Cohen had
come to symbolize to critics of the New Deal
the Roosevelt
administration's continuing attempts to centralize
power in
Washington. As calls for FCC reorganization reached
another
of their periodic crescendos in the spring of
1939,

Republican Congressman Richard Wigglesworth of
Massachusetts condemned proposed legislation to create a
smaller and more powerful FCC as a "Corcoran-Cohen" plan to
create "a dictator of radio and communications" who would

represent "a sinister threat to the country itself" and

endanger "freedom of religious beliefs, freedom of speech
and freedom of press.

"^2

TVA director of personnel Floyd W. Reeves,
testimony before the FCC, October 19, 1934, quoted in
Education by J^adio 4 (October 25, 1934)
tearsheet in
Raymond Clapper Papers, box 112, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
31

,

Radio address. Mutual network, March 1, 1939,
quoted in "McNinch Calls Craven Report 'Stump Speech'," New
York Herald Tribune, March 2, 1939, 2.
32
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The political climate of 1939
reseirUDled that of the
years prior to enactment the
Radio Act of 1927. while there
was substantial unease across
the political spectrum with
the status of broadcasting
regulation, no positive

consensus had yet emerged as to an
alternative. The fear
among the rank-and-file on the Hill
was that an illconsidered reform package could prove worse
than the
current state of affairs, somehow disrupt
the established
pattern of network broadcasting and trigger
outraged
protests not simply from the industry but from
hundreds of
thousands of irate listeners denied their weekly
visits
with Charlie McCarthy and Jack Benny. Accordingly,
inaction
was judged both the wisest and least perilous
political
course.

In any case, until Senators Wheeler and White

reconciled their differences over how best to reshape the
Communications Act, there was little hope of new
legislation even being considered.
industry,

it appeared,

The broadcasting

would be operating under the current

rules for some time to come and so had little choice but to

work with the new chairman.

With critics assembled on all sides, the radio
industry relied on self -regulation to keep governmental

action at arm's length. The broadcasters' ratification of a

voluntary code of regulation had temporarily frozen the
debate over freedom of the air. Some, notably supporters of
"Sundry Bills Affecting Radio Die With Congress;
Dry Answered Gurney, " Variety, August 16, 1939, 30.
^2
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Father Charles Coughlin, called
the code censorship, but
they were in the minority. By
reaffirming its vow of public
service and establishing standards
addressing some
of the

chronic complaints of their critics,
broadcasters hoped
they could enjoy at least a brief
respite from the sniping.
The NAB's code compliance committee
spent the summer
polishing the details of the new code in
preparation to its
formal ratification in late summer and
implementation in
the fall.
The industry's hopes for a honeymoon were
dispelled in

September when Germany invaded Poland. The networks,
their
techniques honed by the crises of the previous year,

broadcast the news of impending war in dazzling detail to

a

spellbound nation of listeners who had grown accustomed to
turning on the radio whenever a new crisis loomed. One

familiar voice was largely absent from the broadcasts as

war approached. H.V. Kaltenborn was in Europe, spending the
final weeks of peace assessing the mood of continental

capitals. To fill Kaltenborn'

s

role as Chorus, Columbia's

Edward Klauber and Paul White summoned the journalist,
essayist and occasional radio commentator Elmer Davis from
his summer house in Connecticut to analyze the torrent of

events as war drew near.

Davis went on the air for the first time as a Columbia

employee on August 23, eight days before Germany crossed
the border into Poland. He had like millions of Americans

listened at home the year before while Kaltenboi-n

explicated the Munich crisis. Now
it would be up to hi.
to
be, as he put it, "the radio
news analyst,
interpreter,

commentator (nobody is quite sure
yet just what to call us)
who from time to time takes up the
latest news, tries to

explain what is true, what is probable,
and what is surely
false (and why)
who ties it together, gives it a
background, and tries to tell the listener
what it
means "^"^
;

.

Broadcasting the news, Davis quickly discovered,
"is
newspaper work immeasurably intensified. ...
Radio can get
out its extras instantly whenever there
is news big enough
to justify it.
The techniques of broadcast journalism

were familiar in many ways,

the former newspaperman

realized, but the medium was also something new and

different.
The rapid ascent of radio news was brought home to

Davis when he noticed the youth of his co-workers.

On the morning of September 1st I looked round
the Columbia news room remembering how I had
heard of the outbreak of another world war in the
New York Times city room on August 1, 1914; and
it struck me that of all the men in the room —
with the single exception of one of the top
Elmer Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of War,"
Harpers Magazine, November 1939, 580-1. Davis had
substituted for Kaltenborn from time to time in the past.
Reading a scripted news commentary was one thing, he wrote,
but "to fill in for him in such a crisis as this was a
little like trying to play center-field in place of Joe di
Maggio [sic] "
3**

.

35

Davis,

"Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 582.
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.

executives of the system who had
come down
because he was an old newspaperman
and couldn't
keep away from the excitement i was the only
one who had worn long pants in
1914. Most of my
present colleagues, then, had not even
been
born
The "top executive" who was unable
to "keep away from the
excitement" was, of course, Klauber. White,
who was running
the show, magically summoning voices
out of the air from
Berlin, Paris, London, Rome and Washington
by manipulating
the dials and switches of a control board
known in the

studio as "Paul White's piano," had just turned
twelve when
the First World War began.

With the first volleys of the new war, the on-going
debate over radio propaganda, government censorship
and the

relationship between broadcasters and their regulators

resumed and quickly escalated. The government had

nationalized the nascent wireless industry during the First

World War and, broadcasters nervously remembered, had the
legal authority to do so again. The Communications Act

explicitly authorized the president to seize or shutdown
any or all radio stations in the case of "war or a threat
of war or a state of public peril or disaster or other

national emergency, or in order to preserve the neutrality
of the United States.

Davis,

"^"^

"Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 582.

Communications Act of 1934, Public Law no. 416,
June 19, 1934, 73d Cong., title VI, sec. 606(c).
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Recalling what had happened three
decades before,
broadcasters were prepared for quick
government action.
Rumors flew that the government was
preparing formal
wartime censorship policies. Fly
addressed the reports with
carefully chosen words intended to both
clarify and
instruct. Such talk, he insisted, was
both "exaggerated and
premature....! haven't proposed any
regulations, have
no

particular rule in mind, nor am

I

sure we shall issue any.

"

The chairman then proceeded to send
several implicit but
obvious signals to the industry. The sources
of all war
reports, he said, must be clearly identified,
and, should
any regulations be drafted sometime in the future,
Fly

promised they would preserve true freedom of radio
by
curbing what he called misuse of the air.^^
Fly's comments, his first substantive public statement
as FCC chairman,

revealed the new administrator's ability

to express policy while denying he was doing anything of

the sort. Fly also seemed to be following in the "raised

eyebrow" tradition of his predecessors, hoping that by

dropping weighty hints he could steer the industry in the

proper direction. Would that hoary technique be enough in
time of war?

Emotions were of course running high, and events were
tipping public opinion ever more strongly against the Nazis
if not in favor of direct military intervention.
38

"Propaganda Curb is Urged for Radio,
Times, September 6, 1939, 14.
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"

Tales of

New York

German atrocities had helped swing
public opinion behind
the British during the First
World War. Given radio's
proven ability to directly engage
its listeners with events
half a world away, similar stories
of death and destruction
this time would likely have even
greater and certainly
more

immediate impact. Broadcasters anguished
that the very
nature of their medium, the directness
and immediacy with
which it conveyed emotionally-charged
information, made
them subject to special criticism, citing
public revulsion
over the sinking of the steamer Athena by a
German

submarine September

3,

network executives. Variety

reported, feared "whatever resolves their
organizations may
have made to maintain neutrality in the talks of
their

domestic commentators

...

were seriously undermined."

As the networks see it, they have never been
faced with a more ticklish dilemma. With opinion
as it is in this country, the imposition of
strict neutrality over its facilities would not
only be going against the public grain, but
subject the networks to severe backfire, with the
word censorship proving but a mild term in the
opprobrium. The networks on the other hand feel
that it is their duty to stem the spread of mob
hatred and prevent being used to cement public
opinion toward America's entry into the European
conf 1 ict ^5
.

The industry's uncertainty on how to cover the war was

already being reflected on the air. The day before the
Germans moved against Poland, NBC Blue's St. Louis
39

1939,

"Neutrality Impossible?" Variety, September

24.
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6,

affiliate cut network commentator
Dorothy Thompson off in
mid-broadcast as she accused Hitler of
ignoring the dangers
of a new world war. The station's
manager denied he was in
any way censoring Thompson. The
commentator,
he explained,

"was expressing some personal opinions,"
and it "does not
seem, in view of the present tension
in international

affairs,

that anything but reporter ial matter
would be in

the public interest" the station was
licensed to serve.

40

The NAB Code approved by the broadcasters
in the

summer of 1939 had demanded impartial objectivity
from

licensees and those who spoke on the air. It was a

peacetime document aimed at answering a variety of
lingering complaints against the industry, with Europe

engulfed in war, news and public affairs broadcasting had
moved to the top of the agenda, and complaints about
children's programs and advertising policy took a distant
second place. Critics of broadcast propaganda raised their
voices,

fearing that partisan words from foreign capitals

or domestic rabble-rousers such as the increasingly

inflammatory Father Coughlin would cloud the minds of the
anxious audience. Among the critics was Elliott Roosevelt,
the president's son who operated a chain of radio stations
in Texas. He called on NAB president Neville Miller to meet

Robert Convey of KWK, quoted in "Dorothy Thompson
Cut Off," Variety, September 6, 1939, 24.
40
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with Fly "to confer" about wartime
propaganda which he said
was already proliferating on the air.^i

A more significant warning emerged
from White House
press secretary Stephen Early. 42 He
had downplayed
administration plans to more strictly regulate
radio and
praised the broadcasters for "that sense
of public
responsibility your codification efforts imply"
when he
addressed the NAB convention in July. 43 Meeting
with
reporters the Wednesday after the fighting began,
Early
assured them that the government had counter-espionage

and

ant i- propaganda plans in place and said he was
certain the

President did not want to formally establish government

censorship of war news as long as the United States

remained a non-belligerent. Radio, however, presented a
unique problem, Early noted, because domestic transmitters

reached beyond our borders. Accordingly, all short-wave
stations, both commercial and amateur, must be especially

cautious and the government would monitor their broadcasts

closely
In regard to the domestic radio industry in general.

Early sent an obvious and chilling message to broadcasters.
41

M

42

"The War,

43

"Early's Speech," NAB Reports

Propaganda Curb is Urged for Radio,

"

14

NAB [National Association of
Broadcasters] Reports 7 (September 8, 1939), 3699-3701
contains a detailed account of Early's remarks from the
industry's perspective.
"

3590-2
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7

(July 15,

1939),

.

He reminded reporters that the
Communications Act allowed
the government to commandeer
transmitters in war time. He
hoped, however, that would not
become necessary. Selfcensorship
he recalled, had proven sufficient
during the
First World War when newspapers
provided the news.
,

NAB Reports, the trade association's
weekly newsletter
for station executives across the
country, heard the
White

House message loud and clear.

Then Mr. Early went on to say that there
was
a general feeling throughout the
government that
radio, because of its youth, was coming into
a
period in history which is new to it.
He added that if radio proved itself to be
a
"good child" and was well-mannered and showed
that it had been well reared, it would be left
to
move along on its own. On the other hand, if
radio proved itself to be a "bad child, " the
disposition would be to teach it some manners to correct it so that it would behave itself, the
secretary explained
The imagery

- and

the warning - was clear.

Radio must

control itself or risk punishment. The government, a stern
but concerned parent, would discipline the industry if it

failed to act its age.
As the broadcasting industry looked for direction,
Columbia, once again, took the lead. With its finely honed

mastery of corporate public relations, Columbia had
traditionally been the network to first respond to attacks
on the industry with skillfully publicized proclamations of

"

The War

,

"

3 7 0 0.
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good intentions which would both
reassure radio's critics
and forestall government intervention. ^5
On September 5,
CBS executive vice president Edward
Klauber distributed a
memorandum "to formalize and amplify- the
network's
policies on news coverage. 46 if, as Senator
Clarence C.
Dill insisted, the "public interest"
clause of the Radio
Act of 1927 was the Magna Carta of broadcast
regulation,
Klauber 's memorandum would prove to be the
founding

philosophical document of modern radio and television
journalism.
Columbia,

the self -proclaimed news network, had during

its dozen years of operation created a distinctive
style.

William Paley, unable to compete for popular entertainers
with NBC's financial juggernaut, had allowed Klauber and
White to create a news and public affairs department which
had won the network critical praise and popular fame. Paley

himself had no journalistic experience and no knowledge of

how such an organization should be built. His abject
45

Merrill Denison, "Editorial Policies of
Broadcasting Companies, " Public Opinion Quarterly
January 1937, 64-82.
46

1,

[Edward Klauber], "CBS European War Coverage: A
Memorandum Governing General Operations for the Information
of the Organization," September 5, 1939. The complete text
of the memorandum is printed in Statement of Columbia
Broadcast ingr System, Inc., with respect to Chain
Broadcasting Regulations and the Petition of the Mutual
Broadcasting System, Inc., for Amendment Thereof, 77-83,
submitted to the FCC in 1941 in response to the
Commission's report on chain broadcasting. FCC docket no.
506 0, record group 173, box 1426, National Archives and
Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland.
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surrender to the newspaper interests
at the Biltmore five
years before demonstrated his limited
grasp of how news was
gathered. He was seeking prestige and
profits for his

organization and simply saw radio news as a
means to those
ends. Of course,

neither Klauber nor White really knew what

made a radio news department either since
nothing of the
sort had ever existed before. Radio through
most of its

existence had been a witness to events, a forum for
opinions and an occasional headline service relying
on the
reporting of others. Critical reporting, which required
constant editorial decisions on which facts and

observations to air and which to discard and which could
not be monitored by management, was something radio had not

emphasized and indeed had often discouraged. Naturally, as
they created a radio news organization, they drew upon the

models they knew best. Klauber of the New York Timee and

White of the United Press built on the foundation most

familiar to them: the factual style of objective reporting

which had emerged a half -century before in the wake of the
triumph of liberalism.
While Klauber and White's prejudices predisposed them

toward a certain journalistic style, Paley sought to expand

and protect the empire he had built over the past dozen
years by seeking accommodation with those who threatened
his network. Among the most potentially threatening were
the regulators who governed the air. By skillfully

cultivating political contacts and changing course to adapt

s

to the ebb and flow of public
opinion,

Paley sought to keep

Columbia squarely in the center of
the mainstream of
opinion and safely away from any shoals
which could
jeopardize his network. As long as Columbia

prospered,

Paley had been quite willing to adjust
network policies on
advertising, children's programs, the sale
of time to

religious organizations and educational
programming to fit
what he perceived to be the consensus view,
in every case,
Columbia pledged its commitment to the public

interest and

argued that industry self -regulation, not rules
imposed by
government, was the means toward that goal.
The Columbia memorandum on war coverage revealed
both

Klauber and White's theories of journalism and Paley'

pattern of political accommodation. The network news
department's "plan of operation," Klauber wrote,
"represents no basic change in the policy the company has

maintained in the past."
This policy has been to deal, honestly,
accurately and fairly with news and with public
discussion. ... Columbia, as an organization, has
no editorial opinions about the war. Those,
therefore, who are its voice in presenting or
analyzing the news must not express their own
f eel ings
.

Columbia's news broadcasts, Klauber continued, must be
"fair and factual" in both content and tone. Announcers
"must refrain from microphone manner designed to cast
doubt,
47

suspicion,

II

sarcasm,

ridicule or anything of that

CBS European War Coverage,
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.

sort...

The rule, Klauber assarted,
applied to news readers,
announcers introducing speakers and,
significantly, news

analysts
What news analysts are entitled to do
and
should do is to elucidate and illuminate
the news
out of common knowledge or special
knowledge
possessed by them or made available to them
by
this organization through its news sources.
They
should point out the facts on both sides, show
contradictions with the known record, and so on.
They should bear in mind that in a democracy
it
is important that people not only should
know but
should understand, and their function is to help
the listener to understand, to weigh and to
judge, but not to do the judging for him.^s
"It was," wrote veteran CBS newsman and historian
of

broadcast journalism Edward Bliss a half-century later, "a
landmark statement.""*^

Klauber

's

memorandum summarized the practices the

network and the industry had constructed over the past
several years. It explicitly recalled in both substance and
tone Murrow's 1938 broadcast from London as well as his

defense of Columbia's news policies before the FCC

'

s

chain

broadcasting inquiry. The memorandum also paraphrased

"CBS European War Coverage," 78.

Edward Bliss, Jr., Now the News: The Story of
Broadcast Journaliem (New York: Columbia University Press,
1991), 107. Fred Friendly, Murrow's producer and alter ego
throughout the 1950s and president of CBS News in 1965-6,
observed while recalling the memorandum "journalists have
always despaired of defining the difference between
reporting and interpretation too precisely, though Ed
Klauber came close." Fred W. Friendly, Due To CircuniBtancee
Beyond Our Control... (New York: Vintage, 1967, 1968), 200.
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Paley'B frequent protestations of
impartiality as he
lobbied for industry self -regulation.
The Klauber
memorandum's main points would be
incorporated in the NAB
Code and would become the industry's
standard.

Additionally,

it set the scene for the
continuing quarrels

over where the line should be drawn
between elucidation and
illumination based on special knowledge on the
one hand and
personal opinion on the other.

On a more basic level, Klauber 's memorandum
expressed
much more than Columbia's practices. It was a
summary
of

the philosophy of objective journalism that
had been

steadily evolving for a hundred years. Influenced by
Carr
Van Anda's rigorous demand for the facts while reporting
for the New York Times,

it is not surprising that Klauber

brought that tradition with him to CBS. The policy also

grew naturally from William Paley's tendency to avoid
controversy by embracing the opinions of those who
controlled the levers of government regulation and by

extension the power to grant or deny broadcast licenses.
The objective style, relying on verifiable facts and

balanced statements from recognized authorities, privileged
those in power and marginalized oppositional voices.

On September

7,

Klauber and representatives of NBC,

Mutual and the National Association of Broadcasters invited

Fly to New York to hear how the industry planned to cover
the European war. The following Monday, September 11,

network representatives met with an FCC subcommittee
329

the

composed of Chairman Fly and
CommiBsioners Thad Brown and
T.A.M. Craven in Washington to
receive the regulators'
blessing for what the broadcasters
chose to call
a

"voluntary arrangement" on war coverage,
in describing the
session, all involved emphasized the
voluntary nature of
the plan. Fly called the meeting "an
exchange
of ideas,"

while the broadcasters insisted they were
only presenting
the arrangement to the FCC "as a matter
of courtesy" and
were not seeking government approval. Klauber
was on hand
to represent Columbia. He was joined by
his counterpart

at

NBC,

executive vice president Niles Trammell. Speaking
for
Mutual were chairman of the board Alfred J. McCosker
and

William Dolph, the manager of Mutual

•

s

station in

Washington. NAB president Neville Miller was also present

and was chosen to announce the latest triumph of selfregulat ion.

^°

The "Memorandum of European War Coverage" pledged the

radio industry to both impartiality and discretion,
Broadcasters, using the same analogy Early had invoked the

week before, proclaimed that radio had come of age and

could be counted upon to "make every effort to be
temperate, responsible, and mature" in broadcasting war
news.

The networks promised to "try to distinguish between

"Network's Adopt Arrangement for War Broadcasts,"
NAB Reports 7 (September 15, 1939), 3717; "Radio Nets Agree
on War Coverage," New York Times, September 12, 1939, 1.
5°

The complete text of the memorandum was published
in NAB Reports 1 (September 15, 1939), 3717-8.
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fact, official statement,

news obtained from responsible

official or unofficial sources, rumor,
and matter taken
from or contained in the foreign
press or other

publications, so that, by reporting and
identifying these
sources, we can help the radio audience
as much as possible
to evaluate the news brought to it."
Radio's primary duty
during this time of crisis, the memorandum
continued, was
as always to serve the public interest,
to insure "that the

American audience shall be as completely and
fairly
informed as possible."
The war coverage compact also contained an
explicit

admission that the American system of broadcasting itself
was under attack and acknowledged that radio had reached
a

critical juncture.

Broadcasters recognize that, if they do not
handle the war with complete responsibility
toward the American people, and if they deviate
from these principles, they run the risk of
involving all other broadcasters in the
consequences of their acts. The operation of
these principles should include at all times a
strong responsibility toward the industry as a
whole
Radio,

its leaders admitted,

had no choice but to regulate

itself, and given the chance could devise policies which

would benefit both the industry and the public at large.
"Networks Adopt Arrangement for War Broadcasts,"
3717. Broadcasters, at the urging of the government's
wartime Office of Censorship, would adopt several voluntary
programming policies to address wartime security concerns.
Musical request and "man-on- the - street " interview programs
were discontinued for fear secret agents would use song
titles or seemingly random comments as coded messages.
52
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Fly isBued a Gtatement following
the meeting saying
"the radio industry, taken by and
large, had rendered an
important public service in broadcasting
news and comment
on war conditions" and voiced confidence
"that all parties
will continue to give consideration to
the most effective
means of assuring that broadcast operation
in this period
of stress will promote the public interest. "53
while Fly's
measured remarks could not be considered a blanket

endorsement of self -regulation, Variety reported,
"conferees reported a general understanding that
no

official interpretation of radio's obligation will
be
attempted. The adoption of policies and practices will
be
left to the discretion of

1

icensees

.

"

^4

Fly clearly sought to avoid having to impose formal

government censorship on radio, a move which would

obviously trigger a firestorm of criticism. Still, he was
not ready to offer broadcasters a totally free hand. As if
to make that point,

the FCC the day of its meeting with the

industry leadership, fired a shot across the broadcasters'

bow by cracking down on a station which the Commission
charged had gone too far. Caught up in war coverage fever,
Weather forecasts were sharply curtailed, and sportscasters
were warned not mention that baseball games had been rained
out

Quoted in "Networks Adopt Arrangement for War
Broadcasts," 3 718.
5"^

1939,

"Self -Regulation on War," Variety, September 13,

21.
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WMCA in New York, a feisty independent
station not
affiliated with any of the major
networks and bereft

of a

European staff of its own, tuned its
short-wave receive
toward Europe and allegedly intercepted,
decoded and
rebroadcast messages transmitted by the
British and German
governments to overseas forces. As the industry
representatives gathered in Washington, the FCC
announced
the station was in apparent violation of
provisions

of the

Communications Act banning unauthorized retransmission
of
radio signals. "During the period of tense
international
relations," the Commission stated,

"the public,

interest,

convenience and necessity required strict observance by
licensees of radiobroadcast stations in this country of
all

provisions of international undertakings." WMCA, therefore,
was ordered to show cause why its license should not be
revoked.

The message was received loud and clear by the

industry. The FCC

'

s

action,

Variety noted, was the "first

instance of Federal stick waving at broadcasters as a

result of European war coverage.

"^^

Two days after the meeting in Washington, the NAB

'

s

board of directors gathered in Chicago to prepare for a
special convention of the trade organization September 15.

Federal Communications Commission, In re
Knickerbocker Broadcast ing Company, Inc., September 12,
1939. Section 605 of the Communications Act forbids any
licensee intercepting and divulging the contents of a radio
message without authorization from the original sender.
"FCC Orders WMCA to Defend License; Hinges on
Decodings, " Variety, September 13, 1939, 21.
56
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The board heartily endorsed the
network's arrangement. The
NAB rank-and-file did the same. The
convention also passed
a resolution pledging the NAB
membership's "full
co-

operation,

through self-regulation, to the support"
of the
government's policy of "strict neutrality"
regarding
the

war in Europe

.

^7

As the convention ended, the NAB board

announced that the self -regulatory Code approved
in
Atlantic City in July would officially take effect

on

October 1.58
"The Code," Neville Miller proclaimed,

"represents

almost a year's constant deliberation of every
conceivable

problem affecting the operation of radio in both the
social
and economic life of our nation." It also represented,
the

NAB president frankly stated, proof that the American

system of broadcasting could combine public interest and

private profit:

Adherence to the Code means to the individual
radio station operator a better long-pull
investment and to the American home gives another
reason for inviting the NAB station as a
preferred guest in its living room. I am
convinced that in the Code we find an admixture
of the best interests of the radio industry and
the public interest of the American people. The
two are inseparable. This is the essence of selfregulation as we know it in our American
8,

"Convention September 15, " NAB Reports 7 (September
1939), 3699/ "Neutrality," NAB Reports 7 (September 15,

1939)

,

3729

Neville Miller, "The Code in Effect October 1 (A
Statement by Neville Miller)," NAB Reports 7 (September 29,
^®

1939)

,

3741.
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democracy. And this is the purpose
of the NAB
Code ^5
.

The Code, Miller announced, would
be interpreted and

administered by an eleven-member committee
"representative
of both the industry and of the
country" to be chaired by
Peoria, Illinois station owner Edgar
Bill, while Bill

gave

the panel a reassuringly Midwestern
image and also sent the
message to monopoly watchers that individual
stations

across the country rather than the New
York-based networks
held control of the air, the best known names
on the panel
were those of the three network representative:
Klauber of
CBS,

Trammell of NBC and Theodore Streibert of Mutual.

Edward Kirby, the NAB

'

s

deft publicist, would serve as the

committee's secretary.

Taken as a whole, Columbia's statement of war coverage
policies,

the networks' arrangement on war news and the

sections of the NAB Code covering news and controversial

public affairs represent a consensus on broadcast

journalism practices and the regulatory relationship

between broadcasters and the state which would remain
intact for forty years. By emphasizing freedom, fairness,

balance and the people's ability to make up their own minds
while attacking censorship, propaganda and the pernicious
influence of monopolists and grasping bureaucrats, the

broadcasters captured the moral high ground.
59

"The Code in Effect October 1," 3741-2.

60

"The Code in Effect October 1," 3741-2.
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Chairman Fly gave the Code a glowing
review. "The
adoption of the Code and its self imposition by the
broadcasters is," he said, "an example
of democracy at
work." The radio industry which used
the public's air, the
chairman said, must operate in the public
interest and it
was ultimately the Commission's duty
to make sure private
broadcasters lived up to their public duty.
The system. Fly
said, had generally proven worthy because
"in general
the

best public service is the best business.
To succeed the
listeners must be attracted and held. Thus, the
private

benefit emerges from an effective public service."
Although
the Commission must ultimately decide whether or
not a

broadcaster operated in the public interest, convenience
and necessity,

"there is no reason why self -regulation may

not be in the public interest and may not to a certain

extent supplement the work of the Government
Fly's opinion was largely shared by newspaper

editorial writers across the country. By emphasizing both
its right to free speech and its responsibility to exercise

that right fairly,

the radio industry was falling in line

with what was becoming a prevailing opinion shared by the
mainstream press.

The NAB collected dozens of laudatory

James Lawrence Fly, "Some Comments on Current Radio
Problems," radio address, CBS Network, October 26, 1939.
Printed text in radio file, Raymond Clapper Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
^1

The ultimate expression of that opinion was the
work of the Hutchins Commission, a blue ribbon panel headed
by University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins which
was created at the urging of Tinie'B Henry Luce in 1942 to
^2

"

editorials from across the country
and distributed texts to
member stations." Radio couid be
responsible and fair and
the American people, given the
facts,

could distinguish

truth from propaganda.
That the people could logically
determine the rational
truth became ironically an article of
faith. Ignoring the

demonstrated power of political propaganda on
the air.
President Roosevelt optimistically proclaimed

that "radio

listeners have learned to discriminate over the
air between
the honest advocate who relies on truth and
logic and the
more dramatic speaker who is clever in appealing
to the

passions and prejudices of his listeners."

Roosevelt's own use of radio undermined his words. The
fireside chats which helped reassure the nation in the

early years of the New Deal and build support for the

administration's reforms succeeded not just because they
were logical expositions of government policy initiatives.
Roosevelt, of course, understood this, but he chose now to

flatter those who were tuned in — the listeners he had so

address the role of the media in the postwar world. The
Commission concluded that "freedom of the press for the
coming period can only continue as an accountable freedom.
Its moral right will be conditioned on its acceptance of
this accountability. Its legal right will stand unaltered
as its moral duty is performed." For the panel's views, see
the Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and
Reeponeible Preee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1947), quotation at 19.
"Editorial Comment Concerning the NAB Code" and
"Additional Editorial Comment Concerning the NAB Code,
supplements to NAB Reports 7, October 2 0 and November 3,
1939

.
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often intimately addressed over
the air as "my friends" by complimenting their ability
to discern the truth, "it
is
a fact increasingly manifest,"
he said,

"that presentation

of real news has sharpened the
minds and the judgment of

men and women everywhere in these
days of real public
discussion - and we Americans begin to
know the difference
between the truth on the one side and
the falsehood on the
other, no matter how often the falsehood
is iterated and
reiterated.
"Real news," Roosevelt explained, was
"objective

reporting.

..

.an unbiased and factual chronicle of

developments.

"64

The president's modern, limiting

definition of news ran counter to the established
traditions of radio journalism which had for so long

rejected reporting and its inherent need to exercise
editorial judgment in favor of live coverage of public
events, complete broadcasts of studio talks or analysis and

commentary which capitalized on the medium's ability to

build an emotional relationship between the broadcaster and
the audience. As the 1930s drew to a close,

this tradition

would be set aside in favor of the factual, balanced style
of reporting which came to be identified as objectivity.

the process,

the inherent biases of reporting,

interpreting

and editing the news would be, if not forgotten,

conveniently ignored.
Quoted in NAB Reports

7

338

(November

3,

In

1939),

3809

A few critics continued to speak
out against what they
interpreted as the broadcasters'
willingness
to surrender

their right to free speech.

United States News editor David

Lawrence insisted during a CBS broadcast
that station
owners had "surrendered their individual
freedom" by

establishing the Code. The idea "that radio
itself is
somehow affected with a 'public interest'
like a public
utility" was, Lawrence warned, "a dangerous
interpretation"
promoted by "various chairmen of the Federal
Communications
Commission possibly because some day they wish to
justify
the exercise of wider power." Self -regulation,
Lawrence

contended, was nothing more than the industry's

capitulation to government control of speech.
Most broadcast journalists endorsed their industry's

new commitment to what Roosevelt had so adeptly identified
as "real news." The Klauber memorandum proposed "a

thoroughly sound policy," Elmer Davis wrote that fall,
"from the point of view of the news analyst... as well as

from that of his employer.

"^^

Davis, another veteran of the

New York Times, believed passionately that in a democracy
the people, given the facts, could be trusted to come to
the correct conclusion

^"^
.

Davis was also convinced that the

65

"Freedom f OX the Thought We Hate, " iradio add.i"ess,
CBS network, October 29, 1939, quoted in NAB ReportG 7
(November 3, 1939), 3810.
Davis,

"Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 588.

Davis was such a favorite at the Times, he was
chosen to write an authorized history of the newspaper
^"^

.

See

.

nature of the medium made shrill
editorializing and
invective ultimately counter-productive,
while newspapers
could survive and prosper should their
readers flip past
the editorial page, a more disastrous
fate, Davis believed,
awaited any broadcaster who followed such
a
course,

denounce Hitler once

I

"if

i

might do it so forcibly as to

impress some of my hearers," Davis explained,

"but if

i

denounce him again the next night, and every
night
thereafter,

the customers will say 'We have heard that

already and turn the dial to something else."^^
Davis' defense of fairness and objectivity betrays
a

selective blindness to the implications of his words.
Davis' practical interpretation of Klauber's standards
show

how objectivity had by the end of the 193 0s become a style,
a journalist's tool rather than a philosophy.

The idea that

it was entirely fitting and proper for journalism to

achieve a political end - whether the immediate goal was

discrediting the New Deal or Adolph Hitler is immaterial went unchallenged. Objectivity, which had become in the

understanding of working journalists a word to describe a
logical argument constructed from observed facts and data

Elmer Davis, History of the New York Timee 1851-1921 (New
York: New York Times, 1921)
"Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 588.
Davis often referred in print to his listeners as "the
customers," a construction reflecting both the down-toearth Hoosier sensibility he cultivated and the realities
of broadcasting.
Davis,
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attributed to reputable sources, was
simply a more
efficient method of persuasion than

an appeal to emoti.on

Kaltenborn, devoted as always to
parading hi 6
erudition and opinions, refused to refrain
from openly
airing his views. Rather than a reporter,
he saw himself as
one with the noble traditions of
crusading editorialists
and stump- speaking advocates. Kaltenborn
believed that he

had established himself as an authority whose
opinions of
the latest developments were worthy
contributions
to the

public discourse. When he returned from Europe to
reclaim
his commentator's seat from Davis, he filled the
air with
the same "fervor of commentation" which marked
his work

during the Munich crisis. The opinionated analysis which

won praise in 1938, however, was received differently in
1939.

The objective reportorial style best and most

influent ially demonstrated by Edward

R.

Murrow would become

the standard for the future.

On September

1,

listeners tuned to Columbia's war

coverage heard a transoceanic confrontation between the old
style and the new. As German troops pushed into Poland, the

English government appeared paralyzed by indecision. Would
the Chamberlain government go to the aid of the Poles? Or

would the world see a reprise of the Munich capitulation
that ceded Czechoslovakia to the Germans? Kaltenborn,

monitoring reports in New York, believed that England would
once again fail to act, and he cited as evidence a Murrow
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dispatch from London. Murrow, furious,
responded on the air
during his next broadcast.
should like to recapitulate a few
things said from
here on an earlier broadcast," Murrow
began.
"I

First, that the British ultimatum
without a time
limit has been handed to von Ribbentrop
[the
German foreign minister]
Second, that Poland
has been hammered by the German military
machine
for nearly twenty- four hours .... Third,
it has
been expected in certain quarters that the
Prime
Minister would speak to the nation by radio
tonight. He has not done so.
I also said that while delay
yesterday and
the day before might have been advantageous to
the so-called peace front, delay today can hardly
be helpful to the Poles and was not calculated to
improve their morale.

Murrow

s

opening was in itself not unusual. As reports

from Europe chased one another through the air,

it was

standard practice to preface a broadcast with a summary of
what had been reported previously. What Murrow said next,
however, was not standard practice. It was a direct slap at

Kaltenborn personally and openly opinionated radio

commentary in general
reported those things. At the end of that
broadcast you were told that my remarks might
have created the impression that appeasement was
in the air. I have had my say concerning
appeasement I reported that I have seen no
evidence of it for some time. I have also given
you such facts as are available in London
tonight. I have an old-fashioned belief that
I

.

A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times (New York
Freundlich, 1986), 138.
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Americans like to make up their own
minds on the
basis of all available information.
The
conclusions you draw are your own affair,
i have
no desire to influence them and
shall leave such
efforts to those who have more confidence
in
their own judgment than I have in mind.^o
As Murrow spoke, Kaltenborn and Robert
Trout listened in
Columbia's New York studio. Trout later
remembered how he
watched Kaltenborn -s face redden in anger,
Murrow, as usual, was reading from a prepared
script.

His words were as always carefully chosen.

^2

He had not, he

told his listeners, relied on his own uncertain
"judgment"
to convey to the audience what was happening in
London.

Instead, he had "reported" the "facts" and "evidence"
which

were "available in London tonight." It was not his job to
shape opinion. That was, as it should be, the American

audience's "own affair." Kaltenborn might be so sure of
himself that he could foresee the future, but Murrow would
be content to describe what was known to have happened. It

was not his role as a broadcaster to speculate or to take
sides. That,

also, was the kind of broadcast journalism

that Columbia under Paley, Klauber and White favored and

7°

CBS network, September 1, 1939, text in Edward R.
Murrow, This ie London, ed. Elmer Davis (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1941), 11.

Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times

,

141.

Murrow usually dictated his reports to a secretary,
then edited the transcript and read the resulting copy on
72

the air.
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which had been enshrined in the NAB
Code and the network's
memorandum on European war coverage.
conveniently, the Murrow style also
fit the definition
of "real news" posited by President
Roosevelt and endorsed
by Fly. Murrow and his "boys," the CBS
correspondents who
covered the Second World War, developed
and shared
a

distinctive style of broadcast journalism based
on the
public record, the opinions of authoritative
sources and
close personal observation that came to
represent the new
generation of radio news. They exploited the immediacy
and
intimacy of the medium, but they consciously avoided
the

overt expressions of personal opinion which was the
stock
in trade of an earlier generation of broadcast journalists

exemplified by Kaltenborn and Boake Carter. Murrow, of
course,

set the pattern and remained the master of the

technique
Murrow'

s

words,

spoken in a grave baritone filtered by

short-wave transmission, survive in both recordings and
print.

"^^

His broadcasts from London during the blitz

described in one sense a momentous battle between historic

A two-record collection including many of Murrow'
most famous broadcasts, Edward R Murrow: A Reporter
Remembers Volume One: The War Years and Volume Two: 1948.

,

Columbia 02L 4 00, is unfortunately no longer in
print. For selections of Murrow' s scripts, see Murrow, This
IB London and Edward R. Murrow, In Search of Light, ed.
Edward Bliss, Jr. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967)
Murrow' s collected papers, Edward R. Murrow Papers 19271962 (Sanford, NC: Microfilming Corporation of America,
1982), contain most of his post-war scripts but the texts
of only scattered wartime broadcasts.
1961,
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forces for the future of Europe, but
on a more fundamental
level, they related one man's
experience and celebrated the
common Man, the paragon of Anglo-American
democratic myth.
While he reported the latest military
and political
gleanings, his most memorable broadcasts
recounted how the
war touched the people of Britain.

Murrow's listeners learned what it was like to
be in
London as the bombs fell, how exhilarating, how
lonely, how
random the destruction could be. By listening to
his words,

they were transported to the streets of the city.

"One

night," Murrow reported after a tour of a bombed-out

neighborhood,

"I

stood in front of a smashed grocery store

and heard a dripping inside. It was the only sound in all
London. Two cans of peaches had been drilled clean through

by flying glass and the juice was dripping down onto the
floor

"''4
.

"Bombs," he calmly explained one night,

most unpredictable manner.

"behave in the

""^^

A bomb may explode at an intersection and the
blast will travel down two streets, shattering
windows for a considerable distance, while big
windows within a few yards of the bomb crater
remain intact. The glass, incidentally, generally

CBS network, September 13,

London,

This is

173.

CBS network, August 18,

London,

194 0; Murrow,

14 4.
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194 0; Murrow,

This is

falls out into the street, rather
than being
blown inwards
.

The broadcasts are filled with
such precise and homely
observations. This war, listeners soon
learned, was more
than a geopolitical struggle among
nations. By reducing the
war to human scale, Murrow made it
understandable

Most of all, Murrow described the people
of London,
creating in the process a new prototype, a
petit bourgeois
descendent of the sturdy British yeoman who
peopled

Shakespeare's histories. Murrow brought his listeners
with
him to the pubs and bomb shelters, the shops and

air fields

of England where the Common Man refused to yield
to the

Nazi threat. In the fall of 1940, as the blitz was
at its
worst, Murrow described buying flashlight batteries
at a

shop near the BBC studios in the Strand.

bought three. The clerk said: "You needn't buy
BO many. We'll have enough for the whole winter.
But I said: "What if you aren't here?" There were
buildings down in that street, and he replied:
"Of course, we'll be here. We've been in business
here for a hundred and fifty years. ""^"^
I

These, Murrow understood, were the real stories. As he had

told the FCC chain broadcasting inquiry eighteen months
before,

"we are trying to give people an opportunity to

hear the sort of thing they would hear if they were

actually with us." These humble events, small enough to
"^^

London,
"^"^

London,

CBS network, August 25,

194 0; Murrow,

This is

14 6.

CBS network, September 13,
174.
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194 0; Murrow,

This ie

make Benee of in a world dominated
by issues beyond
comprehension, brought the war home. "The
little incidents,
the things the mind retains, are in
themselves

unimportant," he said from London one night
in 1940,
they somehow weld together to form the
hard

"but

core of

memories that will remain when the last 'all-clear'
has
Bounded. ""^^
The method seemed so simple.
news,

"Just provide the honest

and when there isn't any news, why, just say so,"

Murrow told Eric Sevareid when he hired the young
Minnesotan in 1939,

"I

have an idea people might like

that. "79 Murrow and his colleagues covered the news,
but

the broadcasts most remembered,

the dispatches which had

the greatest impact at home, were those which brought the

telling details of everyday life home to America. These

broadcasts shared a powerful subtext. The British people
were just like us, decent, hard-working men and women who

hoped to live their lives in peace, but who were willing to
CBS network, September 13,

London,

194 0; Murrow,

Thie ie

174.

Quoted in Eric Sevareid, Not So Wild a Dream (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946, 1969), 107. Sevareid worked
for the PariB Herald, the French outpost of the New York
Herald Tribune, before joining Columbia. In a letter
confirming the job offer, Murrow promised a salary of $250
a month but cautioned, "the matter of terms of employment
and the salary paid are normally matters of strict
confidence, even between colleagues." Murrow the reporter
was still first and foremost management's representative in
Europe, responsible for protecting the company's interests.
Murrow to Sevareid, August 16, 1939, box Al personal
correspondence folder, Eric Sevareid Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
,
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endure any hardship when confronted
with the totalitarian
war machine

While Murrow was the master of the
style, his
colleagues used the same tricks. Speaking
from Paris at the
outbreak of the war, Sevareid combined
official

announcements, foreign press reports and
personal

observations to describe the scene in the French
capital
during a Columbia broadcast. so with nothing new
to report
from government sources, Sevareid relied on
personal

observations to communicate the reaction of the
people of
Paris to incipient war. "I saw a woman crying," he
began,

recalling the price the French paid for the First World
War. As the government debated how to respond to the
German

attack on Poland, the French people pondered the personal
cost.

Rather than simply summarizing the reaction of the

French press, Sevareid incorporated the latest news into a
tour of Paris. As he strolled the avenues, he told his
audience, he saw groups gathered around kiosks. They were

scanning the front pages of the latest newspapers "and
these are some of the headlines they read.

"

While they

awaited their government's decision, Sevareid said,

"many

of the ordinary people you speak to" were resigned to war.

A skeptical listener might wonder just how many "ordinary
people" Sevareid had canvassed before reaching his
so

Eric Sevareid, CBS network, September 3, 1939,
recording in Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded
Sound Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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conclusion, but the broadcaster
insisted he was simply
conveying the facts as he discovered
them. With the French
government threatening censorship, it
would likely become
increasingly difficult in the days
ahead to determine
the

facts, he admitted.

"News may dry up and we'll be
limited

to a few official communiques." He
would continue to do his
best, he implied, to bring the whole
truth to the American

people. Now,

it seemed,

France was preparing for war. This

conclusion was not personal opinion, Sevareid
assured his
listeners, it was the result of disinterested
reporting.

"It's not for me to plead the case" for a French

declaration of war, he said,

"but the truth has to be

told.

Sevareid correctly reported that there was in fact no
news to report as the French cabinet caucused behind closed
doors. Additionally, he had no doubt accurately related the

fear and uncertainty many French men and women felt in the
final hours before war was declared. Did the people

Sevareid described represent prevailing opinion among the
French public? There is no way to know, but his listeners
surely recalled the images he described of the crying woman
and the crowds pressing around the sidewalk kiosks,

awaiting word of their fate. Columbia's listeners also as
they turned off their radios understood that the French,

reluctantly perhaps, were prepared to fight.
Kaltenborn would have put it more bluntly, basing his
statement on his knowledge of world affairs and his
349
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asseBsment of his discussions with
high-level contacts and
relying on his personal standing to
persuade the audience.
Murrow and his proteges used a different
technique which
took advantage of the unique virtues
of the
radio.

Archibald MacLeish, the poet and radio
dramatist who in
1938 had pointed out what a useful dramatic
device
the

announcer's voice had become, understood when he
paid
tribute to Murrow in 1941:
You spoke, you said, in London. Sometimes you
said you were speaking from a roof in London
looking at the London sky. Sometimes you said you
spoke from underground beneath that city. But it
was not in London that you spoke. It was in the
back kitchens and the front living rooms and the
moving automobiles and the hotdog stands and the
observation cars of another country that your
voice was truly speaking. And what you did was
this: You made real and urgent and present to the
men and women of those comfortable rooms, those
safe enclosures, what these men and women had not
known was present there or real

MacLeish understood the magical power of word and sound. He
understood that by making what was happening in London
"real and urgent and present," Murrow was setting the stage

for the predictable human response. Something had to be

done to ease these people's pain. Murrow and his colleagues

understood as well.

®^

Archibald MacLeish,

"A Superstition is Destroyed,
radio address, CBS network, December 2, 1941, in MacLeish,
William S. Paley, Edward R. Murrow, In Honor of a Man and
an Ideal ... Three Talks on Freedom (New York: Columbia

Broadcasting System,

1941),

7.

350

-

Columbia's broadcasts from Europe in
the first years
of the war cemented the network's
standing as the leading
news network and added immeasurably
to the network's
prestige. Listeners were eager to hear
about the war, and
Columbia and its affiliates gave them what
they wanted to
hear.

Paley,

concerned as always with building a prosperous

and secure empire, was overjoyed. NBC and
underfunded
Mutual scrambled to match Columbia's success,
ending their
reliance on official statements from government
spokesmen
and interviews with newspaper reporters and sending
their

own correspondents overseas to provide exclusive
on- the
scene reports written and read with a radio audience
in

They never caught up.

mind.

"This was the first thing that

put CBS ahead of NBC in anything," Sevareid recalled years
later,

"That's what gave the Columbia Broadcasting System

its first real leg up after the war."®^

By 194 0, Murrow and his kind of personalized radio
news had become the new model for broadcast journalism. The

networks continued to broadcast round table discussions and

offer speeches by distinguished guests, but "the news"

increasingly came to mean the latest reports from the

network correspondents. Commentators such as Kaltenborn

continued to be heard, but they were pressed to limit their
expressions of personal opinion and offer instead

background information and analysis. A few, notably Davis
Eric Sevareid, interview, "CBS: The First
Years," Broadcasting, September 14, 1987, 88.
^2
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and Raymond Gram Swing, offered
thoughtful and timely
broadcaete which equaled the best
newspaper columns.
Increasingly, however, the most popular
and financially
successful commentators were seen as
quirky and colorful
personalities, entertainers whose success
stemmed from
their ability to share their lives and
interests with the
audience rather than journalists concerned
with the rapidly
changing state of the world.
In practice,

the line between opinion and analysis

remained difficult to define, but commentators
noted that
when their analysis led to conclusions at variance
with the
prevailing public mood of the moment, they were likely
to

be accused for peddling their personal opinion. As
the

nation became increasingly fixated upon the worldwide
struggle for democracy, broadcasters like their listeners
The prototype of the commentator-as -entertainer was
NBC's Walter Winchell, a one-time vaudevillian who gained
fame as a gossip columnist and broadcaster. He routinely
mixed show business notes with crime news and attacks on
Hitler and the "Ratzis." See Bliss, Now the News, 57-8 and
Walter Winchell, Winchell Exclusive (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice -Hall
1975). For a delightful profili of
Mutual 's Gabriel Heatter, see Philip Hamburger, "The
Crier," The New Yorker, January 20, 1945, 23ff. While
Heatter invariably reported the latest headlines to his
audience. Hamburger noted, his success was a credit to
other things. Heater's "major interests are the final
defeat of Fascism and the formulation of a workable,
democratic peace," Hamburger wrote, "but historians may
someday record that he reached his peaks of eloquence and
insight while speaking of dogs. Heatter feels about dogs
the way Churchill feels about the British Empire. No man
more staunchly supports those dogs who have laid aside
their muzzles and gone off to war." Similarly, ABC's Paul
Harvey was the most widely listened- to radio commentator of
the 196 0s, but his broadcasts are largely ignored by
chroniclers of journalism.
,
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increasingly spoke with one voice. The
broadcasting
industry became, in social historian
James Baughman's
phrase, "a voluntary propagandist",
proclaiming as always
its role as a bulwark of democracy,
eagerly portraying
itself as a partner with government and
the public in the
great struggle.
The triumph of objectivity was not absolute.
Both the
chains and local stations across the country
continued to

broadcast discussions of "controversial issues" as
well as
live coverage of events as they happened. Such
programs

continued to stir controversy, especially when speakers

questioned the extent of the United States' involvement in
the war or argued that pressing domestic issues were being

ignored
The FCC under its new chairman and the industry seemed
to have struck an accord on program content with the NAB

Code and the agreement on responsible war coverage, but

broadcasters suspected they were enjoying only a cease-fire
in their traditional battle with the regulators. The FCC

was completing work on its chain broadcasting report, and

powerful critics of the industry continued to control the
levers of government. Chairman Fly was a presidential
appointee, and the Roosevelt administration was tilting

increasingly toward intervention. Senator Wheeler, chairing
See James L. Baughman, The Republic of Maee
Culture; Journal i em Filmmaking and Broadcasting- in
America since 1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1992)
,

,
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the committee responsible for
broadcast legislation, was an
outspoken isolationist. The potential
for conflict,

broadcasters nervously noted, was immense.
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CHAPTER VI
"THE VITAL NECESSITY FOR OBJECTIVITY "1

As Europe went to war in 1939, the
American
broadcasting industry appeared to have
withstood another
challenge. The National Association of
Broadcasters' new
Code was in place, and the industry's
voluntary agreement
on war coverage had received the blessing
of the Roosevelt

administration's new chairman of the Federal
Communications
Commission. Self -regulation, radio's first line of
defense
against federal interference, had, it seemed, deflected
another challenge to the American system of broadcasting.
In exchange for serving the public interest, commercial

broadcasters - which increasingly by the end of the 1930s
meant the ever more powerful national networks - would be

allowed to profit.
1939 and 194 0 were very good years for the radio

networks. The economy was finally beginning to show signs
of real recovery,

thanks in large part to industrial

production related to the war in Europe. 1938 had seen a
sharp economic slump, but that year's disappointing time

Paul White to "Dear Gang" [CBS European staff]
[May
Edward R. Murrow Papers 1927-1965 (Sanford,
25, 1940]
North Carolina: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982)
reel 15, folder 164, frame 0062. The letter was received
and dated by Mary Marvin Breckinridge, a CBS reporter in
Paris
^

,

,

355

sales were forgotten as the new
numbers were totaled. Gross
advertising sales for the four nationwide
chains jumped
sixteen percent between 1938 and 1939
and soared another
sixteen percent to $96 million 1940. NBC,
thanks to its two
networks, remained atop the list with income
of more than
$50 million, but CBS had become the single most
profitable
chain, grossing over $41 million in 194
0, a whopping

nineteen percent increase over 1939 and nearly two
million
dollars more than NBC Red.^
The war had indeed been good for the radio business,

because Americans were tuning in to keep up with the most
exciting continuing drama they had ever heard. Each of the
networks logged its share of scoops and spectaculars, but

Columbia had become in fact what the network's publicists

had long claimed it was: the leader in news and
information.

"If any single radio job since radio began

could unanswerably justify the business of broadcasting as

now conducted," proclaimed Time in 1941, "CBS's news
coverage since 1938 might well be it."^ Across the country,
listeners sought out the latest information from the front.

They tuned in for live coverage of important events, talks
and forums featuring prominent newsmakers and the nightly
commentaries of Elmer Davis and H.V. Kaltenborn, but the
"Four Major Webs Grossed $96,000,000 in 1940,
Rise for New Highs," Variety, December 18, 1940, 1.

16%

December

15,

2

3

1941,

"From Brick Dust to Bouquets,
50.
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Time,

most memorable broadcasts were the
on-the-scene reports
from Columbia's growing stable of
reporters overseas.
Network correspondents such as Eric
Sevareid in Paris and,
especially, Edward R. Murrow in London
bore witness to

history in the making. They offered an
immediate emotional
connection which neither the newspaper's columns
of
print

nor the newsreel's pictures could match.

"Radio's quick

telling of the whole story," Variety boasted,

"the fabulous

incident of the radio-described scuttling of the
Graf Spee,
the actual sound (via oceanic short-wave)

of gunfire and

explosions over London have all combined to produce a saga
of new style journalism."'*

Despite their triumphs, the industry's leaders

remained uneasy about the future of commercial
broadcasting. The broadcasters had managed to defuse the

potential crisis of re -regulation in 1939, but the
"quarrelsome year" of 194 0, as Variety described

it,

rife with the signs of future "clash and struggle.

was

"^

Broadcasters anticipated confrontations with their
regulators over lingering questions of monopoly and
economic power. While the particulars had changed over the
years, both the industry and the state continued to wrestle

with what radio reformer Charles Siepmann would call "the

Robert J. Landry, "Radio's Quarrelsome Year,"
Variety, January 8, 1941, 87.
^

Landry,

"Radio's Quarrelsome Year," 87.
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basic paradox with which radio stands
uncomfortably saddled
- how far can a system built entirely on private
profits

function adequately in the public interest,
to which it is
also theoretically committed?
The industry was proud of its financial
success, but
in their public statements, its leaders
always emphasized
its service.

The networks had written a spectacular story

of economic success despite the depression,
but their image
of choice was that of responsible stewards of
the people's
air.

"The year 194 0 brought to radio broadcasting in

America opportunities for public service hitherto
unparalleled," Columbia's William Paley proudly told his
stockholders in March of 1941. Radio helped Americans
"become intelligently aware of the reality of world

events," he said, and had become "an essential component of
the American democratic way of life.""^ A vital factor in

the network's service to democracy,

Paley continued, and

one which had won the network "a vast audience," was

"Columbia's consistent and determined effort to present the

essence of the news, both national and international, in a

Charles Siepmann, "Radio's Big Chance," The New
Republic, January 12, 1942, 46.
^

William S. Paley, Annual Report of the Columbia
BroadcaGting System, Inc. for the Fiscal Year ended
December 28, 1940 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System,
1941),

[1].
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strictly factual and objective way,
devoid of bias, and at
the earliest possible moment
following its occurrence
Despite Paley's self-congratulatory
words, radio, an
industry barely two decades old, was
preparing for a major
battle over the FCC s monopoly probe of
chain broadcasting.
'

As the commission staff prepared its
long-anticipated
report and order under the guidance of
chairman James
Lawrence Fly and general counsel Telford Taylor,

broadcasters became increasingly certain that bad
news was
in the offing.

Preliminary reports issued in June and

November of 194 0 indicated that the Commission was ready
to
mount a full-scale assault on the financial underpinnings
of network radio.

The June subcommittee report to the full

FCC all but declared NBC and CBS illegal monopolies,

concluding "that National and Columbia, directed by
men,

a few

hold a powerful influence over the public domain of

the air and measurably control radio communication to the

people of the United States." Such domination "presents
inherent dangers to the welfare of a country where

democratic processes prevail" and was clearly not in the
public interest.^

8

Paley, Annual Report,

[5]

Federal Communications Commission, "Memorandum of
Submittal Accompanying Report of Committee on Chain
Broadcasting, and Conclusion of the Committee's Report,"
June 12, 1940, in Federal Communications Commission, Report
on Chain Broadcasting- (Washington: Gtovernment Printing
Office, 1941)
99
^

,
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The CommiBGion-s subeequent call
for oral arguments
targeted the heart of the network
system, contractual

agreements between the networks and their
affiliates across
the country. The FCC s laundry list
of possible new
'

regulations suggested ending exclusive
contracts between
the networks and individual stations,
restricting the term
of affiliation agreements, limiting
network ownership and
management of individual stations and strengthening
an

affiliate's right to pick and choose among network
offerings, airing those which it deemed to be in
the public
interest and rejecting the rect.^°
"There is little doubt,"

Va^-i ety

reported in March of

"that the Government has made up its mind that

1941,

drastic changes in status quo are, from the Government's
viewpoint, essential to preserve free competition and check

drifts to either monopoly or powerful concentrations of
control.

"11

The financial viability of network broadcasting

was based on the ability to create a nationwide audience

and sell that audience to willing advertisers. If the
networks were unable to guarantee their advertisers access

1°

Federal Communications Commission, "Procedures for
Oral Argument on Network Inquiry Report," November 28,
194 0, in FCC, Report on Chain Broadcast ing-, 101-2. The
JReport on Chain Broadcasting- is an invaluable resource for
scholars, providing the best single source of data and
summary of the condition of commercial radio immediately
prior to the Second World War.
11

"Time Limit (One Year) on Affiliates' Ties One of
Expected FCC Proposal," Variety, March 12, 1941, 26.
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to the audience through iron-clad
contracts with their

affiliates, how could they continue to
reap profits?
Broadcasters feared for two other nascent
projects,
television and international commercial
broadcasting, each
of which could become tremendously
profitable but which
required both FCC approval and the cash
flooding from the
networks to proceed.
The industry, with Paley and CBS leading
the way,

mounted major public relations and lobbying
campaigns in
hopes that the White House would bury the monopoly

report

and bring the FCC to heel.i^ Columbia played the
most

visible role partly due to Paley

s

nature, but also because

NBC was reluctant to jeopardize further its plans for
television. Radio was simply one portion of the RCA empire

and no longer the most important. David Sarnoff had been
one of the architects of the medium, but now, Paley

recalled,

"he wasn't enthusiastic about radio's future. He

didn't care about radio really. He was a guy who liked the

scientific side of things, the new things that were being
invented.

By 1940, the new thing was television. RCA was

already involved in a bitter dispute with Fly and the FCC

12

Landry,

"Radio's Quarrelsome Year," 87.

See Sally Bedell Smith, In All Hie Glory: The Life
of William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 0)
195-9
13

.

William S. Paley, interview in "CBS: The First 60
Years," Broadcast ing-, September 14, 1987, 68.
14
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over technical standards for
television broadcasting, and
Sarnoff was wary of inviting new
antitrust investigations.
He would do most of his fighting
behind the scenes,
allowing Paley to carry the flag for
radio. 15

While the networks waited for the FCC
to act, radio's
critics in Congress feared the Commission
would once again
fail to move strongly enough. Radio's
opponents saw the

industry's formidable public relations
apparatus gearing
up, and recalling how the networks and
the administration
had teamed up to block the congressional monopoly
report in
1938,

feared another FCC cave-

in.

Republican Senator

Charles Tobey of New Hampshire reminded his colleagues
that

Congressional attempts to launch an independent probe of
the broadcasting industry had been turned back by the

promise that the FCC

'

s

chain inquiry would be sufficient.

Former FCC chairman Frank McNinch had promised Congress in

November of 193 8, Tobey reminded the Senate, that the
report would be ready in sixty days. One year later, in

November of 1939, Fly, McNinch 's successor, again promised
that the report would be ready in sixty more days. Clearly,
the senator fumed,

"the whole thing has been a mockery."!^

Kenneth Bilby, The General: David Sarnoff and the
Rise of the Communi cations Industry (New York: Harper
Row, 1986), 135-7. Sarnoff was busily lobbying both
Congress and the White House on behalf of RCA' s television
system during this period. See Burton K. Wheeler with Paul
F. Healy, Yankee from the West (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 19 62)
42 0-2
15

&.

,

Congress, Senate, Sen. Charles Tobey, "Report of
Federal Communications Commission on Alleged Radio
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In the House, opponents came
within nine votes of cutting
the FCC's 1941 operating budget
after a rancorous floor
debate. The "usual barrage of rocks
was thrown at the

Commish during debate," Variety reported,

"with the

perennial finger-pointers adding a new touch
to the attack
by chiding the regulators for slowness
in finishing up the
chain -monopoly inquiry and for failing to
crack down on
both CBS and NBC."!^

Committee hearings on the reappointment of veteran
FCC
commissioner Thad Brown turned into a summer-long
assault
on the Commission's policies.i^ Conservative "finger-

pointers" led by Senator Tobey relentlessly attacked the

Commission and the industry for a variety of past and
present sins. More ominously, committee chairman Burton

Wheeler and ranking Republican Wallace White joined in the
assault with charges that the FCC was still far too

sympathetic toward the industry it regulated and far too

ready to sacrifice the public interest on the altar of
private profit. Both Wheeler and White were stalling

legislation to reorganize the FCC pending completion of the

Monopoly," 76th Cong., 3rd sess., ConofreBBional Record (May
15,

1940), vol.

86,

pt.

6,

6145-6.

"FCC's Yearly Congressional Drubbing," Variety,

February

5,

1941,

40.

1®

Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce,
Hearings .on the Nomination of Thad H. Brown on
Reappointment ae Federal Communications Commieeioner, June
12-August 23, 1940, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.
.

.
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chain broadcasting report. As the
hearings rolled on, each
expressed his fear that the Commission
was dragging
its

feet on the critical issue of monopoly.
Brown's

reappointment was held hostage by Wheeler,
and the last
survivor from the old Federal Radio Commission
was allowed
to withdraw his name in the fall
rather than
face the

humiliation of possible Senate rejection.
The congressional assault on the FCC was
in no way an
endorsement of the broadcasting industry. Veteran
critics

such as Wheeler had long charged that the industry
and its

regulators were one in the same, advocates of a potent
radio monopoly bent on controlling the ether and shaping

public opinion in their own corporate, internationalist
image.

Revelations of a "radio trust" in the 192 0b and the

headlong growth of the national chains in the 193 0s

provided ample evidence to them that powerful corporations
were conspiring to control both the industry and,
ominously,

the flow of information to the people of

America. While liberals condemned the broadcasters for

crass commercialism and pleaded with the government to set
aside frequencies for nonprofit agencies or establish a

competitive state -owned radio network to rescue the medium
from the advertisers, conservatives feared government — or
See "Strike at FCC Itself in Grilling Brown; Much
Trade History is under Light," Variety, June 19, 1940, 28;
"Nightmare on Stand for Thad Brown but Another 7 -Year Term
Looks Okay," Variety, June 26, 1940, 41; "Brown Is Left
Dangling," Variety, September 25, 1940, 27.
19
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more precisely Roosevelt administration involvement
would lead not to free speech but to
even more suffocating
centralization. The thought of broadcasting
under the
control of interventionist New Dealers
bent on suppressing
free enterprise and dragging the country
into war terrified
many in Congress, driving them into an
unlikely and

contentious alliance of convenience with the radio
networks
"Voluntary sel f - regulat ion" of the air, Republican

Representative Karl Mundt of South Dakota said in the
summer of 194 0,

"has many advantages over the various

proposals for intensified Government regulation and

supervision which are beginning to be discussed informally,
and rather too generally, in the congressional cloakrooms."
While radio must remain "on guard against highly

emotionalized speakers and programs whose broadcasts might
render a disservice to the best interests of America,

"

the

industry's efforts to police itself were commendable. The
medium, Mundt said, was far too powerful to be placed in
the hands of the New Deal.

"Once a political administration

tasted the intoxicating blood of power which would come
from Government radio,

"

it

would surely control what was

broadcast. The administration would stifle free speech and

use the radio to perpetuate itself. The industry's efforts
to regulate itself, especially radio's pledge to cover news
of the war in Europe with moderation and impartiality, were

therefore to be applauded and an activist FCC, a creature

.

of the New Deal, was to be condemned.
Remember what had

happened during the First World War, Mundt
cautioned. If
America entered the new war in Europe, he
continued,
"private radio would,

in all likelihood, be one of the

first and one of the permanent casual ties

.

"20

Broadcasters appreciated such endorsements of their
efforts to regulate themselves but realized they
were

motivated by opposition to the Roosevelt administration
rather than affection for the radio industry, while

conservatives feared administration control of
broadcasting, corporate control was only a slightly more

preferable alternative. Mundt reminded the broadcasters
that they "hold virtual monopolies over favored airwaves

for private profit" and cautioned them that the exercise of

such "rights and privileges" implied "responsibilities."'!
The fundamental bargain struck nearly two decades before

remained in place; Broadcasters could utilize the people's
air if they operated in the public interest. The definition
of that term was becoming increasingly slippery as the war
in Europe intensified.

2°

Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Karl E.
Mundt, "Columbia Broadcasting System Answers Congressman
Mundt 6 Open Question to Radio Executives," 76th Cong., 3rd
sess., CongreBsional Record (June 7, 1940), vol. 86, pt.
16, 3644-5.
'

Mundt, "Columbia Answers Congressman Mundt
Question, " 3645
21
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Open

Chairman Fly was a partisan Texas Democrat
and loyal
New Dealer who rarely found himself on the
same
side as

conservatives such as Mundt

.

Both men shared, however, a

visceral fear of monopoly control of broadcast
ing
Mundt

's

.

22

while

greatest nightmare was a radio system in the hands

of the Roosevelt administration, Fly saw the
government as
a defender of the public interest and a necessary

counterweight to excessive corporate power.
The FCC had been created by Congress to protect the

public interest. Fly pointed out soon after taking office,
and must carry out its charge.

^3

Fortunately, the American

system of broadcasting had "in general" served the public
interest because "the best public service is the best

business." It was the role of government to make certain
While Fly throughout his career crusaded against
monopoly control of the air, he was delighted when that
crusade also aided his party. When Roosevelt urged the FCC
to study limiting newspaper ownership of broadcast
stations, Fly accepted the job with pleasure. "It's a
natural point of view for a New Dealer to have," FCC
counsel Harry Plotkin later recalled, "because Roosevelt
and the New Deal were catching hell from newspapers all the
time, never got a fair break, and we realized that if there
was going to be any fair electioneering, you'd have to do
it with this new medium. " The fact that newspapers
controlled a third of all radio station licenses could be
interpreted as evidence of an information monopoly, Plotkin
argued. It was certainly a political threat. "Therefore,
this idea really was both a liberal idea, and... it was
necessary for a strong Democratic party, strong two party
system, because the press was one party. " Harry Plotkin,
interview by Sally Fly Connell, n.d., 24-5, in the James
Lawrence Fly project of the Oral History Collection of
Columbia University, hereafter Plotkin, COHC*
22

James Lawrence Fly, "Some Comments on Current Radio
Problems," radio talk, CBS network, October 26, 1939.
2^
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that tradition continued. While "all
of us interested in
the development of policies and rules
of conduct should

maintain an open and tolerant mind toward
the views of
others as experience accumulates and principles

emerge,"

the primacy of the public interest enshrined
in the

Communications Act must not be compromised. Beyond
that
basic principal, however. Fly continued, "there
is...

substantial area where industrial self -regulation should
have a fair opportunity to work."
His enemies within the broadcasting industry feared

Fly was merely voicing free -market platitudes to conceal
his true intentions.

"I

got along with Fly pretty well -

we were not personally bitter,

Neville Miller in 1973,

"

remembered NAB president

"but Fly wanted to run the NAB,

h

wanted to run the industry, and he had a good deal of
power. "24 In fact, the chairman meant what he said. He di

not want to "run the industry." He simply wanted the

industry run with the public's interest in mind. Fly woul
throughout his term continue to prod the industry into

serving what he saw as the public interest, but he would
also oppose with equal ardor any talks of government
ownership. Fly was,
Roosevelt,

in a way,

similar to his president.

first feared by captains of industry as a

traitor to his class, would ultimately be understood as a

Neville Miller, interview by Donald H. Kirkley,
September 25, 1973, 24-5, in Miller biography file,
Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC.
24
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staunch defender of liberal capitalism
with, as his
Secretary of Labor pointed out, "no
thought or desire to
impose any overall economic or political
change on
the

United States.

"25

Like Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt sought
to

save the system from its basest instincts.
Fly, by the end
of his term in 1944, would be seen by
many broadcasters not
as the stalking horse for an administration
takeover of

radio, but as "their bulwark against Government

ownership

an intelligent, careful liberal who believes

in finding and stubbornly serving the facts. "26
The radio

industry would not be nationalized in the Second World
War.

Industry self -regulation carried out under the watchful eye
of the government would remain the foundation of the

American system of broadcasting.
In the last years of peace, however,

there was no way

the networks could know that. The industry feared for its

future. To protect themselves from change,

the broadcasters

once again wrapped themselves in the banner of public

service and sought to portray their industry as,
words,

in Paley's

"an essential component of the American democratic

way of life." As in the past, the industry would rely in
large part on its news and public affairs programming to

prove that the American system of broadcasting served the

Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York:
Viking, 1946; Harper & Row, 1964), 332.
25

26

"Battler's Exit," Time, November
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13,

1944,

73-4.

public interest. As Americans debated
their nation's role
in the war in Europe, however,
the role radio played in
shaping that debate and the way the
medium broadcast the
news would become extraordinarily
controversial.
As German forces swept across Europe
in 194 0 and
threatened both England and the Soviet
Union in 1941, no
question more divided the nation than that
of American
neutrality. The NAB Code directed member
stations to
"provide

[free]

time for the presentation of public

questions including those of controversial nature"
while
refusing to sell air time to advocates of one side

or the

other. The Code, however, made an exception for
candidates

for office. They would be allowed to purchase as much
time
as they pleased when campaigning for election. 27 The
Code,

however, was silent on how the industry should deal with a

candidate who also happened to be the sitting president.
The 194 0 Roosevelt campaign was a strategic reprise of
the 1936 effort. The president would act presidential,

ignoring Republican challenger Wendell Willkie until the
final weeks and taking every advantage of his office.

Roosevelt insisted his frequent inspection tours of defense
facilities were not campaign trips, even though he did seem
to be following roundabout routes which took him through an

27

NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Code
Compliance Committee, "Controversial Public Issues," Code
Manual (Washington: National Association of Broadcasters,
[1940]),

n.p.
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improbably high number of cities.
When questioned about
Willkie's latest positions, Roosevelt
innocently told
reporters, "i don't know nothin' about
politics. "28
Roosevelt, of course, knew everything
about politics, and
he also knew that as president and
commander-in-chief
he

had a virtual open invitation to address
the nation over
the radio.

While Candidate Roosevelt remained out of
sight until
the final weeks of the campaign, President
Roosevelt

frequently found it necessary to speak to the country.
The
Republicans, of course, protested, but the NAB s Code
•

Compliance Committee ruled in August that Roosevelt's
opponents had to prove that the president's talks were

partisan before they could request time to respond. The
Republican National Committee fumed, purchased sixty-eight
hours of nationwide radio time in hopes of competing and
saw the NAB action as additional evidence that the New Deal

had the radio industry under its thumb.
Paley was certainly doing his best to ingratiate
himself with the Roosevelt administration, and the White

House was reciprocating. Each side respected the power of
the other and sought to maintain cordial relations.
28

James MacGregor Burns, Rooeevelt The Lion and the
Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 434-5.
:

Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television and American
PoliticB (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 43-6. Chester
notes that the Democrats purchased fifty-eight hours of
national time during the campaign.
29
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Roosevelt, faced with overwhelming
newspaper opposition to
a third term, relied on radio
to reach the voters. Paley
feared the government's authority to
cripple his
corporation by imposing new regulations,
in the fall of
as Paley prepared to visit South
America,

1940,

Roosevelt

invited him to the White House and confidentially
asked if
as he toured the continent he could assess
the
impact of

Nazi propaganda efforts in Latin America.
Paley later sent
Roosevelt a glowing congratulatory note after the
election.
"Few things have meant as much to me, or have
given me such
full gratification," he wrote, "as the decision of
the

American people to have you lead us during the next four
years

.

"^o

Paley 's praise should not be interpreted as an

endorsement of the administration's policies regarding
radio.

If Willkie had won,

Paley would have addressed an

equally fawning compliment to the new chief executive in
hopes of maintaining access to the Oval Office. The

industry was as always deferential to the party in power

while at the same time maintaining cordial relations with
the opposition. The 194 0 platforms of both major parties

contained planks endorsing "free" radio and condemning
"censorship." The Republicans, fearful of an activist FCC
in the hands of the New Deal,

^°

stated,

"We oppose the use of

Quoted in Smith, In All HiB Gl ory,
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195

licencing to establish control

.

"3i

The Democrats also

showed little faith in the FCC as it
existed and called for
a new law. "We urge such
legislative steps as may be
required to afford the same protection
from censorship that
is now afforded the press under
the constitution
of the

United States.

"32

Broadcasting historian Erik Barnouw

observed that the planks,

"perhaps intended as anti-FCC

mortar fire," indicated "the close ties" the
industry

maintained with both parties.
true,

33

while that is certainly

they also indicated the perils broadcasting
faced.

Neither party was satisfied with the existing system
of
radio regulation or the state of the broadcasting

business.

The industry interpreted that dissatisfaction as a

potential threat to stability.
Despite their considerable efforts, the networks could

hardly avoid offending one side or the other during the

election campaign and the ongoing neutrality debate. When
Roosevelt after the election proposed Lend-Lease, criticism
of radio escalated.

Looking back at "the great debate" one

month after Pearl Harbor, Variety radio editor Robert
Landry said the industry's "official and mandatory
31

"Text of GOP Platform Pledging Preparedness,
Peace," Boston Herald, June 27, 1940, 11.

"Democratic Platform Asserts Party Increased
Economic Efficiency," Boston Herald, July 18, 1940,
32

12.

Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting- in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 143.
33
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impartiality" insured "free speech
for all." Radio "went so
far in fairness," he added, that
"broadcasters took

torrents of abuse" from both sides,

"conclusive proof that

the ideal of fairness was observed
in everyday

performances, not just the speeches of industry
spokesmen"^'*

The networks, by any quantitative standard,
did their

best to offer both sides of the neutrality
debate

comparable time. Their increasingly popular public
affairs
programs - "America's Town Meeting of the Air,"
"People's

Platform," "People's Forum," "University of Chicago
Round
Table," "America's Forum of the Air" - invariably matched
an advocate of intervention with a spokesman for isolation.
The format usually produced both a spirited confrontation
to entertain the audience and a sure defense against

charges of bias. The broadcasters also presented frequent
studio talks on the issue and provided live coverage of

rallies staged by both friends and foes of American
intervent ion

Air time was allocated with precision. When the
networks decided not to air an America First Committee

rally at New York's Madison Square Garden in October of
1941,

the organization's state chairman called it

censorship. NBC president Niles Trammell denied the charge.

Robert J. Landry, "Bigots Will Be Back After the
War," Variety, January 7, 1941, 109.

374

pointing out that the network had
broadcast fifteen
isolationist rallies during the year,
offering free time to
senator Wheeler eight times and carrying
four speeches by
Charles A. Lindbergh, America First's
leading celebrity
spokesman. To say that the isolationists
were being denied
access to the radio was simply "unfair,
unreasonable and

unjust," Trammell said, and he pledged to
"continue to
abide by our self-imposed rule of giving equal
opportunity
to important groups to express their views
over
our

facilities on controversial quest ions

.

"^5

Inevitably, just as isolationists reacted angrily
to

speakers advocating immediate aid to the British,
listeners

favoring an enlarged American role in the war bristled as
they listened to the America Firsters.

"It was irksome to

many citizens," Variety observed after America had entered
the war,

minute,

"to hear radio time apportioned,

to the anti-democrats,

minute for

the fascist -minded,

the

haters of progress, the Bundists."^^ clearly, both sides

agreed that radio was a powerful tool for shaping public
opinion and believed they had the right to use the people's
air.

The industry was caught in the middle and did its best

to give each side an opportunity to state its case.

If

"Broadcasters Deny Prejudice Charges," New York
Timee, October 31, 1940, 3; Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time:
The Life of Edward R. Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969)
236
,

.

Landry,

"Bigots Will Be Back After the War," 109.
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anything, radio broadcasters were
too cooperative, too
sensitive to charges of bias to say
no. "The usual

complaint of the minority that it
does not have an equal
opportunity to be heard is, except in
rare instances, illfounded,

wrote the general counsel of the
American civil
Liberties Union after reviewing the record.
"Probably
"

the

minority gets more proportionate time than
its numbers
warrant "^"^
.

In addition to doling out time with an
even hand,

industry spokesmen missed no chance to defend
radio's

impartiality against every challenge. When Senator
Wheeler
charged bias during the Lend-Lease debate, Philadelphia

station owner Samuel Rosenbaum, head of the NAB
of network affiliates,

not correctly informed.

'

s

committee

responded "that Senator Wheeler is
"

Station owners were acutely "aware

of public service obligations" and were "eager to bring our

listeners views on both sides of controversial issues."
Those obligations both served the public interest and

created "vital and thought -provoking programs that increase
our listening audiences, something every station desires."

Arthur Garfield Hays, "Civic Discussion Over the
Air," The Annale of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 213 (January 1941), 40. Among the few groups
which did not get "an equal opportunity to be heard, " Hays
said, were Nazis and Communists. Even in those cases, he
said, public opinion, not the broadcasters, should be
blamed. "This is because the country does not want to hear
from Nazis and Communists. It is hard to conceive how any
system of broadcasting developed even by those who have the
highest ideals of free speech could bring about any other
result
.

376

.

Broadcasters, RosenJ^aum insisted,

"have no editorial

policies. We do not color the news."
if "there is an
overwhelming current of public opinion
running one way or
another," radio reports it, but "every
listener draws his
own opinions. "38

That was the ideal the industry sought to
convey:

Radio was merely a balanced forum for the
opinions of
others with none of its own. It was an ideal
that appealed
to Chairman Fly's sense of fair play. Convinced
that
the

public interest required radio to be an honest broker
of
opinion, he sought a means to enshrine such balance
in the
law.

Unsure as how to do it without violating both the

Communications Act's explicit ban on censorship and his own
strong belief in free speech, Fly found what he hoped would
be a solution in a licensing battle over Boston radio

station WAAB

Boston department store owner John Shepard had put
WAAB on the air to publicize his business. The station had
in time proven an extremely profitable sideline, and WAAB

had become the first link in the Yankee Network, a regional
chain serving New England. Yankee had been a pioneer of
38

Samuel R. Rosenbaum of WFIL, Philadelphia, quoted
in "Self -Interest Alone is Guarantee of Unbiased Comment,
Sez Rosenbaum," Variety, February 19, 1941, 24.
The proceedings would be merged with consideration
of a rival application for WAAB s frequency. In re: The
Yankee Network, Inc. (WAAB)
FCC docket no. 564 0 and In re:
The Mayflower Broadcaetincf Corporation FCC docket no.
39

'

,

,

5618.

377

aggressive and sensational broadcast
journalism in the mid1930s when the chain refused to
acquiesce to the Biltmore
Agreement ending the Press-Radio War.
Under the direction
of flamboyant "Editor in Chief"
Leland Bickford, the

station covered breaking news throughout
the region.
Listeners also tuned in to hear Bickford's
increasingly
incendiary editorials.
Fancying himself the voice of the people,
Bickford
engaged in frequent reform campaigns v/hich
served to

publicize both him and his station. Following the
lead of
the yellow journals of the turn of the century,
WAAB

combined sensational news stories with populist crusades
to
attract an audience. Bickford railed against political
corruption, gambling and dental quackery,

inevitably taking

the side of the little guy against the interests. During
the Boston mayoral election of 1937 and the Massachusetts

gubernatorial campaign of 1938, Bickford sought to cash in
on his notoriety by selling both radio time and his

services as Editor-in-Chief to chosen candidates. For a
fee,

he would broadcast ringing endorsements of their

candidacies over WAAB and the Yankee chain. When the FCC

held preliminary hearings on the station's license renewal
in 1939,

a who's who of Massachusetts politics turned out

to condemn both Bickford and the Yankee Network and to

demand that the FCC silence them.
Former Boston mayor Frederick Mansfield charged

Bickford's attacks were both unfair and untruthful and said
378

he was denied free time to
respond. How could it be in
the
public interest, he asked, for a
station to air only one
side of a debate? "Unless I bought
radio time at $15 a
minute, or $225 for 15 minutes,"
Mansfield told the FCC

examiner,

"i

found

I

could not answer him.

"40

Bickford's campaign broadcasts were remarkable
even
for a city with Boston's rich tradition
of political
vituperation. Speaking "in the interests of"
mayoral

candidate Maurice Tobin on election eve,
1937, Bickford was
at his fulsome best.4i He denounced rival
candidate William
Foley as "a masquerader" in the thrall of "Daniel
H.

Coakley,

the political boa constrictor of Massachusetts

politics." Malcom Nichols, another candidate,

"is and

always has been a human pawn for the most vicious gang of

political pirates in Massachusetts" led by James Michael
Curley, whose "services as Mayor of Boston and as Governor
of this Commonwealth have had no equal for political filth

"Former Mayors Blast Bickford,

November

11,

1939,

"

Boston Herald,

2.

41

Leland Bickford, "Bickford Speaks!" WNAC, November
1, 1937, text in FCC docket no. 5618, record group 173, box
1690, Washington National Records Center, National Archives
and Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland. WNAC and
WAAB were both owned by the Yankee Network which in turn
operated two parallel program services, the Yankee Network
and the Colonial Network. The dual chains were created to
give sponsors a choice of advertising packages and
frequently were heard on the same stations around New
England. WNAC usually originated Yankee programming while
WAAB originated Colonial programming. Bickford was
introduced on the air as "Editor-in-Chief of the Yankee
Network and Colonial Network News Services."

379

"

and degradation." Curley and hie
minion, Bickford
proclaimed, must be denied a final
chance "to plunder and
loot the City of Boston.

Bickford steadfastly portrayed himself as
the
crusading editor, the enemy of "gangland,
crooked politics
and other subversive agencies." He had
been,
he said,

"attacked from many platforms in this State ...
because of
some of my expressions of fact," but he would
continue

to

speak out because "an honest man has nothing to
fear." To
insure his voice continued to be heard, radio must
remain a
medium "of honest and unshackled expression. .. which
makes

possible the greatest of God's many blessings, freedom
of
speech.

"42

Joseph Pulitzer could not have put it better. It

was the kind of testimonial, however, the broadcasting

industry could have done without.
The sincerity of Bickford

's

protestations was tarred

by the fact that his "honest and unshackled expression" was
for sale to the highest bidder.

Still,

his words reflect

a journalistic style that was once highly valued.

By the

Leland Bickford, radio talks, November 1, 1937,
September 15, 1938, texts in FCC docket no. 5618.
Gov. Charles Hurley told the FCC Bickford had
threatened to attack him on the air after he failed to sign
a controversial bill Bickford supported. In 1938, Bickford
editorialized on behalf of Hurley's opponent, calling the
governor "a colossal failure ... self -centered and
malicious." See Leland Bickford, radio talk, WAAB and
Colonial Network, September 15, 1938, text in FCC docket
no. 5618; "Hurley Cites Radio Attacks," Boston Herald,
November 10, 1939, 44.
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end of the 1930s, however, the
crusading editor was
becoming an anachronism. On the radio,
such creature s were
fast becoming pariahs. Conflict and
controversy
made for

exciting programming, but stations licensed
to serve the
public interest and networks fearful of
federal regulation
were retreating from taking the burden of
opinion
on their

own shoulders. A spirited roundtable discussion
among
carefully a balanced group of invited guests could
be

justified as a contribution to democratic debate,
however,

the broadcasters themselves took sides,

if,

the

leaders of the industry feared they were vulnerable
to

charges that they were seeking to use their facilities to

propagandize and were inviting regulatory retaliation.
When attorneys representing the Yankee Network and its
rival for the frequency, Mayflower Broadcasting, appeared

before the FCC to argue for the license. Fly was clearly

appalled by what he heard. As Yankee Network attorney Paul
Spearman explained how Bickford, who was still the
network's Editor-in-Chief, had given editorials on behalf
of candidates.
"Now,

Fly interrupted.

wait a minute. Let me get that clear," the

chairman said,

"The Editor in Chief of The Yankee Network

made the speech on behalf of the candidate?"
"At the candidate's request,

during time the candidate

had bought and paid for, over the station,

"

Spearman added,

insisting that Bickford was acting on his own behalf and
not in his network capacity.
381
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Fly failed to see the distinction.
"I

must say,

Mi-.

Spearman,

that

am unable to say

I

anything as an individual person in this
industry, however
much I would like to, some times."

Spearman conceded that, yes, Editor-in-Chief
Bickford
had made campaign speeches in favor of
candidates during
time purchased on the station by the
candidates and
was

indeed introduced on the air as Editor- in Chief.
"Now,

hand

then," he said,

"I

will get back to the case in

.

"Well,

we needn't be confused by that, Mr. Spearman,"

Fly interjected,

"I

think we have got the case right here,

BO far as your client is concerned,

and if you have

anything more to say on this subject,
say it

.

I

think you should

"44

Spearman explained that while Bickford was still on
the air and still called Editor-in-Chief,

he now simply

read the factual, unbiased news summaries. WAAB had stopped

broadcasting editorials when its license was challenged,
and the station's president had promised to air none in the

Federal Communications Commission, Official Report
of Proceedinge Before the Federal Communicat ione Commiceioxj
at Washington DC, in the Matter of the Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp. and the Yankee Network, Inc. FCC docket
nos 5618 and 5640, July 25, 1940, 26-33, in record group
173, box 1696, Washington National Records Center, National
Archives and Record Administration, Suitland, Maryland.
During a recapitulation of Bickford 's campaign editorials.
Fly noted that former Gov. Hurley had been his landlord
while the chairman attended Harvard Law. Proceedings 6.
44

,

,

.
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future. Fly, however, remained
focused on the station's
past performance.

"Did the Network put forward a man
for each of the
candidates," the chairman asked, "to
lend the influence of
the Network to that candidate?"
"It did not put one forward for
anybody," Spearman

protested,

"I

tell you, Mr. Chairman,

the man was acting as

an individual, and was approached as such."
Fly was clearly not satisfied.
"Let me ask you this: Do you approve of that?
Do you

approve of what happened there, and do you think
your
client approves of that?"
"I

don't think my client does now," the chastened

Spearman confessed,
three years, and

"He hasn't had any of those for two or

think

I

I

know that there will never be

any more of them; and he has indicated as much by, years
ago,

taking off all of those editorials

.

"^5

Fly's message had come through loud and clear. As a

steward of the public's air, WAAB had grossly abused its
license and thus assaulted the public interest. Yankee's

attorneys subsequently filed an affidavit from Yankee

Network president John Shepard III swearing the station
"has no intention to and will not broadcast any so-called

editorial hereafter." Yankee would "comply fully" with the

NAB Code and "refuse to present controversial questions
'^^

Proceedings

,

FCC docket nos
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.

5618 and 564 0,

33.

"

unless equal and fair opportunity is
given for the
presentation of both sides or viewpoints "46
.

Shepard's apology - and Mayflower's failure
to
assemble adequate financing to operate the
station - saved
WAAB-s license. However, neither the
station nor the
industry escaped the Commission's wrath. Fly
seized the

opportunity to announce a new policy. WAAB
the FCC stated,

•

s

management,

"has revealed a serious misconception of

its duties and functions under the law."

"Radio can serve as an instrument of democracy only

when devoted to the communication of information and the
exchange of ideas fairly and objectively presented," the

Commission's order continued.

"A truly free radio cannot be

used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be
used to support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot
be devoted to the support of principles he happens to

regard most favorably.
"In brief," the Commission announced,

"the broadcaster

cannot be an advocate." Every broadcaster using "the public
domain" of the air had "the obligation of presenting all
sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively

and without bias." While it was up to the individual

"Affidavit of John Shepard, 3rd re: present and
future policy with respect to broadcasting of so-called
editorials," sworn August 7, 1940, filed September 11,
1940, FCC docket no. 5640, box 1701.

384

station operate within these
standards,

"the ultimate duty"

to enforce them "is vested
in the Commission. "47

The Mayflower Doctrine, as the
Commission's dictum
came to be known, was firmly
rooted in the

regulatory

tradition which had evolved over the
preceding two decades.
The air was "the public domain"
and, therefore,
the

Commission argued,

-

is paramount.

"the public interest

- not the private

These requirements are inherent in the

conception of public interest set up by the
Communications
Act as the criterion of regulation. "48
In
practice,

however,

it

would be up to private interests, the nation's

radio stations, to make sure that the public
interest
prevailed. Only if the industry failed to regulate
itself

would the government step

in.

The core principle of the Mayflower Doctrine,

that

"the broadcaster cannot be an advocate," was not simply
the

result of a New Deal effort to use the licensing system to

enforce its political will on radio. It was also rooted in
the broadcasting industry's attempt to avoid government

regulation by regulating itself. Paley in 1938 had proposed

virtually identical limits on the industry's freedom of
speech when he stated "we must never have an editorial

47

Federal Communications Commission, Decieion and
Order in re: The Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation and the
Yankee Network, Inc., January 16, 1941, 8 FCC 333,
quotation at 339-40.
48 FCC,

Mayflower decision, 34 0.
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page." if broadcasters did not
voluntarily remain "wholly,
honestly and militantly nonpartisan"
while always defending
the right of others to express
their views,
"I do not

believe it would be amiss for the
Commission if it has the
power or the Congress, if the Commission
does not have the
power,

to make adherence to these principles
a prerequisite

of having and holding a broadcasting
license.

"49

The Mayflower Doctrine would survive until
1949 when
the FCC enunciated the Fairness Doctrine,
permitting

licensees to editorialize if they allowed time for
replies
from representatives of the opposite side.^o no station
was
ever stripped of its license for violating the Mayflower
Doctrine, and, because it summarized an emerging consensus

within the industry, its actual impact on how broadcasters
went about their business is difficult to ascertain.

^1

The

William S. Paley, CBS network, April 5, 1938, text
published as "Minimum Interference Asked by Paley,"
Broadcast iiiff, April 15, 1938, 15.
For an excellent summary of the evolution of the
Fairness Doctrine, see Hugh Carter Donahue, The Battle to
Control Broadcast News: Who Owns the First Amendment?
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 33-51. For an insider's view,
see Fred W. Friendly, The Good Guye The Bad Guys and the
First Amendment Free Speech vs. Fairness in Broadcasting(New York: Vintage, 1977)
The FCC report which struck down
the Mayflower Doctrine and established what became the
Fairness Doctrine is Federal Communications Commission,
Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorializing- by
Broadcast Licensees docket no. 8 516 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1949)
^°

,

:

.

,

.

For discussions of the legal ramifications of the
Mayflower Doctrine, see "Radio Editorials and the Mayflower
Doctrine," Columbia Law Review 4B (July 1948), 785-93; "The
Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled," Yale Law Journal 59 (1950),
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doctrine, as critics would later
point out, was a clear
restriction of free speech and probably
a violation

of the

Communication Act's prohibition of censorship.
The
Commission, historian Hugh Carter Donahue
argued,

"exceeded

statutory provisions in the Radio and
Communications acts,
neither of which specified public affairs
programming
or

mentioned broadcast editorials."" when the
doctrine was
repealed in 1949, the NAB s president excitedly
compared
the action to the John Peter Zenger case as
a landmark
'

in

the history of free speech.

The Mayflower Doctrine was of dubious legality,
but it

was important. It represented Fly and the FCC

•

s

response to

the widespread belief that radio was a powerful
propaganda

tool which was subject to potentially calamitous misuse.

Recalling the Yankee Network case, long-time FCC counsel

Harry Plotkin saw
but admitted,
mistake.

.

.

it as

"a germ" of the Fairness Doctrine

"in retrospect, most of us think it was a

.Probably what should have been done was to go

after them for unfairness." But how could the Commission

determine what was fair? Plotkin suggested "it was
easier... to say to a station 'You shan't editorialize at
all' rather than to say 'If you're going to editorialize

759-70; Emlyn I. Griffith, "Mayflower Rule — Gone but Not
Forgotten," Cornell Law Quarterly 35 (1950), 574-91.
52

Donahue,

The Battle to Control Broadcast News, 36.

NAB president Justin Miller, no relation to Neville
Miller, quoted in "The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled," l^On.
5^

387

you've got to be fair about it.."
On balance, Plotkin said,
the Mayflower Doctrine limited
vigorous discussion
of the

issues and "the cure was worse than
the malady. "54
the
incendiary climate of the times, however,
fairness and
balance were becoming increasingly
problematic terms.

m

Opinion and propaganda were becoming
synonymous.
Fly and his colleagues based their
action on the broad
powers of program review which the Commission
had gradually
assumed - and the courts had upheld - in the
past. These
powers stemmed directly from the "public interest"
clause
of the Communications Act and,

Fly believed, gave the FCC

far-reaching responsibility to determine how broadcasting
could best serve the people. The Commission, he believed,

could not only assess what a station had actually put
on
the air,

it

could measure an applicant against its ideal of

what a station should put on the air. As FCC assistant

general counsel Joseph Rauh had explained during the chain

broadcasting inquiry,
is to be

"the Commission's licensing function

exercised so that the radio stations operate in

the public interest,

and this includes the power in my

judgment, to see that the licensee stations give the public
the service of which they are capable." That implied more

than "determining whether the service of a station is

satisfactory as compared to other stations, that is
determining what is black and what is white." The FCC, in
54

Plotkin, COHC, 25
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other words, could in its role
as protector of the
public
interest go beyond what a station
was to what it could
become and consider "the potential
service it could render
freed from contractual restrict ions 55

An important part of that public
interest ideal as
conceived by Fly and the FCC was fairness
and

impartiality.

Yet in the period immediately before
Pearl Harbor, as both
the leaders of the industry and the FCC
sought,
in the

words of the Mayflower Doctrine, to impose
on the medium
"the obligation of presenting all sides of
important public
questions, fairly, objectively and without bias,"
broadcast
news and commentary was becoming increasingly
personal and
opinionated. Despite repeated claims of absolute

impartiality from network executives, the men and women who
were producing the daily news broadcasts heard on the air
were displaying grave doubts that disinterested,

factual

reporting served the greater goal of maintaining democracy.

Many of radio's leading journalists were promoting American
intervention in Europe.

Raymond Gram Swing, the most thoughtful and
intellectually stimulating of the era's radio commentators,
had described the professional crisis which confronted
Federal Communications Commission, Official Report
of Proceedings in the Matter of CowmiBBion b Order No. 37,
Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in
the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters, docket no.
5060, vol. 74 (December 2, 1940), 8736, record group 173,
box 1425, Washington National Records Center, National
Archives and Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland.
55
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broadcast journalists in 1939. In a
speech delivered at the
New York World's Fair, where visitors
in a time of

international conflict marveled at the
perfect world of
tomorrow, Swing spoke of his profession's
dilemma.
"In the good old days," Swing remarked,
a reporter had

been expected to be "a living camera,
registering
impressions accurately, and saying nothing
about what they
meant." As war approached and fascism threatened
the

foundations of democracy, such reporting was no
longer
enough. "Today everybody has to be concerned
about
the

meaning of news," Swing argued,

"Here is a time where the

correspondent who is indifferent to what things mean just
isn't a good correspondent."^"^

A reporter must honestly say what things mean, rather
than simply report disjointed actions as they occur.

Because they understood the importance of explaining what

events meant, and said so, the best reporters had been

accused by those who disagreed with them of editorializing,
coloring the news with "what used to be condemned as
strong personal bias." This,

a

in the superheated political

atmosphere of 1939, was a serious charge, but those who
feared that this kind of journalism was polluting public

Raymond Gram Swing, "Writing Contemporary History,
address delivered at the Hall of Music, New York World's
Fair, Flushing Meadows, May 10, 1939, text in box 1,
Raymond Gram Swing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC.
^"^

Swing,

"Writing Contemporary History," 4-5.
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discourse with dangerous propaganda
were in error. What
critics called bias, Swing said, was
actually "a strong
Bense of historic truth." Disinterested
objectivity, the
camera-like recording of actions, no longer
served the
profession, the nation or, ultimately, the
truth,

concluded,
there is

he

"because there is more truth in judgment
than

[in]

mere momentary accuracy.

"^8

Swing did not call for his colleagues to abandon
their
search for the truth. He simply reminded them that
if

journalism was to fulfill its proper function in a
democracy, reporters had to remember what that function
was.

Journalists were to provide the information that

informed public debate. For that debate to be fully
informed,

he implied,

reporters had to be certain that the

participants understood the possible results of their
decisions. Fascism was a threat to democracy, and that

truth had to be expressed. As the situation in Europe
deteriorated, radio journalists increasingly and explicitly

shared that truth with their listeners.
In March of 1941, Edward

R.

Murrow told his American

listeners of spring in England. As always, he carefully

observed the segment of history he was assigned to report,
but he also explained what things meant.

fighting weather ahead," he predicted,

^®

Swing,

"There's good

"In four days'

"Writing Contemporary History," 5-6
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time

.

the moon will be full again and
there's a feeling in the
air that big things will happen soon. "59

The British,

standing alone after the collapse of the

French in June, had the year before withstood
the brunt of
the German blitz. The courage of the outmanned
Royal Air
Force and the stoic fortitude of London's
citizens
were

admired across the Atlantic by millions of Americans
who
had heard Murrow and his colleagues describe it in
intimate,

searing detail. The United States was still

sharply divided over whether or not the nation should go
to
war, but with the passage of the Lend- Lease Act the
month

before,

the United States had cast its lot with the

British. As Murrow noted that Sunday afternoon,

"This

island lives by its ships, and the ships will be carrying
supplies from America."
Murrow'

s

broadcasts had as Archibald MacLeish would

observe later that year brought the war home to the United
States. Now, he told his audience,

the fate of democracy in

the Britain and the United States were intertwined.

"The

course of Anglo-American relations will be smooth on the
surface," Murrow predicted,

"but many people over here will

express regret because they believe America is making the
same mistakes Britain made." It would be up to Americans,
the government and people of the United States,

to make the

CBS network, March 9, 1941; Edward R. Murrow, This
IB London, ed. Elmer Davis (New York: Simon and Schuster,
231-7
1941)
5^

,
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necessary decisions "in the full light
of publicity and
debate," he continued, "and no mere
radio reporter has the
right to use the weight of monopolized
opportunity in an
effort to influence those decisions ." so To
Murrow, of

course, the decision was clear. Fascism
had to be resisted

and democracy defended. If that required
American military
intervention - and he was convinced by 1941 it did -

so be

Although he larded his report with the terminology
of
objective reporting - prefacing his remarks with "many
it.

people over here

.

.

.

bel ieve

.
.

.

"

and "British statesmen are

fond of repeating..." - and explicitly stated that "no
mere radio reporter" should attempt to "influence" public

opinion on such a vital issue, his point of view is
obvious. Reading his text today, and imagining how it was

heard by his audience in 1941, the message is clear: The
focus of the conflict was shifting to the United States.

Appeasement and failure to stand ready to defend ourselves,
"the same mistakes the British made," would lead only to

war

Murrow was explaining to his audience what the events
unfolding before them meant. His views were shared by most
of the nation's leading radio news broadcasters including

virtually all of the network correspondents in Europe. The
changing climate of opinion was noted in the White House.
Robert Sherwood, who had joined the administration as a

60

Murrow,

This ib London, 23 6
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speech writer for the 194 0 campaign,
observed that radio
was building support for the
Roosevelt administration's
increasingly interventionist policies.
"The great American
foreign correspondents had for years been
warning
of the

menace of German and Japanese imperialism,"
he recalled.
"The voices of Edward R. Murrow and
Fred Bate from London,
William L. Shirer from Berlin, Elmer Davis from
New York,

Raymond Gram Swing from Washington, among many
others, did
much to strengthen Roosevelt's position. "Si
Those few remaining isolationist broadcasters who
did
not agree with the prevailing opinion, Murrow believed,

deserved only scorn.

"Someday - perhaps before long if

things go on as they are," he wrote to Elmer Davis in the
fall of 1940,

"I

propose to say some pretty hard things

about American commentators and this war.

"^2

^e was

thinking, no doubt, of isolationists such as Mutual

•

s

Boake

Carter and Fulton Lewis, Jr. To fail to realize that the
future of democracy in the United States was inextricably

linked to the fate of Britain was, Murrow believed, simply

wrong

Murrow explicitly exempted Davis from his criticism
because, as Sherwood had noted, his fellow broadcaster had

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An
Intimate Hietory (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 165.
^1

S2

Murrow to Davis, September 15, [1940],
correspondence folder, 1940-42, box 1, Elmer Davis Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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become an increasingly outspoken
advocate of American
intervention." Always strongly antifascist,
Davis was
among those who were appalled by the
British concessions at
Munich. The Chamberlain government's
surrender to Hitler
confirmed his worst suspicions of the moral
rot which

afflicted class-bound Britain. Certainly, Hitler
presented
the greater threat to American democracy, but
should
the

United States fight to preserve England? Davis'
evolution
from opponent of American military involvement to
ardent

interventionist followed a path taken by many liberals in
the years before Pearl Harbor.

Davis analyzed the European crisis strictly in terms
of American self-interest which, broadly defined,

he

equated with political democracy and liberal capitalism.

^4

How could the cost of another war to the United States be
balanced against the possibility of a German victory? In
February,

1939,

Davis knew the question had to be asked,

but he was unsure of the answer.
minds,

"We had better make up our

in case anybody ever asks us,

"

he observed,

"just

what there is in the present distribution of power in

See Alfred Haworth Jones, "The Making of an
Interventionist on the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News 19391941," Pacific Historical Review A2 (February 1973), 74-93
and Culbert, News for Everyman, 12 5-48.

Elmer Davis, "We Lose the Next War," Harper's
Magazine, March 1938, 338-42.
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^

Europe

...

that is worth our fighting for.

"65

^^^^ ^^^^^

with the Allies giving ground on the
battlefield, Davis
took a more activist position but still
stopped short

of

endorsing intervention.

"To those who say that we must shun

involvement no matter what happens," he wrote,

"it might be

said that whenever we judge that direct American
interests
are threatened we are damned fools if we leave
defense of
those interests to Providence." For the time being,
however, material aid to the Allies was commitment
enough;

"anything else, at present, would accomplish no good at
all

commensurate with its coBt."^^
In the spring of 1941, as Murrow warned of coming

German offensives and reminded Americans of their role in
deciding the fight, Davis went to London.

p^j.

fi^re

weeks,

with Murrow as his host, he revisited the city and
countryside he had kno\'m thirty years before as a Rhodes
scholar at Oxford and broadcast his Columbia commentaries
from the bombproof basement studios of the British

Broadcasting Corporation. When he returned to New York,
Davis made his case against isolationism and on behalf of

increased American involvement.

"This war can be won,"

Elmer Davis, "Is England Worth Fighting For?" New
Republic, February 15, 1939, 35.
^5

Elmer Davis, "The War and America," Harper's
Magazine, April 194 0, 4 82.
66

See Elmer Davis, "Journey to England, 1941:
Footnotes for a Future Gibbon," Harper's Magazine, August
1941, 225-36.
67
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DaviB told his network audience,
fact,

he said,

"but it won't be easy.

m

"unless the American people want to win
it

badly enough to work at it - harder than
we are working
now, which is to say that unless we
produce more war
material than we are producing now and see
that far

more of

when we produce gets to England, the war may
be lost.

"68

It was no longer enough for the United
States to be

the arsenal of democracy, Davis explained. The
British

could no longer transport food and munitions across
the

Atlantic alone in the teeth of the German submarine wolf
packs.

"We shall have to help see that the stuff gets

there," Davis continued,

"That means convoys, which may

mean shooting, but if Hitler should win this war, there's

likely to be some shooting afterwards which would no longer
be on the other side of the Atlantic.

"^9

By the early

summer of 194 1, Davis had become, as historian Alfred Jones
observed,

"an advocate of belligerency in all but name.""0

By any standard, this was a controversial view, going well

beyond the declared policy of the United States government.
Davis' broadcasts seemed to violate both Columbia's

internal policies and the industry's voluntary agreement on

Davis broadcast "a digest and conclusions" of what
he had observed in England over the Columbia network. The
"greater part" of the broadcast was published as Elmer
Davis, letter to the editor, Saturday Review of Literature,
June 14, 1941, 9.
68

69

Davis,

letter to the editor,

'^^

Jones,

"The Making of an Interventionist," 92.
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war coverage which pledged that no
news analyst would "be
allowed to say anything in an effort to
influence acti on or
opinion of others one way or the other, "^i
However, both
propaganda and objectivity are subjective
terms. Davis

would argue that his conclusions were based
on careful
reporting and analysis, the basic tools of the

independent

journalist.

Isolationists such as Wheeler and Mundt saw

signs of underlying bias and willful distortion
of the
facts in order to reach a predetermined end. Those
who

hoped to keep the United States out of the war agreed
with
Sherwood's assessment of radio's impact. The reports from
Murrow, Davis, Swing and the others were building support

for Roosevelt's policy, and isolationists took frequent pot

shots at the same news broadcasters the White House
praised. As the lend-lease vote approached, Wheeler,

explicitly invoking the principles of the Mayflower
Doctrine, charged network commentators were "not only

editorializing, but in many instances propagandizing" for
war. He fired off letters to each of the networks asking

them "to furnish me with a list of commentators, together

with the names of their sponsors, and if the sponsor is a
corporation,

to give me the name of the president of the

company, and the members of the Board of Directors

."

"^^

Left

"Memorandum of European War Coverage," NAB
[National Association of Broadcasters] Reports 7 (September
3717-8
15, 1939)
71

,

Quoted in "Isolationist, Bitter, Turns on Radio,"
Variety, February 19, 1941, 24. While attacking
"72
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.

.

s

unsaid was the implicit threat of
letter-writing campaigns
and consumer boycotts against companies
sponsoring
"propaganda

.

The secretary of the New York chapter
of America First
said radio had failed to balance "interventionist"

commentators such as Davis, Kaltenborn and Dorothy
Thompson
with "non-interventionists" and was guilty of
unfairness 73
.

Mundt, expressing concern over what he called
"emotionalism

and hysteria" on the radio, singled out Kaltenborn"frequent extremes in excitation." Radio had acted to
tone

down radio drama after the "War of the Worlds" broadcast,
he said,

and he hoped radio executives would not need

"legislative stimulus or restraint" to convince them to
"use equal discretion in not permitting factual reporting
to be colored by hysterical and emotional commentators

whose inflections and intonations can well induce emotional

upsets and develop panicky thinking if they carelessly or

deliberately engage in all the histrionics of their art
instead of functioning simply as reporters of the news.""^^

Mundt

'

comments, of course, virtually paraphrased the

s

networks

'

memorandum on war coverage

commentators in general. Wheeler's main target appears to
have been Mutual s Raymond Gram Swing.
'

"Mary Hiller Charges 'Interventionists' Get Breaks;
Sneers at Wheeler Praise," Variety, April 16, 1941, 28.
73

"^^

Mundt,

"A Question Radio Executives Should Ponder,"

3547

399

Broadcasters groped for a practical way of
meeting
this standard. By offering balanced
amounts of

free time to

advocates of controversial causes, radio
could present
quantifiable, defensible evidence of its
evenhandedness By
refusing to sell time for the promotion of
controversial
.

issues,

the industry could deflect charges that
freedom of

speech was available only to those who could afford
to buy
it. By refusing to editorialize in their
own names,
networks and stations could argue they were not abusing
their privileged positions as guardians of the public's
airwaves. By pledging to harness opinionated commentators,

broadcasters could present carefully crafted statements of

good intentions to truculent critics.
While these policies provided some measure of

protection to the industry, radio's increasingly
sophisticated coverage of war news was threatening to
create an especially difficult problem. That in war, truth
is the first casualty is a commonplace,

deserves analysis.

"^^

but it is one which

Certainly military censorship and the

fog of battle present formidable obstacles to even the most

well-intentioned observer. Add to that the burden of social
and cultural assumptions any reporter brings to the story.

Phillip Knight ley, The First Casualty: From the
Crimea to Vietnam The War Correspondent as Hero,
Propagandist and Myth Maker (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1975) is a jaundiced chronicle of war
correspondence. Knightley credits the title phrase to Sen.
Hiram Johnson of California in 1917.
:

,
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and the search for truth - if such
a thing exists becomes a fool's errand. For radio,
which because it was
primarily emotional was fundamentally
irrational,

the

search for objective truth was especially
futile.

When Murrow spoke of the resolute Londoner
enduring
the terrors of the blitz or of the
shopkeeper's

uncomprehending response to the suggestion that his
store
might be bombed before winter's end, he was reporting
facts, but he was more importantly conveying
emotions. The

search for the telling detail which would bring the

atmosphere of a city far away to a listener at home led
inevitably to what Cesar Saerchinger, Murrow'

s

predecessor

as European representative for CBS, called "a surfeit of

impressionism.

"

Eyewitness accounts were factual in that

they recorded events which had occurred but necessarily
emotional,

"and for the American public to be told for the

nth time from Paris that the French were resolute, and from
London that the British were keeping their chins up, was
apt to sound like propaganda, whether intentional or
not "'s
.

Critics of the Roosevelt administration's domestic

policies were equally convinced that the content of news
reports was tainted. They remained certain that the

combination of the FCC

'

s

licensing power and the

Cesar Saerchinger, "Radio, Censorship and
Neutrality," Foreign Affaire 18 (January 1940), 344.
"^^
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adminiBtration's formidable publicity machinery
would
strangle freedom of the air. The broadcasters
were not
really at fault. Republican Representative
George Bender of
Ohio said. It was the politicized FCC that
was to blame. No
broadcaster. Bender said,

"knowing full well that his

license is subject to termination is going to
invite that
kind of penalty by not opening his microphones

to 'official

news' which has been signed,

recognized authority,

sealed, and delivered by the

""^"^

Radio's dilemma was furthered by the reaction of its
listeners. The broadcaster's words were shaped by the

audience's preconceptions. A study of a thousand New York
area listeners conducted in the winter of 1940-41 revealed
not only overwhelming sympathy for the British and

hostility toward the Germans but a strong tendency to
believe news reports citing British sources while

disbelieving news from Germany. One implication to be drawn
about. the typical radio listener,

Variety reported, was

"that because of this predisposition — or mental pattern —

Quoted in "Congressmen Divide on Party Lines
Concerning 'Censorship' Menace; Deny Mel let Rap of Fulton
Lewis," Variety, April 2, 1941, 23. During the budget
debate concerning the Office of Government Reports,
Republicans charged OGR director Lowell Mellet had "cursed"
Mutual s conservative commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr. and
threatened to have him "heaved off the air." Lewis would
remain on the air for years to come, but the fact the
charge was made — and earnestly denied by Roosevelt
partisans — indicates that administration opponents
believed such allegations would resonate among
constituencies fearful of New Deal domination of the radio
"^"^

'

industry.
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he could perhaps be propagandized
... within certain
limits. "78 Listeners predisposed to
support the British and
oppose the Germans, or support
intervention and oppose
isolation, would hear in a radio report,
no matter how

carefully balanced, the news they wished to
hear.
As the elusive nature of objectivity became
more and
more evident, and the interventionist tilt
of network

coverage more apparent, the industry as a matter
of policy
clung to its stated credo of unbiased reporting
more and
more tenaciously. At CBS, the news leader, the
network's
analysts, as Columbia insisted on describing its

commentators, remained a particular problem.

"^^

The

politically acute Paley remained constantly concerned about
his news programs and how the analysts' comments and the

reporters' dispatches would play in Washington. Murrow, the
jev/el

in Columbia's crown,

remained largely above the fray.

His frequent statements of impartiality, both on the air
and in public appearances, placed him solidly on the record

Edgar A. Grunwald, "Schwerin Survey Timely in Light
of Isolationist's Newscast Issue," Variety, February 19,
1941, 24. The survey was conducted by market researcher
Horace Schwerin of Specter Advertising in cooperation with
WOR.

Columbia's difficulty in coming up with an
appropriate title for its broadcast journalists became a
running joke among the network's staffers. Murrow in 194 3
referred to himself in a letter to Davis as "reporter,
commentator, analyst or whatever circumlocution Columbia
has now dreamed up to describe its wage slaves." Murrow to
Davis, December 15, 1943, "Correspondence 1943-46" file,
box 1, Davis Papers.
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as supportive of the network's policy
whatever private

doubts he had and however his listeners
understood his
words
The voluble Kaltenborn proved especially
troublesome,

but by May of 1940, he was no longer Columbia's
problem.

Kaltenborn's sponsor switched the commentator's
broadcasts
from CBS to NBC. Despite his popularity with
listeners,

Kaltenborn had long been an irritant due to his insistence
on voicing his own opinions, and Paley made no real
attempt
to keep him.

80

shortly after his departure, when

Representative Mundt attacked Kaltenborn for his "frequent
extremes of excitation," Columbia vice-president Harry

Butcher was assigned to placate the congressman. In a
telephone conversation and subsequent letter, Butcher

restated the network's policies and explained, according to
Mundt,

"how certain radio commentators had been

discontinued because their methods were on the side of the
hysterical rather than the factual" and how "radio was

constantly watching its programs to keep them in harmony

with the best interests of the country.

"^^

Butcher

apparently mentioned no names — Mundt mentioned none — but
See David G. Clark, "H.V. Kaltenborn and his
Sponsors: Controversial Broadcasting and the Sponsor's
Role," Journal of Broadcasting- 12 (Fall 1968), 309-21 and
Culbert, Newe for Everyman, 76-80.
80

Butcher to Mundt, June 5, 194 0 in "Columbia
Broadcasting System Answers Congressman Mundt s Open
Question to Radio Executives," 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
CongreBBional J?ecorc?( June 7, 1940), vol. 86, pt 16, 3644-5
81

'

.
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the network had within the past two years shed
both Boake

Carter and Kaltenborn. Kaltenborn felt compelled to
send a
letter to the congressman for publication in the
ConcfreBBional Record restating his position that the move
to NBC had been solely a business matter and any
suggestion

that he had been "dismissed" by CBS was "unfounded.

"^^

That

Butcher would tell Mundt the network had discontinued
hysterical commentators - and Columbia did not challenge
Mundt

'

s

account of the discussion - reflects Columbia's

eagerness to portray itself as a responsible public servant

which could be trusted to keep its own house in order
without government intervention.
Davis,

too,

caused CBS concern. The commentator spoke

each evening from 8:55 until 9:00,

in the heart of

Columbia's prime time schedule. His talents and visibility

brought him praise and wealth, and Columbia profited as
well,

directly by the advertising revenue Davis generated

and indirectly by the audience he attracted which remained

tuned in. He was radio's highest paid newsman, and the NewYork TinteE called him "the Mount Everest of commentators,

towering in serenity and grandeur over the foothill

Kaltenborn to Mundt, June 12, 194 0 in "More About
Radio in Wartime," 76th Cong., 3rd sess., CongreBsional
Record (June 18, 1940), vol. 86, pt 16, 3992-3. While the
evidence shows that CBS was not upset that Kaltenborn
switched networks, the commentator's claim that his sponsor
was pleased with his work is valid. Pure Oil, which picked
up Kaltenborn' s broadcasts in 1939, continued to sponsor
him until 1953.
®2

.
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Caseandras of hie time.

"83

"

Davis' grandeur made him an

inviting target for critics, however, as did
his penchant
for frankly stating his beliefs. Paley would
meet Davis for

lunch at least once a month and, Columbia's
president would
recount years later, caution the commentator that
he was

straying from the network's policy of neutrality,
often

appearing to "get too much viewpoint in" to his nightly
broadcasts.

84

Any potential showdown was averted because

Davis resigned in 1942 to head the Office of War
Information. Tension seems to have lingered. When the war
ended,

Paley expressed no serious interest in rehiring

Davis,

sending a staff lawyer to deliver a perfunctory

offer to Davis' agent while the presidents of NBC, ABC and
Mutual each personally courted the commentator

Paley '6 concern over maintaining the appearance of

objectivity was passed down the ranks through White and on
to the network staff,

apparently with some frequency. In

May of 1940, as the German Army rumbled through the low
countries and into France, White wrote to his European
correspondents.
record,

I

"At the risk of sounding like a phonograph

should like to stress again the vital necessity

Quoted in Bernard Roshco, "A Giant Named Elmer,
WaBhington tlournalism Review, December 1991, 35. Davis was
making $53,000 a year in 1942.
®^

84

Quoted in Smith, In All Hie Glory,

85

Smith,

In All His Glory,

ABC.
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233-4. Davis signed with

s

for objectivity." He cited no specific
violations of the

network's policy instead praising William

L.

Shirer

'

reports from the front as positive examples
of objective
journalism. The broadcasts, he said, "stand out
as

masterpieces of reporting and created an excellent
impression here."^^ ghirer had covered the offensive
from
the German side,

traveling through Belgium with the Sixth

Army. All of his broadcasts were carefully vetted
by
mil itary censors

®^

.

White to "Dear Gang"

[European staff], [May 25
1940], Marrow Papers, reel 15, folder 164, frame 0062.'

William L. Shirer, 20th Century Journey: A Memoir
of a Life and the Times, vol. II: The Nightmare Years,
1930-1940 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984)
491-516. American
broadcasters maintained a curious relationship with German
censors until American reporters were banished from Berlin
in 1941. Shirer observed in his memoirs "that you could say
a great deal if you were not too careless in how you said
it." Frequently, German authorities were quite helpful.
When the invasion of the low countries began, Shirer was
awaJcened by a telephone call from a state radio staffer
informing him of the offensive and asking, "You want to go
on the air soon?" After arranging transmitter time, censors
refused to allow Shirer to refer to "an invasion" in his
opening sentence, but agreed to allow him to say the army
had "marched into" Holland and Belgium, a compromise Shirer
found acceptable. When the armistice was signed at
Compiegne June 22, Shirer and NBC's William KerJcer
described the ceremony in a joint broadcast over a special
high-quality line installed by German radio. Shirer, 20th
Century Journey, II, 395, 490, 494, 531-43. When NBC's
Hjalmar Baukhage broadcast from Berlin in the first month
of the war, state radio provided not only facilities but a
staff announcer to heartily deliver the commentator's
standard opening cue: "Let's listen to Baulchage " NBC
networlc, September 14, 1939, in Motion Picture,
Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC. Both sides realized the
importance of radio in shaping American public opinion and
did their best to present a positive image to listeners in
the United States.
,

!
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In July of 1941, White and Eric
Sevareid engaged in

heated argument over a Sevareid dispatch
from Washington
which White insisted had crossed the line
dividing analysis
and opinion. 88 After reporting to his
listeners that
President Roosevelt had returned to Washington
ready to
"take up again the thread of defense
preparations,"

Sevareid criticized the way the nation's journalists
were
covering the neutrality debate. Broadcasters and
writers,

he suggested, were carrying the idea of balance
and

fairness too far at a time when the nation was in a
state
of emergency.

Every statement by the president would be

countered by a predictable response, pro or con.

"You know,

for example that Representative Bloom will applaud the

President's speech, and that Senator Wheeler will frown

upon it." This did nothing to advance democratic debate,
Sevareid continued. It merely encouraged pointless argument
and dangerous delay.
concluded,
for action,

"Is there not grave danger," he

"that continued talk is becoming a substitute
in a world where we know that action alone can

save a people?"

Sevareid had carefully phrased his comments as

a

question, a common rhetorical technique for sheltering a

point of view, but White was not deceived. He believed the

broadcast was a direct slap at the network's policies.

WJSV and CBS network, July 5, 1941, script in
"Broadcasts 1939-42" folder, box Dl, Eric Sevareid Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
88

408

"

"With reference to your script of July
5," White wrot
"the more I read it the less I like it."
It is essential in a democracy that
anyone and
everyone should have his say at all times.
Thus,

cannot agree with you that there is any
journalistic problem at all. I grant you that you
said you were not certain of the answers to
the
questions you raised, but it seems to me that
your very raising of the questions was a sort of
answer in itself.
I

"Briefly," White concluded,

"it seems to me that you

ventured into a dangerous line of territory.
Four days later, Sevareid replied with a thoughtful

defense of his original broadcast and critique of how the

press in general and Columbia in particular was covering
the neutrality debate. 3° "To my mind," he wrote,

"there are

irresponsible men in this country who [are] dividing and

confusing the people." While he "would not for one moment
deny them access to the press or radio," a journalist "must

daily exercise judgment on these things." This is "our

problem and our responsibility.
"I

am not suggesting that gentlemen like Wheeler and

Lindbergh be silenced or denied access to the means of
reaching the public," Sevareid wrote. Given "the present
crisis," however, journalism's commitment to balance and

White to Sevareid, July 7, 1941, in "Personal
Correspondence, 1941" folder, box Al, Sevareid Papers.

Sevareid to White, July 11, 1941, corrected typed
draft in "Personal Correspondence, 1941" folder, Box Al,
Sevareid Papers.
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fairness had gone too far. The industry
had become a
prisoner of its ovm rhetoric. Editors,
Sevareid suggested
"have a downright sensation of guilt"
every time they give
Wheeler and Lindbergh publicity. "But they
are buffaloed!

They do not want to contribute to confusion
and disunity,"
he said,

"but they are afraid of being accused of
denying

freedom of speech.

"

Radio was especially reluctant to

silence the isolationists, Sevareid suggested,
because the
industry was liable to retaliation. "Wheeler keeps
us all

frightened by his attacks on radio commentators and his
strategic position in the Senate."
"In brief,

Paul," Sevareid concluded,

"I

think we have

reached the point in this country where we face the old

problem of a democracy where we have to decide what

is free

speech and what is filibuster."

White's response to Sevareid'

s

letter was somev/hat

more temperate than his first letter, but he remained as

strongly committed to the network's policy as ever.
grant you there is a journalistic problem,

"

"I

will

he conceded.

Continually quoting the same few sources "is tired and
perhaps lazy journalism." On the other hand, he wrote,

"I

don't believe that you have any more right to discuss your

private opinions in the guise of a reporter than

I

would

have to instruct CBS correspondents to plead for a

negotiated peace."
White made no reference to Sevareid's charge that the

industry was "frightened" by Wheeler. By the summer of
410

"

.

1941, perhaps no response was needed because
the record was
BO clear. White was enforcing a
network policy which had in

large part been shaped by the industry's
attempts to
regulate itself rather than be further
regulated by the
Btate
The FCC in May had finally issued its report
on chain

broadcasting, and the recommendations had confirmed
the
networks' worst fears. NBC and CBS, the Commission
concluded, were through long-term, exclusive contracts
with

affiliates across the country unfairly limiting
competition. Both chains were ordered to loosen their hold

on their affiliates, and NBC was ordered to divest itself
of one of its two networks,

Both CBS and NBC claimed the

FCC was jeopardizing their ability to do business and filed
suit to block the new regulations. The Commission had

anticipated the networks' response and included a warning
to the broadcasters in its report.

If the networks could

not in fact thrive under the new regulations,

Commission concluded,

the

"we must frankly concede that

broadcasting is not properly a competitive industry.

"

In

that case. Congress must create a new regulatory structure
^1

Federal Communications Commission, "Commission
Order in Docket No. 506 0, In the Matter of the
Investigation of Chain Broadcasting," May 2, 1941, Report
on Chain Broadcasting, 91-2. Rather than seek to directly
regulate the networks, the FCC attacked through its power
to license individual stations, stating, for example, that
"no license shall be issued to a standard broadcast station
affiliated with an organization which maintains more than
one network
.
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"appropriate to a noncompetitive industry with
adequate
safeguards to protect listeners, advertisers,
and
consumers. "92 The debate over radio regulation,
it

appeared, was far from over.

Sevareid's broadcast and his subsequent letter
reveal
a strong disagreement between respected broadcast

journalists over the ideal of balance so strongly
promoted
by the network. Perhaps, as a relatively junior member
of

the CBS news department, Sevareid lacked the sophistication
to conceal sufficiently his views and the standing to
avoid
a direct reprimand.

Murrow and Davis enjoyed greater

prestige and listenership and had mastered the artful
disclaimer.

It is not difficult to imagine how Murrow,

for

instance, would have framed Sevareid's original script with

references to "members of the diplomatic corps," "concerned
Congressmen" or "administration sources." The message would
have remained the same, but it would have been couched in
the terminology of objective journalism.

Radio's growing emphasis on factual, reportorial

journalism as the Second World War approached was neither
the inevitable result of journalistic maturity nor

advertising pressures. As the possibility of American
intervention in the war became a matter of debate,

broadcast journalists became less and less certain of their

ability to discern the truth and more and more convinced
92

FCC, Report on Chain Broadcast incf,
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88-9.

that the impending crisis was such
a fundamental challenge
to democracy that, like all Americans
who understood the

gravity of the moment, they were obliged
to sound the
warning. They could most effectively do
this, as

Davis had

candidly admitted, while adopting the objective
style of
factual reporting.
Advertisers as always sought programming which

attracted attentive audiences and showcased their
messages
in a complimentary frame.

If audiences tuned to news,

advertisers would follow. The nightly reviews of popular

commentators such as Davis, Thomas and Kaltenborn were
sponsored, but the majority of news programs were

sustaining programs. While a few advertisers such as Ford
sought to advance their own political agendas, most were

content to follow the ratings, drawing the line only when
their product was attacked.
The primary impetus for the increasing emphasis on

factual reportage was network policy, best documented by

Columbia's repeated claims of absolute impartiality. The

question then becomes: Why did the networks insist they

demanded objectivity even if their programs contained what
can only be described as expressions of personal opinion?

Some advertisers were more tolerant than others.
Columbia's Arthur Godfrey, for instance, made a habit of
kidding his sponsors. A few were upset, but most, notably
Lipton Tea, egged him on, realizing that his jibes were
merely additional advertising.
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The answer can be found by examining
the political climate
of the time.
The broadcasting industry's fear of damaging
federal

regulation played a vital role in shaping what
Americans
heard on the air. The late New Deal's renewed
attention

to

monopoly, personified at the FCC by Chairman Fly,

crystallized that fear, but more profound cultural
influences were also at play. From the beginning, radio
was

synonymous with freedom: freedom from the physical

constraints of space and time, from the boredom of everyday
existence, but also more fundamental freedoms. The new

medium promised freedom of information which could mean
political and economic freedom, too.
By allowing every American immediate and equal access
to information, by freeing information from corporate and

governmental control, radio promised to fulfill the promise
of democracy. As radio the industry became increasingly

centralized, the democratic promise of radio the medium

seemed to many to be slipping away. Opponents of
centralization, governmental or corporate, sought to save
their medium from monopoly. Unable to agree on how best to

achieve their goal, they could develop no coherent policy
to challenge the American System of Broadcasting.

The motley amalgam of New Dealers, prairie populists,

social conservatives, liberal reformers and political

opportunists who attacked the industry was far too diverse
to reach agreement.

The leaders of the broadcasting
414

business, on the other hand, were
fighting to protect an
industry which had in the space of two
decades grown into a
wealthy and much loved institution. The
builders of
the

industry felt their rewards were well
worth the sacrifice
of their right to speak out on the issues.
Let that
be

someone else's job. They would be content to
provide the
platform and collect the fees.
Ironically, radio could not escape the burdens of

citizenship. The medium, despite its protestations,
helped
shape America in the years between the wars, economically

and politically. And in the final years of peace, as radio

cried the loudest that it was not in business to promote
one point of view rather than another,
role.

it

played a crucial

Radio broadcasts brought the conflict home and made

the world war that many Americans hoped to avoid a reality.
It was oddly fitting that when the debate over America's

participation in the war ended on December

7,

1941,

most

Americans first learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor from
their radios. The first bulletins that Sunday afternoon

were models of objective, factual reporting, but, like

Murrow's equally objective accounts of the London blitz,
the dispassionate statements of facts unleashed a torrent

of emotions.

It was the nature of radio that these hopes

and fears ultimately created a far more accurate truth than
mere facts could construct.
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EPILOGUE
"OBJECTIVE NEWS REPORTING IS NOT ENOUGH"^

After Pearl Harbor, the neutrality debate which
had
divided the nation crashed to a halt. The question of

what

role the United States would play in the conflict and
how

radio would address the controversy was suddenly moot. Now,

Americans overwhelmingly agreed, there was only one side of
the question worth hearing. Radio rushed to enlist in the

war effort, becoming "a voluntary propagandist" in the
great struggle to defend democracy.

2

Radio boosted morale

on the home front with flag-waving entertainment and
publicity. Across the Pacific and into Africa and Europe,
the Signal Corps set up scores of radio stations to

entertain the troops with recorded programs from back
home

.

^

Network correspondents accompanying Allied forces

Paul White, editorial broadcast, "KFMB Editorial
Page," June 1, 1951, text in Edward R Murrow Papers 19271965 (Sanford, North Carolina: Microfilming Corporation of
America, 1982)
reel 21, folder 287, frame 0016.
^

.

,

See James L. Baughman, The Republic of Mass Culture:
Journal i em, Filmmaking, and Broadcasting in America since
1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
2

The best contemporary account of the broadcasting
industry's war effort is Edward M. Kirby and Jack W.
Harris, Star -Spangled Radio (Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948)
Some network broadcasters including John Houseman of
Columbia's Mercury Theatre of the Air and many refugees
from European radio studios joined the new Voice of America
which beamed programs to occupied territory behind German
lines. They, too, would discover the problems inherent in
objective journalism. See Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice of
^
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brought the story of the war home with gripping
reports
from the front. The most memorable - such as Edward
R.

Murrow's description of a bombing run over the
"orchestrated hell" of Berlin in 1943 and the eyewitness
account of the Normandy invasion in 1944 by George Hicks

aboard the Ancon - featured vivid, first -person reportage
replete with telling details, hallmarks of the objective
style of factual reporting which had become the networks'

standard in the late 1930s.
Disputes over opinionated news broadcasting were rare
in the first years of the war.

Broadcasters willingly

cooperated with voluntary censorship guidelines developed

by the government, and no commentator could hope to attract
an audience by opposing the war effort or by jeopardizing
the lives of our boys overseas. As the tide turned in the

allies'

favor and the question became when, not whether,

the war would be won,

however, government leaders began to

turn their attention to the coming peace. So, too, did

radio commentators
America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press^ 1991).

Throughout the war, the networks stubbornly clung to
their policy forbidding recorded news programs. There were,
however, exceptions to the rule. Radio reporters who
attempted to capture the sound of battle for later
broadcast were forced to rely on cumbersome and
temperamental technology. Hicks' description of the
Normandy landing was recorded on a "portable" machine which
transcribed sound on movie film and weighed seventy-five
pounds. Magnetic sound recording tape was developed in
Germany and did not fall into American hands until later in
^

1944

.

417

^

In 1943,

Columbia's Cecil Brown charged on the air

that allied leaders were failing to rally the
public behind
a vision of a truly democratic postwar world.

Brown's

broadcasts created a furor, and CBS reacted. News
director
Paul White again defended the precepts of objectivity
and

impartiality that had been enshrined in the network's

memorandum on European war coverage and became embroiled in
a public controversy over biased news and the right of

radio commentators to offer their opinions.

Brown was one of Columbia's wartime stars, albeit one

with a history of alienating both sponsors and co-workers.
"Of all the people who came up in those days," William L.

Shirer later said,

"he had the most swelled head of

anybody." Brown himself admitted the point, saying he had

been "one of the first prima donnas" and never considered
himself "part of the team.

He had been aboard the

H14S

Repulee when she was sunk by the Japanese in 1941, and he
had covered the fall of Singapore. While the British were

fighting the Japanese, the hot-tempered Brown was fighting
the British censors. White was concerned enough about his

correspondent's "crusading" attitude to telegraph a
warning:

"Please exercise caution regarding faultfinding

The best account of the Brown affair is Craig D.
Tenney, "The 1943 Debate on Opinionated Broadcast News,"
Journaliem History 7 (Spring 1980), 11-5. For White's side
of the story, see Paul W. White, News on the Air (New York
Harcourt, Brace, 1947), 198-207.
5

Quoted in Tenney,
Broadcast News," 13.
6

"The 1943 Debate on Opinionated
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.

except where it is necessary in any objective
news

reporting
debts

.

Public will feel you are paying off old

"7

As Roosevelt and Churchill parlayed at Quebec in
1943,

Brown criticized them for a failure in leadership. People
across the United States, he suggested, were no longer sure
what they were fighting for. Like Wilson and Lloyd George,
the allies were winning the war, he said, but they might

lose the peace unless they rallied their nations in support
of a just future. White responded with a stinging reprimand

describing the broadcast as "a statement of what Cecil
Brown thinks, of what Cecil Brown would have done had he

been President Roosevelt, disregarding the very obvious
truth that the people did not elect Cecil Brown but did
elect President Roosevelt.

After a confrontation with

White, Brown resigned and went public, claiming he had been

victimized by censorship.
The resulting controversy reignited the battle over

objectivity in broadcast news. Brown claimed his assessment
of the nation's mood was based on conversations he had had

during a recent nationwide speaking tour and was every bit
as valid and as unbiased as Davis' heralded reports on the

mood of the British people aired by Columbia two years

Quoted in Edward Bliss, Jr. Now the News: The Story
of Broadcast Journal i em (New York: Columbia University
Press,

1991)

,

124

Quoted in Tenney,
Broadcast News," 13.
8

"The 1943 Debate on Opinionated
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before. H.V. Kaltenborn and NBC commentator
John Vandercook

were among those who rallied to Brown's defense.
Kaltenborn

insisted that "no news analyst worth his salt could
or

would be completely neutral or objective.

.

.

.Every exercise

of his editorial judgment constitutes an expression of

opinion.

"9

Vandercook shared a CBS microphone with White on

a broadcast devoted to discussing the controversy and said

the network suffered from a "basic fallacy." How, he asked,

could CBS say with certainty what was true? "Only self-

appointed censors and only those of a dictatorial trend of
mind,

"

Vandercook said,

"have ever been so vain as even to

claim that they could make that fine distinction.

"^0

Brown, Kaltenborn and Vandercook were all expressing a

modern, practical view of journalistic objectivity which

had been evolving through the interwar years. It was
impossible,

they believed, for any reporter to discern the

absolute truth. Given that, journalists should attempt to
be factual, fair and balanced while sharing their

interpretations with the audience. This, they believed, was
a better measure than the unattainable standard of absolute

impartiality the networks had established. White disagreed.
"The Golden Rule is unattainable,

s

too,

"

he wrote in 1947 as

Quoted in White, News on the Air, 204.

Quoted in White, News on the Air, 2 05. That CBS
would devote a program to airing its dirty linen is further
evidence of the network's stubborn commitment to its
policies, in this case, the promise to offer free time for
the discussion of controversial issues.
1°
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.

he recalled the controversy,

"but it has been the

cornerstone of Christianity for close to two thousand
years
- and who would discard it as a precept even if mankind is
so frail it can't live by it?"ii

Impartiality had also been a cornerstone of the

broadcasting industry's defense of its stewardship of the
In the aftermath of the Brown affair, Columbia

air.

restated its belief in radio's neutrality, white

distributed a new policy statement to his staff, reworking
Edward Klauber's 1939 memorandum to emphasize the ban on
editorializing. The network then proudly published the

complete text as a full -page advertisement in the New York
TimeB
"First off,

let it be emphasized that Columbia has no

editorial views except in regard to radio itself," White
began, mincing no words,

"By extension,

those men selected

by us to interpret or analyze the news must also refrain
from expression of editorial opinion or our non-editorial

policy becomes an empty shell."
The heart of Columbia's argument as presented by White

recapitulates familiar themes. Radio frequencies are a
11

White, NewB on the Air,

2 04.

"Why Neither CBS News Broadcasters nor CBS News
Sponsors 'Opinionate' the News." display advertisement, New
York Times, September 20, 1943, 40. Klauber had by this
time been forced out at CBS after an internal power
struggle with Paley and Paul Kesten. Klauber's role would
be filled by Dr. Frank Stanton, who would remain Paley'
chief administrator until he, too, was forced to retire in
1973
12

.
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finite public resource and CBS, as a steward of that
resource, must not create "a powerful and one sided

position on serious issues." The network must not, in other
words, create an information monopoly. By setting aside

time for balanced discussion of public controversies and

refusing to sell time to advocates, the network had proved
its commitment to freedom of speech. That good work would

be undone, White wrote,

"if a small group of men,

some

thirty or forty news analysts who have nationwide audiences

and have regular broadcasting periods in which to build
loyal listeners,

take advantage of their 'preferred

positions' and become pulpiteers."
To permit these men to preach their own views
would be to create for CBS news a super-editorial
page, instead of no editorial page at all. Then
freedom of the air, within the genuine spirit of
democracy, would be merely a hollow phrase. There
is no sense to the idea of erecting a barricade
that will protect public opinion from one-sided
assault and then drilling holes in that defense
whereby men in our own employ are permitted just
such assault
"CBS recognizes that 100 per cent achievement of these news

ideals is not possible," he added.

"The great importance of

these policies, we feel, lies in their resolute direction,
not in minor human deviation.

Commentators had long understood that their audiences

expected to hear not only the latest headlines, but their
points of view on what it all meant as well. They also

understood that absolute objectivity was an unattainable
goal. Was White,

as he claimed,
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simply a true believer in

the quest for impartiality despite human
weakness? Or did

Columbia and its news director have different goals
in
mind?
Clearly, White,

the old United Press man, wanted his

reporters to get it fast and get it right. He also

understood that "it" was meaningless unless his reporters

placed events in context. Did he not see, as so many of his
colleagues argued, that interpretation inevitably included
opinion? He was far too good a newsman and too aware of the

power of the medium to believe that random facts expanded
public knowledge. White, however, was more than a newsman.
He was part of the administrative structure of his network

and industry.
By 1943, Columbia had established itself not only as
the leader in broadcast journalism but as the leader of the

industry's efforts to define itself to the public and the
government. Whether the issue was drug advertising,

children's shows or public affairs programming, CBS had

been quick to declare its commitment to broadcasting in the
public interest. The network's public response to Brown's

commentaries should be seen as another part of its ongoing

campaign to protect itself.
The battle between the broadcasting industry and the

government had escalated following the FCC

'

s

announcement

of new network regulations in May of 1941. NBC and CBS had

sued to block the new rules, and the Justice Department had

responded by filing antitrust suits against the networks.
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In May of 1943,

the Supreme Court had upheld the FCC.

Speaking for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter

declared that the FCC had acted within the scope of its
powers as defined by the Communications Act, and the chain

broadcasting regulations represented "a proper exercise" of
governmental power.

The Supreme Court's affirmation of

the FCC's authority cleared the way for implementation of

the chain rules and, by declaring that the FCC had been

acting within the law, made it clear that future battles
over the basic shape of American broadcasting would be

decided in the pol it ical arena

Although domestic politics took a back seat to the war
effort following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the collapse
of the New Deal legislative coalition continued.

The 1942

elections saw more gains by Republicans and anti-New Deal

Southern Democrats in both the House and Senate. The nation
was veering to the right and retreat ing from the act iv ism
of the New Deal.

Representative Martin Dies of Texas

intensified his crusade to unearth "subversives" in

government and charged the FCC had become a hotbed of un-

American activities. Soon after the Supreme Court ruled on
the chain broadcasting case in 1943, a special House

committee chaired by Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia

also launched an investigation of the FCC^"*
1^

National Broadcast ingr Co., Inc. et aJ

States et al

.

319 US 190 at 227

(May 10,

.

v.

United

1943).

See Robert D. Leigh, "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats,"
Harper's Magazine, January 1945, 97-105, and Erik Barnouw,
14

.

.

The probes were more than attacks on the FCC
and

chairman James Lawrence Fly. They were part of a growing
Congressional reaction to the activist regulatory

philosophy of the Roosevelt administration. Although the
Cox investigation was discredited when it was revealed that
the congressman had accepted a $2,500 payment to intervene
in the case of an Albany,

Georgia radio station and Dies

failed to discover any card-carrying communists at FCC
headquarters, the FCC

'

s

most aggressive period of broadcast

regulation was coming to an end.^^ The agency would
continue to hector broadcasters with criticisms of

programming practices for years to come, but the basic
structure of commercial broadcasting would remain
unchal lenged

Herbert Hoover and those like him who had embraced

American individualism in the 1920s had been chastened by
the First World War and the Russian Revolution. They sought
to insure stabil ity and order in the ir world through

A History of Broadcasting- in the United States, vol.
Golden Web (New York: Oxford University Press,

1968),

2,

The

174-

81

FCC investigators had informed both the Justice
Department and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn that Cox's
actions appeared to be in violation of a federal law that
barred members of congress from accepting payments for
lobbying regulatory agencies. When neither Justice nor the
House took action and Cox intensified his attacks, newlyappointed FCC Commissioner Clifford Durr photocopied the
incriminating check and left a hundred copies on the press
table at FCC headquarters. Cox resigned as committee
chairman four days later. Barnouw, The Golden Web, 175-6,
1^

179

.
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rational liberal reform. After the Second
World War,
Americans who had endured more than a decade of
depression
and war only to confront a Soviet empire which
they saw as
a threat to freedom as great or greater than
Hitler's

Germany also sought to restore stability and order to
their
world. Something had to be done, as Thomas

told Dwight

D.

E.

Dewey bluntly

Eisenhower, to "save this country from going

to Hades in the handbasket of paternal ism- social ism-

dictatorship

.

"1^

For the leaders of corporate America,

including the

leaders of the broadcasting industry, the goal became the

creation of what historian Robert Griffith has termed "the
corporate commonwealth," This ideal of a "noncoercive,
self -discipl ined, and harmonious corporate society" closely

resembled the associat ionist ideal of the 1920s. Its
advocates hoped that "by limiting the New Deal state,
forging cooperative relations between business and
government, promoting social harmony and consensus at home,

and by maintaining a stable and Western-oriented

international order abroad,
of

1

"

they could assure the future

iberal capital ism and democracy. ^"^ In the corporate

commonwealth — "in which," historian Alan Brinkley
observed,

"commitment to mass consumption and full

Quoted in Robert Griffith, "Dwight D, Eisenhower
and the Corporate Commonwealth, " American Historical Review
9987 (February 1982)
1^

,

Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate
Commonwealth, " 100.

426

employment had superseded older concernc about
economic
power and control of production" - there was
no room for
the concerns over monopoly which had driven
criticism of
the radio networks and the broadcasting industry
in the

years immediately before the war.

18

The broadcasting industry flourished in the new

environment. The industry had since its beginnings

advocated cooperative control of the air, and broadcasters,
seeking to solidify their right to stewardship of the ether

through public affairs programming, had helped create the
ideology of consensus. The commitment of the networks to
mass consumption could not be questioned. They had been

created to bring the nation together into one vast,
attentive audience. Radio profits had soared during the war
years and continued to climb in the late 1940s. Television
soon proved the economic and cultural giant forecasters of
the 1930s had expected it to become.

As pillars of the culture of consensus, the leaders of
the broadcasting industry understandably endorsed

programming which reflected and ratified the existing
order.

Broadcasts which promoted "social harmony and

consensus" won favorable time slots and lucrative

advertising contracts. Programming which executives

considered negative or controversial was first marginalized
"The Antimonopoly Ideal and the
Liberal State: The Case of Thurman Arnold," Journal of
Anierican History 80 (September 1993), 579.
18

Alan Brinkley,
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and then eliminated. As always, when critics
accused them
of ignoring the public interest, network
executives

defended themselves by denying any motive other than

a

desire to provide the public with what the public demanded.

Success in the marketplace, they said, was the ultimate

evidence that the industry served the public.

Broadcast journalists were no more immune to the
culture of consensus than their employers. As the

profession matured and techniques evolved to keep pace with
changing technology, most agreed that the credo pronounced
by Frank Cobb, editor of Joseph Pulitzer's World at the

dawn of the radio age, was equally appropriate for
broadcasters.

"The first duty of a newspaper to public

opinion," Cobb had written,

"is to furnish the raw

materials for it and the tools for its formation.

"-^

The

idea that journalists should "furnish the raw materials" of

public opinion remained unchallenged. The major debate

within the prof ess ion was over which

"

tools " were most

appropriate. Cobb never doubted that newspapers must help

Students of the industry after the Second World War
should not ignore William L. Shirer, Strangfer Come Home
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), a roman a clef presenting,
the publisher announced, "the story of a veteran foreign
correspondent turned radio commentator who returns to his
native land and meets head-on the political pressures of
today," Shirer's Sunday evening news program was canceled
in 1947. The network insisted it was a business decision.
Shirer maintained his opinions were no longer acceptable in
Cold War America.

Quoted in "The White House and the Press," The New
Republic, February 24, 1973, 5.
20
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shape public opinion by expressing their own.
The "utter

partiality" which marked his editorials reflected the

certainty of his times. 21 By the end of the 19306, that

certainty seemed out of place in a society assaulted by
doubt and wary of propaganda. Leading journalists

increasingly came to adopt the cooler, measured tone of
Cobb's successor at the World, Walter Lippmann, which

acknowledged that the truth was not always so clear cut,
the enemies of democracy and freedom not always so obvious.

The transition, however, was not absolute. Journalists

continued to see themselves as molders of public opinion.
The factual style which appealed to the rationality of the

educated middle class of the progressive era and had become
the favored technique of broadcast journalists in the late

1930s was, as Elmer Davis admitted in 1939,

simply a more

efficient and persuasive means of communication.
That the objective style of broadcast journalism was,
in fact,

a style rather than an ideology can be seen by

examining the careers of its architects. White, the man
most responsible for the content of the news broadcasts

listeners heard on Columbia during the 193 0s and early
left CBS after the war. He resurfaced as executive

194 0s,

news editor at KFMB in San Diego where he started a new

21

Dial,

James Boylan,

1973),

The World and the 20

6.
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'b,

(New York:

.

career as, of all things, the station's
crusading

editorialist

.22

"We take very seriously our responsibility to
inform

the public through news programs," White told his

listeners,

"but we think that objective news reporting is

not enough - that interpretation is called for." He did
not, he said,

insist that his opinion was always correct

and pledged to allow the other side to be heard, but the
station,

issues

.

"from now on,

intends to speak its mind on public

"23

"White is a refreshing editorial radio breeze" for

staid San Diego, observed The Nation. He "speaks his mind
on local issues; wages editorial campaigns; and wins more

often than he loses.

"24

it seemed a radical change for a

man who had so long argued for absolute impartiality on the
The irony was not lost on White who, when he sent a

air.

copy of his first editorial to a former colleague at CBS,

asked him to "show the script to Ed the Murrow when you're
finished with it.

I

know he'll get a kick out of

it,

in

See Bliss, Now the News, 183-5, Sally Bedell Smith,
In All Hie Glory: The Life of William S. Paley (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1990), 291-2, and A.M. Sperber, Murrow:
Hie Life and Times (New York: Freundlich, 1986), 263-5.
22

"KFMB Editorial Page," June
text in Murrow Papers, reel 21, folder 287, frame

23

1951,
0016

Editorial broadcast,

.

William Sommers, "Around the U.S.A.: Whitecaps on
San Diego's Airwaves," The Nation, October 10, 1953, n.p.
24

[inside front cover]
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1,

view of the -no editorializing- slogan
follow for so long.

I

was forced to

"25

The times had changed, White implied, and "the
golden

rule" which had been appropriate for network radio
in the

past should not be imposed on broadcast journalists of
the
present. In 1943, when he defended Columbia's policies in
the wake of the Cecil Brown affair, he said eleven years
later,
ally,

"I

also thought that Soviet Russia was a valuable

that nuclear fission was impossible and that, after

the war... steaks would be plentiful and cheap.

"26

Davis, who publicly praised the Columbia's memorandum

on war coverage in 1939 and then used the factual style to

advance the cause of preparedness and intervention, also

admitted that the industry's fetish of impartiality was a
product of the times. When in 1947 legislation was
introduced in Congress to incorporate Columbia's policies
into the Communications Act, Davis, who joined ABC

following the war, fought the bill.

"In view of the

hysterical fear of 'propaganda' which prevailed in August
19 3 9

it was sound network policy"

to demand impartiality,

Davis wrote Murrow, by then a CBS vice-president.
"It would be unseemly for an employee of a competing

organization to offer any opinion as to how far CBS news
[June 1951]
white to "Ted" [Wells Church]
15, folder 287, frame 0015, Murrow Papers.
25

,

,

reel

Paul White, "Favorite 'Bleeding Head'," letter to
the editor, Newsweek, April 12, 1954, 14, 18.
26
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"

analysts live up to it at present," he demurred,

"but

I

venture to recall your attention to the fact that
when

I

worked there that policy, in its strict and literal
interpretation, was violated several times a day - not
least by one Edward
"I

R.

Murrow.

don't think that policy statement did any harm to

CBS," Davis continued,

"though it might have,

if any

attempt had been made to enforce it in literal stringency."

Both Davis and Murrow knew the network was more concerned

with the appearance of impartiality than the reality. As
long as journalists who understood that objectivity was a
style and strategy were deciding what went on the air,

Davis implied, such policies were likely harmless.

"But if

it should be embedded in the statutes of the United States
it could do a lot of harm,

"

he warned,

"especially if the

FCC's administration of the act were watched over.

.

.by

Congressional committees some of whose members would

certainly dislike what some of us say on the air
To both Davis and White,

purpose at a par t icular

t

"^"^
.

the CBS policy had served its

ime in the industry

'

s

and the

Davis to Murrow, June 29, 1947, reel 15, folder
169, frames 0301-2, Murrow Papers Davis also offered
Murrow his opinion on the source of the legislat ion While
Wallace White of Maine, "who, as you doubtless know, is an
excellent person," was the Senate sponsor, "it was of
course Burt Wheeler's work." Wheeler had been upset in the
1946 Montana Senate primary, a defeat which Broadcasting,
acknowledging Wheeler's influence on broadcasting,
suggested would "have a far-reaching effect upon radio
regulation, administration, and legislation." "Radio Will
Feel Effect of Wheeler Defeat," Broadcasting, July 22,
.

.

1946,

15,
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nation's history. Even Murrow by the early
1950s believed
his network should adopt "an open and overt
editorial

policy." When he made the suggestion to his
superiors
however, he wrote White,

"I

was kicked soundly in the

teeth. "28

The CBS hierarchy realized the truth that Davis had

acknowledged. While the FCC remained the administrator of
the nation's broadcasting laws,
in Congress.

the real power now rested

In the age of the Cold War,

the era of Red

Channele and blacklists, broadcasters grew increasingly
timid.

The industry with the coming of television was more

prosperous and influential than ever before, but it
remained bound by the agreement

it

had reached decades

before: The broadcasters' access to the air was contingent

upon their submission to the licensing authority of the
government. Unabashed opinion remained dangerous, not

simply because it might anger certain advertisers and some
of the audience,

but because it could offend those in

power. Journalists,

including Murrow, were fully aware of

the dynamics of the industry.

"A telephone call or letter

from the proper quarter in Washington,

fellow broadcast journalists,

Murrow reminded his

"is treated rather more

Murrow to White, July 11, 1951, reel 21, folder
frame 0 015, Murrow Paper g.

28

28 7,

"
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seriously than a communication from an irate
but not
politically potent viewer. "-^

Objectivity provided a protective shield for the
industry, but the factual style was also continued
to be

embraced by journalists who steadfastly claimed their
professional allegiance to shaping public opinion. In the
years before the Second World War, factual reporting

produced dynamic broadcast journalism which helped align
public opinion behind the democratic crusade against
fascism.

In the 1950g, when the mass audiences who once

listened to network radio turned to television, Murrow

continued to see those years as the model for broadcast
journalism.

"In order to progress," Murrow said,

only go backward. To the time when radio was,

.

"it need

.proud,

alert

and fast," when he and his colleagues had the time to
report and analyze and comment upon the news in depth and
detail and to crusade for what they considered progressive,

humane

1

iberal ism.

Murrow'
Now,

s

television series of the early 1950s, ^ee It

provides an example of the kind of

in mind

.

The program was factual

,

j

ournal ism he had

as were Murrow'

s

radio

broadcasts from London, but it is best remembered for the
powerful point of view it expressed. When Murrow turned his

Edward R. Murrow, speech to the Radio-Television
News Directors Association, Chicago, October 15, 1958^
quoted in Sperber, Murrow: Hic Life and Timee, 539.
29

^0

Quoted in Sperber, Murrow: Hid Life and Times, 539
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attention to the excesses of the ant i -Communist
crusade led
by Senator Joseph McCarthy, he remarked, a colleague
remembered, that "this show may turn out to be a small

footnote to history in the fight against the senator.

"^i

While Murrow's personal opinion was clear to his viewers,
just as his opinion had been clear to his listeners in the

years before America entered the war, he continued to
insist he was "just doing a job of reporting.

.We leaned

over backward to be fair."^^

Perhaps Murrow never saw the contradiction and never
lost his faith. Others were not as sure. A quarter -century

after he joined CBS, Eric Sevareid admitted he had lost the

certainty of youth, and "this has bothered me." He was, he
confessed,

"not so sure on any point,

for fairness

,

any more." The search

balance and accuracy, the rituals of

objectivity which both he and Murrow had followed, had led
him to agree increasingly with Lippmann that the work of

journalists should be considered no more than "notes made

by puzzled men.

Many of the pioneers of broadcast

"^^

Quoted in Fred W. Friendly, Due To Circumstances
4.
(New York: Vintage, 1967, 1968)
Beyond Our Control.
Murrow was referring to the October 20, 1953 See It Now
program devoted to the case of Milo Radulovich, an Air
Force Reserve officer who was discharged as a security risk
because his father and sister were allegedly leftist
radicals
.

32

,

.

Quoted in "Murrow Calls It 'Reporting'," Newsweek,

March 29, 1954, 51.
Eric Sevareid, This is Eric Sevareid (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 19 64)
3, 9.
3^

,
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journalism in the 1930s and 1940s who came to
dominate
television in the 1950s and 1960s found they had
lost,

Sevareid said,

"not only their thirst for but total faith

in human betterment," which had carried them
"straight from

those exhalting New Deal days, through the war and
through
this cold war.

In the 196 0s and beyond, as the consensus of the

corporate commonwealth was challenged from both the left

and right, so too was the notion of objective journalism.
Yet objectivity survived because the culture of broadcast

journalism which emerged in the years of the Second World
War was maintained at CBS and the other networks until well
into the 1970s. The reporters may have become, as Sevareid
said,

less sure of themselves, but their admissions of

fallibility did not appease their critics. While the
solutions to society's problems seemed less clear than they

had in the heady days immediately before and after the war,
their core values remained unshaken.

Before Peggy Noonan, a conservative Republican who was
the author of many of Ronald Reagan's most memorable

presidential speeches, went to Washington, she was a news
writer for CBS.
recalled,

"When

I

got down to the network," she

"the older people from whom you'd learn weren't

just anybody,

they were the Murrow Boys, the last of the

Sevareid,

This is Eric Sevareid,
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2.

.

.

gentlemen broadcaGters

.

"35

The legacy of Murrow perconified

by Sevareid, Charles Collingwood, Dallas Townsend
and their

contemporaries remained a powerful force. They respected
the written word and the communication of the voice.
Always

uncomfortable with the tyranny of camera images, they never
fully made the transition to television. Most importantly,
they represented the tradition of factual reporting as a

means of advancing what they saw as the humane intentions
of

1

iberal ism.
"CBS," Noonan recalled,

"drew people with a mission

thought of themselves as modern people trying to be

[who]

fair." They considered themselves neither liberal nor

conservative in the partisan sense — "to label was to
to admit one is unalive to the complexities" —

confine,

but decent and thoughtful

,

too thoughtful to settle for

simple answers to complex social problems. Within the

political definitions of the 1970s, however, their opinions

reflected those of the liberal establishment which had been
at the forefront of the postwar corporate commonweal th

Significantly, Noonan believed,

"they also thought their

views were utterly in line with those of the majority of

Americans

.

"^^

Peggy Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution A
Political Life in the Reagan Era (New York: Random House,
35

1990)

,

36

:

22

Noonan,

What I Saw at the Revolution, 24.
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ThiG wao the culture of CBS,
well into the 1980d.

the newc leader, until

It wao the culture in which Edward R.

Murrow, Elmer Davie and their colleagueo, all of
whom oaw

themoelveo ac decent, thoughtful men and women, had

flouriohed nearly half a century earlier. They, too,

believed their internationalist viewc and faith in the
efficacy of government programo to promote democracy were,
if not

in line with majority opinion,

opinion the majority would hold

if

attuned to the

it wao

informed. Ao Murrow'c boyo departed,

properly

the economic growth

which held the corporate concenouo became leoo certain and
the prooperity of the network and broadcact televioion in

general were undermined by new technology, the tradition

waned

Fairneoo

.

,

balance and impart ial i ty remained the

Dtated goalo of the network, but thooe goalc, if a growing
choruD of criticD wao to be believed, ceemed increaoingly
out of reach.

Juot ao a new form of journal iom began when radio wao

then re invented at the ctart ot the Second Worl d War

born,

and again when televio ion emerged, radical ly new forme of
See Ken Auletta, Three Bldnd Mice: How the Tl^
Networko LoBt Their Way (New York: Random Houoe, 1991),
Peter J. Boyer, Who Killed CBS?: The Ulidoing- of Aiuerica*o
Nuwber One Neuro Network (New York: Random Houoe, 1988),
Marvin Barrett, ed.. The Alfred J. DuPont -Columbia
Uhiveroity Surveys of Broadcact iJournaliani (New York:
Groooet k Dunlap, 1969-71; Crowell, 1972-80; Evereot,
For a particularly apt caoe otudy of CBS Newo in the
1982)
1980c, Dee Renata Adler, Reckleco Disregard: Weotworeland
V. CBS et al ; Sharon v. Time (New York: Alfred A. lOiopf
.

.

1986)

.
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disseminating information are being invented today.
The
next incarnation of electronic journalism remains

unknown,

but parallels may be drawn with first days of radio.

Corporations today seek to control the new media just as
they did seventy years ago. Inventors,

investors and

entrepreneurs bicker and bargain to gain advantage or form
alliances which will allow them to profit from the new
technology. Once again, both the emerging industry and

consumers anxious to take advantage of the wonders they
have been told to expect look to the government to regulate

competition but fear that any government strong enough to
bring order to the chaos is strong enough to dominate the

new media for its own ends. Government, both regulators and
elected representatives, also remains conflicted as it
seeks to balance order and freedom. Certainly as well, the

new technology will itself be turned in unexpected
directions, just as radio broadcasting so suddenly and

surprisingly emerged in the 1920s.

Communication will continue through whatever
electronic extensions are devised, and news of events and
issues of public concern will continue to have a place on
the information highway. Men and women will continue to try

to mediate those events, and they will be the new

journalists. Like their predecessors, they will have to

learn how to use the new technology and reconcile the new

technology with their notions of what a journalist does.

439

.

.

Despite its clear debt to the traditions of
print
journalism, radio with its immediacy and intimacy
was

immediately seen by the people as a truer source of
information. Listeners believed they could finally hear
for

themselves rather than rely on the corrupted institutions
of the press.

Journalists of the 1920s quickly discovered

this new perception. Gradually,

the audience came to

understand that radio and television did not, in fact,
present reality. Instead, the new medium like the old

mediated and distorted reality, presenting just one

contested version of the truth, and we found that was not
enough.

Proponents of today and tomorrow's media — video,
computers, whatever the future will bring — speak the

language of the early days of radio

.

The leaders of the

corporations which seek to control the new technology speak
of the public interest and the freedom of the marketplace.

Inf ormat ion and entertainment wil 1 be available in

abundance for all Americans

.

The information highway,

they

assure us, will lead society to a better place.

Their vision of the future is not, however, shared by
all.

This time,

the others insist,

the new media will not

be plundered for profit. This time, they predict,
See Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image or What Happened
to the American Dream (New York: Atheneum, 1961) for an
inf luent ial cr it ique of democracy in the age of mass media
Boorstin' s concept of the pseudo-event has thrived over the
^®

years
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technology will bring us a decentralized, democratic
media
which will allow both individuals and society to reach
their potential. To them, the information highway inspires
images of traffic cops enforcing authoritarian rules and

regulations and carefully located exits leading us to
commercial centers where we discover what the corporations
have prepared for us. Their image of choice is a boundless

cyberspace, where every traveler can voyage to his or her

own destination as he or she sees fit.
That our faith in technology remains so strong after
all these years is additional evidence of the stubborn

optimism which has for so long been part of the national
character.

It may also be seen,

more cynically, as proof of

our inability to learn from history. More importantly,
however,

the dream that we will all some day have access to

the information we need to determine the truth reflects our

collective faith that the truth does indeed exist, and it
can make us free.
We continue to seek the truth in different ways. The

new media now emerging are being shaped by the media which

now exist. Just as radio news was influenced by newspaper
canons, and radio traditions helped form television's

professional culture, the new media of tomorrow will
incorporate aspects of today's journalism. Just as

Americans in the past believed their new media would allow
them to discover for themselves the truth, the new media of

today and tomorrow will offer the illusion of reality

through unblinking cameras and digital networks
which allow
us to believe we are more than passive observers of
the

world around us. Just as Americans in the past sought
opinions from those who assured them they knew the truth,

Americans today seek explanations of an increasingly
disorienting society in which the traditional rules seem no
longer to apply. The new media like the old will be eager
to present these prophets, both true and false.

The journalists of the new media will no doubt try

their best to present an undistorted picture of the reality

they perceive. Like their predecessors, they will be both

lionized and damned. They will develop standards and

practices which allow them to understand what they are
doing and explain themselves to the rest of us. While

nothing is certain, they will most likely tell us they seek
to be fair and accurate and balanced. And they will tell us

they are doing the best they can.

442

o

o

.

o

o

.

.

.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS
Broadcaot Pioneero Library, Wachington, DC
Network, otation, biography and oral hiotory fileo
Oral Hiotory Collection of Coluinbia Univeroity, New York,
NY.

Jameo Lawrence Fly Project
Radio Pioneero Project

Manuccript Divioion, Library of Congreoc, Waohington, DC.
Raymond Clapper Paper
Elmer Davio Paper
Eric Sevareid Paper
Raymond Gram Swing Paper
Wallace H. White, Jr. Papero

Motion Pictvue, Broadcaoting and Recorded Sound Divicion,
Library of Congreoo Washington, DC
,

Edward JR. Murrow Papera 1927-1965. Sanford, North Carolina:
Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982. The
original collection ic held at the Edward Ginn
Library, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tiifto
Univeroity Medf ord, Maocachucet t o
,

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Rocenman, Samuel I., editor. The Public Papera and
Addreaoeo of Franklin P, Roooevelt. London: Macmillan,
1941
.

U.S.

Congreoo

Congfreocional Record.

.

1934 - 38

,

194

0

.

Biographical Directory of the United Stateo
Congreoo 1 774 -19 89 Waohington: Government Printing
Office, 1989
.

.

Houoe Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fioher ieo A Bill to Further Regulate Radio
Communication Hearingo on HR 13159, 65th Cong., 3rd
December 12-19, 1918.
oeoo
.

,

.

.

,

.

443

.

.

To Amend the Padio Act of 1912, Hearingc on
HR
11964, 67th Cong., let seso
January 2-3, 1923.
.

.

,

Senate.

Committee on Interstate Commerce. A Bill
to Provide for the Regulation of the Transmission
of
Intelligence by Wire or Wireless, Hearings on S 6,
7lGt Cong., 2nd sess., December 4, 1929 -Februarv 26
^
1930
.

A Bill to Provide for Regulation of Interstate
and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio. Hearings
on S. 2910, 73rd Cong., 2nd sees., March 9-15, 1934.
Confirmation of Members of the Federal
Communications Commission. 74th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 23 -February 2,1935,
•

Hearings. .on the Nomination of Thad H. Brown on
Reappoint men t as Federal Com,m.uni cations Com.mi ssi oner
76th Cong., 3rd sess., June 12-AuguGt 23, 1940.
•

.

.

U.S.

Federal Communications Commission. Annual Report,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935-43.
Reports, Washington: Government Printing Office,
1935-43
.

.

Official Report of Proceedings before the Federal
ComMmni cat ions Commission at Washington, DC in the
matter of Commiission *s Order No, 37, Investigation of
Chain or Network Broadcast ing Monopoly in the
Broadcast ing Industry and Related Matters, FCC docket
no 506 0, Record Group 173 Washington Nat ional
Records Center, National Archives and Records
Administrat ion, Suitland, Maryland
.

,

.

,

Offi cial Report of Proceedings Before the Federal
CommiUni cat ions Commission at Washington, DC, in the
Matter of the Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. and the
Yankee Network, Inc., FCC docket nos 5618 and 5640,
Record Group 173, Washington National Records Center,
National Archives and Records Administration,
Su i 1 1 and Mary 1 and
.

.

,

Report on Chain Broadcasting. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1941
.

444

.

.

_. StatieticB of the Communicatione Induetry in the
United States. Washington: Government Printing
Office
1941.

An Economic Study of Standard Broadcaet inq
Washington: Federal Communications Commission, 1947.
Mimeographed
.

,

U.S.

Federal Radio Commission. Annual Report. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1927-33.

U.S.

Federal Trade Commission. Report of the Federal Trade
CommiBGion on the Radio Industry in Response to House
Resolution 549, Sixty-Seventh Congress, Fourth
Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924.

Report for Fiscal Year 1924. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1924.
•

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES
Barnouw, Erik, editor. Radio Drama in Action: 25 Plays of
Changing- World. New York: Rinehart, 1945.
Bernays, Edward

Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of
Public Relations Counsel. New York: Simon and
Schuster,

L.

a

a

1965.

Bickford, Leland. News While It Is News. Boston: G.C.
Manthorne, 19 35.
Cantril, Hadley. "The Role of the Radio Commentator."
Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939), 654-662.

and Gordon W. Allport The Psychology of
Radio. New York: Harper & Brothers, 19 35: reprint,
Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer, 1986.
.

with Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog. The Invasion
from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1940

.

Carter, Boake
1936

.

"Johnny

Q.

Public" Speaks! New York: Dodge,

.

Daniel, editor. The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels 1913 -1921 Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1963.

Cronon,

E.

.

445

Davis, Elmer.

" Broadcact ing
the Outbreak of War." Harpers
Magazine 179 (November 1939)
579-88
,

.

"Journey to England, 194 1: Footnotes for a Future
Gibbon." Harper E Magazine 183 (August 1941), 225-36.

_.

'

Friendly, Fred W. Due to CircumetanceB Beyond Our
Control.... New York: Vintage, 1967, 1968.
Hoover, Herbert. American IndividualiBm
York: Doubleday, 1922.

.

Garden City, New

The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and
the Presidency 1920 -1933 New York: Macmillan, 1952.
•

.

Howe,

Quincy. The News and How to Understand It. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 194 0; reprint, Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1968.
"The Rise and Fall of the Radio Commentator." The
Saturday Review, October 26, 1957, 13.
•

Josephson, Matthew. Infidel in the Temple: A Memoir of the
Nineteen -Thirties New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.
.

Kaltenborn, H.V. "On The Air," Century Magazine 112
(October 1926), 666-76.
J

.

House,

Broadcast the Crisis. New York: Random
1938.

Fifty Fabulous Years. New York: G.P. Putnam's

.

Sons,

1950.

KDKA Radio. It Started Hear: The History of KDKA and Radio
Broadcasting. Pittsburgh: Westinghouse Broadcasting,
1970

.

Kendrick, Alexander. Prime Time: The Life of Edward
Murrow. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969.

R.

Kilpatrick, Carroll, editor. Roosevelt and Daniels. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952.
Lasswell, Harold D. "The Propagandist Bids for Power."
American Scholar 8 (Summer 1939), 350-7.

Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: Free Press,
1922

.

The Phantom Public. New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1925.

446

.

Lynd,

Robert

and Helen Merrell Lynd Middleto^^'n A Study
An:erican Culture. New York: Harcourt, Brace
and
World, 1929, 1956.

m

S.

.

:

MacLeish, Archibald, v;illiam S. Paley and Edward P..
Murrow.
Honor of a Man and an Ideal
Three Talks on
Freedom. New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 194
.

.

.

McCarthy, Joe, editor. Fred Al len s Let tere Garden City,
New York: Doubleday; New York: Pocket Books
'

.

1966.

McNamee, Graham with Robert Gordon Anderson.
Air. Nev7 York: Harper & Brothers, 1926.
Moley, Raymond. The First New Deal
Brace & World, 1966.

.

You're on the

New York: Harcourt,

Murrow, Edward R. This is London. Edited by Elmer Davis.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 194 1.
Noonan,

Peggy. What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political
Life in the Reagan Era. New York: Random House, 199 0.

William S. Ae It Happened: A Memoir. Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1979.

Paley,

Perkins,

Frances.

194 6;

Harper

The Roosevelt I Knew. New York: Viking,
& Rov7,

19 64.

Saerchinger, Cesar. "Radio Censorship and Neutrality."
Foreign Affairs 18 (January 1940), 337-49.
Sevareid, Eric. Not So Wild A Dream. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1946, 1969.

This is Eric Sevareid.

.

1964

Nev; York:

McGraw-Hill,

.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevel t and Hopkins: An Intimate
History. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.
Shirer, William L. "Berlin Speaking." The Atlantic Monthly
166 (September 1940), 308-17.

Berlin Diary. New York: Alfred

.

1943

A.

Knopf,

.

20th Century Journey: A Memoir of a Life and
Times, volume II, The Nightmare Years, 1930 -1940
Boston: Little, Brown, 1984.
.

Sioussat, Helen. Mikes Don't Bite. New York: L.B. Fischer,
1943
.

447

Swing, Raymond Gram. Forerunnere of Anwrican
Fascism
York: Julian Messner, 1935.

Thomas, Lowell.

Good Even! ngf, Everybody. New York

1976.

Walker, Stanley.

•

New

Avon

'

City Editor. New York: Blue Ribbon

1934.

Wheeler, Burton K. with Paul F. Healy. Yankee From the
West. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962.
White, Llewellyn.

The American Radio: A Report on the
Broadcasting Industry from the Commission on Freedom
of the Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1947.

White,

Paul W. News on the Air. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1947.

FREQUENTLY CITED NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Boston Globe,

1924,

Boston Herald,
Broadcasting,

1936,

1924,

1939,

1938-9,

Literary Digest

1940.

1940.

1946,

1924,

,

1938,

1987.
1938.

1932,

NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Reports, 1938-9.
The Nation,

1924,

1926,

1935,

1953.

The New Republic,

1924,

1927,

1930,

1935,

1939,

1942,

1973.

New York Herald Tribune, 1938-9.
New York Times,
1943,

1922,

1924,

1926,

1928-30,

1933,

1935-9,

1952.

New York World, 1924, 1926.
Newsweek,
Time,

1933,

1938-41,

Variety,

19 32,

1935,

1938-9,

1954.

1944.

1935,

19 38-41.

BOOKS, ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS

Aitken, Hugh G.J. Syntony and Spark: The Origins of Radio.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976.

448

_

The Continuous Wave: Technology and American
Padio, 1900-1932. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1985.

Allen, Frederick Lewis. Only Yesterday: An Informal
History
of the 1920'B. New York: Harper
Row, 1931, 1964.

Althusser, Louis. Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays. New
York: Monthly Review, 1971.
Arato, Andrew and Eike Gebhardt, editors. The Essential
Frankfurt School Reader. New York: Continuum, 1982.

Archer, Gleason. History of Radio to 1926. New York:
American Historical Society, 1938; reprint, Arno
1971.

Auletta, Ken. Three Blind Mice: How the TV Networks Lost
Their Way. New York: Random House, 1991.
Barnouw, Erik. A History of Broadcasting in the United
States. Vol. 1, A Tower in Babel. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966.

A History of Broadcast ing in the United
States. Vol. 2, The Golden Web. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968.
.

Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American
Television New York: Oxford University Press,
.

.

The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern Potentate
York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
.

.

19 77.

New

Baudino, Joseph E. and John M. Kitross, "Broadcasting's
Oldest Stations: An Examination of Four Claimants,"
Journal of Broadcasting 21 (Winter 1911), 61-83.

Baughman, James L. The Republic of Mass Culture:
Journalism, Filmmaking, and Broadcasting in America
since 1941. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1992
.

Benjamin, Louise M. "Birth of a Network's 'Conscience': The
NBC Advisory Council, 1927." Journalism Quarterly 66
(Autumn 1989), 587-90.
"The Precedent that Almost Was: A 1926 Court
Effort to Regulate Radio, " Journalism Quarterly 67
(Autumn 1990), 578-85.
.

Bergreen, Laurence. Look Now, Pay Later: The Rise of
Network Broadcasting. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1980.
449

Berkman, Dave.

"Pol it ice and Radio in the 1924 Campaign •
JournaliBw Quarterly 64 Summer -Autumn 1987), 422-8.
(

Bilby, Kenneth. The General: Da^rid Sarnoff and
the Rice of
the Conwmnicationc Industry. New York: Harper
Row,

Bleyer, Willard GroGvenor. Main Currents in the History
of
American Journalism. BoGton: Houghton Mifflin
'

1927.

Blicc,

Edward,

Journalism

Jr.
.

Now the News: A History of Broadcast

New York: Columbia Univercity PreGG, 1991.

Boylan, JameG, editor. The World and the 20 's: The Golden
Years of New York's Legendary Newspaper. New York
Dial, 1973.
•

Brand,

Stewart. The Media Lab: Inventing the Future at MIT.
New York: Penguin, 1988.

Breed, Warren.

"Social Control in the Newcroom.
Forces 35 (1955), 326-35.

"

Social

Brinkley, Alan. Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father
Coughlin, and the Great Depression New York; Alfred
.

A.

lOiopf,

19 82.

"The Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal State:
The Cace of Thurman Arnold. " Journal of American
History BO (September 1993), 557-79.
.

Brown, Jamec
'Harney
Journal
(Summer

"Struggle Againct Commercialism: The 1934
Lobby" for Nonprofit Frequency Allocationc "
of Broadcast ing & Electronic Media 33
1989), 273-91.

A.

Jamec MacGregor Roosex'elt: The Lion and the Fox.
New York: Harcourt, Brace, 19 56.

Burnc,

.

Communication as Culture. Bocton: Unwin
Carey, JameG
Hyman, 1989.
.

Charnley, Mitchell V. News by Radio. New York: Macmillan,
1948
.

Francis, Jr. Sound and Fury: An Informal History of
Broadcasting. New York: Harper, 1942.

Chace,

Chester, Edward W. Radio, Television and American Politics
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969.

"Kaltenborn Edits the News." The American
Mercury €5 (October 1947), 391-402.

Chester,

Giraud.

450

.

.

"The Press-Radio War: 1933-1935." Public
Opinion Quarterly 13 (Summer 1949)
_.

Clark, David G. "Radio in Presidential Campaigns:
The Early
Years (1924-1932)," Journal of Broadcasting e (Summer
229-37.
1962)
,

Kaltenborn and His Sponsors:
Controversial Broadcasting and the Sponsor's Role."
Journal of Broadcasting 12 (Fall 1968), 309-21.
"H.V.

•

Cole,

Jeffrey Ian. "Born to the New Art CBS Correspondents
and the Emergence of Broadcast News, 1930-1941," Ph.
D. diss.. University of California, Los Angeles, 1985.
:

Culbert, David Holbrook. News for Everyman: Radio and
Foreign Affairs in Thirties America. Westport,
Connecticut Greenwood, 1976
:

"US Censorship of Radio News in the 1930s: the
case of Boake Carter." Historical Journal of Film,
Radio and Television 2 (19 82), 173-6.
.

Czitrom, Daniel J. Media and the American Mind: From, Morse
to McLuhan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press
1982
,

.

Davis, Elmer. History of the New York Times 1851-1521. New
York: New York Times, 1921.

Denison, Merrill
"Editorial Policies of Broadcasting
Companies." Public Opinion Quarterly 1 (January 1937),
64-82
.

.

Donahue, Hugh Carter. The Battle to Control Broadcast News:
Who Owns the First Amendment ? Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989

.

Douglas, Susan J. Inx'-enting American Broadcasting 18591922, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
Dryer, Sherman H. Radio in Wartime, New York: Greenberg,
1942
.

Edgerton, Gary. "The Murrow Legend as Metaphor: The
Creation, Appropriation, and Usefulness of Edward R.
Murrow's Life Story." Journal of American Culture 15
75-91.
(Spring 1992)
,

Epstein, Edward Jay. News From Nowhere: Television and the
News. New York: Random House, 19 73.
Fang,

Irving E. Those Radio Commentators ! Ames, Iowa: Iowa
State University Press, 1977)

FroGt,

S.E.,

Education 'c Own Stationo. ChicaqoUnivercity of Chicago Precc, 1937; reprint,
New York^-i-j^.
Arno, 1971.

GaiiG,

Jr.

Herbert J. Deciding^ What b Nswb A Study of
Evening Newc NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and CBS
Tiwe
York: Pantheon, 1979.
'

:

,

New

Gateo, Gary Paul. Air Time: The Inside Story of
CBS News
New York: Harper, 19 78.

Godfrey, Donald G. "CBS World Newc Roundup: Setting
the
Scene for the Next Half Century." American Journalism
7 (Summer 1990), 164-72.

and Val E. Limburg. "The Rogue Elephant of Radio
LegiGlation: Senator William E. Borah." ^Journalism
Quarterly 61 (Spring 1990), 214-24.
Green, Thomac S.,

Cameron and the Ford Hour."
Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939), 669-75.

Halberctam, David.
Knopf,

Hall,

Hall,

Jr.

"Mi-.

The Powers That Be. New York: Alfred A.

1975.

Edward T. Beyond Culture. Garden City, New York:
Anchor /Doubleday, 1976, 1981.
Stuart.

"Signification, Reprecentat ion. Ideology:
AlthuGcer and the PoGt - Structural iGt Debate." Critical
Studies in Mass Communications 2 (June 1985), 91-114.

Hawley, ElliG. The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly.
Princeton, New Jercey: Princeton UniverGity PreGG,
1966,

1969.

"Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and
the Vicion of the 'AGGOciative State,' 1921-1928."
Journal of American History 61 (June 1974), 116-40.
.

Hayc, Arthur Garfield. "Civic DiccuGGion Over the Air."
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 213 (January 1941), 37-46.
Head, Sydney. Broadcasting in America Second edition.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956, 1972.
.

"Politics and Radio Regulation."
Harvard Business Review 13 (January 1935), 167-78.

Herring,

E.

Pendleton.

HickG, John D. Republican Ascendancy- 1921 -1933

Harper

&.

Row,

196

0.

452

.

New York:

Horowitz

Robert Br itt. The Irony of Regulatory
Refornu New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Hosley, David H. As Good as Any: Foreign
Correspondence
American Radio, 1930-1940. Westport, Connecticut- on
Greenwood, 1984.

Huthmacher, J. Joseph and Warren I. Susman, editors
Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1973.
Ireland, Alleyne. Joseph Pulitzer: Reminiscences of
a
Secretary. New York: Mitchell Kennerly, 1914.
Jansky, CM., Jr. "The Contribution of Herbert Hoover
to
Broadcasting." Journal of Broadcasting 1 (Summer
1957), 241-9.
Jansky, Maurice M. "An Analysis of the Standard of Public
Interest, Convenience and Necessity as Defined by the
Federal Communications Commission. " The George
Washington Law Review e (November 1937), 21-45.
Jones, Alfred Haworth. "The Making of an Interventionist on
the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News 1939-1941." Pacific
Historical Review 42 (February 1973), 74-93.
Kahn, Frank J.
editor. Documents of American Broadcasting.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts 1973.
,

,

Kammen, Michael. Mystic Chords of Memory: The
Transformation of Tradition in American Culture. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.

Katzman, Murray. "News Broadcasting in the United States:
1920-1941," Ph. D. diss.. New York University, 1968.
The Triumph of Conservatism: A
Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916.
Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963; Chicago:
Quandrangle, 1967.

Kolko, Gabriel.

Krasnow, Erwin G. and Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics of
Broadcast Regulation. New York: St. Martin's, 1973.
Landry, Robert.

"Edward

December 1938,
Lash,

R.

Murrow.

"

7.

Joseph P. Eleanor and Franklin
Norton, 1971.

Dealers and Dreamers

.

1988

Scribner's Magazine,

.

.

453

.

New York: W.W.

New York: Doubleday,

.

Leab,

Daniel J. "Document: US Radio Fights Political
Control: 1936." Hietorical Journal of Film,
Radio and
Television 9 (1989), 189-96.

Leuchtenburg, William E. The Perils of Prosperity: 19141931. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
Liebling, A.J.
1938,

"Boake Carter." Scribner s Magazine

Auqust
^

'

.

7.

The Press. Second edition. New York:
Ballentine, 1975

Mackey, David. "The Development of the National Association
of Broadcasters." Journal of Broadcasting- 1 (1956)
305-325
Maier, Charles S. In Search of Stability: Explorations in
Historical Political Economy. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.

Marchand, Roland. Advertising the American Dream. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985.
Marcus, Sheldon. Father Coughlin: The Tumultuous Life of
the Priest of the Little Flower. Boston: Little,
Brown, 19 73.

McChesney, Robert W "Franklin Roosevelt, His
Administration, and the Communications Act of 1934."
American Journalism 5 (1988), 204-29.
McGerr, Michael E. The Decline of Popular Politics The
American North, 1865 -1928 New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986.
:

.

McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of
Man. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
Metz,

Robert.
Playboy,

CBS: Reflections in a Bloodshot Ey^e
1975.

.

Chicago:

Morgan, Ted. FDR: A Biography. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1985.
Mott,

Frank Luther. American Journalism
New York: Macmillan, 1950.

.

Revised edition.

Nord, David Paul. "Teleology and News: The Religious Roots
of American Journalism, 1630-1730." Journal of
American History 77 (June 1990), 9-38.

454

.

.

.

.

;

"Intellectual History, Social Hictory, Cultural
HiGtory. .and Our History." JournaliGni
Quarterlv 67
(Winter 1990)
645-8

^.

.

,

Novick,

Peter. The Noble Dream The "Objectivity
Queation"
and the An^erican Hietorical Profec-cion. Nev; York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
:

Persico, Joseph E. Edward R. Murrow: An American Original
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988.
Purcell, Edward A. The CriGiD of Democratic Theory:
Scientific NatLiraliem & the Problem of Value.
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973.
Radosh, Ronald and Murray N. Rothbard, editors. A NewHi Dtory of the Leviathan Essayc on the Rie-e of the
American Corporate State. New York: E.P. Button, 1972
:

Rivers, William

L.

The Opinion Makers.

Boston:

Beacon,

1965.

Rosen,

Philip T. The Modern Stentors: Radio BroadcaDtere
and the Federal Government 1920 1934 Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 198 0.
-

.

Rowland, Willard D., Jr. The Pol it ice of TV Violence.
Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1983.

Schiller, Dan. Objectivity ^12 ci tliE^ Nowo Tlis Public
Rise of Conwiercial Journal i Din Phi lade Iphia
Univercity of PennGylvania Precc 1981
.'

,

siid

ths

:

^

SchleGinger, Arthur M.
Jr
The Age of Roosevelt: The
Coining of the New Deal. Bocton: Houghton Mifflin,
,

1959

,

.

The Pol i tics of Upheaval.
The Age of Roosevelt
Bog ton: Houghton Mifflin, 196 0.
.

:

Schmeckbier, Laurence F. The Federal Radio Commission
History, Acti vi ties and Organ i zat ion Wachington
Brookingc Inctitution, 1932

:

Its

.

SchudGon, Michael. Discovering the News: A Social History
of American Newspapers, New York: Bacic Bookc, 1978.

Robert R. "The OriginG of Radio Network NewG
Commentary." iJournal of Broadcasting 9 (Spring 1965),
113-22

Smith,

Smith,
S.

Sally Bedell. In All His Glory: The Life of William
Paley. New York: Simon and SchuGter, 199 0.

455

Smulyan, Susan Renee
"'And Now a Word from our
Sponsors.
Commercialization of American Broadcast
Radio, 1920-1934," Ph. D. diss., Yale University
.

.

.

'

:

19 8 5.

Sperber, A.M. Murrow: Hie Life and
Freundlich, 1986.

TinieB.

New York-

Stephens, Mitchell. A History of News: From the Drum to
the
Satellite New York: Penguin, 1988, 1989.
.

Steel, Ronald. Walter Lippmann and the American Century.
Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1980.

Sterling, Christopher H. and John M. Kitross. Stay Tuned: A
Conciee History of American Broadcasting. Second
edition. Belmont, California: Wentworth, 1978, 1990.
Stott, William. Documentary Expression and Thirties
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973
1986
.

Summers, Harrison B., editor. A Thirty-Year History of
Prog-rams Carried on National Radio Networks in the
United States 1926 -1956 Columbus: Ohio State
University, 1958; reprint, New York: Arno, 1971.
.

Susman, Warren

Culture As History: The Transformation of
American Society in the Twentieth Century. New York:
Pantheon, 1973, 1984.
I.

Tenney, Craig D. "The 1943 Debate on Opinionated Broadcast
News." Journalism History 7 (Spring 1980), 11-15.

Tuchman, Gaye
"Objectivity as Strategic Ritual." American
Journal of Sociology 11 (January 1972), 660-79.
.

Making News: A Study in the Construction of
Reality. New York: Free Press, 1978.
.

Weinstein, James. The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State:
1900 -1918 Boston: Beacon, 1968.
.

Wiebe, Robert H. The Search for Order: 1877-1920
Hill and Wang, 1967.

Williams, Raymond. Culture & Society: 1780 -1950
Columbia University Press, 1958, 1983.

.

.

New York:
New York:

Wilson, Joan Hoff Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive.
Boston: Little, Brown, 1975.
.

456

